‘One Chance in a Thousand’: The Mission of Sumner Welles to Europe (Feb-Mar 1940), Rooseveltian Foreign Policy and Anglo-American Relations Nov 1937- May 1940 by J. Simon, Rofe
  Swansea University E-Theses                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
   
‘One Chance in a Thousand’: The Mission of Sumner Welles to
Europe (Feb-Mar 1940), Rooseveltian Foreign Policy and Anglo-
American Relations Nov 1937- May 1940
   
Rofe, J. Simon
   
 
 
 
 How to cite:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
Rofe, J. Simon (2005)  ‘One Chance in a Thousand’: The Mission of Sumner Welles to Europe (Feb-Mar 1940),
Rooseveltian Foreign Policy and Anglo-American Relations Nov 1937- May 1940. Doctoral thesis, Swansea
University.
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa51060
 
 
 
 Use policy:                                     
_________________________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence: copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder. Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from
the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
Please link to the metadata record in the Swansea University repository, Cronfa (link given in the citation reference
above.)
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/
 ‘One Chance in a Thousand’: The 
Mission of Sumner Welles to Europe 
(Feb-Mar 1940), Rooseveltian Foreign 
Policy and Anglo-American Relations 
Nov 1937- May 1940.
By
J. Simon Rofe
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements o f the 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Wales
September 2004
LIBRARY
H
Siliya
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, LS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS HAVE BEEN 
EXCLUDED UNDER INSTRUCTION FROM THE
UNIVERSITY
APPENDICES 
1, 2, 3 AND 4
Pages 252-255
Abstract
This work presents a new analysis of the mission undertaken by Under Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles to Europe on behalf of President Roosevelt in February-March 
1940.
The thesis asks what Roosevelt’s motivations were for undertaking the 
mission, and what he sought to achieve from it. It considers that the Welles mission 
was an expression of a number of influences upon Roosevelt that date back to late 
1937. These influences, or themes, which provide the broader context and run 
throughout the period up to the beginning of 1940, are as follows: firstly the integral 
role in Rooseveltian foreign policy played by Sumner Welles is considered. The 
second theme concerns the position of his superior, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, 
who was to counsel caution in the face of an increasingly serious world situation, 
whilst a third influence was the limits upon American foreign policymaking itself. 
The last element to be considered throughout this study is the influence of Anglo- 
American relations upon the Welles mission. Further, these themes are not distinct 
and are interrelated. And all were subject to the influence of an American public who 
were deeply interested in, but firmly against intervention in, European affairs.
This work concludes that the mission that resulted developed multiple 
objectives after being bom out of a discussion between Roosevelt and Welles on the 
role the United States could play in achieving a sound and lasting peace in Europe. 
Such a hope, reckoned by Roosevelt to be ‘one chance in a thousand’, was at the 
outset incongruous with the situation in Europe. Roosevelt and Welles knew this to be 
the case, and pressed ahead because of the existence of other objectives that such a 
mission could achieve. These were the gathering of first-hand information by Welles 
from the four capitals of Europe, the perpetuation of Italian neutrality and the 
prolonging of the ‘phony war’. These objectives were never clarified by the 
protagonists and evolved in themselves through the deployment of the mission, thus 
requiring the analysis provided here.
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INTRODUCTION
The Mission of Sumner Welles to Europe (Feb-Mar 1940), Rooseveltian Foreign 
Policy and an Anglo-American Relations Nov 1937- May 1940
In February and March of 1940 Sumner Welles, the United States Under Secretary of 
State, visited four European capitals to speak with the leaderships of Italy, Germany, 
France and Great Britain. Fie was undertaking a mission that he and President 
Franklin Roosevelt had conceived at the turn of the year. It took place during the 
period known as the "phony war', when a lack of actual fighting on the Western Front 
seemed to provide a moment to take stock before the expected onslaught in the spring.
The motivations behind, and the objectives of, the mission are the focus of this 
thesis. Neither Welles nor Roosevelt ever provided a complete account of their 
thinking about it. Purity of intention with regard to the Welles mission, as with much 
else in Roosevelt's foreign policy, is illusory. The Welles mission can only be 
understood if the longer-term themes that made it possible are considered alongside 
the objectives that both Roosevelt and Welles sought from it. For the first time this 
work will provide a comprehensive explanation that draws upon archival research and 
published primary sources, alongside the relevant secondary literature, by looking at 
the thoughts and actions of the key protagonists.
The mission has previously been characterised as a failed attempt at an 
outright American 'peace' move during the hiatus of the "phony war'. The most 
extensive account to date was produced in the Journal o f American History (1971- 
1972) by Stanley Hilton. He suggests that the mission was designed to ‘bolster the 
position of the Allies by weakening the Rome-Berlin Axis and delaying the spring 
clash'.1 He dismisses too readily the exploration of peace that Roosevelt and Welles 
considered at the mission's genesis. While providing a worthy analysis it does not go 
far enough in considering the broader motivations or the other objectives involved in 
Roosevelt's decision, and thus does not create sufficient context for a thorough 
examination of Welles' mission.
In addressing this gap in the current literature, this thesis can claim its 
originality in three areas. The first is in the nature of the approach this work takes to 
understanding the Welles mission. The central question of this thesis is: what was
1 Stanley Hilton, ‘The Welles Mission to Europe, February-March 1940: Illusion or Reality?" The 
Journal o f American History’ 1971-72 58. p.94.
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Roosevelt's motivation for undertaking the mission, and what did he seek to achieve 
from it? Posing this question in such a way allows for a broader understanding to be 
reached which moves beyond the mission merely being considered as Roosevelt 
naively probing for peace. Further, this approach provides a suitable analytical 
framework for the investigation of the ‘themes' that this thesis considers imperative to 
understanding the context behind the Welles mission in the period 1937-1940.
The second aspect that makes this work distinct is its conclusions. In 
answering the central question, this work points to four objectives of the Welles 
mission, namely: the exploration of a peace compatible with American terms; the 
gathering of first-hand information through a personal envoy; prolonging the 'phony 
war' and perpetuating Italian neutrality. Never before has the intricate interplay of 
these objectives been considered. The key point is that these objectives evolved 
during the course of the mission, and their interrelationship is therefore vital.
The third aspect of originality that this work is able to claim is its use of 
primary resources, and especially of the Sumner Welles papers. The Welles papers 
were unavailable until deposited at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library in 
September 1995, before being opened for public consultation in the spring of 1996. 
This source was inaccessible to previous scholars looking at the Welles mission. A 
key advance uncovered during the research for this work relates to providing dates 
and references for two documents, one of which was un-accounted for and the other 
undated, referred to in The Foreign Relations o f the United States section on the 
Welles mission. Copies of these documents, which refer to the British Ambassador's 
initial communication to London of Roosevelt’s intention to embark on the Welles 
mission, were found in The Papers of Viscount Halifax as Foreign Secretary (FO 800 
324, PRO).
This introduction outlines the nuanced arguments this thesis will employ 
concerning the contextual themes and objectives of Welles’ mission. In examining the 
Welles mission it is vital to consider the necessary, but not absolute, distinction 
between motives and objectives: ‘the first a push of the past, the second the pull of the 
future'.2 This analysis allows the events under consideration to be examined in a 
comprehensive fashion by looking firstly at the background to the way in which
■ John Lukács, Five Days in London May 1940 (London, 1999), pp.40-41.
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American foreign policy was made between 1937 and 1940 and then at the mission 
itself
Naturally, this thesis makes considerable use of the secondary literature, but it 
has been predominantly based on archival research in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. Primary research was conducted in the newly accessible Sumner 
Welles papers and the Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, both of which can be found at 
the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. New York. The State Department 
records in the National Archives, Washington DC were consulted, as were the papers 
of Cordell Hull and the unpublished draft biography of Joseph Kennedy, both at the 
Library of Congress. In the United Kingdom, the papers of the key protagonists were 
consulted at institutions such as the Special Collections Department at Birmingham 
University, the Borthwick Institute (York), the Churchill Archives Centre 
(Cambridge), and, for the crucial Foreign Office documents, the Public Record 
Office, now The National Archives (London).
In order to indicate clearly the differences between this and other works there 
follows a brief review of some of the key texts related to the Welles mission. Robert 
Dallek's seminal text sees the mission in conventional terms as one of ‘three peace 
moves' that Roosevelt undertook in early 1940.1 *3 He places the mission alongside the 
visit of General Motors’ supremo James Mooney to Berlin, and the conversations 
with other neutrals that Cordell Hull announced on the same day that Roosevelt 
announced the Welles mission. Dallek accepts that Roosevelt was prepared to 
consider peace with Germany, but only if it would be more than a temporary truce, 
i.e. on terms compatible with American values. William Langer and Everett Gleason 
go further in suggesting that ‘a major objective of the mission [was] to explore peace 
possibilities even with the Nazi government'.4 Although heavily influenced by their 
State Department past, and considered a semi-official text by some, this volume again 
fails to account for the additional objectives as well as for the motivations that were 
involved in Roosevelt's decision making in January 1940. Arnold Offner sees
1 Key sources on Rooseveltian foreign policy that offer more than a standard interpretation of the
Welles mission as a "peace move’ include: Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American
Foreign Policy 1932-45, (Oxford and New York, 1995); William Langer and Everett Gleason, The 
Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, (New York, 1952). The standard view of the Welles mission as solely 
a misplaced peace mission can be found, where considered at all, in many of the texts covering 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy, such as Basil Rauch, Roosevelt -  From Munich to Pearl Harbor: A Study in 
the Creation o f a Foreign Policy (New York, 1950).
4 Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, pp.361-362.
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Rooseveltian foreign policy as essentially that of appeasement in avoiding 
confrontation, and the Welles mission as epitomising the ‘full ambiguity of American 
appeasement in the 1930s'. where Roosevelt sought to preserve United States interests 
with little concern for the consequences for Europe/ The extent of any ambiguity 
requires the contextual understanding provided here.5 6
The Anglo-American relationship during the period before the Second World 
War has received extensive scholarly attention, but there has been little consideration 
of the Welles mission in it. 7 The exception is the work of David Reynolds, who 
considers the Welles mission to be a genuine attempt at a 'compromise peace". This 
he sees as a result of an antipathy for Britain, within the State Department which 
included Welles, and so represented an ‘underlying Wilsonianism' within the
5 Arnold Offner ‘Appeasement Revisited: The United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 1933-40' 
The Journal o f American History1 64 (September, 1977) pp.373-393.
h Naturally, Roosevelt has become the subject of many scholarly works. For primary sources on 
Roosevelt's foreign policy see: Elliott Roosevelt (ed.), FDR: His Persona! Letters Vols. 1-2, (New 
York, 1947-1948); Samuel Rosenman (ed.). Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Vols. 1-15, (New York, 1938-1950); Samuel Rosenman (ed.), Complete Presidential Press 
Conferences o f Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933-19-15 Vols. 1-25, (New York, 1972); Edgar B. Nixon 
(ed.), Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 1933-1937 Vols. 1-3, (Cambridge, Mass., 1969); 
Donald B. Schewe (ed.), Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign Affairs, 1937-1939 Vols. 1-14, (New 
York, 1979-1983). The major texts on Roosevelt’s foreign policy and the Second World War, including 
those of a revisionist ilk, that have been most useful in the production of this work include: Charles A. 
Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 : A Study in Appearances and Realities 
(New Haven, 1948); Basil Rauch, Roosevelt -  From Munich to Pearl Harbour: A Study in the 
Creation o f a Foreign Policy (New York, 1950); William Langer and Everett Gleason, The Undeclared 
War (New York, 1953); James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, 1956); 
Robert A. Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York, 1965); 
James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: Soldier o f Freedom (New York, 1970); Warren F. Kimball, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World Crisis, 1937-1945 (London, 1973); Frederick Marks III, Wind 
over Sand: The Diplomacy o f Franklin Roosevelt (Athens, GA„ 1988); Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler
-  Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New Jersey, 1991); Kenneth S. Davis, FDR into the 
Storm -  A History (New York, 1993).
7 Sources on the Anglo-American relationship of the period include: Ritchie Ovendale, 'Appeasement' 
and the English Speaking World - Britain, the United States, the Dominions and the Policy o f 
Appeasement, (Cardiff, 1975); C.A. Macdonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-39, 
(London, 1981); William Rock, Chamberlain and Roosevelt: British Foreign Policy and the United 
States, 1937-1940, (Columbus, 1988); David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's 
America and the Origins o f the Second World War, (Chicago, 2001). Sources dealing with the Anglo- 
American relationship over a longer time frame include David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An 
Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and American in the Twentieth Century, (London, 
1988); Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1995); David 
Ryan, The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century, (London, 2003). Reading dealing 
specifically with the wartime ‘special relationship’ should begin with Kimball’s coverage of the 
Roosevelt -  Churchill communications; Warren Kimball, Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete 
Correspondence Vols. 1-3, (New York, 1988); others of note include Joseph P Lash, Roosevelt and 
Churchill 1939-1941 -  The Partnership That Saved The West, (London, 1977); John Charmley 
Churchill's Grand Alliance: the Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940-1957 (London, 1995); 
Warren Kimball, Forged in War; Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second World War, (New York, 1997). 
For sources on the interwar relationship see Brian McKercher, Anglo-American Relations in the 1920 s
-  the Struggle for Supremacy, (London, 1991); and Brian McKercher, Transition o f Power -  Britain’s 
Loss o f Global Pre-eminence to the United States, 1930-1945, (Cambridge, 1999).
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Roosevelt Administration.8 More recently, in a general volume on Roosevelt and the 
American entry to the Second World War. Reynolds identifies the goals of delaying 
the spring offensives and Roosevelt's desire to gain information from a single source 
in the Welles mission. While making an important contribution, Reynolds however 
underplays the exploration of a possible peace settlement and fails wholeheartedly to 
address the consideration of Italian neutrality in Roosevelt's thinking.9
One aspect of the Anglo-American relationship that requires concise 
explanation here is the notion of a ‘special relationship' between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. Given its contemporary resonance, the idea that Washington 
and London have exceptional and distinctive relations owes much to the experience of 
the Second World War. However, the period under consideration here, up to the 
spring of 1940. is notable for a lack of understanding of a number of key national 
interests. Indeed the impact of the Welles mission on Anglo-American relations 
exhibits both concord and misunderstanding in almost equal measure. Before any 
contemporary assessment could be made, the events of the summer were so 
overwhelming, as to relegate the Welles mission from view.
The central focus of this work in terms of an individual is Benjamin Sumner 
Welles.10 His papers were deposited for public consultation only in 1995, at the 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library. His son, Benjamin Welles, drew heavily on these 
papers in producing a revealing biography of Sumner that included a candid 
acknowledgement of the indiscretions that cost Sumner his job. Nevertheless, 
Benjamin Welles sees his father as Roosevelt's key foreign policy adviser and the 
mission of 1940 as primarily a fact-finding one. Irwin F. Gellman, in his examination 
of the triumvirate relationship between Roosevelt, Hull and Welles, sees the mission
8 David Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive 
Cooperation (Chapel Hill, 1982) p.72. This work establishes the idea of'competitive cooperation' as 
its central thesis. Whereas this analysis aptly describes the economic underpinning of the Anglo- 
American relationship throughout the period 1937-1941, the diplomacy of the Welles mission in early 
1940 requires a modified critique. The personal and diplomatic nature of the mission had little to do 
with competition’ or 'cooperation'; instead the two parties were not in a position to compete or 
cooperate on the issues that surrounded the Welles mission. This again necessitates the contextual 
analysis provided here.
v David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor Roosevelt's America and the Origins o f the Second 
World War (Chicago, 2001).
10 Sources on Sumner Welles in addition to his papers include most notably Benjamin Welles, Sumner 
Welles -  FDR 's Global Strategist (London, 1997). Two other recent texts were also helpful to this 
study: Irwin F. Gellman, Secret Affairs: Franklin Roosevelt, Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, 
(London, 1995); and Christopher O’Sullivan Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a 
New World Order, 1937-1943 (Columbia University Press, 2003). There is also Frank Warren Graffs 
The Strategy o f Involvement: A diplomatic Biography o f Sumner Welles -  1933-43 (New York, 1988).
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as putting forward a ‘naïve peace plan'. The mission can certainly be considered naïve 
but this needs to be qualified by the other, more realistic, objectives that the mission 
developed. Christopher O'Sullivan's recent work focuses on Welles' importance in 
American post-war planning where he sees the Under Secretary as crucial in 
promoting a post-war order that would best serve the interests of the United States. In 
considering the Welles mission, O'Sullivan points to it as an attempt to promote an 
American brokered peace, and also as an effort to delay the spring offensives. Again 
these are important factors but the gamut of motivations and objectives are not 
discussed in this source.
Importantly, there is of course Sumner Welles' own book. Time for 
Decision." This text reveals the report that Welles presented to Roosevelt, but little 
else of Welles' opinions bar his appraisal of the mission as ‘a forlorn hope'. This lack 
of critical analysis is hardly surprising, given that the work was published in 1944, 
just a year after Welles had resigned, and with the war continuing. Although it is a 
crucial text, the report given to Roosevelt by Welles was later published in The 
Foreign Relations o f the United States and so this adds relatively little to any 
explanation of events surrounding the Welles mission. Tellingly, though, in preparing 
Time for Decision Welles sent a copy to Roosevelt for his perusal. The President then 
passed it on for review to Samuel Rosenman, his long-time aide and speechwriter. 
Having read the chapter dealing with the mission, Rosenman wrote that ‘you 
(Roosevelt) asked him to go because it seemed to you that if the war continued and 
the all-out offensive by Germany on the Western powers should take place, the results 
would be unpredictable and there would be greater danger that the United States be 
involved.' While clearly written with knowledge of how the war had unfolded up to 
that point, Rosenman's view in June 1944 was: ‘Personally, I see no objection to it.' 
Given the ongoing problems confronting Roosevelt at the time and the fact that the 
account replicated so closely the one Roosevelt had seen in the spring of 1940, it is 
perhaps hardly surprising that there is no more than a typical ‘FDR OK' in the file. 
This is despite the multiple factors that were involved in his decision-making behind 
the mission at the turn of 1940, which will be examined herein.* 12
" Sumner Welles, Time for Decision (New York, 1944).
12 Memorandum by Rosenman for Roosevelt, 9 June 1944. Samuel Rosenman Papers (Hereafter SRP), 
Box 4 The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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In short, this work differs in scope, analysis and sources from the existing 
literature, as it seeks to place the Welles mission within a framework that explains the 
complex processes at work in the Roosevelt Administration and Roosevelt's desire to 
do something at the beginning of 1940. This all led to the multiple objectives of the 
mission in February and March.
It is only by working through the analysis presented that one can arrive at a 
comprehensive understanding of the Welles mission. This thesis finds that the longer- 
term motivations for the mission have precedents in the foreign policy making 
practice of the Roosevelt Administration. Four themes will be explored in this 
analysis of the Welles mission. In essence they are the critical role played by Sumner 
Welles, the caution expressed by Cordell Hull, the limitations upon United States 
foreign policy from American public opinion resulting in policy privately 
acknowledged as likely to be ineffectual and consideration of Anglo-American 
relations. These themes will be explored in the first two chapters and in doing so they 
provide the contextual framework to the subsequent examination of the Welles 
mission. They require some elucidation here, especially in relation to the ubiquitous 
reach of American public opinion.
The views of the American people were a continual concern for Roosevelt in 
his policy making. The impact that the American people exerted on Rooseveltian 
foreign policy was remarkable in the way that it came to influence the events in this 
study. But it is important to acknowledge that it was the perception of a potential 
influence as much as a direct impact that conditioned Administration thinking. The 
pressure was neither constant nor explicit and reflected two interwoven trends within 
American opinion. A first element was a deep interest among the American people in 
events overseas, with sympathy for those facing the Dictators but an equally strong 
disgust with the policies of the Axis powers. A second facet of American opinion was 
that it would not countenance the possibility of overseas commitments that might lead 
to political, and possibly military, entanglements. Thus, far from being what is 
commonly referred to as 'isolationist', implying a completely closed-off view of the 
world, American opinion can be more accurately termed ‘non-entangling', in 
indicating its awareness of the challenges posed by world affairs but its belief that it 
could remain aloof from them. This was epitomised in the neutrality legislation of the 
mid-1930s that sought to eradicate United States involvement in any war zone. The 
importance of clarifying this here is that both trends in American opinion conditioned
7
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the scope of Rooseveltian foreign policy between October 1937 and January 1940.13 It 
is also important to recognise that the policy moves considered by the Administration, 
were formulated in light of these trends. This resulted in policies that were 
acknowledged by those that were making them, to stand only the smallest chance of 
influencing the direct recipients in the stated manner. Given the subsequent events of 
the war, it is easy to say with hindsight that such policy options were destined to fail 
and antagonise. Instead, the policy options that were developed, the Welles mission 
included, should be considered as attempts to influence events within the constraints 
imposed by American public opinion and in doing so illustrate to American opinion 
the dangers posed to United States national interests.
The first chapter introduces the four themes as the Roosevelt Administration 
considered a plan for a conference of the world's diplomats, to be convened in 
Washington on Armistice Day 1937. The proposal was orchestrated and prepared by 
Welles and reveals how important he had already become to Roosevelt's foreign 
policy making by 1937. Welles drew up substantial plans and, although the proposal 
was mothballed in early November 1937, it was resurrected early in 1938. Throughout 
this five-month period and beyond, Hull's input into the process must be understood 
in terms of the triumvirate relationship between himself, Roosevelt and Welles. Hull's 
concerns about the conference proposal contributed to its postponement in 1937 and 
then, when the plan was being reconsidering in January 1938, an insistence that the 
Chamberlain government be sounded out. The Secretary of State was concerned that 
making any move would unsettle both American public opinion and the democracies, 
whilst antagonising further the Axis powers. These anxieties are vital to this thesis, as 
Hull had them consistently throughout the period in question and are therefore evident 
in early 1940 when the Welles mission was first being considered. The third element 
to be considered in relation to Welles' plan is how such a policy was prepared in the
11 Non-entanglement had a considerable heritage in the United States, stretching back to the Founding 
Fathers. Among those committed to divorcing the United States from crises overseas were a number of 
leading Senators, who through the process of seniority occupied important congressional positions. 
Men such as William Borah, Gerald Nye and Hiram Johnson were often supporters of Roosevelt 
domestically but ‘had the ability to arouse intense emotions in the country over alleged foreign 
exploitation of the United States’. Dallek, FDR and American Foreign Policy, p.70. Furthermore, 
isolationists could count amongst their number Father Charles Coughlin, a Detroit radio preacher, and 
the anti-Roosevelt William Randolph Hearst, the press magnate. It is significant that these two men 
were able to appeal to the heartland of ‘isolationism’ in the mid-west through the written press and 
radio. The literature on Isolationist influence can be found in the following works: Wayne S. Cole, 
Roosevelt and the Isolationists 1932-1945 (Lincoln NE, 1983): Robert A. Divine, The Illusion o f 
Neutrality (Chicago, 1962); R. Powaski, Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism and 
Europe, 1901-1950 (New York, 1991).
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face of the constraints imposed by the views of the American people. This manifested 
itself in policy that was considered in the full knowledge that its impact was likely to 
be minimal, while having the appearance to the American people of having made an 
effort to address the situation. Without any thought of resorting to the use of force, 
moves such as the conference plan reveal how Rooseveltian policy was framed with 
the views of the American people in mind. The first chapter goes on to explore the 
state of Anglo-American relations at the beginning of 1938. It was then that Roosevelt 
and Welles contemplated redeploying the plan, and approached the Chamberlain 
government. Chamberlain was against the proposal from the outset, as he feared it 
would interfere with his own plans to deal with Hitler and Mussolini: the policy of 
appeasement. The distinct lack of enthusiasm for the proposal in London left Anglo- 
American relations in a poor state and created a legacy that could be felt throughout 
the period under investigation.
The latter part of Chapter One explores the evidence for these themes in the 
events of 1938 and 1939. These events include those central to the outbreak of war, 
such as the Munich crisis (September 1938), and also events in the Anglo-American 
relationship, such as the conclusion of a Trade Agreement (November 1938). Of 
particular note is how Roosevelt's foreign policy was made on the basis of Tong 
odds'. In other words, the Roosevelt Administration, given the constraints upon it, 
was conducting foreign policy at the margins of what was possible in the full 
knowledge that it was unlikely to succeed in its stated aims. This notion was summed 
up by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle, in late August 1939. He wrote of 
messages sent to Europe by the United States calling for restraint:
‘...these messages will have about the same effect as a Valentine sent to 
somebody's mother-in-law out of season; and they have all the quality of 
naïveté which is the prerogative alone of the United States. Nevertheless, 
they ought to be sent. The one certain thing in this business is that no one 
will be blamed for making any attempt, however desperate, at preserving
14 Memorandum by Adolf A. Berle, 22 August 1939. The Papers of Adolf A. Berle (Hereafter ABP), 
Box 210 The Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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This expressive quote is used to establish at the outset of this work how far 
those involved in producing foreign policy in the United States at this time, were 
realistic as to what they could achieve in terms of influencing events in Europe. This 
attitude is fundamental to understanding the longer-term motivations for Roosevelt's 
thinking at the beginning of 1940, which would result in the Welles mission.
A final point of note here is that, faced with this pressure, Roosevelt was ready 
to employ two strategies to fulfil his foreign policy. The first was the use of personal 
diplomacy, and the second was circumvention of American public opinion, i.e. policy 
that had ulterior motives to those publicly stated. These elements are interrelated, as 
the former was often used to fulfil the latter. In the instances examined here, of the 
visit of Captain Royal E. Ingersoll to London in January 1938 and the royal visit of 
June 1939. Roosevelt hoped to further wider policy goals rather than just discuss 
naval plans or entertain the Royal couple. The Welles mission was another example of 
Roosevelt's propensity to use individuals to fulfil key tasks and illustrates that 
personal diplomacy was a notable part of the way the President conducted foreign 
policy. That Welles, a trusted colleague, had already operated under personal 
direction from Roosevelt in Latin America by the time tensions in Europe reached 
crisis levels meant he was on hand for the President. This is one of the key trends that 
this chapter establishes in providing a full comprehension of the Welles mission.
The second chapter of this analysis maintains these themes, but is augmented 
by consideration of the changed circumstances brought by the war. As the war began, 
the United States adopted the policy of neutrality prescribed by the legislation of the 
same name. This sought to remove American interests from any theatre of war, but 
once Germany and the Soviet Union had divided up Poland in the late summer of 
1939, the lack of actual fighting led many in the United States to ask how real the war 
was. Senator William Borah of Idaho, coined the phrase ‘the phony war’ to describe 
the lack of warlike activity, a phrase which has subsequently been generally applied to 
the period from the declaration of war in September 1939 through to the German 
drive westward in April 1940. Nevertheless, the onset of war did raise the issue of 
neutral rights during war, which the American State Department was very keen to 
protect. This increased tension with Great Britain to the point at which the British 
Ambassador, Lord Lothian, referred to a minor crisis in Anglo-American relations at 
the end of January 1940.
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Crucially, this chapter charts how the ‘phony war' period also served to put 
the issues of 'peace' and American mediation on the agenda of the Roosevelt 
Administration. These areas were discussed in the State Department during the last 
months of 1939. and both were a product of. and contributed to, a notion that 
Roosevelt should consider doing something to address the situation in Europe. This in 
turn was heightened by the universally accepted belief that the hiatus of the ‘phony 
war' would come to an end in the spring of 1940. Many in the United States feared 
that would mean a return to the horrors of the trenches of the Great War, or the 
prospect, promulgated by some such as Charles Lindbergh, of indiscriminate aerial 
bombardment of civilians. These prospects, for a generation who had hoped never 
again to see total war, imposed a further degree of pressure on those in the 
Administration to address the situation in Europe. Allied to an acknowledgement that 
their influence in Europe was marginal, and desirous of exhausting every possible 
policy option, the Roosevelt Administration was left to ask what real harm any 
American move during the ‘phony war' could do.
Yet on their own, the broader motivations and the pressure of time in the 
phony war may not have propelled Roosevelt to decide on a diplomatic mission to 
Europe without the possibility that it could achieve something to further United States 
interests. In assessing the objectives of the Welles mission it is imperative to accept 
that they existed alongside the motivations, and these were often intertwined. The 
story of how the objectives for the Welles mission emerged from the motivations 
prior to Welles' departure is told in Chapter Three, and is epitomised most clearly in 
the drafting of the mission statement that Roosevelt made public on 9 February. 
Roosevelt's original objective for a mission to Europe in early 1940 was a long shot: 
exploring the possibilities for peace in Europe on terms compatible with American 
interests. This purpose was almost immediately broadened by other potential 
objectives during January and early February 1940. Although their interplay turned 
out to be crucial, the full range of considerations have never before been analysed 
together. Ultimately the entire span of objectives, in addition to exploring possibilities 
of peace, came to be the following:
• to gather first-hand information from the Axis capitals;
• to perform the same task in the Allied capitals with a secondary aim of 
allowing Welles to assess Allied allegiance to their war aims;
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• to prolong the hiatus in full-scale conflict of the 'phony war';
• to perpetuate Italian neutrality.
These aims did not maintain a consistent balance or priority throughout the 
course of the mission, but they did evolve alongside each other, and this evolution is 
central to the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapters (four, five and six). At 
the outset Roosevelt's initial aim was influenced firstly by Hull, who largely repeated 
the concerns he had presented with regard to the Armistice Day plan of 1937. and 
then by the British through Lothian. These views, expressed at the very end of 
January and beginning of February 1940, did have a material effect on the mission in 
one important sense, as the public announcement of the mission made no use of the 
word 'peace’.
Nevertheless, when Welles was in Europe he did follow a line of questioning 
that enquired about possible peace terms. In Italy, his first stop, this may have been 
for the purposes of genuinely exploring peace terms, but by the time he had finished 
listening to the Nazis in Germany, all chances of a settlement compatible with United 
States interests had disappeared. However, Welles continued to pose the question of a 
settlement in Paris. London and back in Rome. This was with a view to using the 
possibility of achieving a resolution as a way of furthering the mission's other 
objectives. In seeking to clarify peace terms in his conversations, Welles was at 
various points trying to gather information, to ascertain the aims and conviction of the 
Allies, to prolong the 'phony war’ and to maintain Italian neutrality. The exploration 
o f peace terms thus formed something of an umbrella under which at assorted times 
the other objectives sheltered. This is important in illustrating how the goal of 
pursuing peace terms was entwined at various points throughout a spectrum of 
objectives.
The gathering of first-hand information certainly came under this umbrella. 
While Roosevelt denied to journalists at the 9 February press conference that he 
needed a ‘new reporter' in Europe, he did hope that Welles would be able to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the situation in Europe in January 1940. Roosevelt would 
thus be able to learn from a single source the state of affairs on the ground and have it 
communicated to him directly, as Welles had done previously in orchestrating the 
'Good Neighbor’ policy in Latin America. Roosevelt’s desire to see one man fulfil the
12
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task across Europe further reveals his disposition towards utilising personal 
diplomacy.
The interconnectedness of means and ends in the mission's objectives is 
illustrated by Welles' quest for information in the Allied capitals on the precise nature 
of their war aims and their commitment to prosecuting them. Welles was seeking 
confirmation from the Allies that they were fighting for the cause of liberty and 
democracy and not for what could be seen as ‘Old World' interests of territorial 
acquisition. This would serve a dual purpose, of providing the Administration with 
information it could use to illustrate to the American people the differences between 
the aims of the Allies and of the Axis, and also of allowing Welles to pass information 
to Roosevelt on the personalities of those involved in the conflict. Welles would use 
discussion in the Allied capitals of a possible settlement not for that as an end in itself, 
but because it drew out succinct statements of what the belligerents were fighting for. 
Had the mission been solely, or indeed overwhelmingly, dedicated to the pursuit of 
peace, and had it not had other objectives, then Welles would have followed up the 
semi-positive response he received from Daladier in Paris to the discussion of a 
settlement of the conflict, or the heavily qualified comments of a similar vein made by 
Chamberlain in their final meeting in London. That he did not do this indicates, not 
only that he considered the possibility of a resolution to the war to be impossible after 
his time in Berlin, but also, the existence of these other objectives.
The last two objectives developed most clearly after Welles' initial 
conversations in Rome. Prolonging the “phony war' and perpetuating Italian neutrality 
were both considered with a view to limiting the scale of any conflict that the spring 
was expected to bring. Their antecedents, and Welles’ involvement, can be seen early 
in 1940, as Italy -  a neutral nation -  was not in the original itinerary for the mission. 
As Roosevelt decided in mid-to-late January that Welles would be the one 
undertaking the mission, the Under Secretary sought to include Italy in order to 
mitigate domestic criticism that the mission was concerned solely with the warring 
nations. In doing this Welles also broadened the scope for the mission to make a 
positive contribution: something that would be evident once Welles was in Europe. 
Once there, he sought privately to use comments made by Mussolini in their first 
conversation, that peace might be possible on Axis terms, to encourage the Italian 
leader to think he might have a role to play and therefore to distance himself from 
Hitler. Although success was highly unlikely, here again Welles was using a line of
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discussion with regard to a possible settlement to further the mission's other goals; in 
this case that of perpetuating Italian neutrality. However, Mussolini was himself 
trying to assess the extent to which the United States was prepared to contemplate 
peace with Italy and Germany, especially once Welles had returned to Rome in 
March. Mussolini had his answer on 16 March, after a telephone conversation 
between Welles and Roosevelt which the Italians bugged. The two Americans 
declined the opportunity for Mussolini to take up with Hitler notions of American 
involvement. Indeed. Welles' tactic may have precipitated the tightening of the Axis, 
as at the hastily arranged Brenner Pass meeting (18 March) Mussolini agreed to enter 
the war. Once Welles had listened to the Nazi position in Berlin, he sought to 
propagate the view that Roosevelt might act after his return to Washington and so 
prolong the ‘phony war'. While the Nazis were clearly aware that this would not 
mean a commitment of American forces, a further diplomatic move might just have 
complicated preparations for the assault westward. This was undoubtedly an outside 
chance, but reflected the margins in which Welles was operating. He was not to know 
that, the day before he arrived in Berlin, Hitler had given a Führer directive to prepare 
for the attack on Scandinavia (Operation Weserübung, 8-9 April 1940).
Welles' conduct on his mission to Europe reveals that he was attempting to 
further a number of objectives at the limit of what was possible. This was typical of 
Rooseveltian foreign policy, as exhibited in other moves of the late 1930s examined 
here. The intricate interplay of motivations and objectives, both before and during the 
mission, necessitate a broad contextual understanding of Rooseveltian foreign policy 
and Anglo-American relations, provided for the first time by this work.
After spending almost three weeks in Europe, including many hours of 
discussion, Welles returned to Washington with a report for the President. Roosevelt 
later announced that there was ‘scant immediate' prospect of peace in Europe. Two 
weeks after that Hitler's forces attacked and overwhelmed Denmark and Norway, 
before the German war machine turned west and drove into the Low Countries, just as 
Winston Churchill replaced Neville Chamberlain as Prime Minister on 10 May 1940. 
Given these tumultuous changes to the political landscape of Europe the mission of 
Sumner Welles had barely any chance of fulfilling its original goal or any of the other 
objectives. Yet this would hardly have surprised Roosevelt, or indeed Welles. In 
broaching the subject of the Welles mission with Lothian, in early February, 
Roosevelt offered odds o f ‘one chance in a thousand', that the mission would produce
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anything that could resolve the conflict in Europe. Yet the Roosevelt Administration 
had become accustomed to working in the margins of diplomacy, developing policies 
that were extremely unlikely to succeed outright but. critically, might be able to 
advance other objectives. The experiences of this between the end of 1937 and the 
beginning of 1940 provide crucial contextual background to the Welles mission and 
provide the opening to this thesis.
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CHAPTER ONE
Rooseveltian Foreign Policy-making and Anglo-American relations in 
1938 and 1939 - Relationships in the Making
'If we get out of this business without a war it will be principally due to 
Sumner. He is the only one who apparently keeps his head working aside 
from his emotions.'1
This description of Sumner Welles came from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf 
Berle in the immediate aftermath of Roosevelt's Quarantine address in October 1937 
(the implications of which will be discussed presently). Yet it could have been applied 
at a number of key points, up to and including the Welles mission, during the 
subsequent twenty-eight months as the Under Secretary made a crucial contribution to 
Roosevelt's foreign policy. The chances of outright success in many of the policies 
considered were minimal, but this was not an impediment to enacting policy within 
the Roosevelt Administration.
It is pertinent to begin analysis of the Welles mission of 1940 by looking at the 
period between October 1937 and February 1938. This is a crucial one for 
Rooseveltian foreign policy, as the President sought to give direction to his foreign 
policy once firmly secure in a second term. It is also a vitally important time in 
providing contextual background to the motivations and objectives of the Welles 
mission. This chapter will present key themes illustrative of the links between the 
Welles mission and Rooseveltian foreign policy between the end of 1937 and the 
outbreak of war. The themes that are relevant are fourfold: firstly, the role played by 
Welles in formulating Rooseveltian foreign policy; secondly, and flowing from this, 
the position of Hull and his relationship with both Roosevelt and Welles, thirdly, how 
United States foreign policy was limited in its options and how this meant policy was 
being conducted in full recognition that it was unlikely to be able to influence the 
major powers -  on the basis of ‘long odds’; and, fourthly, the ongoing status of 
relations between London and Washington. Furthermore, and pervading the motifs 
mentioned above, was American public opinion. Rather than exerting a consistent and 
outright direct pressure on the themes and events of 1938-1939, United States public
1 Memorandum by Berle, 13 October 1937, ABP Box 210.
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opinion was omnipresent in creating an inhibiting atmosphere in which American 
foreign policy was made. Nonetheless, the themes are evident during the five-month 
period between October 1937 and February 1938 in the consideration Roosevelt gave 
to a plan for a major diplomatic conference. This plan was formulated by Welles and 
considered on two occasions (November 1937 and January 1938). The study of this 
proposed conference will form the opening to this chapter, and through its 
examination the themes will be explored. They are then considered in relation to the 
vital events of 1938 and 1939 before the outbreak of war. To a greater or lesser extent, 
as foreign policy was framed, these themes were visible at the time of the Munich 
crisis, in the negotiations over an Anglo-American trade agreement, in the ‘appeals' 
the Roosevelt Administration put together in April and August 1939 and in 
Roosevelt's efforts throughout the period to circumvent the influence of those who 
wanted to see the United States remain non-entangled. Of course these events retain 
their own unique place in the history of the run up to the outbreak of war, but by 
examining them in the light of these themes, this thesis is able to provide further 
contextual understanding of Roosevelt's decision making in January 1940 with regard 
to the Welles mission.
The influence of Sumner Welles
The first theme to be considered in understanding the importance of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s proposal for a diplomatic conference is the role played by Benjamin 
Sumner Welles. The relationship between Welles and Roosevelt was time and again 
at the nexus of foreign policy-making and so, to fully comprehend the part Welles 
played, some key elements of their background are required.
Sumner Welles was a vital influence upon Roosevelt’s foreign policy during 
his tenure as United States Under Secretary of State.2 This should be of little surprise, 
given that. Roosevelt made sure Welles was promoted to the position of Under 
Secretary on 20 May 1937. In doing so Roosevelt was calling upon a man who had 
followed in his own educational footsteps to Groton and Harvard and who had over 
twenty years of experience in the Foreign Service. Indeed, when Welles had applied
2 Welles would eventually resign from his position as Under Secretary of State to prevent salacious 
rumours regarding his private life from being published. The rumours of homosexuality, propositioning 
and drunkenness were in part true and were propagated by Welles’ opponents. Welles position became 
politically untenable, and despite their close friendship Roosevelt accepted Welles’ resignation on 30 
September 1943.
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to join the State Department in 1915 he had called upon the then Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, one Franklin Roosevelt, for a reference. Roosevelt said of his younger 
compatriot that he would be 'most glad to see him successful in entering the 
Diplomatic Corps. He has travelled extensively, speaks several languages ... and 
should give a very good account of himself.3 Although Welles was ten years 
Roosevelt's junior, the two men had shared a common upbringing typical of the east- 
coast establishment families into which Franklin and Sumner were born. Alongside 
matching educational paths, this background instilled a common set of values, which 
manifested itself in a shared view of the place of the United States in the world. It 
would be especially evident in their attitude to those nations south of the Rio Grande 
in the 1930s.
After an initial posting to Japan, Welles devoted his career to Latin American 
affairs. Indeed by 1920, aged just 28, he had become Chief of Division for Latin 
American Affairs. Although the 1920s saw him twice resign, he was an authority on 
Latin American affairs when he and Roosevelt met to discuss foreign policy in 1928.4 
That summer, in preparation for the New York gubernatorial race, and to help 
articulate the foreign policy of Democratic presidential candidate A1 Smith, Roosevelt 
published an article in Foreign Affairs. The article focused largely on addressing 
European criticism of American behaviour in ‘retreating from responsibility’ in the 
aftermath of the First World War, but did contain a section on Latin America. Welles 
supplied this.5 When Roosevelt was successful in the New York race, Welles, often 
through the internationally-minded Norman Davis, supplied him with further 
information on foreign affairs. This dialogue increased in importance after Roosevelt 
had become the Democratic presidential candidate in the summer of 1932. Welles 
campaigned for his friend in his home state of Maryland and was delighted when 
victory was secured in the November election.
Even before the inauguration had taken place, Roosevelt had given Welles a 
key task: outlining the scope of inter-American relations. Welles’ response was to lay 
the foundation for what would become the ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, and to outline 
principles which guided United States foreign policy more broadly. These principles
' Letter from Roosevelt to Welles, 15 March 1915, Roosevelt Group 10 Box 81 File Patronage-General 
1913-1920. Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
4 During one period when he was out of the service he turned to scholarship. This resulted in a two- 
volume history of the Dominican Republic, entitled Naboth’s Vineyard {New York, 1928).
5 Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View’. Foreign Affairs, Vol. VI, 1928. pp. 
573-586.
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of mutual respect for international conduct would be evident in the proposed 
diplomatic conference in 1937, and elsewhere in Rooseveltian foreign policy up to the 
Welles mission itself. In 1933 Welles stressed that the United States should make 
relations with Latin America a 'keystone' of its foreign policy. To secure American 
interests Welles wanted to bring to an end the era of the United States despatching the 
marines, and to replace it with a policy based on mutual responsibility for hemispheric 
issues. Yet this would be a difficult task for Welles and one that called upon the full 
range of his diplomatic skills. Through first his appointment as Ambassador to Cuba 
in 1933, and then in mediating in the Chaco War between Paraguay and Bolivia in 
1935 as Assistant Secretary of State, Welles’s ideas gained acceptance in Latin 
America. In both instances and throughout the time Welles spent in Latin America, 
the manner in which he operated with Roosevelt set important precedents. These 
would be evident at the time of the Welles mission. As his son, Benjamin Welles, 
writes, Sumner left for Havana ‘with Roosevelt’s authorisation to communicate with 
him directly by cable or telephone'.6 This direct line of communication would become 
standard practice for the pair when Welles was overseas. Importantly, this also meant 
that Welles' direct superior, Hull, was bypassed in the chain of command. The 
problems this posed within the State Department, particularly during the proposal for 
the diplomatic conference and then the Welles mission, will be discussed later in 
looking at the role played by Hull.
Nevertheless, Welles’ credibility in Latin America enabled him to press, in 
both Washington and Latin America, for a full inter-American conference in 
December 1936. The rapturous receptions that Roosevelt received in Rio de Janeiro 
and Montevideo on his way to the conference in the Argentine capital indicated the 
success of Welles' work thus far. Roosevelt’s speech at the opening session of the 
conference sought further to encourage the belief that the United States was prepared 
to take hemispheric equality seriously. He said, ‘We in the Americas stand shoulder to 
shoulder in our determination that others, who might seek to commit acts of 
aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for 
our mutual safety. Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each
6 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p. 158.
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one of us learn the glories of inter-dependence.'7 The test of these claims would come 
as the sessions of the conference unfolded, with Welles heading the American 
delegation. He acted tactfully and skilfully to tighten hemispheric bonds and, despite 
Argentine intransigence, achieved an agreement between the American republics to 
meet in times of crisis. This concord later provided the basis for the conferences at 
Lima in December 1938 and, more significantly due to the outbreak of war, at 
Panama in September 1939.
When Welles returned to Washington in early 1937 he was on the brink of 
becoming the second most important man at the State Department. William Phillips, 
then Under Secretary of State, had accepted the position of Ambassador to Rome, 
allowing Roosevelt to promote Welles. Although Phillips will return to this analysis 
when it considers Welles' arrival in Italy in February 1940, his departure in 1937 
brought to the fore the differences between Roosevelt and Hull. Although Hull’s role 
in the proposed diplomatic conference will be examined shortly, suffice it to say at 
this point in the formation of Rooseveltian foreign policy that he disagreed with the 
choice of Welles as Under Secretary. This was somewhat predictable, given Welles’ 
career to this point. Fundamentally, Welles was happiest and most effective working 
on his own under broad-ranging instructions from the President, and independently of 
the Secretary of State, as he had done in Latin America. He was always well prepared 
and had proved his skills in the ‘dimly lit smoke-filled rooms’ where decisions were 
made. In these circumstances, and given both his working and his personal 
relationship with the President, he had licence to fully explore his directives. The one 
limitation to this, which was very much in evidence during the whole period under 
consideration, was the absence from Welles’ diplomatic toolbox of the ability to 
resort to the use of military force. In many ways this added to the pressure to 
undertake diplomatic moves regardless of their chances of success. It is also important 
to see the individual relationship between President and Under Secretary of State as 
facilitating personal diplomacy on behalf of Roosevelt. Both in Latin America and in 
Europe, Welles was operating very much at Roosevelt’s behest, in addition to his task 
of representing the State Department and the United States more generally. For 
Welles, he relished the opportunity to work with Roosevelt; describing it as a ‘joy’.
7 Franklin Roosevelt Address before the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, December I, 1936. Edgar B. Nixon, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Foreign 
Affairs Voi. Ill Sept 1935 -  Jan 1937 (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp.516-521.
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Welles wrote "His mind grasped so rapidly all the implications of a new proposal, no 
matter how vast its scope, that crossing the t*s and dotting the i's were usually 
unnecessary.'8 This background to Welles' early career and his contact with 
Roosevelt is important in illustrating why Welles was in a position to have a decisive 
impact on Roosevelt’s foreign policy in the autumn of 1937. The personal relationship 
between the two was crucial and to provide a relatively minor example, Roosevelt 
made mention of his ‘old boyhood friend' in writing to Chamberlain to help explain 
the Welles mission itself in February 1940.9 Welles would also be in a position (after 
the Welles mission had passed) to emerge as "one of the most important officials in 
the wartime Administration'. According to historian Christopher O’Sullivan, Welles 
was "a man whose vision of the role the US would play on the global stage made him 
a central figure in America's transformation from a major power to a superpower, an 
architect of the coming “American Century”' . 10
Welles' Plan for a Diplomatic Conference
Welles' main impact on Roosevelt’s foreign policy in 1937 was as planner-in-chief of 
the proposal for a World Diplomatic Conference, to be staged in Washington on 
Armistice Day 1937. Although this was not held at that time, Welles’ ability to step to 
the fore in providing policy direction was very much what Roosevelt needed from his 
Under Secretary in the aftermath of the hostile reception given to his Quarantine 
speech. Fervent criticism from those who saw the speech as involving the United 
States in overseas affairs had forced Roosevelt himself to adopt a low profile in 
foreign affairs. That historians have previously underplayed Welles’ position in the 
formation of the conference plan in October 1937 reveals a lack of appreciation of his 
pivotal role in Rooseveltian foreign policy-making. As Berle stated, the plan did have 
a heritage; the notion of a world conference had "been under consideration’ in various 
forms within the Administration ‘since the summer of 1936’.11 Yet it was Welles
8 Sumner Welles, Seven Decisions That Shaped History (New York, 1950), p.22.
9 Letter from Roosevelt to Chamberlain 14 February 1940, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Papers. 
Personal Secretary’s File PSF Departmental correspondence Reel 26, Roosevelt Study Center 
Middelburg, the Netherlands. (Flereafter FDR PSF RSC, Reel 26)
111 O’Sullivan, Welles and Postwar Planning, p.l
11 Thus when Roosevelt hinted at the prospect of an international conference in his famous interview 
with the New York Times’ Arthur Krock in August 1937, it raised little furore in the State Department. 
Berle also makes mention of the plan not being particularly novel. On 26 October 1937 he stated the 
proposal was ‘along the line of a suggestion ... discussed with me in Washington a few weeks ago’. 
Memorandum by Berle, 26 October 1937, ABP Box 210.
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alone who invigorated the prospect sufficiently for it to interest Roosevelt as a policy 
option. He proposed ‘holding a world conference under American auspices which 
would re-establish the rule of law in international affairs, and guarantee justice by 
granting all powers equal access to raw materials'.12 In other words, Welles hoped to 
inaugurate international acceptance of reciprocal trade, non-aggression and mutual 
respect. These were principles that accorded well in Roosevelt’s State Department, 
including with Hull, and which would be evident in various forms up to the time of 
the Welles mission. The declaration to other neutral countries on the day that the 
Welles mission was announced in February 1940 should be seen very much in this 
light. The adherence to ‘principles’ of international conduct would enable the 
Administration to further its efforts to illustrate to the American people the common 
interests they shared with other liberal democracies. Roosevelt himself gave voice to 
this attitude in his weekly radio address following the Quarantine speech: ‘The 
development of peace in the world is dependent ... on the acceptance by nations of 
certain fundamental decencies in their relations with each other. Ultimately, 1 hope 
each nation will accept the fact that violations of these rules of conduct are an injury 
to the well-being of all nations.'13
It was on the basis that the proposal would further Rooseveltian foreign policy 
that Welles worked on the conference plan throughout October 1937.14 Welles’ 
understanding of the wider domestic implications of the plan was evident in his 
writing to Roosevelt to encourage him to pursue it. Welles stated that from ‘the 
standpoint of public opinion at home, 1 would think that your making this proposal 
four days before the opening of the Special Session of the Congress would put a very 
definite quietus upon those individuals who have been deliberately attempting to 
misinterpret your Chicago speech'.15 The Special Session of Congress Welles referred 
to had been called to address legislation backed up during the debate Roosevelt had 
instigated on increasing the number of Supreme Court justices. This added to the 
President’s sensitivity to domestic criticism in October 1937. Nevertheless, as the
12 Macdonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, p.41.
n Franklin D. Roosevelt Fireside Chat 12 October 1937 www.presidency.ucsb.edu
14 The diary entries of Adolf Berle show that the matter was discussed on various occasions during 
October and early November: 13, 26, 28, 29 October and 1. 8 November 1937. For example: 
Memorandum by Berle, 26 October 1937, ABP Box 210.
15 Letter from Welles to Roosevelt 26 October 1937. The Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers: The 
President’s Secretary’s File (Hereafter FDR PSF) State Department Box 70 Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library Hyde Park, New York.
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month drew to a close Berle felt Welles' plan was likely to be put into practice. He 
noted on 28 October that he thought the Administration ‘should be able to get 
somewhere with it [the proposal]', and that the following week was ‘obviously the 
time' to act to take advantage of the significance of Armistice Day.lf>
It is important to consider the significance of Welles' role during this period. 
Welles had embellished a relatively vague idea from within the Administration and 
presented it as a distinct policy option. His ability to interpret Roosevelt's often 
imprecise instructions and then present a practical policy would be very much in 
evidence during the period from 1937 to 1940. Historian Kenneth S. Davis explains 
how the conference plan fitted into this practice. The plan offered an opportunity 
which ‘if nothing else [would provide] a grand theatrical gesture of a kind most 
attractive, as the Under-secretary of State well knew, to the large historic element of 
Roosevelt's personality'.16 7
However, as events unfolded during the first week of November, Roosevelt 
drew back from carrying out Welles' proposal. Roosevelt signalled this by adding to 
Welles’ draft ‘Not carried any further. FDR'. These words came to represent a 
postponement, with the plan being revisited in January 1938.18 Two factors were 
material to Roosevelt's decision to temporarily abandon Welles’ proposal, but guiding 
both was consideration of American public opinion. In the first place Roosevelt was 
sensitive to the wider international situation. He had aimed to use his Quarantine 
speech as an opportunity to put the spotlight on Japanese aggression in China. 
Therefore he initially welcomed the response of the League of Nations, which was to 
convene an international conference in Brussels in early November 1937, and sent a 
trusted associate, Norman Davis, as the American delegate. However, without the 
attendance of the Japanese, the Germans and the Italians, the conference was 
dominated by the French and the British. This posed a particular problem for Davis, 
who was not authorised to enter into any political discussions for fear of appearing 
entangled in European affairs. This meant the British and the French were able to 
place the responsibility for the failure of the conference to do anything about Japanese 
aggression on Washington. The troubles in Brussels meant that the prospect of 
international cooperation, implicit in the Welles plan, was distinctly low. Roosevelt
16 Memorandum by Berle, 26 October 1937, ABP Box 210.
17 Kenneth S. Davis, FDR Into the Storm -  A History (New York, 1993), p. 186,
18 First Draft undated accompanied by letter from Welles to Roosevelt, 26 October 1937, FDR PSF 
Box 70.
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had said in early October that the conference could be 'an example of one of the 
possible paths to follow in our search for means toward peace throughout the whole 
world'.19 Berle summed up the problems Roosevelt faced in early November: 'The 
foreign news is bad. With Brussels in trouble I do not see that it is wise for the 
President to push Sumner's plan of an international conference.'20 The international 
situation worsened still further when, on 6 November, Italy joined the German- 
.lapanese Anti-Comintern pact.
The second vital factor in Roosevelt's decision to postpone the conference 
plan in early November 1937 was the concern expressed by Hull. He was especially 
conscious of the Administration’s standing in the eyes of the American public as the 
economy stalled in late 1937. The so-called ‘Roosevelt recession’ had ‘wiped out 
most of the gains made since 1935'.21 With the prospect of the upcoming Special 
Session of Congress, Roosevelt knew he would need Hull’s political kudos to deal 
with those on Capitol Hill. Hull’s view on foreign policy was vital as was the 
relationship between himself, Roosevelt and Welles through which American foreign 
policy was made.
Cordell Hull -  Left to his Own Devices
Hull's concerns over the conference plan, which would reappear in his objections to 
the Welles mission over two years later, were essentially threefold: the views of the 
American people (with possible political repercussions in Washington); the sense of 
false security given to the democracies by American moves; and the possible 
antagonising of the Axis powers by such moves. Hull said Welles’ proposal was 
‘illogical and impossible’ as it would ‘be fatal to lull the democracies into a feeling of 
tranquillity’.22 Further, Hull was worried by the possibility of more isolationist 
criticism of the Administration should the conference mimic the strife of Brussels. 
Hull had become Roosevelt’s Secretary of State at the outset of the Administration 
and would keep the post until 1944. His appointment was based on his political 
experience. He was chosen ‘essentially for his influence with Congress,’ Benjamin 
Welles writes, ‘where, after twelve terms in the House and two years in the Senate,
|,) Franklin D. Roosevelt Fireside Chat 12 October 1937 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/docs/fireside/IOI237.php
20 Memorandum by Berle, 8 November 1937, ABP Box 210.
21 Dallek, Roosevelt, p. 153.
22 Welles, Seven Decisions, p.23.
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his prestige was high.'21 Yet he served under a President who had ‘determined to be 
his own Secretary of State'. While this may have become the case, the challenges 
facing Roosevelt at the beginning of his presidency meant the whole of the 
Administration was geared to the domestic arena. This in turn allowed Hull to stamp 
his own mark on American foreign policy that manifested itself in a programme of 
reciprocal trade agreements. This programme, and particularly the Anglo-American 
trade agreement of 1938, will be considered presently. Roosevelt understood how far 
reciprocal trade was Hull's ‘baby'. He wrote to Welles shortly after the latter's 
appointment as Under Secretary that Hull ‘genuinely believes that if trade relations 
between nations can be broadened on lines and under conditions where it serves to 
advance economic welfare, existing political tensions would be thereby eased'.* 24 
While this conviction sat easily alongside Roosevelt's views on foreign policy and the 
principles of international conduct that Welles sought to promote, personal tension 
plagued the relationship between Secretary of State and Under Secretary.
The friction between the two can be traced to Welles' appointment, and sprang 
from the differing styles of the two men. When Roosevelt was faced with the prospect 
of finding a new Under Secretary in early 1937, Hull wanted the job to go to ‘his' 
man, Walton 'Judge' Moore. Hull had been frustrated by Welles’ conduct during the 
advancement of the ‘Good Neighbor’ policy, particularly by his unorthodox 
communication with the President. Roosevelt resolved the controversy with Hull by 
reviving the long-dormant position of Department Counsellor for Moore. While these 
beginnings did not necessarily bode well for a harmonious working relationship, 
Welles' conduct in the position hardly helped to effect a seamless transition. As was 
typical of him, he threw himself into the work with little effort made to ingratiate 
himself with his colleagues.25 This meant, in the same way that he often felt about 
others, that he was ‘either liked or disliked with no middle ground'.26 Hull often found 
himself in the latter camp, as ‘Welles’ close ties to FDR, his growing authority, and 
the publicity he was attracting exacerbated Hull's jealousy’.27 Welles’ authority had
21 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.199.
24 Memorandum from Roosevelt to Welles, 28 May 1937, FDR PSF Box 32.
25 Welles had always worked hard on subjects that interested him and did not concern himself with 
those that did not. As far back as his school days, Welles’ ‘mind, when stimulated, was quick, wide- 
ranging and retentive’, skills that were vital in his diplomatic career; ‘when bored, his grades 
plummeted.’ Benjamin Welles, Sumner, p.l 1.
"6 Gellman, Secret Affairs, p.68.
27 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p .l99.
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manifested itself in an internal staff review of the State Department, which saw 
Welles' followers obtain key positions, and the publicity sprang from the prominence 
of his second wife in Washington social circles.28 For the man from Tennessee the 
difference in style and outlook was often stark over the years from 1937 to 1940, and 
would be especially so in January 1940 at the time of the Welles mission. The tension 
did not escape the notice of the rest of the Department, but Berle surmised, ‘The only 
attitude one can take is to endeavour to make sure that the two men, neither of whom 
wishes to indulge in personal considerations at all. continue a smooth working 
program.'29 This was certainly the case during the period under consideration here, as 
there was a mutual respect for each other’s professionalism. Welles’ close friend 
Drew Pearson summed up the difference in approach of the two men: ‘Sumner moves 
with lightning speed and Hull only wants to concentrate on one thing at a time.'30
The strain between the two was often played out in relation to Roosevelt. A 
prime example of this can be seen in the preparation for the neutrals’ announcement 
in the run up to the Welles mission. Welles wrote to Roosevelt on 12 January 1940 
that he had given "the Secretary of State a memorandum a few days ago for his 
consideration’.31 As if to justify this enquiry, Welles included in the rest of the 
sentence reference to the fact that Roosevelt was present when Hull said that he had 
been too busy to deal with it. ‘As he said when we were with you,’ Welles continued, 
due to his being "so swamped recently with his Ways and Means Committee hearings 
he has not had a chance to go into it or talk over the problems involved with you.’ 
Hence Welles sent a draft directly to the President -  T am sending you a copy of this 
memorandum, thinking that you may have time to give it some thought before I have 
the opportunity of seeing you at lunch on Monday.’ This episode shows perfectly how 
Welles would bypass Hull in taking matters directly to Roosevelt. While this may 
seem a less than satisfactory way in which to operate his State Department, Roosevelt 
was not overly concerned as long as the Department continued to function. Indeed,
28 Mathilde Townsend was an exceedingly wealthy lady but her marriage to Welles had caused some 
scandal in Washington as she was ten years older than Welles and had herself divorced a Senator to 
marry Welles.
2<) Memorandum by Berle, 20 April 1939, ABP Box 210.
w Handwritten notes by Drew Pearson. Container G-236 undated Drew Pearson’s Personal Papers, 
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin Texas. Quoted in Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.398. Drew 
Pearson was an old friend of Welles who had become famous during the 1920s for co-authoring the 
best seller ‘The Washington Merry-Go-Round’. During the 1930s he was the author of a weekly 
column through which he often praised Welles whilst criticising more generally the New Deal.
"  Memorandum from Welles to Roosevelt, 12 January 1940, FDR PSF Box 76.
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Roosevelt welcomed the caution that Hull counselled and sought it for that reason. 
This was typical of his presidential style, in that he was prepared to see subordinates 
operate in a 'competitive' fashion. In short, then, the differences between Hull and 
Welles will be a recurrent feature of Rooseveltian foreign policy-making from 1937 
through to the Welles mission, and indeed beyond. Thus as 1937 drew to a close the 
Welles plan for a major diplomatic conference had illustrated, firstly, the capacity of 
Welles to develop ideas in league with Roosevelt, and, secondly, the problems this 
raised with Hull. Before considering the key events of the two years leading up to 
Roosevelt’s decision to embark on the Welles mission one further theme requires 
attention. That is the influence of Great Britain on the thinking of the Roosevelt 
Administration.
Consideration of Anglo-American Relations
The importance of Anglo-American relations in Rooseveltian foreign policy became 
evident in early 1938, when Sumner Welles’ plan for a diplomatic conference was 
resurrected and presented to the British.
On 11 January 1938 Welles called on Ambassador Ronald Lindsay at the 
British Embassy. His task was to present to the British the terms of a plan prescribing 
that ‘essential and fundamental principles ... should be observed in international 
relations’.32 Such sentiment represented the values Welles had hoped to promulgate in 
his earlier conference plan. The document detailing the plan, which he left at the 
Embassy, went on to call for ‘limitation and reduction of armaments’ and equal access 
to raw materials, which were both favourites themes of the Roosevelt Administration. 
Further, and of particular relevance for Anglo-American relations once war had 
broken out in September 1939, the plan called for respect of neutral rights in wartime. 
‘In the unhappy event of war, rights and obligations of government, both on land and 
at sea, ... may be delivered by existing international agreements, and laws and 
customs of warfare whose observance neutrals may be entitled to require.’ 
Accompanying the document Welles gave to the British was a letter from Roosevelt 
to the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. It was composed by Welles and 
reflects the Under Secretary’s desire to see something come from this proposal.
12 President Roosevelt’s plan MOST SECRET, 21 March 1938, A 2127/64/45 FO 371 21526 Public 
Record Office, Kew, London. (Hereafter PRO).
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*1 have felt warranted in addressing to you this communication because of 
my considered belief that unless the nations of the earth strive by 
concerted effort to come rapidly to a renewed agreement upon those 
fundamental principles which the experience of the past, and the best 
judgement of present time, demonstrate as being wise and salutary in the 
governing of relations between states, world peace cannot be 
maintained.'33
This expression of worthy sentiment was typical of Welles' efforts to use 
grand gestures of diplomacy to further policy. Beyond the value of these terms the 
reasons for the redeployment of the plan are not clear.34 Although the domestic 
situation had improved after the Special Session of Congress, Roosevelt’s capacity to 
act in foreign affairs had been strengthened only marginally.
The controversy with Japan over the 'Panay' incident and its peaceful 
resolution during December 1937 had illustrated to the American people the potential 
dangers prevalent in the world.35 The overwhelming desire for a diplomatic outcome, 
with congressmen inundated with letters from concerned constituents, buoyed the 
Administration's desire to promote a diplomatic agenda. For Welles the concept of 
the plan had never entirely died despite the passing of Armistice Day, and he was 
ready to take it up again in early 1938. Although his argument overcame Hull’s major 
objection, the Secretary of State did insist that the British government should be 
approached before the plan was presented to other nations. Hull’s motivation here was 
to defuse American responsibility and to avoid embarrassing the British. In short, his 
concerns of the previous autumn. It is important to remember, though, that the 
significance of this proposal, for the purposes of this thesis, is in illustrating the state 
of Anglo-American relations in January 1938.
From the outset Chamberlain was against the American plan. Despite the 
words of Lindsay, urging ‘very quick and very cordial acceptance’, Chamberlain
Notice of Roosevelt’s plan to Chamberlain left by Welles at the Embassy in Washington, 11 January 
1938, Embassy and Consular Archives, United States of America Correspondence FO 115 3416 PRO.
44 The accounts of Welles and Hull differ on the decisive factor in redeployment. See Chapter I, 
Welles, Seven Decisions. and Cordell Hull, The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull Vol. 1 (London, 1948).
45 The Panay incident involved the Japanese strafing of the USS Panay and the British Ship, the Bee, at 
the beginning of December 1937. This will be examined in reference to the Ingersoll mission later in 
this chapter.
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argued that it would be inappropriate to proceed with the plan.36 He explained his 
reservations in a letter to Lindsay: ‘My fear is that, if the President's suggestions are 
put forward at the present time, Germany and Italy may feel constrained to take 
advantage of them, both to delay the consideration of specific points which must be 
settled if appeasement is to be achieved, and to put forward demands over and above 
what they would put forward to us if we were in direct negotiations with them.'37 *
Clearly Chamberlain was concerned that any American move would ‘cut across' his 
own plans to resolve the tension in world affairs: the policy of appeasement. Lindsay 
was thus in something of an invidious position in relaying London’s lack of 
enthusiasm. Welles later wrote that Chamberlain's response came ‘in the nature of a
T O
douche of cold water’. Roosevelt was left with little choice but to accept 
Chamberlain’s objections and, although this correspondence did have repercussions in 
other areas later in the year, not to proceed.39 However, the situation was different in 
February 1940, when Chamberlain's objections to the Welles mission, although 
heeded to an extent, were not sufficient for the mission to be dropped.
Chamberlain’s lack of enthusiasm for the American approach requires 
explanation. It is inescapable not to attribute his negative response to Welles’ plan, at 
least in large part, to his wider views of the United States. Chamberlain looked across
■1h Lindsay was evidently aware of the wider implications of Welles’ proposal. In writing to London he 
added were the British to ‘kill the scheme before it is propounded by withholding their support ...[it]... 
would annul all progress ... made in the last two years.’ Telegram No.42 from Lindsay to Foreign 
Office, 12 January 1938, A2127/64/45 FO 371 21526 PRO.
,7 Telegram No. 35 from Chamberlain to Lindsay for the President, 13 January 1938, A 2127/64/45 FO 
371 21526 PRO.
18 Welles, Time for Decision, p.56.
59 The repercussions were felt at the time of the Munich crisis which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Before Chamberlain’s objections had permanently mothballed the Welles plan Roosevelt 
suggested in late January that Washington and London share information on certain aspects of foreign 
policy. At the time Roosevelt was keen to see how Chamberlain’s appeasement policies would affect 
his own foreign policy. Given Chamberlain's response to Roosevelt’s plan it might be supposed that 
the President’s request would have received little support. Instead, he wrote to Lindsay ‘... we shall 
gladly give him the fullest information on these matters in which we are both so much interested.’ 
Telegram No. 60 from Chamberlain to Lindsay for the attention of Roosevelt, 21 January 1938, 
A2127/64/45 FO 371 21526 PRO. This reflected Chamberlain’s view that, as long as it did not 
interfere with his own plans, he did not object to cooperation with Washington. Guidelines and subject 
matter were quickly established by Welles and Lindsay, and the two governments agreed to open a line 
of communication which kept them informed during the summer of 1938. Exchange of Information 
between United States and British Governments, 26 January 1938, A651/64/45 FO 371 21525 PRO. 
Initially, matters such as the British Ambassador in Berlin's attempt to sound out Hitler on the colonial 
question and central Europe were the subjects of this dialogue. Later in the summer, reports of the 
Runciman mission were passed to Washington. In this sense historian William Wallace was correct 
when he wrote of the legacy of the January 1938 approach that ‘crucial Anglo-American exchanges 
continued to flow from it’. William V. Wallace, ‘Roosevelt and British Appeasement in 1938’ in 
Bulletin -  British Association o f American Studies, December 1962, pp.4-30.
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the Atlantic with a mixture of disappointment and unease. Based on his examination 
of Chamberlain’s time as Chancellor of the Exchequer, historian Greg Kennedy 
assesses Chamberlain's attitude to the United States in stark terms. His ‘view of the 
United States as untrustworthy, unimportant and marginal in the British strategic 
foreign policy process, as well as his jealous, petty and uninformed view of the nation 
as a whole, continued to plague attempts by the Foreign Office, Admiralty and other 
government bodies at manufacturing closer Anglo-American strategic relations 
throughout his career'.40 It was perhaps unsurprising then that Chamberlain was not 
disposed to welcome the move from the Roosevelt Administration. For his own part, 
Chamberlain told an American relative in early 1938 that his efforts to engage the 
United States had been met with ‘more than one disappointment’.41 However, this 
fails to reveal that Chamberlain was a man with a supreme belief in his own abilities 
and the plans that flowed from them. He wanted to deal with the United States only 
on his own terms and when it did not interfere with his own plans. Chamberlain was 
right, though, in identifying the strength of isolationist opinion as a problem in Anglo- 
American relations: ‘the isolationists there are so strong and vocal that she [the United 
States] cannot be depended on for help if we should get into trouble.’42 His perception 
of Washington’s unreliability was the Prime Minister’s overriding concern. More 
widely, many in London looked to the record of the United States since the Versailles 
Conference and saw naked self-interest in pursuit of commercial interests. Further, the 
United States had exhibited a lack of responsibility in conducting international affairs 
at various conferences, notably the London Economic Conference (1933). Thus a 
proposal for an American diplomatic conference did not appeal to Chamberlain in 
early 1938.
Moreover, Chamberlain was also doubtful about Washington’s decision to 
propose the plan in such a manner. As shall be evident again in early 1940,
40 Greg Kennedy, ‘Neville Chamberlain and Strategic Relations with the US during his Chancellorship’ 
in Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 13, No 1 (March 2002) p.95-120. Kennedy sees 1933 as ‘the pivotal 
year in the formulation of Chamberlain’s view of the US’, when two key elements with implications 
for Anglo-American relations were being considered, namely: Britain’s economic position and the 
condition of the Royal Navy especially in the Far East.
41 Letter from Chamberlain to Mrs Morton Prince (Boston, Mass.) 16 January 1938, The Papers of 
Neville Chamberlain, Special Collections, University of Birmingham. (Hereafter NC) Sir Alexander 
Cadogan, who would become his Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office at the beginning of 
1938, went further, as he summed up Chamberlain’s attitude to Americans as one of an ‘almost 
instinctive contempt’. David Dilks (ed.), The Diaries o f Sir Alexander Cadogan OM ¡938-45 (London, 
1971), p.54.
42 Entry for 19 February 1938, Chamberlain’s diary NC2/24A Diaries 1937-1940 NC.
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Chamberlain was not receptive to Roosevelt's penchant for personal diplomacy. He 
had written in September 1937 on the visit of the American financier and presidential 
advisor, Bernard Baruch that he was ‘another of the unofficial Ambassadors who so 
frequently come over here from the USA with proposals of their own devising but 
without any official authority for them’.43 Although Welles' approach in 1938 
certainly had official backing, the scheme lacked practical application in British eyes. 
Chamberlain’s Home Secretary, Viscount Templewood, wrote that the Cabinet ‘were 
deeply suspicious not indeed of American good intentions, but of American readiness 
to follow up inspiring words with any practical actions’.44 45It was the reliance on good 
intentions and respect, explicit in Welles’ approach, that added to the scepticism in 
London.
In contrast, the Prime Minister’s answer to increasing tension in early 1938 
rested on what appeared to be the tangible attributes of bilateral appeasement of the 
aggressors. The term ‘appeasement’ is a weighty one, and is often viewed with 
hindsight as an appalling miscalculation. ' Yet it was a broadly accepted and popular 
policy in Great Britain during 1937 and 193 8.46 Historian David Dutton suggests 
appeasement ‘was based upon the notion that there must be a point, and a not too 
distant one, at which those being appeased would become satisfied and where a new 
status quo could be constructed on the basis of lasting peace’.47 This was in turn based 
on the ‘liberal attitudes of a generation which believed the lessons of the Great War 
spoke for themselves.' While this may sound idealistic, Chamberlain was a practical 
man who dealt with Hitler or Mussolini only because they were the characters he was 
forced to contend with. At the beginning of 1938 Chamberlain sought to appease the 
Italian leader with recognition of his conquest of Abyssinia and, as his letter to 
Lindsay states, he feared Welles’ plan would scupper this.
4’ Memorandum of Chamberlain’s views on the Baruch Conversation, September 8 1937, FO 371 
20663 PRO. .
44 Viscount Templewood, Nine Troubled Years (London, 1954), p.262.
45 The literature on appeasement comprises a vast body of historical study. Much of it is intimately 
connected with the characters involved, most notably Neville Chamberlain. Other important volumes 
include The Appeasers by Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, which has been republished in 2000 with a 
new foreword. There is the classic repudiation of appeasement in: Cato’s Guilty Men (London, 1940).
46 Sir Samuel Hoare, Chamberlain’s Home Secretary, wrote in his memoirs: ‘Appeasement was not his 
personal policy. Not only was it supported by his colleagues; it expressed the general desire of the 
British people.’ Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, p.262. Sir Nevile Henderson, the British 
ambassador to Berlin, declared appeasement to be ‘the search for just solutions by negotiations in the 
light of higher reason instead of resort to force.’ Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure o f a Mission (London, 
1940), p.49.
47 David Dutton, Neville Chamberlain (London, 2001), p.200.
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The appeasement policy posed particular problems for the Roosevelt 
Administration in two areas. Firstly, the bilateral quid-pro-quo of the process meant 
that the British appeared to be ‘in league’ with those aggressive powers in making 
deals. For the Administration this hampered its portrayal of the democracies as 
standing for values that were in line with American ones. Here again the influence of 
the American people was evident in how far the Roosevelt Administration could 
“associate' itself with those appeasing the Axis. The second concern for those in 
Washington was typically given expression by Welles. In a letter he composed on 
behalf of Roosevelt for Chamberlain he urged the British to consider ‘the harmful 
effect’ the issue of recognition could have ‘upon the course of Japan in the Far East
J U
and upon the nature of the peace terms which Japan may demand of China’. Welles 
and Roosevelt realised both their extremely limited influence and the possibility that 
existed for Chamberlain in trying to influence Mussolini in early 1938. Welles 
informed Lindsay that the ‘President regarded recognition as an unpleasant pill which 
we should both have to swallow and he wished that we should swallow it together'.48 9 
Welles nevertheless appreciated the different approaches: ‘His Majesty's Government 
wished to swallow it in a general settlement with Italy and the President in a general 
settlement involving world appeasement.' This assessment provides a succinct précis 
of the state of Anglo-American relations in the aftermath of the proposal of the Welles 
plan in January 1938.50
The launch of Welles’ diplomatic initiative in January 1938 illustrated the 
differing approaches of the Roosevelt Administration and the Chamberlain 
government to their security concerns, the legacy of which was to be felt in the run up 
to war. However, it is worth considering that at the beginning of 1938 Chamberlain’s 
Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, held a different view of Washington from that of 
his Prime Minister. Eden was enjoying a brief sojourn in the South of France when 
Welles spoke to Lindsay on 11 January 1938. He was called back to London by Sir 
Alexander Cadogan, then Permanent Under Secretary, but did not arrive before
48 Message from Roosevelt to Chamberlain composed by Welles, 17 January 1938, 740.00/264b 
Foreign Relations o f the United States 1938 Vol. 1„ (USGPO, 1955) p. 121. (Hereafter FRUS).
49 Telegram No. 78 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 23 January 1938, A2127/64/45 FO 371 21526 
PRO.
50 Eden later recognised Welles’s efforts in this direction: M have known no man in the United States 
who had a clearer perception than he of the course of international diplomacy in the last years before 
the Second World War.’ Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs -  Facing the Dictators 
(London, 1962), p.568.
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Chamberlain had responded to Roosevelt. The letters he then wrote to Chamberlain 
explain concisely his view of the American initiative.
T really do not feel that this initiative of President Roosevelt need 
necessarily injure the attempts which we are making to improve relations 
with Germany, nor even have any repercussions on the conversations 
which 1 know you are so anxious to start with Italy. It may be that you 
think that I exaggerate, but I truly believe that with the world as it is now, 
it is almost impossible to overestimate the effect which an indication of 
United States interest in European affairs may be calculated to produce.01
Eden’s tone is almost one of desperation in imploring Chamberlain to 
consider the positive effects that might flow from the American proposal. 
Chamberlain did not acquiesce, and Eden wrote again the next day:
'The decision we have to take seems to me to depend upon the 
significance which we attach to Anglo-American co-operation. What we 
have to choose between is Anglo-American co-operation in an attempt to 
ensure world peace and a piecemeal settlement by way of problematic 
agreement with Mussolini.’51 2
This attitude would not have been out of place within the Roosevelt 
Administration itself: the proposal was worth considering even if it was not likely to 
succeed. However, Chamberlain disagreed, and the difference in opinion saw Eden 
resign his position in February 1938, to be replaced by Lord Halifax.53 Although he 
returned to Chamberlain’s government as Dominions Secretary at the outbreak of war, 
had Eden remained as Foreign Secretary then British policy toward Washington might 
have been more agreeable in the months preceding the conflict.
Instead, Chamberlain’s objections to Welles’ proposal meant it was stillborn 
and, although the sentiment it contained would be evident in Administration thinking 
up to and including the Welles mission, it was not to be revisited in this form. With 
Eden gone from the Chamberlain government in February 1938, Anglo-American 
relations were in a difficult state. During the time leading up to war in September
51 Letter from Eden to Chamberlain, 17 January 1938, The Papers of Anthony Eden as Foreign 
Secretary (Hereafter AEP) US/38/3 FO 954/29A.
52 Letter from Eden to Chamberlain, 18 January 1938, The Papers of the Earl of Avon, Special 
Collections, the University of Birmingham. In the Earl of Avon, Eden, p.558.
53 Halifax, austere and well organised, was not going to challenge the Prime Minister’s views, and in 
fact has been described as ‘a quintessential, if not an altogether extreme,’ appeaser. Lukács, Five Days,
p.62.
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1939 the relationship would shift only marginally between increased understanding 
and further frustration for both. Anglo-American relations were strained over key 
issues such as neutrality revision in the summer of 1939, and dislocated over their 
responses to the acts of aggression being perpetrated by the Axis powers during 1938 
and 1939. In short, the transatlantic relationship was not entirely harmonious. This 
episode in January 1938 helped establish a pattern in relations between Washington 
and London over the next two years with the United States exerting only a marginal 
influence on events in Europe and Chamberlain seeking to both avert war and then 
prepare Britain for it. The Anglo-American relationship will thus be considered after a 
brief summation to the conference plan, as this chapter examines the period up to the 
onset of war, in order to provide further contextual background to the Welles mission.
Conclusions to the Welles Conference Plan
In his memoirs, Anthony Eden surmised that the American diplomatic proposal of 
January 1938 sprang from ‘a combination of the President’s instinct and Sumner 
Welles's knowledge’.54 5 This assessment is accurate in identifying the personal 
relationship at the heart of this move. It was Welles’ dynamism that moved the 
proposal to centre stage firstly in the autumn of 1937 and then again in early 1938. 
His involvement in drafting the proposal, presenting it to Roosevelt and then 
personally informing the British Ambassador illustrates his conviction in deploying 
the scheme. This proactive role would be evident again at various key points during 
the following two years leading up to the Welles mission. That nothing came of the 
proposal in 1937 or 1938 caused Welles to lament the opportunity that had passed. He 
wrote in his memoirs that the situation at that time ‘was still fluid’ in Europe, and that 
such ‘an appeal by the President... might well have rallied a still vocal public opinion 
in Europe sufficiently to have changed the course of the events of the next two 
years .
It is only with hindsight that such an appraisal can be made, and that was 
certainly not available to Cordell Hull at the time. His objections to Welles’ plans 
were rooted in his belief that the proposal would lead to frustration both within the
54 Eden, The Eden Memoirs, p.552.
55 Welles, Time for Decision, p.56. Welles was joined in agreement in this belief by Anthony Eden 
when the pair met after the war. ‘We agreed that a comparable opportunity had never occurred, nor 
been created, after this date to avert that catastrophe.’ Earl of Avon, Eden, p.568.
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United States and among other nations. From a domestic point of view Hull was 
worried that the failure to live up to the promise of an Armistice Day move would fuel 
criticism of the Administration. On the international stage, the failure of such a move 
could affect his programme of reciprocal trade agreements, as well as creating further 
disenchantment with the United States among the democracies. Historian Arthur 
Schatz has characterised Hull's belief in 'economic disarmament’ as 'the promotion 
of world peace through international economic recovery'.56 This would not have been 
helped by another inter-war conference that failed to produce results. The memory of 
the distinct lack of international harmony at the recent Brussels Conference was to the 
fore in Hull’s objections. Hull's concerns that the Welles proposal would precipitate 
trouble in the international arena were shared by Chamberlain. The Prime Minister 
was preoccupied with his policy of appeasement and saw the Administration's move 
as liable to 'cut across' it.
The Anglo-American relationship that Welles' plan impacted upon was 
accurately summarised by Ambassador Lindsay at the beginning of 1938. On 7 
February 1938 Lindsay wrote explaining the state of the American Administration 
and the implications for Anglo-American relations. His sage words were to accurately 
reflect the conditions in which the relationship operated during 1938 and 1939.
'What brings America closer to us is the identity of American aims, 
desires and policies with our own. The totalitarian governments have got 
themselves into such a position that they can hardly take any major action 
in any field which does not make that identity more patent. If we try to 
push or pull the Americans forward they inevitably resent it, because they 
must take their measures in their own American way. Fortunately the 
President and his Administration are far-sighted and are doing all the 
pushing and pulling that they think practically possible. If only we had 
time enough we should merely need to be candid, tactful and prudent, and 
the totalitarians would do the whole job for us. ... American opinion is a 
distressing spectacle for at first glance one can see practically nothing but 
rampant isolationism, except in some limited circles and in Congress it is 
very bad. Yet, though I try to avoid wishful thinking, I do believe that it is 
not really quite as bad as it seems. A large part of the press is very
56 Arthur Schatz, ‘The Anglo-American Trade Agreement and Cordell Hull’s Search for Peace, 1936- 
38’ in Journal o f American History 57 (1970-71), pp.85-103.
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sensible and there is widespread genuine friendliness towards us, and 
universal dislike of totalitarian systems. There are many elements in the 
situation favourable to us, and with such an emotional people a dramatic 
incident might have astonishing results.07
Lindsay's analysis presents a number of erudite points. Clear, succinct 
identification of the principles that Great Britain was standing for would help the 
Administration’s efforts to paint a favourable portrait of the democracies for the 
American people, as would greater distance in relations with the totalitarians. The 
Ambassador further suggests that to try to ‘manoeuvre' the Americans before they 
themselves are ready, before they have done it the ‘American way’, would be highly 
counterproductive. Lindsay acknowledges that the Administration was making some 
headway against ‘rampant isolationism' -  the non-entangling element -  and that it 
was not as strong as might at first be supposed. Importantly here, Lindsay alludes to 
the dual trends of United States public opinion. Finally, Lindsay’s analysis identifies 
that time was on Britain’s side in the very long term; the Dictators would make the 
job easier and that a ‘dramatic incident’ could have ‘astonishing results’. This was 
eventually to prove the case when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour in December 
1941. The impact of Lindsay’s pronouncement in London was perhaps not high, 
considering that its addressee, Eden, was about to resign and Chamberlain was in the 
process of declining Roosevelt's approach, but its content was relevant to issues in the 
Anglo-American relationship.
Lindsay was clearly aware of the pressures that the American Administration 
was operating under vis-à-vis the American people in late 1937 and early 1938. This 
prevented overt political intervention in foreign affairs and increased the appeal for 
Roosevelt of a move like the Welles proposal: the grand design meant he could 
circumvent accusations from critics of meddling in overseas politics. A proposal 
which sought to promote respect for international relations would, in the words of 
Eden, ‘put obstacles in the way of Hitler and Mussolini by the only method open to 
Roosevelt'.57 8 The Welles plan charted a path within the constraints of American
57 Letter from Lindsay to Eden, 7 February 1938, AEP US/38/11 FO 954/29A PRO. Lindsay also 
enlightened Eden as to the risks Roosevelt was taking as he alluded to the President’s domestic 
problems. '... I do wish the President would be less temperamental in his treatment of the domestic 
economic situation. He has got every business man in the country, great and small, into a state of 
nervous exasperation in which they are hardly fit to consider any question of public policy in a sensible 
manner.’
58 Eden, The Eden Memoirs, p.552.
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public opinion by avoiding damaging political entanglements and thus the criticism 
that would have followed from the Administration's opponents. That the President of 
the United States had at his disposal a relative lack of foreign policy tools, and that he 
had to consider moves which stood little chance of outright success, reflects the non­
entangling views of the American people. Eden understood this, and later lamented 
Chamberlain's response to the Administration's proposal, which failed to look at 
broader aspects of Anglo-American relations. Eden wrote that Chamberlain ‘did not 
look beyond the Roosevelt plan itself, which admittedly might have failed, to the 
beneficial consequences which might have flowed from it, even in failure'.59 This 
analysis could equally be applied to a number of moves from Washington in the 
following two years, up to and including the Welles mission.
In sum, then, the Roosevelt Administration's consideration of Welles' plan for 
a diplomatic conference on international relations in late 1937 and early 1938 
illustrates key issues for this analysis of the Welles mission. The dynamism of Welles, 
the caution of Hull and the objections Chamberlain raised to reveal the state of Anglo- 
American relations were all to have a determining influence on the course of 
Rooseveltian foreign policy during 1938 and 1939, and indeed during the Welles 
mission itself.
1938 and 1939 -  Welles. Hull and Anglo-American Relations in Rooseveltian Foreign 
Policy
This chapter will now move on to examine the events of 1938 and 1939 in the light of 
these themes, to provide contextual background to the central question of this work, 
namely the impetus behind, and intentions of, the Welles mission.
The greatest challenge for Rooseveltian foreign policy in the eighteen months 
before war broke out was for the United States to exert any kind of peaceful influence 
that might prevent full-scale hostilities. The constraint of non-entanglement imposed 
by the American people meant that Roosevelt had to be almost exclusively reactive 
when it came to dealing with the aggressors. Where he could be proactive was strictly 
limited, and the Ingersoll mission of January 1938 and the royal visit in July 1939 
illustrate the length to which Roosevelt’s foreign policy operated in the margins.
59 Eden, The Eden Memoirs, p.568. Eden’s Atlanticist leanings are discussed by David Woolner in ‘The 
Frustrated Idealists: Cordell Hull, Anthony Eden and the Search for Anglo-American Co-operation 
1933-1938.’ PhD McGill University, Montreal, December 1996.
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These efforts exemplify the extent to which the Administration had to go to 
circumvent non-entangling opinion. The concern for the views of the American 
people was evident throughout the period and manifested itself in the events to be 
discussed in the rest of this chapter.
Crisis Response
The Munich crisis of the autumn of 1938 represented the clearest challenge made by 
Hitler’s Germany to the democracies to that point. The role Roosevelt and his 
Administration played in the resolution of the crisis was minimal and reactive. Yet, in 
view of the pressures outlined above, this was to be expected.
The Roosevelt Administration's reaction to the consummation of the Anschluss 
in March 1938 and then the spring crisis over Czechoslovakia had been negligible and 
provided a guide to the events of the autumn.60 Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the Chief of the 
State Department's European Division, acknowledged this: ‘British reaction to what 
has been going on is the key to the whole situation and with each day that passes it 
becomes clear that England is willing to surrender Eastern Europe to German 
ambitions.’61 To the American people the policies of London and Paris looked like 
surrender to ‘peace at any price’, with the British and French looking as if they were 
conspiring with Hitler over the fate of Eastern Europe.
Tensions in Europe continued to mount during the late summer and early 
autumn of 1938. The Munich crisis that saw Germany absorb the Sudetenland region 
of Czechoslovakia has given rise to much debate within historical circles; however, its 
importance for this thesis is to reveal the different approaches of those in London and 
Washington.62 Chamberlain was at the forefront in preventing any armed conflict in
“  Many in Washington, and London, accepted breaches of the Treaty of Versailles as a fait accompli. 
Although never admitted in public, Cadogan's sentiment in February appropriately conveyed this. 
Explaining that he had been summoned to the Foreign Office ‘as there was a flap about Austria’, he 
recorded, ‘I almost wish Germany would swallow Austria and get it over.’ This was followed by the 
admission that, ‘She is probably going to do so anyway -  anyway we can’t stop her.’ Dilks, Cadogan, 
p.47. Hitler succeeding in joining his homeland into the German Reich by insisting that the Austrian 
Chancellor, Kurt von Schuschnigg, incorporate the Austrian Nazi party into his government at a 
meeting at Berchtesgaden in February 1938. When Schuschnigg tried to stall Hitler, an ultimatum was 
submitted which forced his resignation, and the new regime simply invited a German occupation on 13 
March 1938.
61 Entry for 22 March 1938, Nancy Harvison Hooker (ed.). The Moffat Papers -  Selections from the 
Diplomatic Journals o f Jay Pierrepont Moffat 1919-1943 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), p.29l.
62 There is a vast array of material on the Munich crisis. Some suggested sources: John W. Wheeler- 
Bennett, Munich -  Prologue to Tragedy (London, 1948); Maya Latynski (Ed.), Re-appraising the 
Munich Pact -  Continental Perspectives (Washington, 1992); Dwight E. Lee (Ed.), Munich -  Blunder, 
Plot or Tragic Necessity? (Massachusetts, 1970); Barbara Famham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis -
38
Chapter One
September 1938. His hands-on approach, the famous flights to Germany and his role 
in exerting pressure on Czechoslovakia to accept Hitler's demands were crucial in 
avoiding open conflict. In contrast, the role of Roosevelt was far removed, but his 
approach illustrates again the pressures of American opinion, the limited diplomatic 
tools at his disposal, and how in times of crisis Welles came to the fore.
In what was to become common practice for the Roosevelt Administration at 
times of heightened tension, Roosevelt chose in September 1938 to send diplomatic 
messages to Europe. On 26 September 1938 messages urging ‘continued negotiations’ 
were sent to Prague, Berlin, London and Paris, and the next day messages were 
addressed to Mussolini and Hitler appealing for peace to prevail.63 645The carefully 
worded messages represented the limit to which Roosevelt could act to influence 
events in Europe. They were aimed at least in part at the ongoing education of the 
American people about the dangers posed by the Axis powers to the United States. 
Welles was at the forefront of this diplomatic process. He overcame Hull’s opposition 
to the appeal process by arguing that the President of the United States had to make 
some contribution at such a critical time. As he would do at various instances up to 
January 1940, Welles took Roosevelt’s desire to have some sort of input and 
presented a practical option, which crucially did not incur non-entangling criticism. 
Berle understood the wider purposes of the appeals as he suggested that Roosevelt’s 
messages had ‘only one chance in a thousand’ of influencing European events, but 
would nevertheless help present the stark reality of the situation to the American 
people.6' The recurrence of such odds would not preclude Roosevelt from undertaking 
moves in foreign policy during the period under consideration in this work. The same 
odds would be quoted in January 1940 in relation to the Welles mission. In September 
1938 time would prove Berle’s odds to be overly generous. As the fate of peace in 
Europe was in the hands of Chamberlain and Hitler, those in Washington, as they 
would do almost a year later in the run-up to war, waited and watched.
a study o f political decision making (Princeton, 2000); Keith Feiling, The Life o f Neville Chamberlain 
(London, 1946); Duff Cooper, Old Men Forget -  the Autobiography o f Duff Cooper, (London, 1953); 
Wolfgang Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f  
Appeasement, (London, 1983); Edward L. Henson Jr., ‘Britain, America and the Month of Munich’, 
International Relations 1962 2 pp.291 -301; Igor Lukes & Erik Goldstein, ‘The Munich Crisis’ 
Diplomacy and Statecraft Special issue Vol. 10 No. 2 & 3 Jul/Nov 1999.
63 Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp. 157-158.
64 Berle wrote of Welles’ draft that it was ‘infinitely better’ than his own attempt at an appeal for peace. 
Memorandum by Berle, 26 December 1939, ABP Box 211.
65 Memorandum by Berle, 28 December 1939, ABP Box 211.
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The Munich crisis played a minimal role in Anglo-American relations. 
Although information was passed between the two capitals Chamberlain felt 
vindicated in his view that ‘words' were all anyone could expect from Washington at 
a time when he was dealing with the ‘real" issues. For Roosevelt the episode 
confirmed, as historian Barbara Farnham has suggested, that Hitler would need to be 
stopped at some point in the future.66 Yet the outcome in Europe made Roosevelt’s 
task of illustrating to the American people the distinctions between the democracies 
and the Axis all the harder.67
This sentiment was very much in the mind of the Roosevelt Administration 
when Hitler’s aggressive designs on the whole of Czechoslovakia became clear in 
March 1939. The German leadership had orchestrated a crisis which facilitated the 
occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by German troops. The response from London 
and Paris was to guarantee the independence, as distinct from the territorial integrity, 
of Poland.68 Not surprisingly, the response of the Administration in Washington was 
less decisive and was handled by Welles. In the immediate aftermath of this act of 
aggression Roosevelt considered a full break in diplomatic relations with Berlin, but 
such a dramatic reaction was moderated by Welles. Over the next few days Welles 
fashioned the American response with clear consideration of the domestic situation. 
Moffat explained that Welles was fearful ‘of impeding progress on the reform of the 
neutrality legislation,’ which was then being considered in Washington and will be 
discussed presently.69 Welles was reluctant to consider a complete severance of 
relations with Berlin because he believed in the value of maintaining a dialogue of 
some sort, something that would be evident in the summer of 1940 when he was
M> Barbara Famham, Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis -  A Study o f Political Decision Making, 
(Princeton, 2000).
67 Historian Nicholas Cull suggests that Chamberlain actually was considering public opinion, and 
American opinion particularly, in securing the supplementary declaration to the Munich Agreement 
(this declaration pledged the two countries to abide by the Munich Agreement and ‘never to go to war 
with one another again'). Cull points to the prominence given to American newsreel crews at Heston at 
the behest of Downing Street. However, the ‘image of the “piece of paper” contrived to woo American 
opinion [became] an enduring icon of political folly’ and thus did nothing to improve British standing 
across the Atlantic. This author is unconvinced by Cull’s assertion that at the time of Munich 
‘Chamberlain finally attempted to fuse his European appeasement policies with a concern for American 
public opinion’. If the cameras were positioned to the benefit of American newsreels then this reveals 
Chamberlain’s lack of understanding of the manner in which to influence of American opinion. A 
single image was not going to overcome what looked like a deal to carve up Czechoslovakia. Nicholas 
Cull, ‘The Munich Crisis and British Propaganda Policy in the United States’, Diplomacy and 
Statecraft Special Edition Vol. 10 No. 2 & 3 Jul/Nov 1999 pp.216-235.
68 Dutton, Chamberlain, p.23
b) Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.226. Frank Warren Graff, The Strategy o f Involvement: A Diplomatic 
Biography o f Sumner Welles -  1933-43 (New York, 1988), p.248.
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seeking to pursue Italian neutrality. Welles sought to consider the wider foreign 
policy implications of any move. He argued that there was more merit in keeping 
American representation in Berlin than in risking an open diplomatic spat with the 
Nazis. An open breach with Berlin might see a move toward stricter isolationism 
among the public, and increased difficulties for neutrality revision in Congress. This 
line convinced Roosevelt, and a few days elapsed before the Administration 
responded publicly to the passive absorption of Czechoslovakia. Welles composed a 
low-key statement using typically American language and terminology. It condemned 
Germany for ‘the acts which have resulted in the temporary extinguishment of the 
liberties of a free and independent people’. The use of the word ‘temporary’ indicates 
that Welles did not want to preclude options in conducting relations with Germany. 
Welles' role here, in both using open language and endeavouring to remove emotion 
from diplomacy, illustrates how he sought to present policy to Roosevelt which 
manoeuvred around any criticism that the Administration was involving the United 
States in European matters.70
Although Roosevelt had not severed relations with Berlin, Welles’ statement 
was not the only American response to German aggression in the spring of 1939. 
Roosevelt had learned from the British Embassy that they believed ‘the absorption of 
Czechoslovakia has clearly revealed Germany’s intentions. It marks the first departure 
from the Nazi racial theory and there is little reason to suppose that it is not 
Germany's intention to extend over other countries in Europe, notably Rumania and 
Poland, a control equivalent to that obtained over Czechoslovakia’.71 To counter this 
worry Roosevelt wanted to complement Welles’ statement of condemnation in a 
manner that would prevent isolationist criticism. Moffat recorded that Roosevelt’s 
‘ideas are running along the line of a message to Hitler and Mussolini asking them if 
they will guarantee him that their troops will not invade a whole series of neighboring 
countries’.72 This came to fruition in a presidential appeal for ‘nonaggression’
70 That is not to say Welles was blind to the implications of Britain’s new foreign policy. He told 
Kennedy that Chamberlain’s speech in Birmingham was a ‘very far-reaching step’. Kennedy, who still 
had the ear of the British Cabinet, stated ‘that the fat is now on the fire’, because ‘if Poland’s 
independence is threatened England will go in there with all their resources’. Memorandum of 
telephone conversation between Welles and Kennedy, 31 March 1939, SWP Box 162.
71 ‘Message for the personal and confidential information of the President’ from British Embassy 
Washington 29 March 1939. Reel 11 Great Britain January-December 1939 Part 2 Diplomatic 
Correspondence File, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Office Files, 1933-1945. Roosevelt Study 
Center Middelburg, Holland. (Hereafter FDR OF RSC)
12 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.231.
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addressed to Hitler and Mussolini on 14 April. Roosevelt offered the ‘good offices’ of 
the United States in return for ten-year non-aggression pledges against 31 named 
countries.73 74The appeal ended in idealist language: T hope that your answer will make
74it possible for humanity to lose fear and regain security for many years to come.’
Welles was again crucial to formulating Rooseveltian foreign policy. With the 
legacy of his conference plan evident, the non-aggression appeals hoped to illustrate 
to the American people Germany and Italy’s aggressive intentions and lack of respect 
for international relations.75 This was helped somewhat by the dismissive response 
Hitler gave to the proposition in a speech in the Reichstag late in April. Moffat 
recorded afterwards that ‘the conception of Germany as merely reuniting scattered 
Germans under one flag has given way to the idea of empire, power, living room, 
colonies and wealth’.76 It was this idea the Administration could use to further 
distinguish the differences between the democracies and the Axis to the American 
people. Roosevelt explained this to his Treasury Secretary and confidant. Henry 
Morgenthau. Roosevelt was overgenerous in offering odds of ‘one in five’ that the 
appeal would meet with at least a considered response in Europe, but in the 
conversation Morgenthau learned of what Roosevelt was aiming at. Morgenthau 
stated, ‘and if they turn it down, then you will know exactly where you are at’; the 
President responded simply, ‘that is my whole point’.77 In this straightforward phrase 
Roosevelt revealed the Administration’s wider motive of continuing to inform the
7 Telegram from Roosevelt to Hitler, 14 April 1939, 7400.00/817a:Telegram FRUS 1939 Vol. I., 
pp. 130-131. Simultaneously sent to Mussolini. ‘It was a personal appeal, first for a guarantee of the 
status quo and, secondly for co-operation in dealing peacefully with the problems that were facing the 
world’. Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey o f International Affairs 1939 Volume I (London, 1941), p.629.
74 Letter from Roosevelt to Hitler, 14 April 1939, SWP Box 150.
75 Arnold Offner states that the proposals made were ‘evidently to be organised along the lines of 
Welles’ scheme’ for an international conference, first mooted in the aftermath of the ‘Quarantine’ 
speech of October 1937 and later adapted by Roosevelt in his proposal to Chamberlain in the following 
January.’ Offner, Journal o f American History, pp.375-376.
76 Hooker, Moffat, p.234. Yet Hitler’s words resonated with at least one of the Administration’s 
opponents, Senator Borah, who stated that if war broke out ‘a more sordid, imperialistic war could 
hardly be imagined’. Borah quoted in telegram No. 432 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 14 April 1939, 
A2982/98/45 FO 371 22813 PRO. The Idaho Senator’s views as ‘a strong Isolationist’ were known in 
London. ‘He has been the enfant terrible of American politics; at all times concerned jealously to assert 
the rights of the legislature to control the action of the Executive.’ Report No. 17 on personalities in the 
United States from Lindsay, 6 January 1939, A471/47I/45 FO 371 21541 PRO.
77 Phone conversation between Roosevelt and Morgenthau, 15 April 1939, Jan 31-June 27 1939 Card 2 
The Morgenthau Presidential Diaries, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, New York. (Hereafter 
MPD) In undertaking these appeals Roosevelt was not without criticism. Leading isolationist Senator 
Hiram Johnson wrote in late April that of the ‘critical or fair-minded’ with whom he had talked agreed 
with his analysis that it was Hitler who had ‘all the better’ of the exchanges, yet despite that everybody 
is bound ‘to denounce Hitler and praise Roosevelt’. Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 
29 April 1939. The Hiram W. Johnson Papers The Bancroft Library University of California, Berkeley, 
California. (Hereafter HJP).
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American people by clearly identifying the Dictators with aggressive policy aims, and 
so associating the Allies with a ‘clear call for liberty’.78 Further, the practice of 
pursuing policy with an expected outcome based on a negative response from Hitler 
and Mussolini, and that response serving the Administration's goal, is clear.
The significance of these appeals in April 1939 is in further revealing the 
character of Rooseveltian foreign policy and Welles' role in implementing it. During 
the drafting process and once the appeals were made Roosevelt knew the chances of a 
positive response were minimal, but, as he explained to Morgenthau, this did not 
prevent its undertaking. Clearly, the presentation of the differences between the 
Dictators and the democracies to the American people was important for the 
Administration. The role Welles played in the draft further illustrates how he 
interpreted Roosevelt’s desires and how he operated between Roosevelt and Hull. 
Hull was unconvinced of the value of the appeal process, as he stated he ‘had little 
confidence’ in ‘the direct appeals to the heads of foreign government’, whereas 
Roosevelt, on the other hand, believed the United States had to make some move.79 80
Moffat and Berle both noticed how this played out in April 1939. Although ‘the idea 
was essentially the President’s and the first draft entirely his,’ Moffat wrote, ‘the final 
draft was prepared by Sumner Welles.’ Berle added that in his own opinion the 
Under Secretary’s final version ‘immensely improved’ on the President’s initial 
draft.81 Moffat was evidently aware of Hull’s disapproving views, as he concluded 
Welles produced a solution which ‘very cleverly was halfway between the President's 
and the Secretary’s thesis’.82 Berle was also alert to ‘the obviously growing tension’ 
between Hull and Welles and concerned that, since ‘the crisis is forward, and getting 
worse, there must be no possible shadow which will impair the effectiveness of the 
Department’.83 The dedication of both men ensured this did not happen but the 
differences in approach were becoming starker. Welles’ belief in these appeals 
reflected his desire to keep policy options open. An appeal might not achieve anything
78 Comments by Sargent (17/11/38) on comments made by Ex-President Herbert Hoover attached to 
telegram No. 964 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 3 November 1938, A8441/64/45 FO 371 21527 
PRO.
79 Hull, Memoirs Vol. /, p.62. Although not named, when Roosevelt spoke to Morgenthau about the 
possibility of sending a message he mentioned he would have to get around the influence of someone 
in the State Department. Given Hull’s caution the inference is clear. Memorandum by Morgenthau, 11 
April 1939, MPD Card 2.
80 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.231.
81 Memorandum by Berle, 15 April 1939, ABP Box 210.
82 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.231.
83 Memorandum by Berle, 20 April 1939, ABP Box 210.
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but it was also unlikely to damage the state of United States relations with Rome or 
Berlin, and would again show the values that America stood for without overtly 
antagonising isolationist sentiment. The quoting of odds by Roosevelt reflected the 
feeling that the United States was working in the margins in trying to influence events 
in Europe, which would again be evident when further appeals to Europe were 
considered in the final days of peace in the late summer of 1939. In similarly 
orientated language, Lindsay summed up the value of the April appeals. The 
Ambassador Thought it was the last trump card and would be a comprehensive and 
sound guide in the future for all peacefully disposed nations’.84 856
The appeals may have appeared to be the last card in the spring, when Berle 
was not alone in thinking The chance of getting off without a general war is not 
great', but as the summer progressed and tension rose the Administration again 
considered what it could do. ' The answer was to be provided by Welles in both 
policy and practical terms. In August 1939 Roosevelt left the heat and humidity of 
Washington, and Hull followed suit. This meant Welles was Acting Secretary of State 
and in position to coordinate American policy. Berle stated that Welles had been left 
by Roosevelt ‘very wide authority indeed to do what was necessary to prepare for 
neutrality in case of trouble’. Welles was proactive in the preparatory task and 
telegraphed Roosevelt on 17 August requesting authority to begin ‘informally the 
steps which should be taken by this Government in the event that war broke out’.87 
Welles was again working without recourse to Hull, and directly with Roosevelt. The 
steps Welles took as Acting Secretary involved him overseeing a series of ‘technical 
conferences' with other departments. This meant ‘everything is reasonably well 
organised in advance but, of course,’ Moffat recorded, ‘if war should come there 
would be hundreds of new situations which have not been foreseen.’88 These meetings 
amounted to Welles’ practical contribution to the preparations for war, but his policy 
input is entirely more important in understanding the nature of Rooseveltian foreign
84 Hull recorded that Lindsay ‘expressed his great satisfaction with the President’s communication to 
Hitler and Mussolini’. Memorandum of conversation between Hull and Lothian, 17 April 1939. The 
Papers of Cordell Hull. The Library of Congress Manuscripts Division Washington DC. (Hereafter 
CHP).
85 Memorandum by Berle, 13 April 1939, ABP Box 210.
86 Memorandum by Berle, 17 August 1939, ABP Box 210.
87 Telegram from Welles to Roosevelt, 17 August 1939, SWP Box 150.
88 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.248.
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policy immediately preceding the outbreak of war and its relevance to the Welles 
mission.
While in charge of the department Welles composed a series of appeals to be 
addressed to Europe’s leaders. The first was sent to the Italian monarch, Victor 
Emmanuel, on 24 August, followed by appeals to Hitler and the Polish President, 
Ignacy Mosicki, the day after (25 August 1939). The text of the appeals called for 
restraint, but their impact was utterly negligible as Europe hurtled towards war. This 
was anticipated by the Administration. The aim of the appeals, like those sent in 
April, was to illustrate to the American people that the Nazi regime was unreasonable 
and posed a threat to democratic values. This was clearly understood by those in the 
State Department. T don’t think that anyone felt there was more than one chance in a 
thousand that such messages would affect events,’ Moffat acknowledged, ‘but it 
seemed that the chance should be taken and above all that the record should be 
abundantly clear.'89 It was at this point that Berle remarked that the appeals would 
resemble a misplaced ‘valentine’, but to reiterate the outlook within the State 
Department the ‘one certain thing in this business is that no one will be blamed for 
making any attempt, however desperate, at preserving peace’.90 This would enable the 
Administration to illustrate to the American people the lack of respect the Axis 
powers had for reasonable American initiatives and reveal further their aggressive 
tendencies. Moffat lamented the problem the Administration faced, after the failed 
attempts to revise the neutrality legislation (to be dealt with presently). The American 
people, he recorded, ‘have heard the cry “wolf, wolf’ so often that they do not 
appreciate the dangers involved’.91 Instead, with contingency plans in hand, those in 
Washington were forced to wait for news from Europe as peace expired. ‘There really 
is not much for us to do other than wait,’ Moffat wrote ‘what trumps we had were 
long since played.’92
The impact of this appeal and the Administration’s responses to the crises 
precipitated by the Axis powers in the period between the end of 1937 and September 
1939 were marginal to the unleashing of war. Nevertheless, these appeals reveal 
crucial aspects of Rooseveltian foreign policy in the lead up to the Welles mission. 
Firstly, Welles’ role in influencing the drafting and drive behind these appeals was
89 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.253.
90 Memorandum by Berle, 22 August 1939, ABP Box 210.
91 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.245.
92 Hooker, Moffat Papers, pp.257-258.
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critical. The Under Secretary understood the severely constricted policy options open 
to the Administration. Welles also saw how these moves might help in bringing home 
to the American people the full extent of the dangers the Administration perceived in 
the aggressive designs of the Axis powers. Welles shared this understanding with 
Roosevelt, who gave final approval for the appeals to be sent after returning to 
Washington early from his fishing trip.91 *3 The second aspect of importance in this 
process is how these moves were embarked upon by those knowing full well that in 
its stated goal it was highly unlikely to be successful. Nevertheless, Roosevelt and his 
State Department felt that these moves should be considered because their failure 
would further illustrate the dangerous state of affairs facing the American people. 
Accepting that the Administration’s efforts would have only minimal chances of 
success, Berle neatly surmised the underlying motive behind pursuing policies 
expected to fail: ‘the President wishes to be sure that he has left no stone unturned to 
prevent a war.’94 This attitude of seeking to explore every last option to avoid 
catastrophe would be replicated at the time of the Welles mission
The impact of this sentiment on Anglo-American relations caused much 
disquiet in London at the time of the Welles mission, but its prevalence in 
Administration thinking, alongside Washington’s wider consideration of American 
public opinion had already caused noteworthy areas of disharmony in Anglo- 
American relations from the beginning of 1938. The inability of the Administration to 
revise the neutrality legislation in the summer of 1939 was a considerable 
disappointment. Yet in other areas, and at the same time, there was an increasing 
sophistication to the Anglo-American relationship. This was particularly notable 
within elements of the British Foreign Office and, the conclusion of an Anglo- 
American trade agreement can be seen at least in part as having resulted in improved 
relations. The areas of harmony and disharmony will now be considered.
91 Roosevelt’s return came after the announcement of the Nazi-Soviet Pact on 23 August 1939. ‘The
announcement of the German-Russian understanding,’ Berle recorded, ‘is not surprising, since it has
been perfectly obvious that the Russians were double-dealing right along; but the timing is unpleasant, 
for it can only be regarded as an indication by the Russians that the Germans can have a free hand so 
far as they are concerned. This is as cynical a piece of international business as has happened in a long 
time.’ Memorandum by. Berle, 22 August 1939, ABP Box 210.
94 Memorandum by Berle, 16 August 1939, ABP Box 210.
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Anglo-American relations 1938 and 1939 -  harmony and disharmony 
The transatlantic relationship of the latter part of the Second World War has been 
much vaunted as a ‘special relationship’, but there was little sign of that in the 
aftermath of Chamberlain’s scuppering of the Administration’s January 1938 
approach.
However, the conclusion of the Anglo-American trade agreement in 
November 1938 for political rather than explicitly economic reasons reveals a 
harmony of interests. The trade agreement between London and Washington was 
signed at the White House on 17 November 1938 and had both obvious economic and 
more subtle political features to it. In economic terms, compromise was made on both 
sides, and for the British this meant change to the principle of Imperial Preference.95 
Yet it was the political aspects of the agreement that ensured its conclusion in the 
aftermath of the Munich crisis in 193 8.96 Sir John Balfour, the head of the American 
Desk, was already well aware of this at the beginning of the year. He wrote, ‘it must 
always be borne in mind that the commercial advantages of the agreement may be 
relatively inferior to its political importance.’97 According to Keith Feiling, 
Chamberlain too was aware of the potential for the accord in two areas: firstly, it 
‘would help educate American opinion to act more and more with us’, and secondly 
because ‘it would frighten the totalitarians’.98 While this reveals Chamberlain’s 
knowledge of the potential, it also reveals that he wanted to utilise the agreement in 
support of his own policies. Nevertheless, the agreement between London and 
Washington had an important symbolic dimension. Lindsay was most aware of this 
and saw the meaning of the agreement as ‘being a well-timed gesture of solidarity 
between the two countries’. These words were endorsed by the Foreign Office, who 
saw the agreement as a commitment ‘to a continuance of the liberal system’. It was 
the wider commitment that was of particular value to London, the Foreign Office 
adding that ‘the U.S. Administration are, through Mr Hull, even more certainly
95 This principle had been inaugurated in the Ottawa agreements of 1932 essentially as the British 
Empire’s answer to the Great Depression. It was at odds with Cordell Hull’s view of international trade 
because he saw it as protectionist. The ‘closed market’ was modified in the agreement that came into 
force on January 1 1939.
% Annual Report on United States for 1938 from Lindsay, 7 March 1939, A1882/1882/45 FO 371 
22832 PRO.
97 Letter from Balfour to Stirling, 24 January 1938, FO 371 21490 PRO.
98 Feiling, Chamberlain, p.308.
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committed to such a system.'99 Thus the signing of the Trade Agreement between the 
United States and Great Britain at such a moment, despite some technical problems 
which would ensue, meant they shared a mutual interest in the preservation of at least 
one aspect of international relations.100
Yet the harmony of interests at the agreement’s conclusion betrayed a long 
and hard negotiation process during which differences between London and 
Washington were evident. Hull’s role in overcoming such difficulties requires some 
examination. As explained previously, Hull was a firm believer in the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreement programme and saw an agreement with Britain as integral to this. 
Historian Tony McCulloch states that the "initiative in improving [trade] relations 
came from Washington rather than London and was largely the responsibility of 
Cordell Hull'.101 Yet it had taken until March 1938 for negotiations with Britain to 
begin formally and by early autumn Hull was exasperated by the lack of progress. 
Hull told Lindsay that he was "greatly discouraged [by] the lack of interest of the 
British Government in [the] broader features and objectives of the program to 
promote trade and peace ... but only its very narrowest dollar and cent objectives’.102 
Clearly, Hull had a wider agenda than simply that of "dollars and cents'. Hull saw the 
successful resolution of an Anglo-American trade agreement as an indicator to the 
American people and the Dictators of shared beliefs between Great Britain and the 
United States.103
Although the focus of this thesis is on the motivations and objectives of the 
Welles mission and sees Roosevelt’s relationship with Welles as crucial, Hull’s place 
in American foreign policy is well illustrated here. His views on reciprocal trade were 
widely held in the State Department and in many ways complemented Welles’ ideas 
on international relations. Moffat acknowledged as much in January 1938. ‘The
” Commercial Policy of Great Britain Telegram No. 69E from Mallet, 19 January 1939 A780/26/45 
FO 371 22796 PRO.
100 McCulloch states that the Trade Agreement was important to the Anglo-American relationship: ‘A 
trade agreement was signed in 1938, by which time Anglo-American relations were closer than for 
many years.’ Tony McCulloch, Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy and the European Crisis, 1933- 
1939, September 1978 D.Phil, Oxford, p.l.
101 McCulloch, Economic Diplomacy, p.l.
102 Record of conversation between Hull and Lindsay, 3 September 1938, CHP Roll 29.
IW For an example of this assessment of Hull’s views, see Hans-Jurgen Schroder, ‘The Ambiguities of 
Appeasement: Great Britain, the United States and Germany, 1937-39’ in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Lothar Kettenacker (eds.) The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasement, (London, 1983) 
pp.390-399. For a detailed examination of the facets of wider economic diplomacy in the early 1930s 
one should examine the work of Patricia Clavin, The Failure o f Economic Diplomacy; Britain, 
Germany, France and the United States, 1931-36 (London, 1996).
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developments of our trade agreement program,' he wrote, ‘will automatically put 
economic pressure on Germany and in this we have a ready forged weapon to hand to 
induce Germany to meet general world trade and political sentiment.' 
Unfortunately this ‘weapon' would prove unsuccessful in countering Germany in 
1938 and 1939. Nevertheless, Hull's dedication to pursuing reciprocal trade 
represented another of the options open to the Roosevelt Administration without the 
risk of incurring public rancour. Furthermore, the attitude of reciprocity would be 
evident in the ‘neutrals' declaration Hull made on the same day Roosevelt announced 
the Welles mission in February 1940.
The swift conclusion of the agreement after the Munich crisis indicates that 
the imagery of Anglo-American cooperation was paramount. Such harmony was also 
evident in the face of increasing tension in the summer of 1939 when a transatlantic 
barter deal was concluded. In less than eight weeks a deal was completed which saw 
strategic exchanges of American cotton for British rubber and tin. The speedy 
conclusion of the deal illustrates a number of key developments in the transatlantic 
relationship, at a time when the revision of the neutrality legislation was still in doubt. 
In complete contrast to the protracted negotiations that had preceded the signing of 
the Trade Agreement the previous November, the speed with which matters were 
dealt with reflected the intensified threats Britain was facing and the wider 
implications the conclusion of such a deal could have. From the outset Lindsay urged 
London to adopt a ‘forthcoming attitude’ towards the proposal first put forward by 
American Ambassador to London Joseph Kennedy. Lindsay saw ‘any serious 
achievement in this line’ as having ‘[a] useful effect in Congress’.104 05 This was 
understood in the Foreign Office, as one official wrote that it would be ‘clearly 
desirable’ to conclude a deal ‘with a view to the increase of good will’ that may 
follow.106 Although the deal eventually covered relatively trivial matters, and was 
undoubtedly hastened by the increasing likelihood of war, the fact that Britain was 
prepared to compromise its tangible assets in favour of the influence of American 
public opinion was an important development and showed that London was becoming 
increasingly aware of the political pressures under which the Roosevelt
104 Moffat Memorandum, 3 1 January 1938, NA, RG 59, 611.6231/1002 'A from Schroder in Mommsen 
and Kettenacker (ed). The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasement, p.392.
105 Telegram No.218 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 17 May 1939, A3554/26/45 FO 371 22797 PRO.
106 Comments by Beith (15/5/39) attached to ‘Proposal for exchange of raw materials’ FO minute by 
Beith. 26 April 1939. A3055/26/45 FO 371 22797 PRO.
49
Chapter One
Administration operated. The trading of palpable British assets in return for acts of 
American goodwill and assistance was a process that became vital to the survival of 
Britain during the war.
The importance of the successful conclusion of the Trade Agreement and then 
on a lesser scale the barter deal, was that in one area of economic relations a harmony 
of interests was emerging as the crisis deepened. However, there was not wholesale 
progress, and, increasing understanding across the Atlantic would not be sufficiently 
strong to overcome non-entangling opinion in Congress in the summer of 1939. The 
resultant failure of the Roosevelt Administration to successfully revise the neutrality 
legislation would be a blow to Anglo-American relations.
The process of neutrality revision had begun in March 1939 and would 
represent the limits to which the Administration could operate in the face of non­
entangling public opinion in the United States. The dispute between the 
Administration and its opponents centred on Roosevelt’s desire to revise the 
legislation in favour of allowing presidential discretion, and his opponents worried 
that this would precipitate involvement in the impending conflict. Hiram Johnson, a 
key opponent of the revision, went as far as to write that Roosevelt wanted "to knock 
down two dictators in Europe, so that one may be firmly implanted in America’.107 
The debate that then ensued in the spring and summer of 1939, facilitated by the 
committee-hearing process, was lengthy, heated and complicated even by Washington 
standards. Twin drives for revision in both the House and, Senate, and the 
Administration's initial endeavours to take a low profile, meant there was plenty of 
opportunity for those opposed to revision to make their mark. The end result was 
failure of the Administration’s bills. In June 1939 Johnson wrote to his son that the 
opponents had ‘whipped the Administration in the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations upon the Neutrality issue’. A month later he wrote that it was a ‘strange 
thing to see the House kicking the Administration’s Neutrality Bill around’. The 
outcome of the hearings was ‘exactly what Roosevelt and Hull did not wish’, as the 
legislation was made to be ‘impartial and applicable to all alike’.108 This meant the 
Administration had nowhere left to turn, and with the end of the congressional session
1(17 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 29 April 1939, HJP.
108 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 3 June 1939 and Letter from Hiram Johnson to 
Hiram Johnson Jr., 2 July 1939, HJP.
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approaching, the neutrality legislation was left unrevised and so lacking presidential 
discretion.
The significance of this episode to Administration foreign policy and Anglo- 
American relations was not lost on Roosevelt. After the Senate had voted down the 
Administration's bill he asked Morgenthau to send word to London that the ‘situation 
is a legislative tangle’ but that 'we hope it will come out all right’.109 Roosevelt then 
added with a further gambling reference that he would wager an ‘old hat,' ‘that Hitler 
when he wakes up and finds out what has happened, ... will be rejoicing.’ Whatever 
Hitler’s response, those in London knew that the Administration's failure meant there 
would be little assistance in this area coming from Washington as tension increased. 
Although Lothian, later stated that the debate had shown ‘a wide sympathy with the 
Allies', he concluded that it also revealed an equally ‘unanimous determination that 
the United States must be kept out of war’.110 In short, then, the debate epitomised the 
dual trends within the American population with the non-entanglement element 
winning through. This would limit Rooseveltian foreign policy to making nominal 
appeals for restraint in the late summer of 1939 as war approached. Indeed, the 
significance of this episode is in illustrating the extent to which Roosevelt’s policy 
options were constrained by non-entangling opinion. Once war broke out the pressure 
to remain aloof from Europe would remain an important element in Roosevelt’s 
decision making behind the Welles mission.
Circumvention -  Foreign Policy operating in the margins
By the outbreak of war Roosevelt was accustomed to working within the constraints 
predicated by American public opinion. The Welles mission of February and March 
1940 would illustrate succinctly his efforts to work both within and outside these 
constraints. However, although certain of the Administration’s policies, notably the 
appeals process, were very visible, Roosevelt also employed more oblique methods to 
further his policy aims. In drawing upon two examples, the Ingersoll mission (January 
1938) and the royal visit (July 1939), this study will point to a covert political agenda
109 Phone conversation between Roosevelt and Morgenthau, 30 June 1939, MPD Card 3.
110 Letter No. 772 from Lothian to Halifax, 3 September 1940. Political Review of the Year 1939 by 
Lord Lothian A429/1631/45 in David K. Adams (ed.), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports 
and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print. Part II From the First to the Second World War 
Series C North American 1919-1939 Vol. 25 (University Publications of America, 1995).
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that Roosevelt was able to deploy.111 Having a range of objectives for any single 
policy was very much part of Roosevelt's presidential style; seen in no more stark 
terms than in this author's analysis of the impulses and objectives for the Welles 
mission itself. Less obvious, ulterior motives were often pursued through somewhat 
obscure channels and with indirect means, but they do represent an important part of 
the way in which Roosevelt operated. That these ‘channels' often involved the 
appointment of individuals at Roosevelt's discretion allowed him to maintain a close 
personal hold on his policy and manage the public profile of such moves.
The mission of Captain Royal E. Ingersoll should be seen in this light. In late 
December 1937 Roosevelt was seeking to offer a response to Japanese aggression in 
mainland China whilst also encouraging closer Anglo-American relations and all 
without irking non-entangling sentiment. Roosevelt saw an opportunity to do this in 
the realm of naval relations in the aftermath of the 'Panay incident. Local Japanese 
forces, acting without authority, had attacked the USS Panay and a British ship, the 
HMS Bee, in the Yangtze River (12 December 1937). Although the initial reaction of 
both governments was caution and a pacific settlement emerged with Tokyo, 
Roosevelt seized upon the occasion to promote some coordination of policy with 
Great Britain in the Far East.112 He decided to despatch Ingersoll, the Navy’s Director 
of Planning and later during the war Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, to London late 
in 1937.113
111 Roosevelt had utilised this tactic earlier in his Administration. Richard Harrison’s explores a 
number of occasions when Roosevelt endeavoured to use discussions on ‘technical’ matters to further 
Anglo-American relations. See both Richard Harrison, Testing the Water: A Secret Probe towards 
Anglo-American military cooperation in 1936, The International History Review VII 2 May 1985 
pp.214-234; and Richard Harrison, A Presidential Demarche -  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Personal 
Diplomacy and Great Britain 1936-1937 Diplomatic History’ Voi.5 No.3 Summer 1981 p.246. Richard 
Harrison, The Runciman visit to Washington in January 1937, Canadian Journal o f History XIX, 
August 1984, pp.217-239. This visit is also examined by Tony McCulloch, who asserts that the 
Runciman mission was largely arranged by Roosevelt’s good friend Arthur Murray although initiated 
by the President himself. Tony McCulloch, Franklin Roosevelt and the Runciman Mission o f August in 
I93S: a sidelight on Anglo-American relations in the era o f appeasement. As yet unpublished paper in 
the author’s possession.
112 At the time Chamberlain’s focus was on continental Europe, not to mention the limited capacity of 
the Royal Navy. Anthony Eden explained that, ‘The despatch of an adequate fleet to the Far East 
would expose us to the risk of complications nearer home.’ He was of course referring to the potential 
of Germany and Italy to pose security threats to British interests. Report of final two months by 
Anthony Eden (undated) AEP US/38/6 FO 954/29A PRO. Ian Cowman states that ‘by deliberately 
delaying their response to the Japanese attack, the Roosevelt Administration allowed time for a 
peaceful solution to emerge’. Ian Cowman, Dominion or Decline -  Anglo-American Naval Relations in 
the Pacific, 1937-41 (Oxford and Washington DC, 1996), p. 135.
111 Roosevelt had already been thinking along these lines, by instructing Admiral Leahy, Chief of 
Naval Operations, to hold talks with the British Naval Attaché in Washington. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A 
Study in Tyranny (London, 1962), pp.361-362.
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Anthony Eden, still Foreign Secretary until the disagreement with 
Chamberlain that would see him resign in February 1938. was delighted at the 
prospect of Ingersoll's mission. This was because Eden was aware of the potential 
benefit such an approach could have for the wider Anglo-American relationship. He 
speculated to Lindsay that ‘the President was doubtless thinking aloud and feeling his 
way towards a plan" which if nothing else indicated his ‘good will'. Ingersoll soon 
arrived in London and, when the first round of conversations began on 1 January 
1938. the British sought clarification of the purpose of the talks. Ingersoll stated that 
Roosevelt believed the time had come to coordinate British and American naval 
planning in the Far East ‘more closely’.114 156 The talks were progressing ‘very 
satisfactorily' when Eden cabled Lindsay on 4 January and he thought it might be 
feasible to ‘informally ... discuss all possibilities'.1 b He saw the Ingersoll 
conversations as an opportunity for communication with a personal representative of 
Roosevelt which should be taken advantage of, not necessarily for immediate reward 
but for the sake of future relations. Ingersoll himself was aware of the potential in his 
mission but conscious of not allowing the conversations to stray too far. After 
Ingersoll's conversation with Lord Chatfield, the First Lord of the Admiralty, on 3 
January 1938, Chatfield recorded that Ingersoll felt that their conversation ‘had 
ranged further than was really under consideration at the time’." 6 This awareness, 
even for the matters discussed, is indicative of the limits to the mission. An overt 
political dimension to the discussions could have caused considerable problems in 
Washington and so the talks that continued with members of the Foreign Office and 
the Admiralty until 14 January remained very much on a technical and operational 
level. The result was ‘an informal agreement on joint action in the event of war with 
Japan’ and nothing that could have been called a commitment by critics of either 
party.117
Even in the aftermath of the visit, sensitivity surrounding the matters discussed 
was evident in London. The Foreign Office quizzed Lindsay over the wording of a
114 Records of conversation on Anglo-American Cooperation in the Far East between Herschel 
Johnson, Captain Ingersoll, Eden and Cadogan, I January 1938, F95/84/I0 FO 371 22106 PRO.
115 Telegram No. 19 from Eden to Lindsay, 4 January 1938, AEP US/38/1 FO 954/29A PRO.
116 Memo of meeting with Captain Ingersoll, Lord Chatfield, Admiral Sir WM. James and Captain 
Wilson (US Naval Attache), 3 January 1938, F95/84/I0 FO 371 22106 PRO.
117 C.A. Macdonald, The United States, Britain and Appeasement, 1936-39 (London, 1981), p.61. 
Cadogan put this slightly differently; noting the talks ‘resulted in an agreed record but no 
commitments’. Dilks, Cadogan, p.32.
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press release, as they were worried that if they misconstrued the Americans’ aims then 
those in Washington 'may get [the] impression that we are trying to belittle what they 
have been doing for naval co-operation’. Significantly, the Foreign Office added, 
'That is the last thing we should wish to do....’118 This is a noteworthy admission of 
the consideration of Washington in Foreign Office thinking. Eden concluded that the 
visit was 'interesting', as 'much useful work has certainly been done’, but realised 
this was not necessarily in terms of commitments but in terms of establishing a 
working relationship.119 Further, the field of naval relations could be presented in 
national security terms and so was in one sense a relatively neutral area for both sides 
to discuss.120 That is not to overstate the impact of the Ingersoll mission on the Anglo- 
American relationship. Nevertheless, it was indicative of Roosevelt’s preference for 
personal diplomacy in circumventing the dangers of direct political channels. The 
same can be said of Roosevelt’s handling of the royal visit in the summer of 1939.
The genesis of the visit of King George VI and his Queen had come almost a 
year earlier, when Roosevelt learned of the couple's impending visit to Canada. If 
carefully portrayed as an apolitical visit, Roosevelt saw it as an opportunity to further 
the understanding of the values he felt the United States and Great Britain shared 
without risking domestic criticism.
The President was himself the driving force behind securing the first visit of a 
British sovereign to the United States. In August 1938 Roosevelt wrote to 
Buckingham Palace, inviting the royal couple to add a stop in the United States to the 
planned visit to Canada. In doing so he revealed explicitly that in his eyes the visit 
would have an underlying political aspect: T think it would be an excellent thing for 
Anglo-American relations if you could visit the United States.’ To prevent the royal 
couple from appearing aloof, Roosevelt intended them to stay at his own house in 
Hyde Park, New York. The President stressed the benefits of a trip to upstate New
118 Telegram No.74 from Foreign Office to Lindsay, 28 January 1938, A 2127/64/45 FO 371 21526 
PRO. Also referenced under FI 179/80/10 FO 371 22107 PRO. Eden had already written to Lindsay as 
to how British conduct was being perceived in Washington. Eden wrote 'It would be interesting to 
know [the] reaction of US Government,’ and if the ambassador could glean any 'indication of 
intentions of US Government.’ Telegram No. 19 from Eden to Lindsay, 4 January 1938, AEP US/38/1 
FO 954/29A PRO.
119 Accompanying comments by Eden from Markham (Admiralty) to Harvey, 17 January 1938, FO 371 
22106 F716/84/10 PRO.
120 Regarding the Far East, Cowman suggests that the period until 1941 was characterised as one where 
the military considerations were paramount over diplomatic relations; ‘Yet in the period 1937 to 1941 
strategic considerations underpinned diplomatic relations; the origins of the alliance were always 
essentially military.’ Cowman, Dominion, p.l. This view is confirmed by Christopher Thome, Allies o f 
a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London, 1978).
54
Chapter One
York in a second letter to London: ‘The simplicity and naturalness of such a visit 
would produce a most excellent effect.'121 The effect that Roosevelt wanted was to 
encourage a belief in the American people that they shared values with the United 
Kingdom.
Those in London saw the potential of such a visit. King George VI wrote to 
the President in the aftermath of Munich agreeing to visit the United States and 
exhibiting an understanding of the potential political benefits. T can assure you that 
the pleasure, which it would in any case give to us personally, would be greatly 
enhanced by the thought that it was contributing in any way to the cordiality of the 
relations between our two countries.’122 123Lindsay in Washington shared the view that a 
trip would assist the cause of the Anglo-American relationship: ‘nothing but good 
could come from it.' " Both parties then recognised the potential of a royal visit to 
Washington for furthering the cause of Anglo-American relations.
The care with which Roosevelt orchestrated the visit is evident in the 
discussion surrounding a possible trip to Chicago. Lindsay had considered that it 
might help the underlying motive of the visit were the royal couple to venture beyond 
the East Coast. However, Roosevelt was very wary of sending the royal couple to the 
venue of his Quarantine speech, and home of the Hearst Press with its anti-Roosevelt 
agenda. He wrote to Buckingham Palace, ‘I am not in the least bit insistent on it if you 
decide to forego it.’ Roosevelt’s lack of encouragement for the couple to ‘go west’ 
reflected his twin desires not to incite any criticism for the visit as being political and 
to ensure the couple had time to visit Hyde Park.124 The time in upstate New York 
was duly scheduled for the last two days of the North American trip. The first two
121 Letter from Roosevelt to King George VI, 25 August 1938. Reel 16 Great Britain King and Queen 
June 1938-June 1939 1945 Part 2 Diplomatic Correspondence File, FDR OF RSC.
122 The King added: 'Before I end this letter, I feel that I must say how greatly I welcomed your 
interventions in the recent crisis. 1 have little doubt that they contributed largely to the preservation of 
peace.’ King to Roosevelt, 8 October 1938, FDR OF RSC.
123 Letter from Lindsay to Halifax, 25 October 1938, FO 794/17 PRO.
124 As it transpired, when details of the trip were announced in early November 1938, the itinerary 
allowed only four days in the United States and so the practical possibility of a trip to Chicago was 
dropped. However, the Chicago issue remained under consideration. The following March questions 
were raised in parliament as to the dangers of visiting only the Eastern states. The Foreign Office 
responded ‘[w]e have consistently advocated the extension of the Royal visit to the United States as far 
as Chicago at least, but this has proved impossible owing to the shortness of the visit.’ The brevity of 
the Royal visit was explained by Beith. ‘It must be remembered that the United States visit was 
essentially an afterthought to the Canadian visit.’ Comments by Beith (9/3/39) attached to FO minute 
Loxley, 2 March 1939, A1698/27/45 FO 371 22800 PRO.
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days of four, following the visit to Canada, were to be spent between Washington and 
New York, where the royal couple would visit the 1939 New York World Fair.
When King George VI and Queen Elizabeth arrived in the United States on 8 
June 1939 they received a rapturous welcome from the American public.125 The visit 
to Washington caused quite a 'hullabaloo’, with Moffat noting that 'today virtually all 
work stopped. The visit of the King and Queen was made the occasion of an 
unofficial but nevertheless complete holiday for the entire city'.126 It was after a busy 
day at the World Fair that the couple arrived at Roosevelt's house in New York on 10 
June 1939. It was here that Roosevelt sought to fulfil the promise of the visit. In two 
private conversations Roosevelt attempted to impress upon the young King, as he had 
done with other British citizens he encountered, the need for British preparedness.127 
When King George VI reported to London that Roosevelt had broached the idea of 
transferring some old destroyers to Britain (a foretelling of what would happen in the 
summer of 1940), the suggestion was discounted and the King was seen as having 
been the victim of one of Roosevelt’s 'grand stories', rather than in receipt of a 
possible policy.128 Indeed the inexperienced monarch later felt let down by such 
remarks from Roosevelt, although they were never intended as a portent of American 
aid to Britain at that stage. Nevertheless, the visit to Flyde Park did fulfil Roosevelt’s 
desired aim of presenting the royal couple to the American people. Roosevelt’s 
undoubted charm and the ambience of the setting meant the royal party could 
genuinely relax by the swimming pool in the summer sunshine. According to the 
British Consul General to New York, reports of this scene ‘undoubtedly revealed a 
new and appealing side of royalty to the American public’.129 Lindsay agreed that a 
positive impression had been formed by the royal visit. ‘The truth is that the 
impression Their Majesties have created,' the Ambassador wrote, ‘has been deep and 
has extended to the broadest strata of the population of America.’130 Bar those with an
125 The couple’s travels through Canada provided an appetiser for the American people’s interest in the 
King and Queen. It was estimated that of 11 million Canadians, 6 million of them personally saw the 
King and Queen. Rhodes, Diplomatic History, p.207.
126 Hooker, Moffat Papers, p.242.
127 See Roosevelt’s meeting with future ambassador to Washington, Lothian (Philip Kerr) in January 
1939 where he was given a ‘strong rebuff by the President. The episode is recorded by David 
Reynolds in 'FDR on the British: A Postscript' Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings 90, 
1978.
128 Reynolds, Historian, p.468.
I2<) Despatch No. 211 from Haggard (British Counsel General in New York) to Lindsay, 14 June 1939, 
A4435/27/45 F0 37I 22801 PRO.
130 No. 679 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 20 June 1939, A4443/27/45 FO 371 22801 PRO.
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opposition agenda, the American press was wholly supportive of the visit. The New 
York Times used extravagant language to sum up the views of many in the aftermath 
of the trip: ‘We stand together on fundamentals, whatever our opinions as to transient 
policies ... the mass of us, on both sides of the water, stand firm in our longing for a 
world in which there shall be assurances of peace and in which the spirit of man shall 
have room to grow toward a creative freedom.'131 Despite this attitude, Lindsay 
realised that the visit and the enthusiasm for the royal couple themselves would not be 
realised in political terms, at least in the near future. He wrote that it was far from 
certain that the visit would 'materially influence the minority of the Senate who are 
opposing the amendments of the neutrality law desired by the Administration’.132 
Unfortunately for London, Lindsay was proved right at the beginning of July, as 
outlined above. Nonetheless, Lindsay’s observations succinctly illustrate the dual 
views of the American people.
The royal visit showed that Britain could not count on any sympathy from the 
American people translating itself into a weakening of the non-entangling element of 
American opinion. This was confirmed by Berle, who wrote, ‘I cannot conceive that 
any very deep political results will flow.' Instead, he observed, ‘everybody liked the 
King and Queen and the only broken hearts are those of the large group of people who 
wished to get a little closer to the King than they did’; nevertheless, crucially, Berle 
concluded, 'but none of that is important.’133 Senator Borah agreed with Berle as to 
the prospect of influencing American attitudes. 'Their visit, in my opinion, will have 
in the long run not the slightest effect upon the American people in formulating their 
judgement upon the great matters which concern the United States.’134 At least in the 
short term Borah was right, as the failure to revise the neutrality legislation proved.
Although it would come up in conversation when Welles met the royal couple 
in London in March 1940, the importance of the episode for this thesis lies in
111 Despatch No. 67 from Lindsay to the Foreign Office ‘US press reaction to the visit of Their 
Majesties’, 27 June 1939, A4441/27/45 FO 371 22801 Also filed under4l4/276 FO A443. PRO.
1,2 No. 679 from Lindsay to Foreign Office, 20 June 1939, A4443/27/45 FO 371 22801 PRO. Lindsay 
believed that to further the cause of the British position one had to appeal to the emotion of American 
opinion. Lindsay had first pushed this thesis in a telegram he sent to Eden in March 1937. The 
implications of this telegram and its longer-term impact upon the thinking of those in London are 
discussed by Thomas E. Hachey in ‘Winning Friends and Influencing Policy -  British Strategy to Woo 
America in 1937’, Wisconsin Magazine o f History 1972 55 pp. 120-129.
m  Memorandum by Berle, 12 June 1939, ABP Box 210.
114 Letter from Borah to L.T. Gaddis (Rhode Island), 13 June 1939. Box 514 The Papers of William E. 
Borah. (Hereafter WBP) The Library of Congress Manuscripts Division Washington DC.
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illustrating the efforts Roosevelt made to circumvent political opposition and to 
increase understanding within the American people of a harmony of interests with 
Great Britain. Although Roosevelt might have been disappointed in his desire to see a 
wider improvement in Anglo-American relations resulting from the visit, the ‘effect’ 
he was looking for -  of producing a cordial and sympathetic effect in the American 
people -  was largely achieved. That the visit did not aid the immediate cause of 
influencing the revision of the neutrality legislation in the summer of 1939 would 
have been of little surprise. The visit is important, though, as additional evidence of 
Roosevelt's investing the Administration’s efforts in policy directions where tangible 
outcomes were unlikely. In other words, the Administration's efforts with regard to 
the royal visit and the Ingersoll mission represented, in an oblique fashion, policy 
operating in the margins as far as achieving direct outcomes was concerned. This 
sentiment would be evident in Roosevelt’s motivations for the Welles mission in early 
1940.
Conclusions -  Relationships beine made
In this work's examination of the Welles mission, this chapter has argued that, during 
the period from the consideration of Welles’ conference plan in the autumn of 1937 to 
the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, four key themes of Rooseveltian 
foreign policy are evident which have a broader influence on the mission itself.
The first element is the integral role played by Sumner Welles in formulating 
United States foreign policy. At important moments during 1938 and 1939 -  in 
January 1938, September 1938, in April and then again in August 1939 -  as 
international tensions rose, it was Welles who was the key player in drafting and 
implementing the Administration’s policies. Anthony Eden later wrote of Welles: ‘I 
have known no man in the United States who had a clearer perception than he of the 
course of international diplomacy in the last years before the Second World War.’135 
Welles was able to forward his view because of the unique position he had in 
Roosevelt’s Administration. The Under Secretary, whose background closely 
mirrored that of the President, had an almost uncanny ability to turn Roosevelt’s 
ideas, of which he had many, into definite policy options. These skills, and Welles’ 
own ambition, meant that he was able to develop Roosevelt’s loose instructions and
115 Earl of Avon, Eden, p.568.
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incorporate elements of his own agenda. Having fulfilled this task in Latin America, 
Welles was in a position in the autumn of 1937 to offer a plan for an Armistice Day 
conference. After playing a crucial role in 1938 and 1939 Welles had strengthened his 
standing in interpreting Roosevelt's ideas by the beginning of 1940. The legacy of the 
content of Welles' Armistice Day conference plan should not be underestimated. 
Although the link is direct to the reincarnation of the plan in January 1938, it fed 
indirectly into wider State-Department thinking. The appeals for restraint, Hull’s work 
on reciprocal trade and then the declaration to neutral powers on 9 February 1940 
should be seen in this light. In short, then, Sumner Welles was a key influence on 
American foreign policy both in substance and in being at the right hand of Roosevelt, 
whereas Hull was able to follow his own policy and counsel caution to his President.
This practice fitted in well with Roosevelt's administrative style. He 
encouraged subordinates to pursue individual projects to further United States 
interests even if they appeared to have been given the same remit. ‘Knowing the 
President fairly well,' Berle explained, T know that anyone who acts in his name is 
permitted to go right ahead. He never disavows anyone. As matters go along, he will 
eventually take a stand.'136 Berle’s analysis alludes to how Roosevelt, while not 
concerning himself with the detail, would manage various foreign policy moves and 
be prepared to act when he thought the time was right. Historian Warren Kimball 
writes of Roosevelt’s style that ‘different officials and agencies seemed to have 
responsibility for the same task and policies', and that this suited Roosevelt because it 
"often worked to make him the referee and thus concentrate power in the White 
House’.137 This was crucial for the manner in which foreign policy was made in the 
Administration, particularly with regard to the way Welles operated, although it also 
applied to Hull and his pursuit of the reciprocal trade programme.
Indeed, it is important to consider the standing of Hull in the Administration, 
as this is the second theme evident in this period identified in this work. Roosevelt 
valued his words of caution, and in the case of both the conference plan and the 
Welles mission they were to some degree heeded. Hull’s worries remained constant 
throughout the period and centred on how any American move in foreign affairs 
would be viewed, firstly by the American people, and secondly by those overseas.
136 Memorandum by Berle, 18 August 1939, ABP Box 210
137 Warren Kimball, The Juggler - Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New Jersey, 1991), p.4.
59
Chapter One
The latter worry in itself contained two elements: the reactions of the democracies and 
those of the Axis. Hull knew full well that the United States was not in a position to 
intervene in any meaningful manner in the escalating hostility in Europe, and felt that 
United States interests would be best served by not venturing into European affairs. 
He viewed Welles' plans, throughout the period, as likely to antagonise the Axis 
powers, frustrate the democracies and confuse the American domestic audience.
American foreign policy was limited in its practical ability to influence events 
overseas and this was constantly in the mind of both Welles and Hull. The dual trends 
in American public opinion predicated careful policy formation by the 
Administration. The precise handling of the royal visit is one example of how 
Roosevelt operated under these pressures. Furthermore, Roosevelt's personal 
influence reveals a broader desire to remove the political pressure of public opinion 
by keeping a close rein on foreign policy moves. However, these efforts were 
recognised as being conducted with only the slightest odds of success. Indeed, while 
Europe headed towards conflict, the policies emanating from the Roosevelt 
Administration had next to no impact in Europe
The far-from-harmonious state of Anglo-American relations is the last area of 
relevance highlighted in this chapter. Chamberlain exhibited a lack of understanding 
of the complexity of American opinion and how it informed United State foreign 
policy. In turn this meant cooperation between Prime Minister and President was 
minimal. Chamberlain's retort to Welles’ plan at the beginning of 1938 reflected this. 
The implicit cooperation and harmony of interests on which the Welles plan was 
based meant Roosevelt had little choice but to listen to London. It is important to note 
that at the time of the Welles mission Roosevelt again received a negative response 
from Chamberlain and that the Prime Minister’s objections were to affect the 
mission's evolution, but in very different circumstances, the mission was nevertheless 
put into operation. The explanation of why Roosevelt pursued the mission will 
continue to be explored in the following chapters.
However, it is important to remember that Chamberlain was not the only 
dynamic in the Anglo-American relationship. Other British protagonists, notably 
those in the Foreign Office, especially Eden before his resignation and Lindsay in 
Washington, were becoming increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of the 
ways in which Rooseveltian foreign policy was being made. David Scott of the
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American Desk at the Foreign Office, in March 1939 accurately surmised the 
intluence that the American people had in determining how Britain appeared in the 
United States. He wrote “any compromise by us with the Dictators over a fundamental 
principle or moral issue would do this country untold damage in the United States.' 
The crucial implication here is that if Britain were to appear to be in league with the 
Axis powers then the Administration had less flexibility in conducting foreign policy. 
Vansittart expressed how the United Kingdom needed to act to secure American 
favour: ‘if we have no more Munich’s’ British prospects in the US will be much the 
stronger. ‘We really lost the USA over that,' he continued, ‘but if we now make it 
clear that henceforth we really are going to stand up, we can have much confidence in 
the attitude of the USA.' In a typically dramatic tone he ended, “It is our only 
chance.’138 Relying upon any aspect of the attitude of the United States was more than 
Chamberlain was comfortable with. In evaluating the Anglo-American relationship in 
the two years preceding the outbreak of war, it must remembered that where there was 
progress -  in concluding a Trade Agreement -  there was also disappointment -  in the 
failure to revise the neutrality legislation in the summer of 1939. The temptation is to 
look back at these events from the high water mark of the special relationship during 
American participation in the Second World War and stress the aspects leaning 
towards cooperation, but a qualification must be added that the path to any special 
relationship was rocky and far from straight. The transatlantic relationship can thus be 
described as one reflecting both a harmony of interests in certain areas and also 
differences in others that were to be exacerbated to the point of ‘minor crisis’ once 
war broke out.
A closing insight on the force of opinion that the Administration was 
compelled to address, circumvent and manoeuvre around can be seen in the Ludlow 
Amendment at the end of 1937. So whilst the Administration was considering a plan 
for international cooperation, those on Capitol Hill were considering an amendment to 
the American Constitution that would take the authority to declare war out of the 
hands of Congress and give it to the people in the form of a referendum. ‘This episode 
was a striking indication of the strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States,’ 
Hull wrote after the Ludlow Amendment had been defeated by 209 votes to 188. He
118 Comments by Scott (4/4/39) and Vansittart (9/4/39) attached to telegram No. 339 from Lindsay to 
Foreign Office, March 23 1939, A2439/1292/45 FO 371 22829 PRO.
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lamented that 'the Administration had to exert its whole force to prevent -  barely to 
prevent -  approval of a policy designed to take one of the most vital elements of 
foreign policy, the authority to declare war, out of the hands of the Government.'139 
The extent to which the Roosevelt Administration and its foreign policy were 
conditioned, if not entirely determined, is clear. At the end of 1937 this was a portent 
for the moves described in this chapter. The influence it exerted over the role of 
Sumner Welles, Cordell Hull's cautionary counsel, the 'long odds’ of Rooseveltian 
foreign policy moves and the fluctuating status of Anglo-American relations will be 
central as this work now considers how Roosevelt’s motivations behind the Welles 
mission emerged during the period from September 1939 to the beginning of 1940.
39 Hull, Memoirs Voi. /, p.563.
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CHAPTER TWO
War & Peace -  Rooseveltian Foreign Policy and the ‘phony war’ 
‘...like spectators at a football match’
The outbreak of war in Europe at the beginning of September 1939 cast a 
considerable shadow over the Atlantic and onto Roosevelt’s foreign policy. How the 
United States was going to operate in relation to the war naturally became the focus of 
American foreign policy makers. The war was to be an important influence on the 
themes already identified in the development of Roosevelt’s motivations for what 
became the Welles mission in early 1940.
This chapter maintains analysis of the key themes that were recognised in the 
opening of this work. Welles was again at the forefront of various aspects of 
Administration foreign policy, most notably in Latin America, and Hull’s cautious 
counsel was felt as the Administration pressed for revision of the neutrality legislation 
and dealt with difficulties in Anglo-American relations and with various ‘peace 
moves’ (all of which will be dealt with in this chapter). Further, the limited nature of 
American foreign policy, which manifested itself in the practice of making policy 
liable to have only negligible influence, can be seen in a lack of activity predicated by 
the neutrality legislation and the wider non-entangling influence of American opinion. 
Yet typically the neutrality revision had an ulterior motive to furthering American 
national security, as the provision of cash and carry would clearly benefit the Allies 
because of their need for armaments and British naval power. A disposition towards 
those fighting the Axis, although not openly acknowledged, is hinted at with such a 
motive. Indeed, one might have suspected that revision would help to further 
harmonise relations with the United Kingdom. However, other issues in the Anglo- 
American relationship, such as disputes over the rights of neutrals, ensured that by the 
end of the year relations between Washington and London were on the verge of a 
minor crisis. These four important themes -  the separate roles of Welles and Hull, a 
limited foreign policy and Anglo-American relations -  were augmented by two 
further elements worthy of consideration in this work’s investigation of the Welles 
mission. The first was the continuing influence of American public opinion on the 
Administration’s policy deliberations, seen perhaps most markedly in the neutrality 
revision campaign. The onset of the conflict had little influence on the dual trends 
evident in American opinion. The levels of interest in events in Europe remained high,
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but so did the aversion to any involvement. Someone who observed this and who 
provided a crucial commentary to the ongoing phenomena was the newly appointed 
British Ambassador to Washington, the 11th Marquess of Lothian. Appointed because 
of his belief in the value of closer Anglo-American relations, it was Lothian who 
wrote that the American people watched the events in Europe in the autumn of 1939 
'with all the keenness and intimate knowledge of the personalities and the moves in 
the diplomatic game characteristic of spectators at a football match'.1 Tellingly, 
though, Lothian added that once they realised they were not watching ‘a gigantic 
football show but a game in which the footballs were immensely destructive bombs’, 
the American people were struck by a "wave of emotional pacifism’ that reinforced 
the desire to remain separated from events in Europe. The importance of stressing this 
here is that despite the start of the war the Administration still had to frame its policies 
within these parameters.
The second element that was to be an important consideration for the 
Administration after war was declared was that the possibility then existed for the 
conflict to be ended; in other words, the chance to secure a ‘peace’. An opportunity to 
prevent full-scale fighting seemed to emerge as popular talk of peace proliferated. A 
number of international businessmen with contacts within the Nazi regime 
approached Roosevelt to assess whether the United States could ‘mediate’. The 
importance of these individuals, and of others (such as the King of the Belgians and 
the Queen of the Netherlands) who propagated ‘peace moves’, lay not in the merits of 
their moves but in their contributing to a war of nerves that replaced the reality of 
fighting during the ‘phony war’. Yet these moves prompted consideration by the 
Administration of the issues at stake, and here Hull’s caution against any move that 
could incur criticism is clearly evident. Nevertheless, the details of various peace 
moves covered in this chapter are important in illustrating the discussion of ‘peace’ 
that took place during the hiatus of the ‘phony war’. The link between the 
conversations that took place in Washington in the autumn of 1939 and the 
motivations for the Welles mission are not explicit, and thus, require the careful 
consideration provided in this analysis.
Also brought on by the advent of war was the interest of the Roosevelt 
Administration, and particularly Welles, in the kind of peace that the world was
1 141 Despatch No. 119 Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, Secret Re: Public Opinion. Viscount 
Halifax, Miscellaneous Correspondence folio 324 FO 800 324 (Hereafter HFS) PRO.
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heading for at the end of the struggle in Europe, whenever that might be. During the 
first few months of the war a noticeable change took place in Roosevelt’s attitude to 
the possibility of American involvement in any settlement: from total disregard to 
contemplation on American terms. It was from this environment that the Welles 
mission was to emerge at the turn of the year, but it is important to acknowledge that 
as this story unfolds, American national interest was paramount. The Administration 
wanted to see if they could ensure that any settlement would serve the interests of the 
United States. Any sort of victory for Nazi Germany would not do this, and this 
should be considered when contemplating the Welles mission as an outright peace 
mission.
This chapter will explore Welles’ individual contribution in Latin America 
before turning to the ways in which the themes outlined above are evident in the 
course of the campaign for neutrality revision. The chapter will then look at the 
difficulties that engulfed the Anglo-American relationship before assessing the impact 
of the peace moves of the autumn of 1939. The importance of this chapter is in 
illustrating what can be considered the ‘medium-term’ motivations that were at play -  
heightened by the onset of war after September 1939 -  in Roosevelt’s thinking behind 
the Welles mission. This will then lead into Chapter Three, where the longer-term 
themes and immediate motivations meet the objectives for the mission.
Welles in tune with Roosevelt
In the first few weeks of the war in Europe, Welles fulfilled a key task for the 
Roosevelt Administration which was to make good the promise of the ‘Good 
Neighbor’ policy and ensure for the United States security in the Americas. With war 
declared in Europe Welles pressed for a Pan-American conference to be convened. It 
had been agreed at the conferences in Buenos Aires (December 1936) and Lima 
(December 1938) that whenever a threat existed to the continent the nations of the 
Americas would meet. Under these auspices, twenty-one republics convened in 2
2 Welles began his address to those assembled in Panama by reminding the delegates of their previous 
agreements: ‘In accordance with the principles of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, 
and Reestablishment of Peace, the Declaration of Inter-American Solidarity of Buenos Aires, and the 
Declaration of Lima, the Ministers of Foreign Relations of the American republics or their 
representatives are meeting here in Panama for the purpose of consultation. Under the terms of the 
agreements 1 have cited, this coming together to consult is not an undertaking into which we have 
entered lightly. We have, on the contrary, agreed and clearly stipulated that the consultation provided 
for in these agreements shall be undertaken when there exists in the belief of our respective
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Panama at the end of September 1939. Welles was at the head of the American 
delegation and brought with him three aims for the conference.3 The first two were 
relatively straightforward: an economic plan to help Latin American economies 
affected by the war and measures to stop Axis subversion. The third, a neutrality zone, 
was to prove the most controversial not just at the conference, but also in Washington 
and indeed in Europe for a number of months. It was designed to be ‘a prohibition 
against belligerent operations within 300 miles of North, Central, or South America or 
the Caribbean islands’.4 Welles was able to oversee the successful adoption of the 
zone at the Panama conference because of his knowledge of the delegates and his skill 
at securing their agreement. However, in Washington the concept of the neutrality 
zone was questioned by Hull. The Secretary of State’s concern was over the legality 
of such a move and arose against a background of disquiet in his relationship with 
Welles. The Under Secretary had been communicating directly with Roosevelt and 
Hull was again removed from their conversations. Hull stated later that “the 
hemispheric neutrality zone was frankly an experiment, the idea of the President, 
seconded by Welles’. 5 That such a plan came from a Roosevelt idea and was 
fashioned by Welles fits into the analysis provided here. Further, the practical 
applicability of the zone was doubtful, but its wider purpose was to further 
differentiate between the Allies and the Axis. Roosevelt hoped that a clear moral 
difference could be established in the eyes of the American public between the Allies, 
who would respect the zone, and the Axis, who would not.6
governments a menace to the peace of the continent.’ United States Department of State, Bulletin - 
United States ¡939 Vol.l. (Washington, 1939), p.299.
’ Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, pp. 216-217.
4 Robert W. Love Jr., The History> o f the US Navy 1775-1941 (Harrisburg PA, 1992), p.619.
5 Hull, Memoirs Vol. I., p.599.
h Roosevelt had broached the subject of a security zone in his conversations with King George VI 
during the visit of the monarch in June 1939. An important feature of the effectiveness of this neutral 
zone and the reason that Roosevelt mentioned it to the British at an early date was that he knew in order 
to make rt effective he would need bases in the British Caribbean. Indeed Roosevelt discussed the 
prospect with Henry Morgenthau in the middle of September. The Treasury Secretary recorded: ‘He 
told me in strictest confidence, that he is leasing hangars and bases for sea planes in Bermuda and two 
other places in the West Indies; that nobody knew this.’ Conversation between Morgenthau and 
Roosevelt, 18 September 1939, MPD. The secrecy was important as the implication is that of military 
and political cooperation with the British. After some British reservations, and with the hope from 
some quarters that these bases would increase the chances of the United States entering the war, the 
British agreed to the leases by December. The significance of this was limited during the winter of 
1939-40 as the US lacked the ships to patrol the zone effectively but, as Reynolds states, ‘the episode 
constituted a precedent for the 1940 destroyers-bases deal’. Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo- 
American Alliance, p.65. See also Charlie Whitham, On Dealing with Gangsters: The Limits of British 
'Generosity' in the Leasing of Bases to the United States, 1940-41. Diplomacy and Statecraft. Vol. 7 
No. 3, Nov 1996.
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However, when it came to respecting the zone or securing operational 
advantage, none of the belligerents paid much attention to the concept of a neutral 
zone. The most famous case of 'abuse' of the zone came in December 1939, when the 
German pocket battleship Graf Spec was trapped in Montevideo harbour -  clearly 
within the 300 mile zone. (This incident will be discussed later in this chapter with 
regard to the state of Anglo-American naval relations.) The general lack of respect for 
the neutrality zone evidently irked Welles, as he mentioned it to Winston Churchill in 
his final dinner with members of the British government in London in March 1940. 
His comments at that juncture reveal the wider purposes of such a zone in view of the 
influence of American opinion. Welles asked Churchill why the British did not 
publicise their respect for the zone, as they 'would lose nothing and gain much from 
American sentiment'.7 Clearly much had happened in the intervening months between 
the introduction of the zone and Welles’ conversation in London, but the Under 
Secretary’s concern further reveals the importance accorded by Welles and the 
Administration to the rights of neutrals at times of war. Although this was to feature 
in the disputes of the ’phony war’ in the bilateral relationship between Washington 
and London, the rights Welles was seeking to protect were evident in his address to 
the delegates in Panama in September 1939. He stated: ’it is our common desire to 
take under consideration the complicated question of our rights and duties as neutrals, 
in view of the outbreak of general war in Europe, with a view to the preservation of 
the peace of our respective nations and with a view towards obtaining complete 
respect on the part of all belligerents for our respective sovereignties.’ The desire to 
influence events as a neutral nation was clear and came with some conviction: ‘Our 
influence for peace and for the reestablishment of a world order based on morality and 
on law must be unshaken and secure.’8 Such sentiment reveals how far neutrals’ 
rights, to include respect for international law and liberal economic polices, were part 
of the Administration’s conception of the United States national interest. They had 
been evident in most of the Administration’s policies in this period, including Welles’ 
conference plan and, in February 1940, the invitations to other neutral nations to 
discuss neutral rights.
7 London, 13 March 1940, account by Ambassador Kennedy in Draft Chapter 40 ‘Welles’ visit to 
London’, p.578. Parts of Joseph Kennedy’s unpublished biography can be found in the Papers of his 
writing partner James M. Landis in the Library of Congress. They were drafted between 1948 and 
1950. The Papers of James M. Landis, Box 51 1948-50, Kennedy Joseph P. Memoirs. The Library of 
Congress, Manuscripts Division, Washington DC. (Hereafter Kennedy Memoirs PJL).
8 United States Department of State, Bulletin - United States 1939 Vol.I. (Washington, 1939), p.299.
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The significance of this episode in relation to the Welles mission is evident in 
a number of areas. In completing the promise of the ‘Good Neighbor' Welles was 
again able to prove to Roosevelt that he was the man to call on to secure American 
interests. The personal contact between the two and Welles' familiarity with the area 
put added distance between Hull and Welles. The Secretary of State was concerned 
that the neutrality zone would be unenforceable, would be liable to abuse from the 
belligerents and therefore would be likely to incite criticism in Washington as a 
measure which risked the United States' neutral status. This worry again illustrates 
Hull's concern for the Administration’s standing in the domestic arena. However, the 
latter concern did not really materialise in the aftermath of the zone’s introduction, as 
the Administration spent October 1939 campaigning for revision of the neutrality 
legislation and this is where the chapter now turns.
A Second Attempt at Neutrality Revision
The second campaign for neutrality revision in 1939, following the failed attempt in 
the summer, was successfully concluded with the restoration of the ‘cash and carry 
system’ on 3 November. On that day the House of Representatives voted in favour 
(243-181) -  following the Senate’s (63-30) approval on 27 October. The story of 
neutrality revision sheds further light on some of the wider themes identified in this 
thesis in terms of the extent to which the Roosevelt Administration had to operate in 
the light of American opinion and how policies had ulterior purposes. To address both 
of these elements the Roosevelt Administration argued the case that revising the law 
would serve to improve United States security. Nevertheless, Roosevelt hoped to fulfil 
an unspoken goal and assist the Allied cause against Nazi Germany. As historian 
Irwin Gellman has stated, ‘since the British controlled the seas, the bill [for cash and 
carry] was in reality a form of indirect aid’.9 This campaign for neutrality revision 
was different from that of the summer in a number of ways. Most significantly, the 
revision campaign was given distinct leadership by the Administration when 
Roosevelt called for a special session of Congress in September 1939. There he made 
a bipartisan appeal in which he stressed that American security was his aim. He also 
challenged those who saw the Administration as warmongering: ‘regardless of party 
or section the mantle of peace and of patriotism is wide enough to cover us all. Let no
9 Gellman, Secret Affairs, p. 167.
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group assume the exclusive label of "peace bloc". We all belong to it.’10 Roosevelt 
knew full well that such language, and a bipartisan approach, would go down well 
with the American people. However, those ranged against revision were frustrated 
that the Administration had cornered this line. William Borah wrote, in the midst of 
the six-week debate in Congress, to his colleague Gerald P. Nye wanting the 
Administration to ‘admit that their ulterior motive in wishing to lift the embargo is to 
help Great Britain'.11 Such an admission was not going to be forthcoming from the 
Administration given that it presented revision as securing American interests despite 
the private acknowledgement that repeal would help the Allies most of all.12 The 
important point here is that the Roosevelt Administration was pursuing an ulterior 
objective, and one which assisted the Allies. Lothian’s insightful analysis was clearly 
aware of this at the beginning of November. Having warned London that no one could 
‘prophesy with certainty’ as to the outcome of campaign, he reported that the result 
was ‘that the United States has decided to place its industrial resources behind the 
Allies, on the “cash and carry” basis’.13 14This fulfilled Roosevelt’s desire to strengthen 
United States security and at the same time to help the Allies. Hiram Johnson, the 
Californian isolationist Senator and associate of Borah, acknowledged the 
Administration's success in straightforward terms: ‘It was a big victory for the 
President, and there is no question about that.' With this triumph for Roosevelt and 
its implicit assistance to the Allies, one might have supposed that Anglo-American 
relations would be on a high. However, as before the outbreak of war, different 
interests and misunderstandings characterised the transatlantic relationship during late 
1939 and early 1940.
10 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1939, pp.512-522.
" Letter from Borah to Nye, 24 October 1939, PWB. Borah’s view is succinctly expressed in a letter he 
wrote in early September. ‘I am satisfied that to repeal the neutrality law at this time and to henceforth 
furnish arms and munitions and the implements of war to one side, would send us far down the road to 
actual conflict with European powers.’ Letter from Borah to Marcus J. Ware (an Idaho attorney), 12 
September 1939, PWB.
12 Dallek, Roosevelt, p.202.
13 97 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 3 November 1939, HFS. In an earlier letter at the outset of the war 
Lothian had stated ‘The general impression is that provided the situation is well handled the embargo 
on the export of arms will be abandoned and the cash and carry system restored. Nobody, however, 
under this constitution and in view of the personal resentments and party politics which now divide the 
White House and Capitol Hill can prophecy with certainty.’ 48 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 5 
September 1939, HFS.
14 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 5 November 1939, HJP.
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Wartime Disharmony in Anglo-American Relations
While the Welles mission itself was of great concern across the Atlantic during the 
period, other issues also served to add tension to the Anglo-American relationship. 
One key area of disquiet during the first months of the 'phony war' was the question 
of United States neutral rights in the light of the Royal Navy’s imposition of a naval 
blockade in the Atlantic. Most directly, disputes arose over the issue of ‘navicerts’, 
the British system of approval for shipping to pass through the blockade, but also over 
British trading practices in the United States and censorship of mail. Hull, whose 
concern for free trade has been previously explored, was keen to secure American 
neutral rights at the very outbreak of the war. Mindful also of tensions with Great 
Britain in this area during the First World War, Hull called Lothian in to see him on 4 
September so as to avoid unnecessary 'interference by Great Britain with American 
commerce’.1^ Hull’s insistence on establishing the American position was based on 
his awareness of the work the British Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) had 
undertaken during the 1930s. Despite considerable historical debate as to its 
effectiveness, the MEW had concluded 'that economic warfare had contributed 
significantly to the defeat of Germany in the First World War’, so much so that a 
blockade became "an axiom of British policy’.15 6 The importance of the blockade to 
the United Kingdom was given expression by the Foreign Office as early as 3 
September 1939. Cadogan put a need to ‘manage the naval blockade as effectively as 
possible, without doing serious harm to relations with the USA’ at the top of a list of 
Foreign Office priorities.17 This was a clear concern for those in the State Department 
such as Welles, Berle and Moffat - 'practically all those whom Hull identified as his 
“principal associates'” . 18 Their apprehension reflected the unease felt by many 
Americans about Britain’s conduct during the previous war of securing commercial
15 Memorandum of conversation between Hull and Lothian, 4 September 1939, CHP.
16 Robert W. Matson, The British Naval Blockade and US Trade 1939-40, The Historian 53 Summer 
1991, p.750.
17 Dilks (ed.), Cadogan, p.210.
18 Matson, The Historian, p. 751. See also: Robert Matson, Neutrality and Navicerts -  Britain, The 
United States, and Economic Warfare, 1939-1940 (New York & London), 1994 and W. Medlicott, The 
Economic Blockade (London), 1952. According to Moffat, only one man held a strongly contrary 
opinion in the State Department and that was Herbert Feis. ‘Nearly everyone was in agreement along 
these lines -  except Herbert Feis who as usual spoke up in opposition to any action on our part which 
would in any ways embarrass England. His attitude is so extreme that Walter Hines Page would have 
seemed a sturdy American by comparison....’ Hooker, Moffat, p. 287. Walter Hines Page was 
Woodrow Wilson’s Ambassador to London between 1913 and 1918, and was perceived to have been 
taken in wholly by British propaganda during the First World War.
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advantage from wartime circumstances.19 This injustice was not to be allowed to 
happen again, and American interests were to be defended stoutly. Moffat and his 
colleagues adopted the phrase "No help to Germany but no Dominion status for 
ourselves'.20 According to historian Robert Matson, those in the Administration had 
good reason to suspect the British. He wrote that Britain’s reluctance to provide 
reasons for any refusal to issue a navicert was because it ’had every intention of 
operating a clandestine blacklist under the cover of the navicerts system’.21
After preparation during September and October, the issuing of navicerts 
began on 1 November 1939. The State Department’s concern that the blockade was 
‘open to considerable abuse’ was confirmed almost immediately by Moffat. He 
learned that the British were ‘holding up cables to American businessmen just long 
enough to see that a British company get the contract’. He termed the British conduct 
as ‘cavalier’.22 The importance for this work of this disquiet is that neutral rights were 
an important element of wider State Department policy. In both Welles’ plan and 
Hull’s economic programme, the State Department had a track record and they were 
keen to ensure that any conflict did not have too large an adverse impact on the 
United States. Those in the Administration, notably Hull and Welles, placed 
considerable stock in protection of neutral rights as a vital interest of the United 
States. The announcement that the United States had attempted to coordinate neutral 
opinion made on 9 February 1940 (the same day as the announcement of the Welles 
mission), and indeed Welles' pursuit of Italian neutrality on his mission, illustrate 
further the importance of neutral rights to the Roosevelt Administration.
Worse was to follow for the fate of Anglo-American relations when the issue 
of mail censorship compounded the blockade issue as the ‘phony war’ progressed in 
the autumn of 1939. Indeed, when Welles arrived at Gibraltar the following February 
they were delayed by three-and-a-half hours, prompting the accompanying Moffat to 
record that ‘it was the treatment of the mails that seemed to annoy more deeply than 
the treatment of passengers or cargo’.23 The British had begun the war by examining
19 5 September 1939 Breckinridge Long Papers Box 5. The Library of Congress Manuscripts, Division 
Washington DC. (Hereafter BLP).
20 Hooker, Moffat, p.275.
21 Matson, The Historian, p.750.
22 Hooker, Moffat, pp.275-276.
23 Hooker, Moffat, p.291. This opinion was shared subsequently by Langer and Gleason. ‘It was, in 
fact, British interference with American mails which produced the angriest public reaction in this 
country.’ Draft of Chapter 10 ‘The Phony Peace’ by William L. Langer and Everett S. Gleason, The 
Challenge to Isolation 1937-40 (New York, 1952) p. 27. This draft can be found in the Sumner Welles
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limited amounts of mail but by November they had begun full-scale searches of all 
American mail. This brought Britain’s ‘imperial’ hand directly into the lives of the 
American public and increased antagonism towards Britain. Of equal concern to the 
Administration was the fact that the censorship was carried out when the Royal Navy 
diverted American ships into the area designated by the neutrality legislation as a war 
zone. (Ships heading for Northern Europe were taken to Kirkwall in Scotland, whilst 
ships heading into the Mediterranean were stopped at Gibraltar). Lothian was again 
aware of this problem.24 He cabled London at the beginning of January 1940 and 
stated: ‘The real American objection to Kirkwall arises from their fear that an 
American ship might be bombed or mined there with the resultant uproar in America. 
We should be the sufferers from such an uproar, not the Germans.'25 Clearly, the 
views of the American people, ever in the mind of the Administration, were crucial 
here. Hull was keen to emphasise this to Lothian in a meeting on 22 January. Hull 
explained, ‘There will soon reach a stage where the advantages of these 
discriminations and restrictions will be decidedly less than the bad reactionary effects 
in this country.’26 The ‘discrimination and restrictions’ that Hull mentioned referred 
not only to American ships, passengers and mail being diverted to British checkpoints 
but also to Britain’s contravention of the 1938 Anglo-American Trade Agreement. At 
the beginning of 1940 Britain unilaterally announced that it was moving purchases of 
certain products away from American suppliers. Most notable of these supplies was 
the switch from American to Turkish tobacco, in order to save dollar resources and to 
cultivate a strategic ally. Unsurprisingly, given his belief in reciprocal trade, this move 
riled Hull. There was therefore considerable cause for acrimony in Anglo-American 
relations over neutral rights generally, and specifically the issues of the navicerts, mail
Papers (Box 207) at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Welles had been asked 
to proofread this chapter and returned it with to the authors and they wrote on it: ‘Apparently no 
changes were suggested by Welles.’
24 Both the Americans and the British were aware of the danger of a major incident caused by the loss 
of American lives in the war zone. The memory was strong among many of the sinking of the Lusitania 
by a German submarine off the Irish coast on 7 May 1915 with the loss of 1153 passengers, including 
128 Americans. The uproar this aroused in America, which included a call for war to be declared, 
caused the Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to resign. The Germans had claimed the ship was 
carrying war materials, and when the wreck was examined in the early 1990s small quantities of 
materials were found.
25 128 Memo prepared by Lothian for Halifax, 8 January 1940, HFS. To alleviate the danger in early 
1940, of an American ship being the victim of a German U-boat in warring seas, Churchill wrote to 
Roosevelt that ‘no American ships should in any circumstances be diverted into the combat zone 
around the British Isles declared by you’. Telegram No. 265 from Churchill to Roosevelt, 29 January 
1940. 740.00111A Combat Areas/140:Telegarm. FRUS 1940 Vol. 11. (USGPO, 1957), p.10.
26 Memorandum of conversation between Hull and Lothian, 22 January 1940, CHP.
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censorship and British purchasing. This did not escape the attention of Roosevelt. He 
wrote to Churchill on 1 February that “I would not be frank unless I told you that 
there has been much public criticism here', before suggesting, ‘the general feeling is 
that the net benefit to your people and to France is hardly worth the definite 
annoyance caused to us.'27 28This succinctly shows how the Administration saw the 
difficulties in transatlantic relations of January 1940.
Lothian's Response and American Opinion
The ill feeling in the Administration towards Great Britain drew upon that enmity 
evident in the American people during the ‘phony war’. The fundamental issue was 
how far British conduct was affecting American interests and influencing American 
opinion. Hull concisely summarised the Administration's concerns when asking 
Lothian if it was necessary to ‘apply the slogan “this is necessary to win the war” to a 
great variety of minor practices which would affect the United States'. The 
reasoning behind this was the impact that British practice was having on the American 
people. This view was shared by Breckinridge Long, who recorded in his diary in 
mid-February ‘... the sooner the British realise the effect their actions were having on 
the American people the sooner they could expect better relations with the American 
Government and better support from the American people.’ 29 Consideration of 
American opinion in the Administration should be no surprise, but Hull stressed to 
Lothian that it was the relatively minor issues of mail censorship, etc. that were most 
‘responsible for irritating expression in this country, and they influence public opinion 
[on] more major considerations'.30 It was the link between British practices and
27 Letter from Roosevelt to Churchill, 1 February 1940, Elliot Roosevelt (ed.) FDR: His Private 
Letters, 1928-1945 Vol. 3. (New York, 1952), p.350. Roosevelt was writing in response to Churchill’s 
account of the Battle of the River Plate. The battle, which took place deep within the Administration’s 
neutrality zone, saw three British warships trap the German pocket battleship GrafSpee in Montevideo 
harbour in December 1939. With no chance of escape the German captain, under orders from Berlin, 
put the crew ashore, scuttled the ship and committed suicide. Account of the Battle of River Plate sent 
by Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 January 1940, Roosevelt-Churchill File FDR PPF. Churchill knew 
Roosevelt’s interest in naval matters and this was confirmed in the President’s response to Churchill. 
‘Ever so much thanks for that tremendously interesting account,’ Roosevelt wrote, ‘of the 
extraordinarily well fought action of your three cruisers.’ Letter from Franklin Roosevelt to Winston 
Churchill, 1 February 1940, Roosevelt (ed.) FDR: His Private Letters, p.350. The correspondence over 
this battle reflected their common interest in naval matters, which Joseph P. Lash discusses in chapter 
two of his book Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-41 -  The Partnership that Saved the West (London, 
1977).
28 Memorandum of conversation between Hull and Lothian, 14 February 1940, CHP.
29 Israel, Long, p.59
20 Hull, Memoirs Vol. L, p.735.
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American opinion that influenced the Administration's ability to conduct its foreign 
policy, which, as seen in the neutrality revision, was disposed towards the Allies.
Conveying this understanding to those in London would not be easy, but in 
late January 1940, in the days before he learned of the Welles mission, Lothian's 
conduct revealed the delicate state of Anglo-American relations and his own belief in 
the value of the relationship. Lothian composed two key documents, which he sent to 
his close friend and Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax in London. The first, written on 
27 January, made clear reference to the Administration's dissatisfaction with Britain, 
which he termed a 'minor "crisis” in Anglo-American relations’.31 32The reasoning 
behind American exasperation, Lothian explained, sprang from ‘the feeling that we 
have been needlessly inconsiderate of American interests both private and public', 
and have ‘been trading upon her [US] good will'. Crucially, though, Lothian stressed 
that the annoyance did not take precedence over the wider sympathy for those facing 
Nazi Germany: ‘the recent flare up against us does not mean that either the 
Administration or public opinion has diminished in the least its strong desire that we 
should win the war.’ Lothian concluded that in future Britain would ‘have to prove to 
the USA, which includes public opinion as well as the Administration, that any action 
we take affecting them is really necessary for the winning of the war.’ In short, then, 
Lothian suggested that Great Britain should consider American public opinion. He 
augmented this plea with an extensive document on the subject, entitled simply ‘US 
Public Opinion’, at the beginning of February 1940. Lothian began with a passage 
clearly illustrating the importance of the role of the American population. ‘I say 
"public opinion” deliberately because in this country, owing to the constitutional 
equality of status of the Executive and the Legislative, it is public opinion itself which 
is continually decisive.’ Lothian gave his own opinion, which contained some 
guarded hope for the future and revealed again his belief in the value of solid Anglo- 
American relations. ‘Some of the best judges of American opinion are convinced that
31 132 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 27 January 1940, HFS. Lothian had evidently picked this up 
from a meeting he had had with Moffat the day before. Moffat suggested that the criterion which 
should be used by the British should be: ‘Is a given course of action which is irritating to the United 
States absolutely necessary to win the war? If so, American public opinion cannot prevail; if it is 
merely a convenience and not a necessity, the British Government should definitely bear American 
reaction in mind ...’. Hooker, Moffat, p.290.
32 141 Despatch No. 119 Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS. To summarise the rest of the 
despatch, Lothian continued by recounting the movement within American public opinion since the 
outbreak of the war, the reaction to the Russo-Finnish conflict and role the United States sought to play 
in the Far East.
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behind the surface facade of isolationism the people of the United States are slowly 
making up their minds that if their own future and a free civilisation are to be 
maintained they have got to intervene. That is my own conviction.'33 Lothian knew 
this was going to be a lengthy process but his message did resonate in London: 
Halifax red-penned after reading it, 'a very good despatch'.34
Conclusions to Anglo-American Difficulties
The importance of considering the unease in Anglo-American relations during the 
■phony war’ for this thesis can be seen in a number of areas. The status of Anglo- 
American relations is significant, if only in a relatively indirect fashion in this period, 
in examining Roosevelt's motivations in the lead up to the Welles mission. In simple 
terms, the outbreak of war did little to alter the Anglo-American relationship; there 
was sympathy for Britain as it stood up to Nazi Germany but still issues over which 
disagreements were evident, as there had been before. These differences of opinion 
culminated in the ‘minor crisis’ in January 1940. The crucial point here is that this 
was just a minor crisis and nothing more. On the eve of the Welles mission Anglo- 
American relations, despite having experienced some difficulties, were not in a 
disastrous state. This is clear from the conversation Roosevelt had with Lothian on 1 
February 1940. The purpose of the conversation was to inform the Ambassador of his 
intention to send Welles to Europe, but at its end Roosevelt mentioned the ‘minor 
crisis’. Lothian reported that Roosevelt felt that ‘with a few mutual concessions there 
need be no recurrence of [the] recent little crisis in Anglo-American relations’, with 
the Ambassador adding that the Administration ‘in no way wanted to impede our war 
effort’.35 To have remarked on the delicate state of the relationship at the end of such 
a conversation shows at the very least that the minor crisis was in Roosevelt’s mind. 
Furthermore, his determination to press on with the Welles mission, despite the 
objections the British would subsequently raise, may well have come from a wider 
desire to secure American interests in the Anglo-American relationship. Nonetheless, 
Roosevelt’s comment looked to concord in Anglo-American relations. The inference
13 141 Despatch No. 119 Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS.
34 Lothian prefaced his telegram with a letter explaining that he had sent the despatch to the Foreign 
Office so that Halifax would not ‘miss it in the tide of papers which must flow through your boxes’. 
This individual touch characterised Lothian’s style as Ambassador and reinforced his belief in the 
Anglo-American relationship. 140 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 3 February 1940, HFS.
35 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, I February 1940 (sent 1:37 am 2 February received 
10:35 am 2 February [all times are local]), HFS.
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is firstly that he understood that in the final analysis Britain was at war, and secondly 
that the ongoing war effort would not be affected significantly by his proposal for 
Welles' visit to Europe. The full range of influences that Roosevelt considered for the 
Welles mission in his conversation with Lothian will be considered in the next 
chapter.
In other areas, notably Hull’s concern for the standing of the Administration 
and his wider apprehension over American public opinion, a link between the 
difficulties experienced in Anglo-American relations and the Welles mission can be 
seen in the prominence given to the rights of neutrals. Given the heritage within the 
State Department in the principles propounded by Hull and Welles, the fight to secure 
acceptance of neutral rights was a real and hard-fought one. The technical issues of 
the blockade and navicerts were eventually resolved in what Robert Matson has called 
a ‘genuine compromise’ after an Anglo-French mission held talks in Washington in 
the spring of 1940.36 Yet those in London were beginning to understand why the 
Administration was so insistent on protecting these rights. John Balfour, Head of the 
American Department at the Foreign Office, concluded that, in addition to the mission 
to Washington, Britain needed to encourage ‘the good grace of powerful sections of 
American public opinion’ because of their influence on the Administration. He added, 
in a candid admission, because upon such ‘goodwill we are in the last analysis 
dependent for victory’.37 The importance for Hull and others in the Administration of 
not drawing any criticism that they were favouring the Allies, can be seen in the State 
Department’s strong line on protecting neutral rights. This explains why neutrality 
revision was presented as primarily securing American interests. Furthermore, the 
involvement and views provided by Moffat are notable for their outlook on United 
States relations with Britain because he was to accompany Welles to Europe in 
February and March 1940. His task in Europe, albeit entirely secondary to that of 
Welles, was to explain the American view on neutral rights to those in London, and it 
certainly helped contribute to the work done by the mission in Washington to
36 Matson, The Historian, p.752. The mission was conducted by Frank Ashton-Gwatkin of the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare and Charles Rist of the French Ministry of Blockade. The aim was to negotiate a 
resolution to the navicert question whilst giving ‘particular emphasis [to] the possibility of meeting the 
various protests and complaints which have recently been received from the State Department’. Foreign 
Office Minute, 9 February 1940, W2390/79/49 FO 371 25137 PRO.
37 Memorandum by Balfour, 19 February 1940, A1285/434/45 FO 371 24248 PRO.
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resolving the matter. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five during 
examination of Welles' time in London.
In summation, then, the difficult state of Anglo-American relations, recounted 
in this work since the British dismissal of Welles' plan in January 1938. was not 
dramatically influenced by the outbreak of conflict in September 1939. Difficulties 
surrounding neutral rights did develop during the autumn. They caused sufficient 
disquiet for them to be in Roosevelt's mind at the same time as the Welles mission 
was being considered, but they were just one aspect of Rooseveltian foreign policy. 
Any connection between the disharmony in the Anglo-American relationship and the 
Welles mission remains largely indirect, especially for the relevance for this work, 
when considered in relation to issues raised by the peace moves of the "phony war' 
that might have involved the possible intervention of the United States -  in other 
words, the prospect of an American-brokered peace. This will now be considered in 
the period from September 1939 to January 1940. It is worth emphasising here that 
the disquiet of January 1940 was resolved amicably by the early spring, as the Welles 
mission took centre stage and before the spring campaigns fundamentally changed the 
strategic situation.
Joseph Kennedy in London
Before examining the "peace moves' of the ‘phony war', and having considered the 
views of Lothian as Ambassador in Washington, it is worth considering the role 
played by the American Ambassador in London, Joseph Kennedy.
Having spent the summer of 1939 warning Washington of the destruction the 
war would bring, after only one week of war Kennedy wrote to Roosevelt imploring 
him to end the conflict. Kennedy considered that ‘it is entirely conceivable that the 
President can get himself in a spot where he can save the world’.38 In even more 
dramatic terms, he continued that the ‘situation may crystallize to a point where the 
President can be the saviour of the World’. Kennedy’s words alarmed the 
Administration, and most notably Hull. The Secretary replied insisting that the 
Administration saw ‘no opportunity nor occasion for any peace move to be initiated 
by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not
38 Telegram No. 1578 from Kennedy to Hull (seen by the President 11 September 1939), 11 September 
1939, 740.0011 European war, 1939/258: M 982 European War 740 Roll 9 Confidential US State 
Department Central Files, Archive II, Maryland. (Hereafter SDCF).
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support any move for peace initiated by this government that would consolidate or 
make possible a survival of a regime of force and of aggression’.39 The vehemence in 
Hull’s reply reflected his own caution against any American involvement in the 
European conflict. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that within a little less than five 
months Roosevelt would see an ‘opportunity’ and the ‘occasion’ to initiate discussion, 
with Welles, of a ‘peace move’, even though the Welles mission that resulted would 
be significantly qualified. This qualification would be underwritten by Roosevelt’s 
belief throughout the ‘phony war’ and beyond, and in common with Hull’s views as 
expressed to Kennedy, that he did not want to see the ‘survival of a regime of force 
and of aggression’.40 Roosevelt was well aware of how far Kennedy’s views differed 
from his own on the future of Europe and the threat posed by the Axis. Roosevelt told 
Henry Morgenthau, ‘Joe always has been an appeaser and always will be an appeaser. 
If Germany or Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow Joe would start working on 
the King and his friend, the Queen, and from there on down, to get everybody to 
accept it.’41 Given these views, Kennedy became increasingly marginalised during the 
autumn of 1939. By the time of his return to the United States in early December on 
health grounds he was far from being partner to the most intimate communications 
between London and Washington.42 His fall from grace was illustrated by Moffat, 
who noted that ‘if Kennedy says something is black and Lothian says it is white, we 
believe Lord Lothian’.43
39 Telegram No. 905 from Hull to Kennedy, 11 September 1939, 740.0011 European war, 1939/258: M 
982 European War 740 Roll 9 SDCF.
40 Joseph Kennedy’s Ambassadorship is the subject of two notable works: Ralph F. De Bedts, 
Ambassador Joseph Kennedy 1938-40 -  An Anatomy o f Appeasement (New York, 1985); and Michael 
R. Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt -  The Uneasy Alliance (New York & London, 1980). 
Throughout the autumn of 1939 Kennedy continued to voice his opinion that the war would spell 
ruination for Europe and the rise of Bolshevism on the continent. Elliot Roosevelt shared this same 
assessment of Kennedy. ‘Ambassador Kennedy, during this period, wanted FDR to initiate a peace 
move. Kennedy was pessimistic over the results of a continuation of the war, and believed that either 
England and France would be defeated, or, if Germany lost, that communism would follow in Central 
Europe.’ Roosevelt (ed.), F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-1945 II Vol. 4. (New York, 1950), p.950.
41 Lunch meeting between Morgenthau and Roosevelt, 3 October 1939, MPD Card 4.
42 Kennedy’s health began to fail in the autumn of 1939, possibly as a result of his worrying over the 
course of the war. He cabled the State Department ‘for permission to come home, pointing out to them 
that I was ready to fly back at a moment’s notice. Welles agreed but stated that it would be best for me 
to be officially recalled for consultation so as to avoid the impression that our diplomats at this stage of 
the war could have the customary type of leave’. This last sentence shows the concern of the State 
Department over its image both in Europe and at home. Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.488.
43 Hooker, Moffat, p.5.
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The Prospect of Peace in the ‘phony war'
All the time while the difficulties in Anglo-American relations were developing in the 
autumn of 1939, the more consequential issue of the possibility of ending the war also 
existed. The prospect that a suitable basis for a peace settlement might be found was 
given added credence by the lack of actual fighting and the widespread acceptance 
that the "phony war’ would end in the spring of 1940. It was in this atmosphere that a 
number of ‘peace moves’ developed during the period, and they require both 
clarification and examination in relation to Rooseveltian foreign policy. This is 
important given that the Welles mission is so often considered a peace move in itself. 
This work considers that it did have at its genesis discussion of a peace settlement 
before the other objectives were considered. The peace moves themselves varied 
hugely in their scope, from the clandestine dealings of businessmen with contacts in 
Berlin, to an approach by the Royal households of the Netherlands and Belgium, to 
suggestions emanating from Berlin in both public and private that there was no need 
for the war to continue. To a greater or lesser degree these moves in some way 
involved Roosevelt as President of the United States.
The peace moves of the autumn of 1939 did have an influence on Roosevelt’s 
thinking at the end of that year about what would become the Welles mission. The 
President alluded to the influence of some of the ‘peace moves’ in broaching the 
subject of the Welles mission to Lothian on 1 February. He told the Ambassador that 
as a result of the ‘peace’ moves he had been made aware of by ‘people who had seen 
Goring’, alongside the ‘inevitability’ of the spring offensive which ‘would make 
peace much more difficult to obtain’, he had determined upon the Welles mission.44 
Although when considered beside the broader themes and objectives identified here 
the influence of the ‘peace moves’ would be minimal on Roosevelt’s decision to 
embark on the mission, they did contribute to the wider discussion of peace during the 
‘phony war’ and therefore further our understanding of the motivations and objectives 
of the Welles mission. Yet the term ‘peace move’ requires some clarification. It was 
only their cumulative pressure and not their individual merits that came to influence 
Roosevelt. One further aspect that should be considered is that the moves considered 
here were in reality extremely unlikely to avert further conflict between Germany and 
the Allies. Roosevelt and the Administration knew this, and understood that those
44 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940 (sent 1:37 am 2 February received 
10:35 am 2 February [all times are local]), HFS.
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moves that sought to utilise Roosevelt's position as head of a neutral United States 
carried huge risks for the Administration of appearing entangled in European affairs.
Therefore this section presents a brief insight into the most important of the 
‘peace moves', so as to provide a full understanding of the environment in which the 
Welles mission itself was formulated. Key members of the Roosevelt Administration 
devoted time and energy to these peace moves, and special attention should be paid to 
a discussion amongst members of the State Department that took place on Sunday 7 
October in response to a speech by Hitler of the previous day. It is here that this 
section begins.
Before moving on, though, it is important to consider that the discussion of 
peace led indirectly to thinking about what the war was being fought for and then in 
turn what the Allied war aims were. This had particular implications for the 
Administration in Washington in terms of illustrating to the American people what the 
Allies were fighting for, i.e. a war to stop the threat posed by fascism and not one over 
territory in Eastern Europe. The importance of clarifying Allied war aims, albeit as a 
consequence of discussing peace, should be stressed, given that part of Welles’ 
agenda in London and Paris aimed at assessing this.
The Administration’s Position
A clear insight into Administration thinking on the state of the war and its propensity 
to consider playing an interventionist role is provided by the discussion that took 
place after Hitler’s speech at the beginning of October 1939. The speech that was 
translated and broadcast across Europe purported to be a ‘peace offer’ on the basis 
that neither the Allies nor Germany had anything to gain from continuing the conflict; 
Poland had already gone and it would be sensible to resolve any further problems 
‘before millions ... are uselessly sent to death and billions of wealth destroyed’.45 In 
essence, then, it meant an acceptance of German domination of continental Europe. 
With the FUhrer’s words still fresh in their minds, the attitude of the United States to 
peace was discussed by Hull, Moffat, Long and Berle on Sunday 7 October. Hull 
recorded that the purpose of the meeting was to cogitate over ‘the draft of a possible 
United States proposal’, whilst Moffat recorded the aim as being to discuss ‘whether
45 Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 Volume VIII The War Years 4 September 1939 -  
18 March 1940 (London, 1954), p.229. (Hereafter DGFP).
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there existed any possibilities of the President offering mediation'.46 Such an agenda, 
where the United States' role in peace was being considered, was clearly a significant 
one. The conclusion to the discussion was that ‘the time was not ripe for mediation', 
because ‘nothing should be done that would prejudice ... the Allies'.47 Nevertheless, 
it was felt that some preparatory work on ‘certain broad principles on which ultimate 
peaceful relationships would have to be built', Moffat wrote, ‘...would at least focus 
the direction of people's thinking’.48 The propensity to consider all the options is 
clear. Hull’s wider concerns as to an American role were evident as he was prompted 
to approach Moffat in order to ‘run over one or two points in the European situation’. 
Moffat recorded that Hull was worried by the ‘rumours from abroad that the President 
will be encouraged to mediate', which made him ‘very fearful’ on three counts; any 
offer of mediation by the President ‘would (a) not be successful; (b) would prove 
embarrassing to England and France, and (c) would tend to embroil us in Europe’.49 
Hull’s concerns are noteworthy here, as they align with those he raised in opposition 
to Welles’s conference plan and would be replicated in his reluctance to support the 
Welles mission three months later. Prompted by Hull’s ongoing anxiety, discussion 
continued in other quarters of the State Department. Long admitted to having given 
the matter ‘a good deal of thought’ in the process of drafting ‘several memoranda ... 
directed to the situation', for the President. However, Long left them in ‘rough’ form 
as there was ‘no reason to believe that the President should at this time do anything’.50 
Berle shared Long’s view that the moment was not right ‘but the time might come and 
it might come very soon’.51 It is clear, then, that the State Department was considering 
a possible mediating role the United States could play.
The discussion in Washington following Hitler’s speech is important in 
illustrating key aspects of the Rooseveltian foreign policy-making process in the 
autumn of 1939 in the build-up to the Welles mission. Firstly, evident again is Hull’s 
caution over any United States involvement, and how the American people would 
perceive this. The second important point is that the position of Great Britain was 
being considered. At a time when difficulties over neutral rights were emerging in the 
autumn of 1940 those discussing any settlement were clearly conscious of not wanting
46 Hull, Memoirs Vol. 1., p.711. Hooker, Moffat, p.272.
47 Hooker, Moffat, p.272. 11 October 1939, BLP.
48 Hooker, Moffat, p.272.
49 Hooker, Moffat, p.272.
50 11 October ¡939, BLP.
51 Memorandum by Berle, 10 October 1939, Box 211 ABP.
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to ‘prejudice' the British position by making them appear as the obstacle to peace. A 
third aspect relates to the longer-term attitude of the State Department in being 
prepared to consider a full range of policy options. Here the linkage to preparing 
policy with its deployment subject to further modification is again evident: the ‘long 
shot'. Indeed, the preliminary work that Moffat and Long considered here was 
complementary to both the issues involved in aspects of the Welles mission, and also 
in the embryonic post-war planning process that both men were involved with begun 
in early 1940 under Welles’ chairmanship. What these features point to is a 
community in Washington, beyond solely Roosevelt and Welles, that was discussing 
the role of the United States in addressing the situation in Europe in the period leading 
up to the Welles mission.
The Businessmen of Peace
The Administration’s discussion of an American mediating role throughout the 
autumn was in some degree prompted by, and subsequently maintained by, a number 
of ‘peace moves’ that involved the exploits of some businessmen who attempted to 
encourage Roosevelt to mediate. Characters such as Americans William Rhodes 
Davis, a businessman who had brokered an oil deal with Nazi Germany, and James D. 
Mooney, the President of the General Motors Overseas Corporation, made notable 
efforts to exploit their access to the Administration in Washington and their contacts 
in Berlin in the cause of ‘peace’.52 The peace that men such as these sought requires 
clarification. Their motivations are unclear, as well-meaning intent must be balanced 
against the realisation that the ongoing war was not necessarily helping their business 
interests. Further, and more significantly for the success of any moves, there was a 
chance that these men were being ‘used’ by the German authorities to gauge how far 
Roosevelt was prepared to involved the United States. Berle suggested that the Allies 
too were prepared to see how far the President would involve himself. ‘The air is 
filled with rumours,’ Berle noted, which he thought were ‘largely emanating from
52 Other individuals included a Swedish businessman, M. Dahlerus, who approached the British 
government through Alexander Cadogan. Cadogan’s colleague, Frank Roberts, wrote of the Swede; he 
‘had a hero worship of GOring who, in his eyes, could do no wrong’. Roberts surmised Dahlerus’s 
efforts as those of ‘an honest man who sincerely wished to avoid war and bring about better Anglo- 
German relations. 1 think he acted perfectly uprightly throughout.’ Letter from Frank K. Roberts to Sir 
Llewellyn Woodward, 27 November 1942. The activities of Mr Dahlerus A4. 410.3.10 (i). The Halifax 
Papers, The Borthwick Institute, York. (Hereafter HP).
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Berlin and allied sources’.53 What this meant was that it was known that these ‘peace 
moves’ could be part of a German ploy and therefore were almost wholly discounted 
as providing any meaningful opportunity to provide a real settlement. Nevertheless, 
and as was evident in other foreign policy moves, Roosevelt saw a possibility of there 
being some value in keeping up with these moves as sources of information.
The significance of the exploits of these men for the Welles mission is 
twofold. In the first place, the exploits of these international businessmen added to the 
surreal atmosphere of the ‘phony war’ in which peace was being discussed. The 
second aspect was that Welles, on his visit the following year, would meet with 
Goring who regularly appeared as the ‘peace-monger’ in these moves. With regard to 
the case of James Mooney, the lengths the Administration went to in order to 
disassociate itself from his views in the spring of 1940 reveal that, once the Welles 
mission was truly under way, Roosevelt was convinced nothing could come from 
Mooney’s efforts. Although discussion of the details of these moves would detract 
from the focus of this work, an examination of some of the key points can add weight 
to the analysis presented here.
The Goring Factor
An important element in the peace moves of the autumn of 1939, of particular 
relevance to those involving the escapades of the various businessmen, was the role of 
the Reich Air Marshal, Herman Goring. In the rumour and counter-rumour of the 
peace moves Goring was often seen as likely to replace Hitler as Chancellor, who 
would in turn move to a purely figurehead position. This tale was relevant because it 
remained to some degree in the thoughts of those in the State Department. In the case 
of Davis’s exploits in September and October, the businessman claimed that he had 
seen Goring and the German wanted to end the war. Although Davis had had an 
audience with Roosevelt on 15 September and then met Berle once he returned from 
Europe, the Administration was clearly not impressed with Davis’s activities. Berle 
wrote that Davis had tried to ‘counter a German intrigue with an intrigue of his own’ 
and endeavoured to portray ‘a set of views which he thought would appeal to Goring’. 
Berle was under no illusions as to Davis’ significance: ‘There is practically nothing in 
it; and no single statement which Davis has made really stands up under
53 Memorandum by Berle, 10 October 1939, Box 211 ABP
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examination.'54 Berle's comments do reveal though, that the Administration was 
aware that those in Berlin were seeking to use the likes of Davis to gauge the United 
States position. Hull too was aware of the activities of Davis, and saw potential 
dangers for the United States. Having learnt from Harrison, the American Consul in 
Berne, that Goring was apparently ready to accept Davis, he cabled both Berne and 
Berlin to categorically deny any involvement. Hull wrote: "Davis does not in any way 
represent either the President or the American Government.'55
The notion that Goring could be divorced from Hitler and somehow become 
the presentable face of German Nazism was maintained during the "phony war’ by the 
exploits of Davis et al. From Berne, Harrison reported that if "peace might be possible 
[it] would strengthen the hands of Goring' in contrast to ‘Ribbentrop’s argument that 
Great Britain and France desire only to crush Germany and do not want peace’.56 
Harrison went on to say that he had learned of ‘the possibility of making [Hitler] a 
mere figurehead as “the leader” and turning over the actual control of the government 
to Goring as Chancellor...’.57 Berle returned to the possibility of a division between 
Goring and Ribbentrop in early December after the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish 
War.58 Having surmised that a rift was ‘by no means improbable’, Berle noted, 
"something curious is happening in Central Europe which I can only guess at.’ This 
curiosity arose because Italian planes had gone through Germany en route to Finland 
to assist in repelling the Russian invaders. Berle continued, with a further reference to 
Davis, ‘In endeavouring to explain this, I revert to that fantastic adventurer, W.R. 
Davis. His intrigues showed a distinct difference between Ribbentrop and Goring. The
54 Memorandums by Berle, 12 and 13 October 1939, Box 211 ABP.
55 This telegram was signed in Hull’s own hand. Telegram from Hull to Kirk 13 (crossed out and 16 
written over in pencil), October 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/78. State Department Decimal 
Files RG 59 1930-1939, Archive II, Maryland. (Hereafter SDDF).
56 Telegram No. 125 from Harrison (Consul at Berne) to Hull, 12 October 1939, 740.00119 European 
War 1939/78. FRUS 1939 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1956), p.512.
57 Telegram No. 126 from Harrison (Berne) to Hull, 12 October 1939, 740.00119 European war, 
1939/79: M 982 European War 740 SDCF.
58 The Russo-Finnish war provided another surreal aspect to the ‘phony war’, although it ended with 
victory for the Russians on 12 March 1940. Conflict had begun on 30 November 1939, when Soviet 
troops crossed the border and Soviet planes began bombing Helsinki. For further information on the 
war see Carl Van Dyke, The Soviet Invasion o f Finland 1939-40 (London, 1997). The fate of Finland 
was of particular interest to the United States people, as the Finns had made strenuous and ultimately 
successful efforts to repay their war debts. That this was still a source of contention in American 
relations with the Allies is clear in comments made by Moffat when in Paris in March 1940. He 
recorded in his previously undiscovered account of the trip that the only ‘offensive remark’ he heard in 
the entire trip was when a Frenchmen said that American “‘reluctance to advance money to Finland” 
has at least convinced the French that they had done the right thing in not making a greater effort to 
repay their war debts’. ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.24, SWP Box 211.
84
Chapter Two
naval, propaganda and diplomatic machinery are in Ribbentrop’s hands and are 
assisting the Russians. The army and air forces belong to Goring, and Goring is 
apparently favouring the Finns, in all left-handed ways. Whether this means that the 
German split on the Russian issue is beginning to appear, I do not know, but it is 
worth watching.’59 The British were certainly watching the events involving Davis 
and Goring. The British report confirmed that Davis had access to ‘high circles in 
Germany’, and concluded that the ‘State Department regarded the whole thing as a 
Nazi plot to enlist neutral sympathy for a peace move based on alleged differences 
between Hitler and Goring’.60 That the State Department did not regard this move as 
anything more than a plot is clear.
It is important to note that it was not only through third parties that the 
Administration learned of Goring peaceful leanings. In November Raymond Geist, 
the Consul General to Berlin, returned to Washington with a message from the 
German. Geist told Berle that Goring had called on him before he left Germany and 
had urged him to ‘persuade the President to try to make peace on the basis of the 
status quo’.61 Geist, an experienced diplomat, was frank in his assessment to Berle 
that there would be no prospect of a settlement, just that the Germans would ‘take 
what they have’ and go on to build an ‘ever huger military machine’. This raised the 
probability that the Allies would be overwhelmed and that America ‘should have to 
get into it’. This was a prospect that was not realistic for the Administration in the 
autumn of 1939, given the strength of public opinion against any actual involvement 
in Europe.
Roosevelt’s Involvement
While contending with American opinion and securing revision of the neutrality 
legislation, Roosevelt was also keen to ascertain a complete picture of the situation in 
Europe regarding peace. His propensity to let matters develop before acting
59 Memorandum by Berle, 11 December 1939, Box 211 ABP.
60 Foreign Office Minute entitled ‘American Peace Moves’ by Roberts, 9 February 1940, C2759/89/18 
FO 371 24405 PRO.
61 Memorandum by Berle, 28 November 1939, Box 211 ABP. Berle continued to lament the next day. 
He confessed to his diary that Geist ‘knowing GOring well; ... has seen the effect of the Russian 
alliance;... that one cannot make peace;... that there is a distinct possibility that that British and French 
may be worn out, that in that case we shall have to enter the war’. This was something Berle, and the 
rest of the Administration, knew they could not countenance at this stage. Memorandum by Adolf A. 
Berle, 29 November 1939. Beatrice B. Berle & Travis B. Jacobs (eds.), Navigating the Rapids 1918- 
1971 From the papers o f Adolf A. Berle (New York, 1973).
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decisively, his preference for personal diplomacy and his desire for information from 
Europe meant he was prepared to tolerate the likes of Davis even if they were 
"adventurers’. In this phase Roosevelt recognised that what the various businessmen 
proposed stood next to no chance of achieving a peace but by taking on board their 
views he might learn something. To repeat the sentiment, evident in previous policy 
considerations: what harm could it do when the die was already cast?
Without seeking an exhaustive examination of the minute details, the case of 
James D. Mooney is illustrative of Roosevelt’s involvement in the development of a 
peace move. Although Mooney operated without any official endorsement, the fact 
that Roosevelt met him on a number of occasions during the ‘phony war’ and 
maintained a correspondence with him, at the very least implied he would welcome 
news of Mooney’s exploits. Nevertheless contradictions abound. Although during the 
spring and summer of 1940, and especially at the time of the Welles mission, the 
Administration made extensive efforts to disassociate itself from Mooney who even
then talked of peace, Roosevelt did not wholly discount him: in 1942 Mooney became
62Director of Aviation Production in the Navy.
Mooney’s peace move began in the autumn of 1939. The businessman, who 
was effectively ‘the “foreign minister” of the vast General Motors industrial empire’, 
and a ‘veteran Roosevelt supporter with easy access to the White House’, held a three- 
hour meeting with Goring in Berlin on 19 October 1939.62 3 According to his friend 
Louis P. Lochner, during this meeting Mooney was told by Goring to go to the Allies 
and find out ‘what this war is all about’.64 Mooney proceeded to Paris and London 
where he met with Ambassadors Bullitt and Kennedy, before talking to Robert 
Vansittart at the Foreign Office in London on 26 October 1939. Even before then, 
Mooney’s proposal at the behest of Goring ‘for a meeting between British, French and 
German statesmen on neutral territory with a view to ending the war’, was discounted 
by the State Department.65 Typically, Hull sought to distance the Administration from 
any association with such a move. He told Bullitt that he was ‘quite right in assuming 
that this government would not instruct you to urge that the French government accept
62 Box 6448, FDR PPF.
63 Louis P. Lochner, Always the Unexpected -  A Book o f Reminisces (New York, 1956), p.263. 
Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.242.
64 Lochner, Always the Unexpected, pp.262-265.
65 Foreign Office Minute entitled ‘American Peace Moves’ by Roberts, 9 February 1940, C2759/89/18 
FO 371 24405 PRO.
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Mooney’s proposals. Please inform Kennedy'.66 The British were equally dismissive 
of the value of the suggestion Mooney brought. Having learned of the detail. Cadogan 
lamented: ‘No assurances, no promises, no signatures of the present regime are worth 
anything, Germany must do some deed as evidence of good faith.’ 67 Vansittart 
concluded that, despite his impression of Mooney as ‘an honest and reputable man', 
he ‘was being “used” by Field-Marshal Goring’. 68 This was the line the State 
Department had propagated to the British Embassy in Washington: Mooney had ‘been 
got at by the Germans and by Field-Marshal Goring in particular’. Clearly, then, 
Mooney’s moves were given little credence by Hull and those in the State 
Department. This was in some contrast to Roosevelt himself, who met Mooney again 
on 22 December 1939, listening ‘patiently and attentively’ to the General Motors man 
recount his experiences of the autumn before stressing that he would not move until 
he thought the time was right.69 By this stage, as will be explored presently in this 
chapter, Roosevelt’s ideas were coalescing around the notion that there might be a 
role that he could play to assist in a peaceful settlement. The difference between 
Roosevelt and Hull reflected the former’s desire not to discount any option and the 
latter’s caution as to the risks. Roosevelt met Mooney again in mid-January 1940. On 
that occasion he left Mooney with a note stating he would welcome any information 
Mooney was able to learn, thus revealing that Roosevelt placed at least some value in 
Mooney’s information. Crucially though, Roosevelt did not put himself in a position 
to be implicated by Mooney should the businessman be shown up to be operating 
wittingly or otherwise on behalf of the Germans.
The significance of Mooney’s mission in the autumn of 1939 is not that he 
was undoubtedly part of a German ‘intrigue’ but the degree of association Roosevelt 
had with him despite the State Department’s efforts to discredit his efforts. This 
reflected to varying degrees Roosevelt’s consideration of personal diplomacy, his 
desire for information and his propensity to consider taking risks -  policies with long 
odds of achieving a positive outcome. Although to differing degrees, these features 
would all be evident during the Welles mission itself.
66 Telegram No. 1308 from Hull to Bullitt, 25 October 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/34. FRUS 
1939 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1956), p.520
67 Dilks, Cadogan, p.220.
68 Foreign Office Minute entitled ‘American Peace Moves’ by Roberts, 9 February 1940. C2759/89/I8 
FO 371 24405 PRO.
69 Lochner, Always the Unexpected, p.267.
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The Array of Peace Moves
Before concluding this chapter, it is worth considering other peace moves of the 
autumn of 1939. This is because the breadth of these moves illustrates that the issue of 
peace was very much on Roosevelt’s agenda by December 1939 through his 
individual involvement and that of members of the Administration.
During October 1939 the Administration learned of possible peace moves 
under way in Belgium. Joseph Davies, the American Ambassador reported that there 
were ‘thorough-going efforts’ happening in Belgium, ‘in connection with the German 
“peace-offer”' of 8 October. He had learned of the presence of four ‘prominent and 
powerful German industrialists’ who were ‘asserting with the greatest confidence that 
peace is now assured’ and were there ‘making anticipatory business arrangements’.70 
Although this merely prompted a reply thanking Davies for his report, the arrival of 
another tale which purported to be a peace move involving ‘businessmen’ contributed 
to the discussion of peace in Washington. So, too, did the Ambassador’s report on a 
three-hour conversation that he had conducted with the King Leopold of the Belgians. 
Davies suggested that the monarch thought that ‘there was still a slender hope for 
peace, but the only one who could do anything about it was FDR’. Roosevelt 
responded personally and candidly to the King, admitting forlornly that ‘not a day 
passes without my trying to see if a favourable opportunity exists for some move that 
would lead to peace’.71 Clearly, Roosevelt was conscious of any chance that might 
exist for peace and his role in such a possibility. This became explicit in early 
November, when Davies reported a peace move initiated by King of Belgium and 
Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands. The two monarchs issued a statement saying 
that ‘as sovereigns of two neutral states’ they were ‘ready to offer ... good offices’ to 
the belligerents. To this they added a somewhat desperate statement: ‘We hope that 
our offer will be accepted and that thus a first step will be taken towards the 
establishment of a durable peace.’72 Davies explained the desperation. He wrote to 
Washington that the two monarchs had learned that ‘Germany was going to invade 
Holland on Thursday [and] while there was scant hope that the joint efforts of the two 
rulers to obtain peace would be effective they nevertheless felt it imperative to make
70 Telegram No. 489 from Davies to Hull, 10 October 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/113 
SDDF.
71 Roosevelt, F.D.R., p.938.
72 Telegram No. 258 from Gordon (The Hague) to Hull, 7 November 1939, 740.00119 European War 
1939/126. FRUS 1939 Vol. l.(USGPO, 1956), p.524.
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some effort'.73 Clearly in Davies' assessment the two monarchs shared the view of the 
Administration that the viability of a move did not preclude its undertaking. It would 
have been of little surprise that the move found "little favour’ in Washington or 
London, where Chamberlain told Kennedy that ‘no peace proposal is practical just at 
this time’.74 75Nevertheless, Davies alluded to the possibility that the Germans "were 
pressing the neutrals to assume active responsibility in pushing a peace offensive if 
they wish to prevent the horrors of the unrestricted war that otherwise is impending'.7:1 
Although nothing came of the monarchs’ appeal, this talk kept the idea that ‘the 
neutrals’ could have a role to play alive in Washington.
Although Goring was the focal point of a number of the peace moves of the 
period he was not the only member of the German hierarchy who was associated with 
peace. Dr Hjalmar Schacht. the former President of the Reichsbank and Finance 
Minister, came to the attention of the Roosevelt Administration after a conversation 
he held with the American Charge d’Affaires in Berlin, Alexander Kirk.76 Schacht 
had told Kirk that he ‘endorsed the view ... that mediation by the President might 
bring about peace and indicated his sympathy with those groups in Germany which 
were dissatisfied with the present leadership’.77 The Reich Minister proposed that he 
be invited to the United States under the pretext of giving a public speech, in order to 
talk with the President. The Administration was not impressed. George S. 
Messersmith, an Assistant Secretary of State, wrote that both ‘the Secretary and 
Under Secretary were in agreement that... there could be no official sponsorship even 
of the most indirect character and that certainly no official contacts, such as [Schacht] 
had in mind, could be arranged’. The fact that Schacht was given such short shrift by 
Welles is interesting, given that within three months he would meet the Finance 
Minister in Berlin. Messersmith’s final thoughts on Schacht reflected awareness 
within the State Department that the peace moves may have been emanating from the
73 Telegram No. 170 from Davies to Hull, 7 November 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/128 
SDDF.
74 8 November 1939, BLP. Telegram No. 2309 from Kennedy to Hull, 8 November 1939, 740.00119 
European War 1939/133. FRUS 1939 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1956), p.527.
75 Telegram No. 173 from Davies to Hull 8 November 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/134. 
FRUS 1939 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1956), p.524
76 Morgenthau had learned at the beginning of October that an associate of Schacht, Adam Von Trott, 
was in America arguing that if the United States ‘were going to back the English in a policy to 
exterminate the Germans’, then it would only force themselves [the German people] to back Hitler’. 
However, ‘if the English would be reasonable, there would be chance for peace.’ Lunch meeting 
between Morgenthau and Roosevelt, 9 October 1939, MPD.
77 Telegram No. 1954 from Kirk to Hull, 5 November 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/122. FRUS 
1939 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1956), p.522.
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German government with the aim of unsettling both the neutrals and the Allies. 
Messersmith concluded that "there was at least reasonable ground to believe, keeping 
in mind other information we have, that this move of Dr Schacht was a part of the 
general effort of the German Government to establish contact with other governments 
through unofficial agents who appeared to be acting entirely independently of the 
German Government and in fact in some ways in opposition to it’. The State 
Department's view was clearly that the German government was endeavouring to 
unsettle neutral opinion.
Roosevelt was aware of this sentiment when Welles approached him in early 
December with news of another peace move that was not associated with the German 
leadership. This time the overture came from a Belgian, Mr Van Zeeland, who was a 
‘leading spirit in refugee work'.78 9 The Belgian’s proposal built upon a plan he had 
given to the Administration in June 1937, when he had accompanied the Belgian 
Prime Minister to the United States. The substance of his proposals was similar to that 
of the Welles Armistice Day plan of late 1937: an international meeting of those 
countries with an interest in establishing a lasting peace.80 Having explained this to 
Roosevelt, Welles suggested that the Belgian would ‘doubtless wish to have some 
public expression of support’ for his idea to be put into operation. ‘Mr Van Zeeland’s 
plan is on the whole good,’ Roosevelt’s reply began, ‘but I think misses the 
psychology which is necessary to success.’ The Belgian’s proposal, the President 
explained, would lead to 'most people’ regarding it as a Targe series of small 
individual projects and would mentally miss out on the conception of the whole’. 
Roosevelt lamented that ‘somebody has to breathe heart and ideals on a large scale 
into this whole subject if it is to be put into effect on a world-wide basis’.81 It was 
becoming more evident that the only person who could ‘breathe heart and ideals’ into 
a settlement was the President himself. That Roosevelt was aware of a large volume
78 Memorandum by Messersmith to Moffat, 9 November 1939 attached to Telegram No. 1954 from 
Kirk to Hull, 5 November 1939, 740.00119 European War 1939/122. FRUS 1939 Voi. I. (USGPO, 
1956), p.523.
79 Letter from Welles to Roosevelt, 1 December 1939, FDR PSF Box 76.
80 Van Zeeland’s proposals in 1937 included the following: ‘A meeting in the immediate future of 
representatives of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, and 
Switzerland -  in other words, the nations now supporting the principles embodied in the tripartite 
agreement -  for the purpose of considering and agreeing upon certain steps which they might jointly or 
simultaneously take in order to advance disarmament, monetary stabilisation, and the furtherance of the 
United States liberal trade policy.’ Memorandum from Welles to Roosevelt re conversation Welles had 
with Belgian Prime Minister and Mr Van Zeeland, 25 June 1937, SWP Box 149.
81 Letter from Roosevelt to Welles, 4 December 1939, FDR PSF Box 76.
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of peace moves during the 'phony war' was crucial in creating the atmosphere at the 
end of 1939 from which he considered undertaking a mission to Europe.
To emphasise the importance of the peace moves of autumn 1939 for the 
purposes of considering how they contributed to Roosevelt's motivations behind, and 
objectives for, the Welles mission, one needs to consider a number of factors. Firstly, 
the sheer number of moves that emerged during the ‘phony war' meant most 
importantly that the issue of peace was never far from the agenda of those in the 
United States. A second crucial factor was the variety of sources from which the 
moves came, which meant that discounting them en masse was less easy. Although 
the State Department clearly overlooked those emanating from sources close to the 
German government, whether other of the peace moves were totally independent of 
any German intrigue was hard to judge amid the rumour and counter-rumour. 
Certainly Roosevelt was ready to consider sources of information even if they did 
carry increased political risk. The slight difference between the State Department and 
the President is explained by Hull's ever-present concern of the implications of even 
discussing the American role, as exemplified by the aftermath of the discussion on 8 
October, and Roosevelt’s reluctance to rule anything out completely when faced with 
the prospect of the spring campaigns. Furthermore and despite the considerable risk, 
Roosevelt did not entirely dissuade the likes of Davis and especially Mooney from 
appearing to speak on his behalf - he suspected they would anyway. As was the case 
when Welles endeavoured to leave the impression in Berlin the following March that 
Roosevelt was actively considering making a move in order to prolong the ‘phony 
war’, the President may have considered it worthwhile for Mooney et al. to engage the 
Germans and try to instil the idea that he might make a move and thus forestall their 
plans for further aggression. This was certainly in the minds of some in the 
democracies. French Premier Edouard Daladier delighted in telling Bullitt that he was 
in receipt of a number of peace feelers emanating from German sources. Bullitt 
concluded that Daladier ‘was convinced that his pretence of readiness to consider 
German proposals had been the main factor in keeping the Germans from attacking 
this autumn’. While this may have merely been delusional on the part of the 
Frenchman, Roosevelt’s actual belief in the value of Mooney’s conversations in 
Berlin was not as important as whether the Germans placed any value on them. 82
82 Bullitt, For the President, p.389.
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Ultimately they did not (the Germans even telling Welles when he arrived in Germany 
that the businessmen were an annoyance), but given the limited policy options 
available to Roosevelt the association with Mooney and the other businessmen was 
something he could entertain. Clearly, the situation in the autumn of 1939 with regard 
to the peace moves was confused. The variety of the moves stretching back to the first 
weeks of the war kept discussion of peace and the role the President of the United 
States could play in the mind of Roosevelt. It was from the mêlée of rumour that 
Roosevelt's ideas coalesced in December 1939 around the idea that the United States 
may be able to make a worthwhile contribution.
Roosevelt feels the weight of the pressure ‘to do something’ at the end of 1939 
The latent pressure of the ‘phony war’ placed the President of the United States at the 
nexus of consideration about how to end the war. With peace moves coming to the 
Administration's attention on a regular basis, and against a background of minor 
difficulties in Anglo-American relations and with American opinion inhibiting his 
options, at the beginning of December Roosevelt began actively to consider how he 
could address the situation in Europe.
Roosevelt was clearly thinking along the lines of some American involvement 
in a settlement: in other words, a peace move. He told Berle that he ‘proposed to make 
peace next Spring on the basis of having everybody produce everything they could; 
take what they needed; put the rest into a pool; and let countries which needed the 
balance draw it as needed, through the cartels'. Although it was a ‘strange’ tale, Berle 
lamented that Roosevelt's plan was ‘as good a way as any other; the conventional 
methods seem to be landing us precisely nowhere’.83 This certainly was a fantastic 
tale, and Berle’s words reflected both Roosevelt’s inclination for thinking aloud and 
also the feeling in the State Department, present in the last days of peace, that any 
American move could hardly make the situation worse.
The President articulated his thoughts on the situation he was facing in more 
considered terms, at a dinner meeting with Lothian on 13 December. Lothian’s report 
to London contained a precise insight into what Roosevelt thought he might be able to 
contribute. The Scot, maintaining his propensity for sporting analogies wrote that 
Roosevelt ‘evidently hopes that before his time is up he may be able to intervene as a
83 Memorandum by Berle, 5 December 1939, Box 211 ABP.
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kind of umpire'. The Ambassador was well aware that this would cause alarm in 
London and qualified his analysis: *He clearly does not want another Wilsonian peace 
conference. He rather seems to think that if he were appealed to he could lay down 
conditions for an armistice. He is quite clear however that the time has not yet nearly 
come for this." This last point of the time being ‘right’ is a crucial one, yet the criteria 
that would mean the time was right were never clarified by Roosevelt. This was 
undoubtedly a deliberate ploy to leave the question open and avoid accountability in 
such a sensitive area, for Roosevelt knew the consequences of openly contemplating 
American involvement in any settlement.
Yet Roosevelt had begun to stir in terms of what actions he might take. The 
idea of a personal mission to Europe was seen in his proposal to Pope Pius XII that he 
should send a representative to the Vatican. This was so that when the time was right 
the views of the two would have ‘united expression’. The Pope, who had visited the 
United States in 1936 as Cardinal Pacelli, agreed to receive the President's chosen 
representative, the former head of US Steel, Myron C. Taylor.84 Taylor's mission 
ultimately proved inconsequential, although he did meet Welles when the latter was 
on his mission. Nevertheless Roosevelt welcomed a further source of information 
from Europe, particularly in relation to Mussolini’s position, and did not explicitly 
seek to discount the idea that he and the Pope might act in the future.
The nature of any peace move or settlement that Roosevelt was considering 
endorsing, proposing or even just being associated with is worth pointing out. He told 
Lothian in their 13 December meeting that the nature of any future world order must 
be based on four essential freedoms. Although they would be famously championed 
over a year later in his address to Congress on 6 January 1941, Roosevelt explained 
the ‘four freedoms’ to Lothian as being made up of the following: ‘a) freedom of 
religion; b) freedom for information, that is honest publications of accurate news, but 
not necessarily for editorial opinion; c) freedom from fear, namely excessive
84 The more immediate history of relations with the Vatican began at the end of July 1939. Hull and 
Welles both argued to open relations with the Vatican as the Secretary reasoned ‘that the Vatican had 
many sources of information, particularly with regard to what was occurring in Germany, Italy, and 
Spain, which we did not possess’. Hull, Memoirs Vol. I., p.713. Langer and Gleason suggest that ‘the 
President was moved by the laudable if rather tenuous hope of pooling his influence and co-ordinating 
his efforts with those of the Pope in preventing the spread of the war and providing a just peace’. Draft 
of Chapter 10 ‘The Phony Peace’ by Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, p.8 
SWP Box 207. The choice of Taylor was a unanimous one. Hull agreed, ‘A more suitable selection 
than Mr Taylor could not have been made. He possessed wide intelligence and unusual common sense. 
In addition to his work at the Vatican he became one of the moving spirits in our work of initiating and 
developing the outlines of a proposed world peace organisation.’ Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 1., p.715.
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armaments and war. and d) freedom for trade and access to raw materials.’ Although 
couched in typically grandiose Rooseveltian language, what these criteria do show is 
that the President's ideas were incompatible with those of the Axis on any future 
settlement. Yet Roosevelt was not in a position to make such a clear statement at that 
time.
The President’s sensitivity to his position with regard to the American people 
was evident at the end of 1939. During the rest of his conversation with Lothian in 
mid-December, he lamented the problems he faced. The Ambassador wrote that ‘one 
of his greatest difficulties was to make the American people understand the 
tremendous risks that they themselves were running’ and that any attempt to address 
this would ‘depend upon the political situation in the United States'. In short, then, 
this provides further evidence that the state of American public opinion was 
constraining Roosevelt's ability to act. The extremely tentative nature of Roosevelt’s 
engagement with the Vatican at the beginning of December should be seen in this 
light. Roosevelt’s awareness of the dilemmas posed by American public opinion can 
be seen in his annual address to Congress at the beginning of 1940. He stated clearly 
to the audience on Capitol Hill and to those across the nation that there was ‘a vast 
difference between keeping out of war and pretending that it is none of our 
business’.85 6 He then went on to state that a peace was in the interests of the United 
States: the nation would ‘encourage the kind of peace that will lighten the troubles of 
the world, and by doing so help our own nation as well’. Roosevelt ended by warning 
his countrymen, and in particular those convinced that the United States could remain 
aloof from events in Europe, of the danger posed by the dictators. By using the 
example of an ostrich which buries its head in the sand, Roosevelt hoped that ‘we 
shall have fewer American ostriches in our midst [as] it is not good for the ultimate 
health of ostriches’.
At the beginning of 1940 Roosevelt had no definite strategy for fulfilling any 
potential role in influencing events in Europe. It was at this juncture that his Under 
Secretary -  alive to the kaleidoscope of different peace moves that kept discussion of 
peace to the fore, acutely aware of the limits on Administration policy and the 
wartime circumstances in which the Allies found themselves -  came to prominence in 
devising Rooseveltian policy.
85 1 03 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 14 December 1939, HFS.
86 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, pp.l-6.
94
Chapter Two
Welles" Involvement
Welles was very much in tune with Roosevelt’s thinking at the turn of the year. Ever 
since his return from Panama, where he had safeguarded hemispheric security, Welles 
had sought to increase both his knowledge of, and his influence, upon, the 
Administration's policy toward Europe. Given his relationship with Roosevelt and the 
President’s thinking on the possible role he and the United States could play, it was of 
little surprise that in early January 1940 the two individuals began to discuss the 
whole raft of issues that surrounded peace moves and a settlement. The first 
substantial evidence was the convening of a State Department committee to discuss 
the role of neutrals in post-war planning, with Welles as its chair. When the 
committee first met on 4 January, Berle recorded that Welles was fully prepared to 
deal with the issue of peace: ‘Sumner’s mind moved smoothly and cleanly.’ The 
Assistant Secretary noted two aims of the committee, with the first clearly bearing the 
hallmark of Welles’ Armistice Day plan of November 1937 and Roosevelt's 
subsequent proposals of January 1938. Berle recorded that the primary aim of the 
committee was ‘a conference of neutrals to be called here to discuss the maintenance 
of neutral rights’; the secondary and more consequential aim was ‘incidentally to 
suggest, if possible, some plan ... which might be used as a nucleus for peace 
efforts’.87 This secondary aim implied an element of pro-active investigation on 
behalf of the Administration and became clearer when the committee met again on 11 
January. Berle concluded that the Administration was ‘about decided that the next 
thing to be done is to call a meeting of neutrals, in theory to discuss methods of 
maintaining their rights during the war period.’ Of more importance was the fact that 
this would lead to a ‘real and inevitable discussion [of] ...whether mediation could not 
be proposed, together with possible peace terms, and with an insistence that the 
neutrals sit at the peace table with equal right’. 88 The admission that a State 
Department committee was discussing mediation and peace proposals at the 
beginning of January 1940 should not be a great surprise, given the discourse that was 
under way in Washington. Yet the stakes had been raised from the informal Sunday 
morning discussion in October; a committee had been formed with the State 
Department’s key minds involved. The committee met again on 13 January.
87 Memorandum by Berle, 4 January 1940, Box 211 ABP.
88 Memorandum by Berle, 11 January 1940, Box 211 ABP.
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Breckinridge Long thought that they were investigating the “possibility of organising 
the neutrals for a peace movement’. The committee “proposed that the President call a 
meeting of the representatives of groups of powers in Washington and that it be the 
basis for discussing a program which we would submit’.89 Clearly the heritage of the 
Welles conference plan was still in the mind of the State Department when addressing 
the trials of international affairs. Berle acknowledged this, as he considered the 
committee ‘an evolution of an idea which Sumner put forward several years ago.'90
The significance of the committee was that the primary aim of a coming- 
together of neutrals was directly addressed in early February, whilst the secondary 
aim of considering mediation and peace proposals was to be considered less directly 
through the Welles mission. Langer and Gleason neatly sum up the committee's role 
as the Administration preparing itself ‘with a positive program if any opportunity 
presented itself.91 Welles played a key role in basing between the committee and a 
President who was beginning to feel somewhat exasperated that catastrophe was 
around the corner in the spring while he was unable to influence events. Roosevelt 
told the Under Secretary in one of the pair’s meetings in early January that ‘no 
possibility, however remote and however improbable should be overlooked’. Most 
significantly Roosevelt added, he had an ‘obligation to the American people ... to 
leave no stone unturned’.92 It was at a brief series of unrecorded meetings in early 
January that the idea of a United States mission to Europe was first broached by the 
President and his close ally, the Under Secretary. Welles’ access to the President’s 
inner thoughts, his own views and ambition put him in a position to illuminate 
Roosevelt’s ideas and influence the outcome of Administration policy. As January 
developed Roosevelt and Welles set in motion a mission to Europe, and this will be 
examined in the next chapter.
Conclusion
With a full appreciation of the limited means at his disposal and the desire to 
safeguard United States national interests, by the very end o f 1939 Roosevelt was 
contemplating ways in which he could influence the European conflict. The prospect
89 13 January 1940, BLP.
90 Memorandum by Berle, 11 January 1940, Box 211 ABP.
91 Draft of Chapter 10 ‘The Phony Peace’ by Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, 
o.6.
92 Welles, Time for Decision, p.74.
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of the spring offensives drew ever closer, and would certainly be detrimental to 
American security. In this environment Roosevelt's discussions with Welles at the 
beginning of January were the genesis of what became the Welles mission.
Before then though, the themes that this thesis has identified were clearly at 
work during the autumn of 1939. Welles' ability to illuminate Roosevelt’s line of 
thinking was critical during this period. Although at the end of 1939 the pair were on 
the verge of deciding on a mission to Europe, Welles’ work in securing hemispheric 
solidarity should not be discounted. His effort pertaining to South America was vital 
in securing United States national interests within the Western hemisphere. Clearly he 
was not at the very forefront of every aspect of Administration policy during the rest 
of the autumn, but the fact that he again came to the aid of Roosevelt at the turn of the 
year illustrates his importance in Rooseveltian foreign policy-making. Hull too, in 
other vital areas, was crucial in formulating policy. His ongoing concern for American 
interests was clear in his caution over the discussion of American involvement in any 
peace, and in protecting the rights of neutrals. This latter interest was long held, given 
Hull’s enduring interest in reciprocal trade.
The unease Hull expressed on neutral rights, the discussion of peace and the 
neutrality revision again reflected the inhibited nature of Rooseveltian foreign policy. 
During the early days of ‘phony war’ the American people’s sympathy with the Allies 
was reinforced as they saw them stand up to Nazi aggression. However, the lack of 
dramatic incidents as the autumn progressed meant that something approaching 
boredom set in; it was in the eyes of the American people a phony war’. Furthermore, 
the lack of incident meant there was little evidence to support the President’s case that 
there was a distinction between the Allies and Germany; instead it looked as though 
the war was simply over territory in Eastern Europe. The need to define the 
differences between the belligerents was prevalent in Roosevelt’s thinking throughout 
the ‘phony war’. It can be seen by his support of the hemispheric neutrality zone. 
Roosevelt’s main achievement during the autumn of 1939 was the revision of the 
neutrality laws in early November. Whilst this marked a real contribution to the cause 
of the Allies it was presented to the American people as a measure to help American 
security.
As had been the case during the previous eighteen months, during the last four 
months of 1939 the Anglo-American relationship was still fraught. Tension was 
exhibited most clearly in the dispute over neutral rights, which prompted the
97
Chapter Two
Administration to ask the key question of whether British policy was actually doing 
more harm than good in the eyes of the American people. The abrogation of the Trade 
Agreement, the inspection of American mail and the navicerts were issues that 
brought British intervention into the lives of the American people, and those seeking 
to distance the United States from the European conflict were not slow to point this 
out. During the first four months of the war the initiation of the key personal 
relationship between Churchill and Roosevelt was crucial for its ultimate outcome, 
but in the short term the relationship between Roosevelt and Lothian would prove 
vital to ameliorating Anglo-American tensions. Lothian understood the constraints 
Roosevelt was working under but stressed in his communications to London, despite 
the difficulties he had to report, that it was the policy of the Administration ‘to help 
the Allies to defeat the totalitarians by every means short of war’.93 Lothian knew that 
this was not because Roosevelt happened to be sympathetic to the British plight but 
because he reasoned ‘that the United States would be in deadly peril if the Allies 
failed’, and therefore ‘as being essential to the future of his own country [he] ... 
would go to almost any length to secure the overthrow of Hitler and company’.
The intertwined relationship between the strain in Anglo-American relations 
and the influence of American public opinion was given expression by Roosevelt 
himself. In direct relation to how Britain could best present its policies to the people 
of his country, Roosevelt suggested, ‘... the most convincing approach to the 
American public was to admit the errors of the past,’ and, at the same time, point ‘to a 
change of heart in the present’. Lothian understood this as he endeavoured to convey 
to London the need for a clear definition of the British war aims as a measure to assist 
the President in educating the American people. Yet this would take time. 
Interestingly, when Chamberlain read of Roosevelt’s suggestion for British action, 
instead of discounting it (as he might have been expected to), he lamented that ‘errors 
might only become “errors” with the passing of time’.94 While one can only speculate 
as to what ‘errors’ Chamberlain was referring to, the upcoming Welles mission would 
reveal that Anglo-American relations still held scope for considerable
misunderstanding.
141 Despatch No. 119 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS.
94 Margin notes by Chamberlain attached to 103 letter from Lothian to Halifax, 14 December 1939, 
HFS.
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To the mix of themes that illustrate the motivations behind the Welles mission 
the 'phony war’ added the prospect of peace. The expected spring escalation that 
might mean complete catastrophe, added a somewhat surreal edge to discussions of a 
settlement. It was the collective effect of the 'peace moves' in terms of both number 
and variety, that meant Roosevelt could not avoid their influence. The variety of 
sources mitigated against completely discounting the moves, no matter how sceptical 
those in Washington were of the intent behind them. Nevertheless, Roosevelt himself 
did not decisively dismiss the notion carried by Mooney et al that he was prepared to 
listen to the peace moves. In doing this, Roosevelt considered, as Welles would in 
Europe the following year, that any doubt over the United States position might cause 
pause for thought in the minds of the belligerents. It is clear in retrospect that such a 
calculation was not going to work, but it reflected the unreal atmosphere of the 'phony 
war’, Roosevelt's desire for first-hand information and his propensity to consider 
policy without determined outcomes. In making such an estimation Roosevelt had to 
consider whether there were those within Germany who were genuinely interested in 
peace or whether they were merely feeding information to unsettle the Allies and key 
neutrals. Roosevelt’s thinking on peace and any possible settlement evolved as the 
‘phony war’ progressed, from his categorical rejection of Kennedy’s melodramatic 
appeals at the start of September, through the State Department discussion of October 
and Roosevelt’s thinking out loud at the beginning of December, to a point at the end 
of the year where he was prepared to do something. That he mentioned the various 
peace moves in the preamble to the Welles mission shows that they had at least a 
latent influence on his thinking. It is important to consider that at no point in his 
consideration of the issues surrounding peace did Roosevelt underestimate the 
seriousness of the situation facing the Allies. He told Davis in September ‘that the 
Germans perhaps had not realised the real situation in Europe. The British and the 
French were not fighting for Poland, primarily; they were fighting in order to have 
some assurances for the future against continual interruptions of peace’.95 Such a 
concise statement displays the foundation of Roosevelt’s understanding of the issues 
at stake. Yet discussion of the issue of peace was difficult and risk-laden. Vansittart’s 
comments on what Britain’s aims might be when considering peace illustrate the 
difficulties that surrounded the discussion of the whole subject. ‘[I]f we win, it is
95 Memorandum by Berle, 15 September 1939, Box 211 ABP.
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bound to be rather a drastic one, [although] it will be at least 1/10 as severe as if the 
Germans win. In other words, I hope that we shall be less severe and wiser in many 
respects than at Versailles, but more severe and wiser in others.’96 These sage words 
show the flux that surrounded discussion of peace.
The position of the Roosevelt Administration as 1939 drew to a close was 
neatly summarised by Berle. He captured the mood of the President: ‘My own private 
opinion is that the President’s mind is working towards trying to summon a general 
peace conference before the beginning of the spring drives. My own mind is leaning 
in that direction. 1 agree that it is not ideal. But I do not see that it will be any more 
ideal, no matter who comes out top dog in the spring and summer fighting. In other 
words, I do not see that the situation is any worse for making peace now than it will 
be later.’97 The idea that the ‘phony war' provided an opportunity in which every 
possibility should be explored is clear. In short, Roosevelt was motivated, in the light 
of American public opinion and of a desire to secure United States interests, and 
underwritten by an acceptance of escalation in the spring, to explore the possibilities 
in Europe: a peace move of sorts. The pressures of the ‘phony war’; the talk of peace 
and the need to work within the constraints imposed by the American people provide 
a context for the President to consider a move in European affairs. From this 
atmosphere came the Welles mission. Its origins and immediate motivations, and the 
development of the mission's multiple objectives, will be examined in the upcoming 
chapter.
96 119 Memorandum by Vansittart on letter from Lothian to Halifax, 14 December 1939, HFS.
97 Memorandum by Berle, 29 December 1939, Box 211 ABP.
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CHAPTER THREE
‘Wishing Welles’: The Immediate Origins of the Welles Mission, January and
February 1940
On the morning of 9 February 1940 Roosevelt informed the assembled pressmen at 
the 622nd presidential press conference that he had ‘only one thing of importance' to 
tell them. He then made public his intention to despatch Welles to Europe in a press 
release of just three paragraphs (see Appendix One). Welles' goal for the mission was 
‘solely for the purpose of advising the President and the Secretary of State as to 
present conditions in Europe'.1 Having read from the statement, Roosevelt declared to 
the press, ‘Now do not get didactic. You have to stand on this statement... Now that is 
the whole thing. It is all in one sentence...’.2 Reality could hardly have been more 
different. Instead, Roosevelt, as illustrated in this analysis, was influenced by various 
motivations in considering the Welles mission. This chapter charts how during 
January and the first week of February 1940 the various factors that Roosevelt was 
conscious of at the end of 1939 came to bare alongside the objectives that the mission 
could achieve. This will in turn allow a full assessment of the mission’s goals prior to 
Welles’ departure for Europe on 17 February. In short, the mission’s objectives by 
that point had become an exploration of the possibilities for peace, a desire for first­
hand information from the protagonists, perpetuating Italian neutrality and the 
prolonging of the ‘phony war’.
The chapter will begin by looking at the process of drafting the press 
statement that Roosevelt read out on 9 February. This process clearly reveals the 
longer-term themes that were involved in Roosevelt’s thinking behind the mission, 
namely: the influence of Welles; the concerns of Hull; the limitations on American 
foreign policy due to American public opinion, and the views expressed by the 
Chamberlain government. Beside the contending views of Welles and Hull as to what 
the mission should entail, influence from London was felt in a series of transatlantic 
exchanges that came to shape the draft and which reveal again the state of Anglo- 
American relations. This episode began on 1 February, when Lothian learned first­
hand of the intended mission, and subsequently illustrates Chamberlain’s opposition 
to the whole enterprise. This section highlights key passages of the dialogue that took
1 Please see Appendix One. The press release can be found in PSF Box 76 at The Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
2 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, pp.79-80.
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place and draws out of them the points relevant to this work. Importantly, it was at the 
meeting on 1 February that Lothian also learned that in Roosevelt's estimation the 
mission would have only a *one in a thousand’ chance of influencing events in 
Europe. From the outset an acceptance that the mission stood little chance of 
succeeding was acknowledged as the mission’s objectives developed in early 1940.
The chapter will then move on by examining the intentions of Roosevelt and 
Welles on the eve of Welles’ departure for Europe. Their intentions were seen in 
concise form in a series of letters the pair composed. Drafted by Welles on 
Roosevelt’s behalf, these documents addressed to Mussolini, Daladier and 
Chamberlain explained Welles’ mission and provided a welcome from the President. 
It is notable that only three were composed. There was no message for Hitler, thus 
revealing that peace with Hitler’s Germany was recognised as a virtual impossibility. 
In turn, such an omission hints at the existence of the other objectives that the mission 
had developed.
Assessments of Roosevelt’s intentions in the first few weeks of 1940 were 
clouded still further on 9 February. Hull announced, later in the day, that the United 
States was approaching over fifty other neutral nations with regard to convening a 
meeting of neutrals. Though the heritage behind such a move can be seen in the 
policies forwarded by the State Department, and flowed out of the debate over 
neutrals’ rights prompted by the war, it was left unclear as to how the neutrals’ 
discussions would interact with the Welles mission. This move therefore also 
necessitates the explanation provided in this chapter.
As soon as Roosevelt had finished his press conference on 9 February, 
speculation erupted as to the President’s real purposes. The conjecture was not 
confined to the press. With no more than Roosevelt’s brief statement to go on and 
with less than 24 hours’ notification (unlike the British), governments in Rome, Berlin 
and Paris were left to ponder the President’s intentions. Unremarkably, given that 
Roosevelt’s announcement was received in both European government and press 
circles at such short notice, speculation in both groups ran along similar lines. This 
chapter charts the major areas of conjecture that emerged. These included parallels 
drawn with the activities of Colonel House and his trips to Europe during the First 
World War, and notions of the mission being a ploy by Roosevelt to secure a third-
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term. Most importantly, the press and the European governments pondered whether 
Welles’ trip to Europe meant a substantial United States 'Peace Drive’.3
That so many questions were raised by the prospect of Welles’ mission (and 
would continue to be raised during its duration) was undoubtedly in Roosevelt’s mind 
as he read from the press statement on 9 February. The ambiguity that surrounded the 
mission in fact served a purpose for Roosevelt and Welles, in keeping open the 
possibility that something might result from the mission. This fed into Roosevelt and 
Welles’ intention to prolong the ‘phony war’ and the Administration’s wider thinking 
in accepting ‘long odds’ in pursuing policy.
In essence, then, this chapter is pivotal in tackling the central question of this 
work. It addresses the coming together in the first few weeks of 1940 of the longer- 
term themes that have been identified in this work. These were all present as 
Roosevelt, and Welles, put the mission into operation. That multiple motivations and 
possible objectives can be seen in Roosevelt's wanting to return to the simplicity of 
the mission in his 9 February press conference. His final words reiterated this. 
Roosevelt suggested: ‘You had better just stand on that language. That is all there is to 
say. Using the same old phrase I used before, do not try to break it down by 
impossible questions. The thing states the actual fact, the whole of the actual fact, and 
there isn’t anything more. That is really the whole thing.’4 This chapter will show that 
there were ‘impossible questions’, that there was considerably ‘more’, and that this 
press release was definitely not ‘the whole thing’.
Two Revealing Drafts of the Press Release and the Mission’s Objectives 
The drafting of the press release poignantly illustrates the various influences on 
Roosevelt at the beginning of 1940. Two draft versions of the press release can be 
found in Roosevelt’s papers, and they are presented here as Appendices Two and 
Three. In brief, the evolution from these drafts to the final statement shows that at the 
outset Roosevelt saw the mission as an opportunity to explore the possibilities for 
peace. The objections of both the British and Hull are evident as this objective is 
diluted and the word ‘peace’ removed entirely. Also evident is Welles’ influence, in 
particular in adding Italy to the itinerary. Lastly, the drafts show clearly the
3 The New York Times, 10 February 1940.
4 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, p.77.
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emergence of the publicly-acknowledged aim of the mission: to advise ‘the President 
and Secretary of State as to present conditions in Europe'.
An exploration of the drafts in greater depth will now provide an answer to the 
central question of this work, namely Roosevelt’s motivations and objectives for the 
Welles mission. Every sentence of each draft is vital in ascertaining the evolution in 
Roosevelt’s thinking. Although both drafts are undated, the one with blank spaces and 
no name is the earlier draft and can be approximately dated to the last week of 
January, whereas the second draft, which is much closer to the final draft given to the 
press on 9 February, was drawn up on 6-7 February. In looking at the first draft, its 
opening sentence illustrates two important things. The first is that the mission was 
conceived of by Roosevelt himself, with no mention of his Secretary of State. The 
second feature of the first draft is that Italy is missing from the tour itinerary and the 
mission was to be solely to the belligerent nations. This further strengthens the 
argument that at the outset Roosevelt wanted to address the issue of ‘peace', and this 
is confirmed in the draft’s next sentence. Roosevelt’s intention at this initial drafting 
stage to assist the cause of peace was clear. He wrote that it ‘will be the purpose of Mr
______’s mission to ascertain whether the governments of those belligerent powers
will state for the confidential information of the President the basis upon which they 
would be prepared to make peace’. This sentence is important because it is the one 
that was modified most between the first draft and the public announcement. The last 
two sentences in this draft reveal that concern for American public opinion was never 
far from Roosevelt’s thinking, and that he sought to divert potential isolationist 
criticism by stating that no ‘proposals’ would be made and his representative would 
merely be ‘reporting’.
In turning to the second draft, its first significant feature is that Roosevelt had 
settled upon Welles as the man to undertake the mission. This was not entirely 
preordained. When Roosevelt had broached the idea of sending an emissary, on what 
he then described as a ‘fact-finding’ mission to Europe, with Myron Taylor in early 
December, the President ‘had not decided whether it would be Welles, Berle or a 
“businessman”’.5 That Roosevelt had settled on Welles no doubt reflected the Under 
Secretary’s keenness to undertake the task which will be considered presently. It is 
also important that, in deciding on Welles over Berle, he was choosing someone at
5 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.538.
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least with Anglophile leanings over a dedicated Anglophobe, and in deciding against 
a businessman he was choosing to keep the mission official and close to him 
personally. The second significant development in this draft is the absence of the 
word ‘peace’. If one reads under the crossing-out one can see that the word ‘peace’ 
has been removed. The explanation for its removal will be provided when examining 
the influence of both Hull and the British, but it is worth noting here that, after 
consultation, Roosevelt was prepared to change the stated purpose of the mission. 
Further, that he took on board British concerns shows that, in spite of the developing 
goals of the mission, fundamentally Roosevelt did not want to compromise the British 
position.
Welles’ Own Contribution
The development of Roosevelt’s ideas at the end of 1939 towards the design of a 
mission to Europe meant that the man who was to undertake the trip was able to exert 
a considerable influence on the formulation of the mission. By the middle of January 
1940, the idea of Under Secretary Sumner Welles undertaking a mission to Europe 
had been agreed between Welles and Roosevelt.6
Welles’ influence on the drafts can be seen most clearly in the inclusion of 
Italy in the mission’s final itinerary. This is significant, because Welles was to pursue 
the ‘Italian angle’ once on the mission and into the early summer of 1940. The hand­
written inclusion of ‘Italy’ in the second draft of the mission statement reveals that 
Italy was added to the itinerary at a relatively late stage. As Welles was away from the 
State Department for a few days at the beginning of the last week of January 1940 
owing to illness, it is likely that Italy’s inclusion came about as a result of Welles’ 
return. Welles had a number of reasons for wanting to see a visit to Rome on the route 
of his mission. First of all, he wanted to include another neutral nation in his tour. 
This revealed a degree of political savvy. He wanted to mitigate any accusation from 
the Administration’s opponents that the mission was involving the United States in a 
European war. In arguing for Italian inclusion and subsequently in his pursuit of the 
‘Italian angle’, Welles was conscious that encouraging any sort of Italian involvement 
would remove sole responsibility from the United States. This could provide a
6 Although no definite date exists, Benjamin Welles suggests that two meetings which the pair had on 5 
and 10 January 1940 were the occasions when a mission was agreed upon. SWP Box 262.
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‘scapegoat’, which he could point to were the political implications of his mission 
become overly dangerous for the Administration.
This in turn reflected a view within the State Department that Mussolini had 
played a notable role in preventing war at the time of Munich and had tried to prevent 
war from breaking out in September 1939. Berle recorded in his diary only two weeks 
after the war had broken out that Mussolini might be ‘sympathetic’ to ‘some neutral 
nation who might so act ... as [an] arbitrator’.7 The notion that Welles might be able 
to encourage Mussolini to act as an ‘honest broker' would also allow the Under 
Secretary to ascertain the strength of the Axis. Indeed the objective of gathering 
information on the state of affairs in Europe was perhaps strongest in Rome, as 
Ambassador Phillips had not seen Mussolini for a number of months. Welles was at 
the very least intrigued to learn in his initial conversations in Rome of Ciano’s dislike 
of Ribbentrop and Mussolini’s claim that he retained full liberty of action in the Axis. 
Indeed, the aim of exploring any division within the Axis was certainly something the 
German Foreign Office considered as a possible motivation for the mission, and this 
will be discussed in due course. In pursuing such a line Welles considered that any 
division between Italy and Germany would help limit the scope of the war and might 
assist the Allies.
Lastly, it is worth considering that Welles knew, given the belligerent status of 
the other countries he would visit, that adding Italy provided him with a greater 
opportunity to be able to produce a ‘positive’ outcome from the mission; even if this 
was only a postponement of Italy’s decision to enter the war. The prominence Welles 
gave to Italy his final report and the efforts he went to in the spring betrayed a need to 
justify Italy’s inclusion. Berle concluded once Welles had returned to Washington that 
‘The Italian position at the moment was determinative.’8 Again, although this may 
seem a grand claim, Berle knew full well that it was extremely unlikely to produce 
anything. His attitude, as it had been the previous September with regard to the last 
ditch appeals, revealed this: ‘Fortunately, there is always liberty to dream, even if the 
result is nothing but dreams.’9 In short, then, and in keeping with the ‘neutrals’ 
declaration’, and with the heritage of Welles’ own conference plan, Welles saw Italy 
as an opportunity to explore whether or not a neutral bloc could be formed.
7 Memorandum by Berle, 15 September 1939, ABP Box 211.
8 Memorandum by Berle, 3 Aprii 1940, ABP Box 211.
9 Memorandum by Berle, 19 Aprii 1940, ABP Box 211.
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The wider strategic importance of Italy in relation to the war was also an 
important element for Welles. Benjamin Welles emphasises this as he argues that 
Sumner Welles ‘won' Italian ‘inclusion' by stressing ‘the importance of Italian 
neutrality to Anglo-French control of the eastern Mediterranean’.10 1In this area Welles 
was actually in line with British thinking. The Chamberlain government well 
understood the significance of Italian neutrality. In assessing Britain’s position, in the 
weeks after the war had broken out, Cadogan was pleased that, contrary to the fears of 
British strategic planners, who had seen war with any of the three Axis powers as a 
precursor to war with them all, they were only facing Germany. In this sense, Italian 
neutrality was worth pursuing in order to ‘hold the Mediterranean open for Middle 
Eastern and Imperial reasons’." An article by Robert Mallet discusses the full range 
of efforts undertaken by the British to keep Italy neutral, including supplying oil to 
Rome, until Mussolini declared war on 10 June 1940.12
To return to early 1940 and Welles’ influence on the formulation of an 
American mission to Europe: Welles’ opportunity to affect the mission by including 
Italy is also explained by the intimate relationship he had with the President. As 
argued previously in this analysis, Welles had an almost intuitive understanding of 
what Roosevelt wanted to do. Roosevelt well knew that Welles’ character made him 
suitable to undertake a mission that carried with it considerable political risks for the 
Administration. Welles was described by Harold Ickes, the Secretary of the Interior, 
as ‘a man of almost preternatural solemnity and great dignity. If he ever smiles, it has 
not been in my presence. He conducts himself with portentous gravity and as if he 
were charged with all the responsibilities of Atlas. Just to look at him one can tell that 
the world would dissolve into its component parts if only a portion of the weighty 
secrets of state that he carries about with him were divulged.’13 Welles’ grave 
disposition and lack of emotion meant that Roosevelt had every confidence that his 
Under Secretary would not become a ‘football’ to be kicked about by Europe’s 
leaders.
10 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.245.
11 Dilks, Cadogan, pp.209-210.
12 Mallet suggests ‘it was generally believed within official circles that Italy would almost certainly 
join the conflict at some point in the future, an eventuality for which London was far from prepared 
militarily.' Robert Mallet, ‘The Anglo-ltalian war trade negotiations, contraband control and the failure 
to appease Mussolini 1939-40’, Diplomacy and Statecraft Vol. 8 March 1997 No. 1.
11 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary o f Harold L. Ickes -  Volume II, The Inside Struggle 1936-1939 
(New York, 1954), p.351.
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Welles’ own ambition to orchestrate Administration policy should not be 
ignored. While paying little more than lip service to his direct superior, Hull, Welles 
had become the State Department’s expert on Latin American affairs. Irwin F. 
Gellman argues that as tensions rose in Europe Welles sought to extend his remit in 
that direction as well. ’Already acknowledged as the department’s Latin American 
expert, Welles intended to wear the same badge for European matters.’14 Despite his 
capacity for reticence in public, Welles was certainly keen to take on Roosevelt’s plan 
for a mission to Europe. Ickes attributed the mission to Welles’ personal ambition: 
‘My guess was that the proposal emanated from Welles, who saw an opportunity to 
step out more towards the center of the stage.’15 Hull certainly saw it that way. He 
wrote later in his memoirs that ‘the President expressly stated to me that Welles had 
come to him secretly on several occasions and pleaded to be sent abroad on special 
missions. For this reason I feel satisfied that Welles had requested the President to 
send him on the trip in 1940...’.16 Historian Arnold Offner agreed. He suggests that 
‘Welles doubtless inspired his mission’, based on his record of interpreting 
Roosevelt’s ideas during his tenure as Under Secretary.17
On a practical level, Welles’ influence in the last week before the public 
announcement was reduced owing to a brief bout of illness.18 Nevertheless, Welles 
did meet with Lothian after the Ambassador had learned of the mission from 
Roosevelt on 1 February. The Ambassador wrote to Halifax on 2 February that Welles 
had said ‘that if [the] 100 to one chance of obtaining agreement did not come off he 
thought [the] only statement which [the] President could make would be that he 
regretted no agreement was in sight’.19 This would lay the blame for continuing the
14 Gellman, Secret Affairs, p. 173.
15 Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary o f Harold L. Ickes -  Volume III The Lowering Cloud 1939-1941, 
p. 138.
'6 Hull, Memoirs Vol. 1., p.737.
17 Arnold Offner, ‘The United States and National Socialist Germany’ in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Lothar Kettenacker (eds.) The Fascist Challenge and the Policy o f Appeasement (London, 1983), 
p.421.
18 Benjamin Welles writes that when Sumner Welles’ ‘doctor ordered two weeks’ convalescence, FDR 
agreed to wait’. Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.243. This is agreed to in Sumner Welles’ own 
account. Welles. Time for Decision, p.73. Welles failed to remain in bed for the full two weeks as 
despite his illness his personal involvement at the mission’s conception is shown by the fact that he 
personally informed the embassies of his prospective destinations of the mission. This task was made 
harder by the fact that the French representative was ill, and the German Chargé d’Affaires not at his 
embassy either; nevertheless, Welles saw both personally. Gellman, Secret Affairs, p. 174. Welles 
suffered a brief relapse before embarking for Europe. He wrote to a colleague on 15 February that he 
had ‘been laid up during the past two days’. Letter from Welles to Duggan, 15 February 1940, SWP 
Box 65.
19 Telegram No. 147 from Lothian to Halifax, 2 February 1940, HFS.
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war on Germany and not with the British. Significantly, Welles' words allude to the 
multiple aims that he and Roosevelt saw in examining the ‘possibilities’ for an 
agreement. While it is clear that an 'agreement' for exploring possible peace terms 
was an objective for the mission, it is also clear that Welles thought the chances of 
obtaining satisfactory terms was extremely slim. Yet the Under Secretary saw a 
positive corollary, in allowing the Roosevelt Administration to further promote to the 
American people the distinction between the British and the Germans, alongside the 
first-hand information he would gather.
Further, the manner in which Roosevelt and Welles communicated when 
Welles was in Europe served to concentrate his personal influence on policy-making. 
That Welles would communicate with Roosevelt directly, without recourse to Hull, 
had become standard practice when Welles was in Latin America. It was not 
surprising for Berle to learn therefore that during the Under Secretary’s mission: 
‘Welles is reporting in cipher to the President; and the Secretary does not have the 
cipher; he learns what the President tells him.'20 In short, then, Welles’ influence on 
the mission at this stage in its formulation was crucial. In terms of influencing the 
objectives for the mission, he successfully argued for the inclusion of Italy as a result 
of his relationship with Roosevelt. Welles’ The Time for Decision stresses how it was 
he and Roosevelt who were the ‘directors’ of foreign policy.21 The Welles mission 
was a case in point. Yet Welles would not be the only influence that would shape 
Roosevelt’s concept of a mission to Europe in January and early February 1940.
Hull’s Influence on the Welles Mission
Cordell Hull’s impact on the Welles mission in early 1940 was minimal but at the 
same time significant. Although the publicly-stated purpose of the mission was to 
inform the ‘President and the Secretary of State’, it was only in the latter stages of the 
mission’s formulation that Hull learned of Roosevelt’s intention. Hull later recalled 
that Roosevelt asked him if a mission ‘would be agreeable ... in early February’. This 
is telling, given that the mission had already been under consideration by Roosevelt 
and Welles since early January. Some scholars have argued that Hull had no ‘inkling’ 
at all prior to the announcement of the mission, but this seems incredibly unlikely 
given that Lothian learned of Hull’s ‘doubts’ and reported them to London on 6
20 Memorandum by Berle, 18 March 1940, ABP Box 211.
21 This opinion of The Time for Decision is shared by Gellman, p.352.
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February.22 (This also helps date the second draft of the press release.) Whenever Hull 
did learn of the mission, it seems that he was presented with a fait accompli. Hull’s 
memoirs confirm this: 'the President merely inquired of me whether I had any 
objection to Welles’s going on the mission.’ Although Hull had 'no objections' he did 
have ‘a few observations’ for Roosevelt ‘if he really wished Welles to make the trip'. 
Hull stated that the United States had ‘exerted all possible efforts, within the limits of 
isolationist opposition, to promote peace’. Therefore the prospect of a ‘peace’ mission 
would give false hope to those facing attack and encourage the aggressors in the war 
of nerves. Hull then supposed that ‘five hundred different rumours would inevitably 
arise as to the purpose and results of Welles’s trip. These would create confusion in 
Europe and here at home'. It is worth remembering at this stage how far these 
objections married up to Hull’s concerns over Welles’ Armistice Day plan of 
November 1937. In both instances Hull was worried that the move would serve only 
to give a false sense of security to the democracies and destabilise American opinion, 
neither of which Hull wanted to see. Hull’s consideration of the domestic 
constituency shows how far he was liable to consider the influence of the American 
public, and Roosevelt knew this.
While Hull had been totally marginalised in the initial discussions behind the 
Welles mission in January, he did exert a notable if limited influence in early 
February. This can be seen in microcosm in the inclusion in the second draft of the 
press release of the word ‘commitments’. Hull wrote in his memoirs that it was his 
influence that prompted the added insertion: ‘Mr Roosevelt, having in mind the 
comments I had made to him, emphasised that Welles was not authorised to make 
proposals or commitments in the name of the United States Government’.23 (Italics in 
original.) This reflected Hull’s long-standing concern that the Administration should 
not appear to be in league with European powers in the eyes of the American people 
and Congress. Furthermore, Hull’s anxiety over how far an explicit ‘peace’ mission 
would upset the Allies fell in line with the objections the British would raise. These 
are to be discussed presently, but for Roosevelt to receive similar objections from 
both his Secretary of State and the British government could only have added to their 
impact on the eventual shape of the mission.
22 Gellman argues that ‘Hull had no inkling of the mission’. Gellman, Secret Affairs, p. 174. Telegram 
No. 160 from Lothian to Chamberlain, 6 February 1940, HFS.
23 Hull, Memoirs Vol. 1., pp.737-738
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Herbert Feis, the State Department's Economic Adviser, commented in the 
spring of 1940 on how he saw Hull’s influence in the State Department at this stage. 
He told Henry Stimson, the soon-to-be War Secretary, that the mission had 
‘originated from the President and Welles’ and that ‘Hull was not sufficiently in 
control of his subordinates and was devoting himself to specialities like the passage of 
the reciprocity legislation’.24 Feis concluded that ‘the Department was a little out of 
hand’. Although this was a harsh assessment, it was in such an environment that 
Welles was able to operate independently of his superior. The differences between the 
two were clearly revealed in the Welles mission. Hull’s memoirs state clearly how he 
felt about the mission: ‘I myself would not have considered sending Welles or anyone 
else of his official position to Europe on such a mission at that stage in the war.'25 
Such sentiment was shared by the Chamberlain government in London. Having 
looked at the influence of both Welles and Hull on the formation of the mission, this 
analysis now turns to the influence Chamberlain exerted on the mission in early 
February 1940.
The British Influence on the Formulation of the Mission
The Chamberlain government had a significant impact on the thinking of both 
Roosevelt and Welles in the week prior to the public announcement of the mission. 
As soon as those in London learned of the mission, following the meeting between 
Roosevelt and Lothian on 1 February, they sought to dissuade Roosevelt from 
pursuing it. The exchange of telegrams that flowed between London and Washington 
reveals much about Roosevelt’s intentions for the mission, and in particular his fluid 
approach to policy-making. The ultimate effect of British objections, as with the 
influence of both Welles and Hull, can be seen in part in the press release that 
Roosevelt read from on 9 February. Chamberlain’s protestations served to notably 
dilute the objective of exploring possibilities of peace.
Those in London first learnt of Roosevelt’s intention to despatch Welles to 
Europe after receiving a telegram from Lothian (No. 142), sent on 1 February 1940.26 
The meeting with Roosevelt that day began with the President alluding to the ‘peace’
24 Dictated after conversation between Stimson and Feis, 8 May 1940. Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson 
Vol. 29 January 1939 -  June 25 1940. Microfilm from the Yale University Library. Roosevelt Study 
Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands.
25 Hull, Memoirs, Vol. 1., pp.737-738.
26 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940 (sent 1:37 am 2 February received 
10:35 am 2 February [all times are local]), HFS.
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moves he had been made aware of by 'people who had seen Goring’ during the 
‘phony war’ and then turned to the ‘inevitability’ of a spring offensive. Roosevelt 
explained that the escalation of the war ‘would make peace much more difficult to 
obtain’. The underlying influence of the various peace moves of the ‘phony war’ was 
clear to see in the President’s desire ‘to do something’ in the early part of 1940, as 
was Roosevelt’s objective at the outset to consider peace. Roosevelt confirmed his 
intention to involve the United States in a possible peace move when he explained his 
motivation to Lothian. He told the Ambassador that ‘in order to satisfy himself and 
public opinion here that every possibility of ending the war had been [exhausted] he 
and [the] Secretary of State had decided to send Sumner Welles to Europe’. He then 
went on to state that Welles’ objective would be ‘solely to advise the President and 
the Secretary of State whether there was any possibility of ending the war in the near 
future’. These two statements reveal in simple form Roosevelt’s motivation and what 
he saw at this stage as the mission’s objective. That the latter subsequently changed 
should be of no surprise, given Roosevelt’s tendency to accept unfixed outcomes in 
his policy-making. Indeed, the desire to make sure every option had been explored to 
avoid the war escalating, is clear.
Had Roosevelt left the mission statement in such stark terms, then the case for 
the Welles trip being solely a peace mission would be strong. However, he 
immediately began to qualify the objective of the mission and so inaugurated a 
process that would continue throughout the mission. First of all, he stated that Welles 
would be ‘authorised to make no proposal ... in [the] name of United States and 
would report on his return solely to [the] President and Secretary of State’. Such a 
qualification indicated an awareness of the political ramifications of such a move, as 
did Roosevelt’s next comment that the Welles mission ‘would be a public mission and 
not a private one like Colonel House’s’. The allusion to Colonel House, who had been 
President Wilson’s roving eye during the First World War, was one line around which 
speculation arose after the Welles mission was made public (this will be discussed in 
greater depth later in this chapter). Yet for Roosevelt to mention it at this stage 
illustrates that he was conscious of the concerns that could surround Welles’ mission.
Lothian was certainly aware that the mission would arouse concerns in 
London. The content of his telegram (No. 142) to London, beyond a description of 
what Roosevelt had told him, reflected his desire to mitigate unease in London. His 
first words in response to Roosevelt illustrated this clearly. Lothian wrote that the
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Welles mission would "produce a profound effect in Europe of mingled hope and 
anxiety’. Lothian then pressed Roosevelt on what "possible basis’ the mission could 
lead to peace. Roosevelt countered that in his view any settlement "must include 
restoration of freedom to Czechoslovakia and [the] Poles in some real form and 
guarantees that there would be no renewal of aggression during any of our life-times’. 
Such a statement allowed Lothian to conclude his telegram by stating that Roosevelt’s 
‘ideas about peace were practically the same as ours’. Nevertheless, Lothian’s words 
would prove insufficient to placate British concerns.
Before turning to British unease and its subsequent influence on the mission’s 
objectives, one can see further evidence of Roosevelt’s propensity to consider policy 
on the basis of long odds. Lothian recorded from his conversation that Roosevelt 
foresaw many difficulties ahead for the mission and was therefore ‘not hopeful of 
[the] Under Secretary of State being able to find any basis of agreement which he or 
the Allies could accept’. He acknowledged the likelihood as being ‘one chance in a 
thousand’. Roosevelt then conceded that even in such a situation something could be 
achieved. He told Lothian that in such a scenario he would be able to ‘issue a 
statement... making it clear that Germany was the obstacle to peace and that Germans 
were being made to fight not for the security and integrity of their own country but for 
aggression’. The audience for such a statement would be the American people, and 
Roosevelt’s awareness of their importance to his foreign policy is clear.27 Such a view 
of American public opinion also explains why Welles pressed those he spoke to for 
‘peace terms’ even when it was nonsensical to do so in terms of achieving a peace. 
Nevertheless, it would enable him to clearly identify the different war and peace aims 
of the belligerents.
Reaction in London
The first vestiges of influence that London exerted were seen in the initial response of 
the Chamberlain government to the prospect of the Welles mission. The arrival of 
Lothian’s telegram telling of the mission caused a sensation in London. Cadogan’s 
initial reaction was scathing; he called it an ‘awful, half-baked idea’ and saw the 
mission as Welles coming ‘over here with a flourish of trumpets to collect data on
27 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940 (sent 1:37 am 2 February received 
10:35 am 2 February [all times are local]), HFS.
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which Roosevelt is to proclaim [the] basis of peace!’.28 The British response, which 
Chamberlain helped Cadogan to compose, was a four-page seventeen-point refutation 
of Roosevelt’s proposal. That it was sent within twenty-four hours of receiving 
Lothian’s telegram (No. 142) illustrates the gravity of the concerns Chamberlain had. 
In simple terms, the British did not welcome the idea of Roosevelt intervening in 
Europe, and specifically objected to the prospect of a publicly declared ‘peace 
mission’. It is this reply that The Foreign Relations o f the United States was unable to 
date when the volume was published in 195 9.29 My research has enabled a definite 
date of 3 February 1940 to be identified.30
The British reply, intended for Roosevelt himself, began in a diplomatic tone 
but, despite ‘appreciation’ of Roosevelt’s ‘motives’, concerns dominated the telegram. 
This reveals a number of reasons why the proposed mission received a poor reception 
in London. The British objections began with the observation that the peace feelers 
that were coming out of Germany, and at the same time the ‘inevitability’ of the 
spring offensive, were all part of the German propaganda campaign. The issues 
surrounding the discussion of peace that the Administration had been forced to 
consider during the autumn of 1939, were at the forefront of British minds in early 
February 1940. Chamberlain stated that it ‘must be realised that this war of nerves is 
directed not only against the belligerents but also against the neutrals’. The concern of 
the British in this was that it might be ‘precisely the policy of the German 
Government to produce [the] impression ... [that] they can mobilise world public 
opinion against the Allies who would be represented as being the sole obstacle to 
peace.’ This was the essence of Chamberlain’s disquiet. He wrote: ‘I must frankly 
admit to a good deal of anxiety lest the effect of this move however carefully 
presented should be to cause embarrassment to the democracies from which Germany,
28 Dilks, Cadogan, p.253.
29 This document comes on the first page of volume 1 of the 1940 Foreign Relations of the United 
States with the footnote that its text is taken from a ‘Photostatic copy of [an] undated telegram obtained 
from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Flyde Park, N.Y.’. Footnote 1 to Telegram from Neville 
Chamberlain to Lord Lothian 121.840 Welles, Sumner/69'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.l.
30 This telegram was written on 3 February 1940, and despatched in the early hours of the next day, 4 
February 1940: Telegram No. 172 from Chamberlain to Lothian, 3 February 1940, HFS. The telegram 
began: ‘You may certainly take the earliest opportunity of informing the President that I am most 
interested in his proposal and appreciate fully the motives that have inspired it.’ This sentence is 
footnoted in the FRUS with the following statement: ‘Evidently the proposed mission to Europe of the 
Under Secretary of State had been discussed by President Roosevelt with the British Ambassador 
previously. No earlier record of these discussions has been found in Department Files.’ The document 
they are ‘missing’ is Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS. Footnote 2 to 
Telegram from Chamberlain to Lothian 121.840 Welles, Sumner/69'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. L, (USGPO, 
1959)p.L
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still unconvinced of the failure of [the] policy of force, will reap advantage.’ It is 
worth noting the similarity of such an objection to Chamberlain’s response to 
Roosevelt’s January 1938 plan for a diplomatic conference. In both instances he was 
apprehensive as to how Roosevelt's move would affect the British position in relation 
to Germany. Although the circumstances were very different, Chamberlain still saw 
the influence of the United States as only likely to complicate and frustrate his own 
policy. Chamberlain maintained this outlook in the rest of the British telegram in 
February 1940. He quoted Roosevelt’s phrase that any settlement ‘must include 
“guarantees that there would be no renewal of aggression during any of our life­
times” [as] the kernel of the difficulty'. Chamberlain, mindful of his and the British 
people’s experience of attempting to negotiate with Hitler, saw the ‘utmost difficulty 
in persuading people of this country’ of the value of signing ‘any settlement ... with 
Hitler or [the] present regime’. The British response then poured further 
discouragement on the idea by highlighting the worldwide impact such a move would 
have, especially were its aim to be wholly disclosed. ‘The announcement of [the] 
mission of Mr Welles will of course produce a sensational impression throughout the 
world more particularly if it makes public [the] full purpose of this initiative.’ It is 
interesting to note that the British saw something of a distinction between the public 
and private goals, of the mission. It is clear from Roosevelt's comments with regard to 
House that at this stage he wanted the mission to have a clear public profile. 
Nevertheless, a gap was to emerge between the public and private goals as was seen 
in the drafting of the private telegrams Welles composed for the President during the 
week before his departure. In fact the distance between public and private objectives 
for the mission would become another source of anxiety for the British government as 
Welles travelled towards London.
The overwhelmingly negative aura of the British telegram was compounded 
by Chamberlain’s concluding remarks: ‘I earnestly hope that he will consider very 
seriously [the] possible side effects of a public announcement of [the] purpose of Mr 
Welles’ mission.’ Clearly, Chamberlain did not want Roosevelt to pursue the mission.
Roosevelt considers and accepts British influence
Despite the swift reply by Chamberlain to Lothian it was not until the morning of 6 
February that the Ambassador met Roosevelt. Lothian handed Roosevelt 
Chamberlain’s response (No. 172) and waited until the President had finished reading.
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According to Lothian, Roosevelt’s reaction, tempered by an overall disappointment, 
was an ‘appreciation’ of Chamberlain’s views ‘and general agreement’.31 That such 
an unfavourable response to his plan from those in London drew such a low-key 
response reflected in part the discussions Roosevelt had conducted with Hull in the 
intervening period. Hull had forewarned of doubts from the democracies, particularly 
along the lines Chamberlain highlighted.
Having heard Roosevelt’s initial response, Lothian sought to assuage 
Roosevelt’s disappointment. In keeping with the informal and friendly atmosphere 
that characterised relations between the pair, Lothian chose to disclose to Roosevelt 
the contents of a second document from London. The document (No. 173) was 
intended to provide Lothian with background information on the British view of The 
President’s new move’.32 Although it largely repeated the lines Chamberlain had 
composed (No. 172) in terms of establishing the British belief that the various ‘peace 
feelers’ of the ‘phony war’ had just been part of the ‘German war of nerves’, it went 
on to stress the potential damage London foresaw in a public announcement of a 
peace mission. Lothian explained that the British had ‘for some time past been 
expecting a peace move to come either from the Italian Government, the Pope or from 
the President, though we had not foreseen that it would be so spectacular as a public 
mission from Washington, the object of which would be fully advertised in 
advance’.33 Clearly, to reveal such a passage was a sensitive tactic for Lothian. 
Nevertheless, it did achieve the response that many in London would have hoped for. 
Roosevelt understood the British objections as being primarily concerned with the 
public outlook of the mission. In essence, the British did not want the mission to be 
publicly acknowledged by the President of the United States as one of peace. 
Roosevelt told Lothian he was prepared to compromise on the publicly stated aim. 
Lothian reported ‘that in any published instructions to Welles [Roosevelt] would 
probably avoid use of the word “peace” and simply send him on a tour of enquiry’. 
From Roosevelt’s point of view, in direct regard of the state of Anglo-American
31 Telegram No. 160 from Lothian to Chamberlain, 6 February 1940, HFS.
32 The final point of No. 173 explained its purpose and what Lothian should do with it. ‘This telegram 
is intended to supply you with the background against which we see the President’s new move. It is not 
intended for communication to him as it stands, but you may draw on it so far as you think fit in the 
course of conversation.’ Telegram No. 173 from Chamberlain to Lothian, 3 February 1940 (despatched 
1.45 am 4 February), HFS.
33 Telegram No. 173 from Chamberlain to Lothian, 3 February 1940 (despatched 1.45 am 4 February), 
HFS.
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relations, the British were sufficiently important to discuss the mission with and then 
to take on board their views. Nevertheless, Roosevelt made it plain to Lothian that he 
was ‘clearly in favour of proceeding' with the mission.34
Lothian's reporting of this to London on 6 February helps further in dating the 
second draft of the mission's press release as being after 6 February, because the 
second draft sees the removal of the word ‘peace’. Although David Reynolds does not 
attribute any date to this, he agrees that it was the influence of Chamberlain’s 
disapproving telegrams (No. 172 and No. 173) that prompted this change: 
‘Chamberlain’s two messages obliged Roosevelt to couch his initiative in more 
cautious language, and he agreed to avoid the words “peace” or “peace initiatives”.’35
Also evident in Roosevelt’s acceptance of British objections is the fact that the 
mission the President had initially envisaged at the turn of the year had already 
evolved. The objective of the mission, in public at least, would effectively be fact­
finding. This change was a significant one, given Roosevelt’s initial intention for the 
mission. Further, Roosevelt reveals again his capacity to incorporate the views of 
others into policy-making. This in turn illustrates that the mission was not inaugurated 
with fixed goals in mind. As had been the case with both Welles and Hull, the scope 
of the mission had been altered: in this instance thanks to British influence.
Yet in all Roosevelt’s thinking on Welles’ mission the influence of American 
opinion was never far from the surface. This became clear again as his meeting with 
Lothian drew to a close on 6 February. The Ambassador asked if he ‘could make a 
purely private and personal comment’ on the situation. In recognition of Roosevelt’s 
potential influence he prefaced his comments with the observation that ‘the situation 
was one in which a little audacity might have tremendous results’. Lothian went on 
that ‘it was clear to everyone that the United States could not afford to see Great 
Britain or France destroyed without grievous damage to its own national culture and 
interests. Was it not possible therefore for Mr Welles to make this fact plain to the 
German and Italian Governments?’ Under such circumstances, then, ‘it might be 
worthwhile for the United States to make a proposal for ending the war’. Lothian 
relayed Roosevelt’s response directly to his friend Lord Halifax. He told the Foreign 
Secretary that Roosevelt ‘did not dispute that some such step was the right one to take
34 Telegram No. 160 from Lothian to Chamberlain, 6 February 1940, HFS.
35 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, p.81.
117
Chapter Three
but said however it was politically impracticable for him to do so'.36 37The reason was 
American public opinion. After this exchange of ideas, Lothian reported that 
Roosevelt's 'present intention is to carry it [the Welles mission] through'.
A New Thread to British Objections
News that Roosevelt intended to carry on with the Welles mission increased the 
vehemence and breadth of British objections. In a final volley of telegrams from 
London, Chamberlain made clear his intention that he did not wish Roosevelt to go 
ahead with the mission. He did this by introducing consideration of British 
involvement in the Russo-Finnish war. The Chamberlain government, along with the 
French, wanted to support the Finns in their war effort. According to Chamberlain’s 
telegram to Washington, they had just secured acceptance of the passage of war 
materials through Sweden and Norway to the Finns and the Prime Minister worried 
that the ‘action he [Roosevelt] proposes to take should interfere with the success of 
this plan’. In language almost identical to that which he had used to object to 
Roosevelt's diplomatic conference plan of January 1938, the Prime Minister sought to 
dissuade the President by suggesting that his plan would ‘cut-across’ the actions 
Chamberlain was planning to undertake. Again, the quick turnaround of telegrams in 
London is indicative of the anxiety the mission was causing the British, with the 
response to Washington being sent on 7 February 1940. Chamberlain was clearly 
trying to use the issue of French collaboration on aid to the Finns as another reason 
for Roosevelt not to carry on with the Welles mission. This was acknowledged by Sir 
Orme Sargent, the Foreign Office Assistant Under Secretary, who hoped that ‘the 
telegram which was drafted this afternoon explaining the intentions of His Majesty's 
Government as regards Finland will have the desired effect of making him modify his 
plans .
A second accompanying telegram revealed how adamant the British 
government were in their disapproval of the Welles mission. It focused on the crux of 
the matter for Chamberlain: the potential effects of a publicly acknowledged peace 
mission. The telegram stated that if Roosevelt ‘is determined in any event to send Mr 
Sumner Welles on a mission 1 do hope that he may not think it necessary to make [a]
16 Letter No. 135 from Lothian to Halifax, 7 February 1940, HFS.
37 Comments by Cadogan, 7 February 1940 attached to conversation between Hutton and Butterworth 
5 February 1940, A1309/131/45 FO 371 24238 PRO. (originally entered in C2695/G).
118
Chapter Three
public announcement on the subject. If he must make [a] public announcement, I hope 
a least it would not be in any form that would encourage the idea that the mission was 
part of a peace plan'.38 The escalating desperation in Chamberlain's words provide, 
again, proof of the substance of his objections: was Roosevelt going to provide Hitler 
with the opportunity to retain his conquests and raise questions as to why Britain was 
involved in the conflict in the first place?
The prospect of the mission raised this concern among many within the 
Foreign Office. David Scott, the American Desk’s Departmental Under Secretary, 
feared that Roosevelt thought British defeat imminent and therefore that a peace offer 
was a way of ‘saving us from ourselves’, while Cadogan concluded that ‘Mr 
Roosevelt’s latest half-baked scheme’ must be killed ‘by kindness -  and firmness’. 
The disquiet within the Foreign Office was given its most pointed expression by Sir 
Robert Vansittart, who referred to Welles at this point as a ‘grass snake’. The analogy 
being drawn by Vansittart was that the Welles mission’s appearance had proved 
startling to the British and that they might need to manoeuvre with caution, but that 
Welles was not expected to prove to be anything more than troublesome, against a 
backdrop of other more lethal animals.39
Confirmation of the British influence on the formulation of the Welles mission 
can be seen in Lothian’s final meeting with Roosevelt before the 9 February 
announcement. The President sought to further allay British concerns by reconfirming 
that the ‘United States would have nothing to do with an inconclusive and precarious 
peace’. He told Lothian that the ‘procedure he proposed to adopt would remove the 
[twin] dangers [the] Prime Minister feared’. Firstly, Roosevelt explained to Lothian 
that the ‘published purpose of the Under Secretary’s visit would be merely to report to 
the President “as to the present conditions in Europe’” . This would avoid the explicit 
use of the word ‘peace’ that Chamberlain feared. Secondly, in order to tone down 
British worry over how the Welles mission might interfere with British plans for 
Scandinavia, Roosevelt said he would write to the monarchs of Sweden and Norway. 
He explained that he would tell them that he ‘did not think that there was a thousand 
to one chance of peace and that the mission was one merely of enquiry’.40 The 
understanding that Roosevelt had of the chances of peace is evident in his quoting of
38 Telegram Unnumbered from Chamberlain to Lothian, 7 February 1940, HFS.
39 Comments by Scott, Cadogan, Vansittart, 7 February 1940 attached to conversation between Hutton 
and Butterworth, 5 February 1940, A1309/131/45 F0 371 24238 PRO.
40 Telegram No. 173 from Lothian to Chamberlain, 8 February 1940, HFS.
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such long odds. While this may have been some solace to those in London, they were 
in the process of drafting a reply the next day when Roosevelt’s ‘splash’ came across 
the wires on 9 February. Cadogan’s first reaction was that the announcement of the 
Welles mission was ‘not too bad’.41
The Anglo-American exchanges of the first week of February 1940, alongside 
the influence of Welles and Hull, are crucial to understanding Roosevelt’s motivations 
and objectives for the Welles mission. The President was motivated to address the 
situation of war in Europe although his objectives during this week were still not 
wholly finalised. That the British were able to exert a notable influence on the 
consideration of the mission is a testament to the fact that Roosevelt was not tied to 
fixed plans even a week before the mission was to be announced. Nevertheless, as is 
also clear, Roosevelt was not wholeheartedly dissuaded by British objections. The 
benefits Roosevelt envisaged, amplified no doubt by Welles, outweighed the potential 
costs of antagonising the British government. This was because throughout, and 
despite other ‘minor’ irritations in transatlantic relations, Roosevelt wanted nothing to 
do with a peace settlement that would allow Nazi Germany to continue to threaten 
Great Britain and thus, in Roosevelt’s mind, the national interests of the United States 
in the future. This will be seen in microcosm by the simple fact that he neglected to 
compose a private letter to Hitler explaining Welles’ mission.
Before turning to the detail of those letters, it is worth reiterating for its 
importance in this thesis Roosevelt’s susceptibility to influence during this period. His 
approach to policy-making was malleable, allowing deliberately for the views of a 
variety of people to be considered. During the end of January and beginning of 
February 1940 he was prepared to be manoeuvred by Welles, to listen to Hull and to 
accept a degree of British reservation. The significance of this approach is to dilute 
the accusation that the mission was one to find peace terms from the outset and 
throughout. Instead, although the Welles mission might have begun with this in mind, 
as is illustrated here, it was augmented by other objectives: the gathering of first-hand 
information, the prolonging of the ‘phony war’ and the perpetuation of Italian 
neutrality.
41 Dilks, Cadogan, p.254.
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Revealing Letters
As discussion of the Welles mission quickly circulated round the world after 9 
February, the content of which will be discussed presently, Roosevelt and Welles 
stood firm in not adding any further comment in public. In private, however, Welles 
was busy composing a series of letters addressed to Mussolini, Daladier and 
Chamberlain. But no letter for Hitler. The absence of a letter to the Führer is evidence 
that Roosevelt and Welles were not solely trying to engage with Nazi Germany in 
ending the war. Given the public silence from the Administration before Welles' 
departure, these letters provide further insight into the thinking of Roosevelt and 
Welles and their objectives for the mission. Welles originally drafted the letters on 12 
February for Roosevelt's consideration. The cordiality that the pair wished to impart 
was typified by handwritten additions such as ‘Mon Ami Daladier’ on the letter for 
the French premier and the suggestion to Mussolini that the pair should consider 
meeting. Similarly, the letter addressed to Number 10 began ‘My dear Chamberlain’. 
Such a convivial tone is perhaps surprising, given the history of discord in the 
relationship between the two and the objections Chamberlain had raised to the 
mission during the first week of February. Nevertheless, the letter explains in concise 
terms, and with allusion to his personal relationship with Welles, Roosevelt’s 
objectives before Welles left for Europe:
‘My dear Chamberlain: Sumner Welles, my Under Secretary of State, 
and an old boyhood friend will give you this. What you tell him will be 
maintained in the strictest confidence and will be told solely to myself 
and to Cordell Hull on my talk with him on his return. At this grave 
moment I deeply hope this exchange of views may be of real value 
towards a peace which is neither ‘inconclusive nor precarious.’ Enough 
said. My warm regards, faithfully Roosevelt.’42 
The qualification to Roosevelt’s initial objective of early January of exploring the 
possibilities of peace is significant, as is his desire for information. Both reveal the 
evolution of other objectives for the mission. Roosevelt had already expressed in clear 
and concise terms that Welles was not interested in peace at any price in his 8 
February conversation with Lothian. He had told the Ambassador that the ‘Under 
Secretary would have private instructions that [the] President was not interested in [a]
42 Letter from Roosevelt to Chamberlain, 14 February 1940, FDR PSF RSC Reel 26.
121
Chapter Three
truce or unstable peace, and that anything like a successful attack on France or 
England would inevitably bring the United States nearer war’.43 The latter admission 
(in conversation with Lothian) was evidently unlikely to come to fruition in terms of 
United States belligerence, given the state of American opinion, which Lothian fully 
understood, but it is indicative of Roosevelt’s state of mind and certainly points to 
events such as the Destroyers Bases Deal later in 1940.44
As a brief glimpse of the days between the public announcement of the 
mission and Welles’ departure for Europe, the drafting of these letters illustrates 
further that the mission had evolved from its initial conception to a qualified 
exploration of the situation in Europe. Thus while Welles ‘explored the possibilities 
of peace’ on his mission -  a peace which was to be neither ‘inconclusive nor 
precarious’ -  he was not solely aiming at finding acceptable peace terms, but at 
utilising such discussion for the other objectives outlined in this work.
The Neutrals’ Declaration follows on 9 February
The breadth of purpose in Rooseveltian policy-making was further exemplified on 9 
February 1940. Less than an hour after Roosevelt had ended the press conference that 
announced the Welles mission, Hull declared that the United States had invited over 
fifty neutral nations to consider issues raised by the war. This enterprise was designed 
to sound out neutral opinion on the foundations for a ‘sound international economic 
system and at the same time world-wide reduction of armaments’ in the post-war 
world.45 Such a proclamation, to many at the time and since, clouded further the 
purposes of Rooseveltian diplomacy in early 1940. To enlighten, the importance for 
this study lies in two main areas. First of all, the neutrals’ conversations reveal the 
continuation of the diplomatic heritage within the Roosevelt State Department from 
which the Welles mission also came, and, secondly, the Administration realising, the 
dangers of irking political opposition, tried to counter this by looking to the post-war 
world. A related but lesser point is that by announcing the conversations on the same 
day as the Welles mission, the Administration was endeavouring to mitigate any
43 Telegram No. 173 from Lothian to Chamberlain, 8 February 1940, HFS.
44 Alan Dobson has said of the Destroyers-Bases deal that it signalled the United States ‘no longer even 
had the formal appearance of being neutral.’ Alan Dobson, U.S. War Time Aid to Britain 1940-1946 
(London & Sydney, 1986), p.24.
45 Cordell Hull’s press release. The New York Times, 10 February 1940.
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accusation that they were interfering in the current conflict by pointing to the neutrals’ 
conversations as being compatible with the neutrality legislation.
Roosevelt explained to Lothian the purposes of the conversations on 1 
February, when he first announced his intention to despatch Welles. The President 
stated that the conversations would not be concerned with 'terms for ending of war 
but rather to elicit neutral views as to principles which should underlie [the] final 
peace including reduction of armaments, [and] a sound international economic 
system’.46 Robert Dallek expressed the purposes in more forthright terms by stating 
that the conversations hoped to see an ‘organisation of neutrals’ sit ‘at the peace table 
with equal right’.47 The neutrals proposal should be considered as congruent with 
longer-term concepts deeply ingrained in both the Roosevelt Administration and the 
State Department agenda. The antecedents to the neutrals' conversations can be seen 
in the State Department’s vociferous support of neutral rights in relation to British 
practice after the outbreak of hostilities, and in the recent history of both Hull’s 
preoccupation with free trade and the heritage from 1937 of Welles’ plan for 
international relations.
The political dimensions of the conversations, most notably the possible 
connection to the ongoing war, were understood by the Administration. Hull included 
in his statement of 9 February that ‘matters involving present war conditions are not a 
part of these preliminary conversations’.48 It was during the run-up to the neutrals’ 
conversations that the example used in the first chapter to illustrate Welles’ explicit 
bypassing of Hull took place. As regards substance, Welles’ involvement reveals the 
political conditions the Administration was operating under. He wrote in January that 
it would be ‘understood that before any actual meeting in Washington took place, all 
of the governments mentioned would have agreed upon [a] concise and detailed 
agenda and would have been afforded an opportunity, through diplomatic channels, of 
reaching an agreement as to the general lines of the recommendation to be 
formulated’.49 Welles added further qualification as late as 5 February, which
46 Lothian’s response illustrated further his concern to prevent any recurrence of the ‘minor crisis’ in 
Anglo-American relations. He thought the conversations a good idea as long as the discussions were 
‘concerned with mobilising neutral opinion about fundamentals of world peace and did not degenerate 
into proposals for whittling away [the] Allied blockade or belligerent rights in [the] name of neutral 
rights.’ Discussion of this matter ended when Roosevelt said that he ‘entirely shared’ Lothian’s 
concerns. Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS.
47 Dallek, FDR and American Foreign Policy, p.216.
48 Cordell Hull’s press release. The New York Times, 10 February 1940.
49 Memorandum from Welles to Roosevelt, 12 January 1940, PSF Box 76.
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revealed his own desire to provide order in international relations and the longer-term, 
post-war, justifications for the neutrals' conversations. He wrote posing the questions 
as to ‘...whether moral cooperation between neutral states would be of service in 
bringing about the formulation of standards of international conduct, and the solution 
of other problems related thereto, which they would hope to see observed in any post 
war period’.50 The desire to present the neutrals’ conversations to the American 
people as essentially apolitical is evident.
That the Administration was politically aware of any fall out from the 
neutrals’ conversations was not surprising, and neither should it be a surprise that 
Roosevelt failed to draw distinct lines between the conversations and the Welles 
mission. The Daily Telegraph posited: ‘... it is not possible yet to know whether Mr 
Welles’s mission and the American conversations with neutrals are designed to merge 
into one another.'51 Given Roosevelt’s desire to stimulate debate within the American 
people on foreign affairs issues without risking political criticism, it is entirely 
probable that he would have been happy that The New York Times banner headline the 
next day read ‘Roosevelt Sounds Neutrals on Peace’, coming as it did above news that 
Welles was going to Europe.52 That the matter was being used in some part to deflect 
possible criticism of the Welles mission is evident from the fact that although fifty- 
five nations initially responded to Hull’s enquiries by the middle of March the 
Administration acknowledged that the immediate opportunity had passed.53
Nevertheless, the neutrals’ conversations should be seen as part of the efforts 
Roosevelt made in early 1940 to do something about the war in Europe, with the 
Welles mission as a focus, compatible with American public opinion and before the 
spring escalation. In some respects the conversations again represented the ‘what 
harm can it do’ element of Rooseveltian foreign policy-making. Court historians 
William Langer and Everett Gleason conclude that the attempt to organise ‘a neutral 
front ... remains in many respects simply a remarkably picturesque manifestation of 
American indecision in the face of a war which our people and our Government could 
neither wholly ignore nor resolutely embrace’.54 The importance of being in step with
50 Memo from Welles to Wilson, 5 February 1940 Folder 15 Office Correspondence 1920-1943 Hugh 
Wilson 1940, SWP Box 65.
51 The Daily Telegraph, 10 February 1940.
52 The New York Times, 10 February 1940.
53 Harold B. Hinton, Cordell Hull-A Biography (London, New York and Melbourne, 1941), p.231.
54 Draft of Chapter 10 ‘The Phony Peace’ by Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, 
p. 19, SWP Box 207.
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American opinion is evident in the endeavour to build a consensus of neutrals, 
alongside the belief within the State Department, held by Welles especially, in the 
value of a 'code of conduct' in international relations. Establishing a case for 
international norms stretched back through the Roosevelt Administration and would 
extend into the future as part of the extensive efforts toward post-war planning 
undertaken in Washington. In February 1940 that lay in the future. The immediate 
focus for the Administration was the Welles mission.
Administration Reaction
The reaction in the State Department to the announcement of the Welles mission and 
the neutrals’ conversations reflected their acceptance of the limited options open to 
the Administration because of American public opinion. In other words, those who 
had become accustomed to Roosevelt undertaking policy moves with long odds saw 
the Welles mission in this light. Berle, who had expressed this sentiment on a number 
of occasions, wrote that the mission was merely 'a variation on a procedure we have 
thought of before’.55 Moffat, meanwhile, who was to accompany Welles on the 
odyssey to Europe, initially saw the mission as a ‘last effort ... to restore peace’, but 
agreed the process was not particularly novel.56 Assistant Secretary Breckinridge 
Long offered his own assessment of the mission: ‘It will be a very important trip -  
that is, it may be. If Sumner can find any willingness on the part of the various 
responsible officials of any of those Governments to cease hostilities, it will be 
important, but if he does not find any such situation, it will probably mean that the 
war will continue on ad infinitum.’57 Reaction within the State Department to 
Roosevelt’s announcement reveals that they saw the mission as being in line with 
previous policies: that some initiatives were worth pursuing even if they might not 
seem to be successful.
While opinion in Washington was largely supportive, the views of those in the 
American diplomatic corps ranged from wholehearted support to vitriolic 
condemnation. William Bullitt fell into the latter camp. The Ambassador to France 
returned to the United States on 9 February and learned of the mission only in the 
evening press. He told Ickes at a dinner meeting the next day that ‘he did not relish
55 Memorandum by Berle, 9 February 1940, ABP Box 211.
56 Hooker, Moffat, p.291.
57 9 February 1940, BLP Box 5.
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the idea of Welles's going over and, in effect, superseding the regularly accredited 
diplomatic representatives'.s8 Although Bullitt was apparently ‘seething with anger' 
by the time he met the President soon afterwards, Roosevelt pacified him somewhat 
with talk of a cabinet position. Despite this, Bullitt refused to return to Paris until 
Welles had returned to the United States and let it be known to the French 
Ambassador that if he had known of the mission before ‘he would have opposed it'.58 9 
Thus Bullitt, still smarting from his pacification in the White House, helped in ghost­
writing the Chicago Tribune article entitled ‘Welles’ Peace Trip Scuttles Peace at 
Home’, which castigated the mission prior to Welles’ departure.60 In conversation 
with Long before he left, Welles blamed Bullitt’s ‘vitriolic tongue’ for the press 
stories which ‘indicated that he and the Secretary had had some dispute’ over the 
mission.61 Welles claimed that ‘Bullitt had taken the trouble to go the Capitol and to 
talk to a number of Senators and that they arranged a story of this nature to go to 
Chicago and to appear in the Chicago papers so that it would not have the earmarks of 
a Washington story’.62 Such concern reveals an understanding on Welles’ part, rarely 
expressed during the mission because of his reluctance to discuss it, of the potential 
for the mission to be misconstrued.
Whereas Bullitt met news of the mission with outright anger, Joseph Kennedy 
confronted it with something approaching resignation. Kennedy had become 
increasingly disenchanted with his role after the outbreak of war, and was back in the 
United States convalescing at the time of the announcement. It was probably of little 
surprise to him, therefore, that Roosevelt had seemingly ignored him. According to 
Michael Beschloss, Kennedy saw the mission as ‘merely another instance of personal
58 Ickes, The Secret Diary Mol. 111., p. 138.
59 Robert Murphy, the Charge in Paris, stated later that Bullitt ‘was furious that Welles was about to 
make a swing around Europe for Roosevelt -  even going to Paris’. This was because ‘Bullitt 
considered himself FDR’s viceroy for Europe’: he thought ‘he had an understanding with President 
Roosevelt which made him the principal White House adviser on European affairs...’. Conversation 
between Murphy and Benjamin Welles in New York, 1974, in Welles, Sumner Welles, p.246. Robert 
Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York, 1964). p.35.
60 The Chicago Tribune article by Arthur Sears Henning, 14 February 1940.
61 Bullitt’s anger at being usurped would lead to the most vigorous campaign against the Under 
Secretary, which would eventually ‘destroy Welles’, For a full account of Bullitt’s ongoing campaign, 
see Benjamin Welles’ Sumner Welles. An alternative account is supplied by Orville H. Bullitt, William 
C.’s brother, who explains Welles’ resignation purely in terms of a disagreement between Hull and 
Welles in which Roosevelt was forced to decide between them. Orville H. Bullitt (ed.), For the 
President Personal and Secret -  Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C Bullitt 
(Boston, 1972), p.517.
62 17 February 1940, BLP Box 5.
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humiliation by the White House’, which in turn gave ‘more evidence to Whitehall that 
Roosevelt had no faith in his Ambassador’.63
Interestingly, as well as Kennedy and Bullitt being in the United States at the 
time of the announcement of the Welles mission, so was Joseph Davies, then the 
Ambassador to Belgium. He was on holiday in Florida on 9 February and wrote to the 
President the next day. He was full of praise for Roosevelt and Welles in undertaking 
the mission. His letter began by stating that ‘the appointment of Sumner Welles for 
this exploratory mission in Europe is timely and splendid. Sumner is just the man to 
get an objective perspective and procure it simultaneously from the principals 
involved’. Notwithstanding this, Davies was not optimistic about the prospect of the 
mission providing a settlement: ‘I have little hope that any peace discussion will 
fructify or even germinate now. The principals involved are too far apart -  their real 
or avowed purposes too extreme and too set in passions. ... Nevertheless it is 
worthwhile. If there is one chance in a thousand it is worth a try.’ It is important to 
note that Davies, physically removed from the State Department, recognised that 
despite the dangers involved -  the long odds -  the mission was ‘worthwhile’. 
Furthermore, Davies considered that by endeavouring to explore the possibilities for 
peace ‘it will renew the faith of the liberty and peace-loving people the world over in 
the fact ... that you are doing everything within human power to try to stop this 
terrible tragedy’.64 This was a crucial point, as Davies understood that ‘exploring the 
possibilities for peace’ actually provided an opportunity to achieve other goals, 
including illustrating to the American people the differences between the Allies and 
Germany.
That Davies’ views were most clearly in line with the Administration, reflects 
the state of the relationships Roosevelt had with Bullitt and Kennedy. Relations with 
both had broken down during 1939. As the Ambassadors moved further away from 
the Administration’s line -  Bullitt to the point where he was promoting the idea that 
the United States would defend France and Kennedy becoming increasingly defeatist 
-  Roosevelt became more and more likely to question the information he received 
from the two capitals. He had told Morgenthau in October 1939 that Kennedy was 
‘just a pain in the neck’ because of his readiness to accept appeasement, whilst Bullitt
63 Michael Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt -  the Uneasy Alliance, (New York and London, 1980) 
p.204.
64 Letter from Davies to Roosevelt, 10 February 1940, FDR PSF RSC Reel 23.
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was equally troublesome. Morgenthau recorded Roosevelt stating the ‘trouble with 
Bullitt is in the morning he will send me a telegram “Everything is lovely" and then 
he will go out to have lunch with some French official and I get a telegram that 
everything is going to hell'.6'1 Roosevelt saw some consolation in the autumn in that 
the ‘only thing that saves the information is I know my men’. By the turn of the year 
it seems that his patience with biased information had worn thin. The disenchantment 
with Kennedy in particular was no secret, and may have fed into the questioning 
Roosevelt received from the press within minutes of the announcement of the Welles 
mission. Roosevelt was asked if his information from London and Paris was 
satisfactory, and ‘if he needed a new reporter?’, to which he responded that he had 
‘excellent’ information from each country. Significantly, though, Roosevelt went on 
to say: ‘It might be a good thing to get somebody to see all the conditions in all the 
countries so that one mind would be able to cover the situation instead of having four 
separate minds reporting on separate things....’65 6 To add support to such an argument 
Davies wrote to Roosevelt stating that ‘no single Ambassador assigned to a European 
post’ could have conducted the mission he proposed.67 In summation, Roosevelt 
clearly did see the mission as an opportunity to hear first-hand information on the 
European situation from a single trusted source: gathering information was a clear 
objective for Welles. While this was the only publicly acknowledged goal, in the 
immediate aftermath of the 9 February announcement, both the press and the foreign 
governments whom Welles was intending to visit were still endeavouring to clarify 
the mission’s purpose.
The reaction from Europe in both government and press circles 
There was a good deal of similarity between the views on the mission of the world’s 
press and those of the governments in Europe. This is in part logical, because the 
paucity of information supplied by the Roosevelt Administration meant that those in 
Europe looked to the press for clarification. In short, none of Welles’ destinations 
particularly relished the prospect of the Under Secretary visiting Europe. The lines 
taken by the press and those in Europe focused on the following areas: the real 
chances for peace; Roosevelt’s official objective; consideration of the Welles mission
65 Lunch meeting between Morgenthau and Roosevelt, 3 October 1939, MPD Card 4.
66 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, p.78.
67 Letter from Davies to Roosevelt, 10 February 1940, FDR PSF RSC Reel 23.
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as a domestic move and part of a possible campaign for a third-term; exploring the 
strength of the Axis; and analogies with Colonel House's mission to Europe. In 
examining these views, concise evaluations of how far any of these lines were 
actually involved in Roosevelt's thinking will be provided in this section
To many, the mission was simply a ‘peace move'. Many papers and 
individuals shared the view of the The New York Times, which saw the Welles 
mission as the ‘President’s long-awaited “offensive for peace”’. This was a concern 
to all the governments in Europe, but it was most evident in French opinion. Indeed, 
French alarm in this area was largely to mirror that of the Chamberlain government in 
respect of a ‘peace’ move disturbing domestic opinion. With Bullitt unaware of the 
enterprise, the French government had been taken by surprise by news of the mission 
and it was not enamoured with the prospect of Welles’ arrival. Murphy, the American 
Chargé in Paris, learned this the day after Roosevelt’s announcement. M. Charveriat, 
the Director of Political Affairs at the French Foreign Office, explained the French 
position with faint praise that bore the hallmarks of a begrudging acceptance. The 
French government had two observations: the first a formal welcome, and the second 
an expression of ‘reserve as to the purposes of the visit’ for fear of disturbing Allied 
public opinion.68 9 Similarly, William Strang of the British Foreign Office learned from 
the French Embassy in London that, although the mission would officially be 
welcomed, Allied war aims had already been proclaimed and ‘the President’s 
initiative was likely to be a cause of disturbance in the public opinion of the Allied 
countries’.70 In this scenario the French sought to publicly play down any ‘peace­
making’ rumours about the mission and instead stress its fact-finding aspect. A press 
release through the semi-official Havas Agency stated that Welles’ purpose was not as 
‘a mediator or even as a messenger between the different capitals but to make a 
general report to Washington on war conditions’.71 The rest of the French press 
largely followed this line -  agreeing with Roosevelt’s stated purposes.72 The British
68 The New York Times article by Felix Belair Jr in Washington, 10 February 1940.
69 Telegram No. 194 from Murphy to Hull, 10 February 1940. 121.840 Welles, Sumner/11: Telegram. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.6.
70 Conversation between Strang and Cambon, 10 February 1940, C2488/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO.
71 Telegram No. 196 from Murphy to Hull, 10 February 1940, including a copy of Havas press release 
Paris 2 pm, 10 February 1940, 121.840 Welles Sumner/8: Telegram. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 
1959), p.5.
72 Le Temps was typical: ‘Mr Sumner Welles will have no mandate to undertake any negotiations 
whatever or to act as an intermediary between the various European Governments, and there can be no 
question of an indirect attempt to set in motion a mediation or intervention of any kind in the present
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Ambassador to Paris, Sir Ronald Campbell, concluded that news of the mission had 
‘aroused considerable interest and some anxiety’.* 713
In Germany the mission prompted equal levels of curiosity about Roosevelt’s 
published objective. Kirk reported from Berlin that ‘although the official reserve on 
the matter of the visit ... still continues there is reason to believe ... that [Welles’] 
impending arrival in Berlin has aroused the greatest interest in the highest government 
circles here...’.74 This was an accurate assessment as, in accepting that Welles would 
be afforded an invitation, von Ribbentrop queried Roosevelt’s ‘intention and 
objective’ for the mission by making enquiries to Hans Thomsen, the Chargé in 
Washington.75 Thomsen suggested that it was the desire for specific information that 
had prompted the mission. This was because ‘the American Government ... has been 
surprised and confused by the course of the war and the international power situation 
to date and has not yet been able to reach any definite conclusions’.76 It is also worth 
noting regarding the German calculations that Thomsen reported to Berlin that he 
thought Welles had been chosen because he was ‘especially suited’ to the mission 
‘owing to his sharp attacks on the Versailles Treaty and its consequences for 
Germany’.77 Welles, along with many in the department, had criticised the Versailles 
system as sowing the seeds of the war they were now facing. German press coverage 
of the announcement was minimal: restricted as it was to perfunctory coverage the 
next day and no editorial comment. This was hardly surprising, given the extent to 
which the Nazi party influenced all aspects of the media.78 An official reaction to the 
Welles mission similar to that emanating from Berlin could be found in Rome. Press 
reports in Italy were superficial, with little comment. Although Count Ciano, the
war.’ Nevertheless the paper added something of a counter in case these thoughts were in Roosevelt’s 
mind: ‘Any attempt of this nature would be particularly inopportune at the present time.’ Le Temps, 10 
February 1940.
71 Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office, II February 1940, C2188/89/18 FO 371 24405
PRO.
74 Telegram No. 388 from Kirk to Hull, 14 February 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/32: Telegram.
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.8.
75 Von Ribbentrop to Thomsen, 14 February 1940, Document No. 613 33/25221. The Germans were 
informed of the Welles mission on 8 February when Thomsen despatched a copy of the press release to 
Berlin. Thomsen to von Ribbentrop, 8 February 1940, Document No. 598 33/25205 DGFP, p.750.
76 Thomsen to von Ribbentrop, 8 February 1940, Document No. 598 33/25205 DGFP, p.750.
77 Thomsen to von Ribbentrop, 9 February 1940, Document No. 603 33/25209-10 DGFP, p.757
78 Nevertheless, Berle saw some hope in this. He wrote in his diary that the ‘German papers are not 
using it for propaganda, but are reporting it straight. This augers a certain degree of hope’. 
Memorandum by Berle, 10 February 1940, ABP Box 211. This is important, as the British in particular 
as well as some in the Administration, had feared that the German government might claim that the 
Allies had approached the United States to facilitate a peace settlement and so turn the announcement 
of the Welles mission into a propaganda coup.
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Italian Foreign Minister and son-in-law of Mussolini, said he and the Duce would be 
‘happy to receive' Welles, Ciano’s expression of enthusiasm on behalf of his father- 
in-law would prove unfounded.79 The New York Times’ Rome correspondent provided 
a more balanced view in reporting that news of the mission was ‘received with ... 
scepticism’.80 In this respect, all four of the countries on Welles’ itinerary had something 
in common in their initial responses to the mission. None was wholly sure that 
Roosevelt’s stated aim of gathering information would not be a precursor to a dramatic 
peace move. This prospect was something that Welles would endeavour to cultivate in 
Europe, in Berlin in particular, and so he and Roosevelt were not keen to dispel this line 
in the aftermath of the public announcement. Nevertheless, the reaction in both the press 
and the foreign governments of looking to the possibilities of peace and the gathering of 
information had been, and would continue to be, in addition to the other objectives, part 
of Roosevelt’s thinking behind the mission as a whole.
The influence of domestic politics, and particularly of electoral considerations, 
on Roosevelt’s thinking was a further area of speculation that arose in each of the 
European capitals. Roosevelt’s sensitivity to the views of the American people had 
become broadly known. In London, Scott had brought this matter up in Foreign 
Office discussion of the Welles mission. He stated that ‘if the President can somehow 
stop the war his own domestic position will be enormously strengthened’. Scott added 
that ‘to do him justice, I don’t believe he would set his own personal position before 
what he thought were our interests [but] we should remember how passionately he 
must wish for another Democratic term to carry on the work of the New Deal’.81 
Vansittart, who had already called Welles a ‘grass snake’, was not so charitable. He 
stated after Welles’ time in London that ‘President Roosevelt is ready to play a dirty 
trick on the world and risk the ultimate destruction of the western democracies in order 
to secure the re-election of the Democratic candidate in the US’.82 After the 
announcement, The Times' New York correspondent reported that ‘most people [in the
79 Telegram No. 94 from Phillips to Hull, 10 February 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/2: Telegram. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.5.
80 The New York Times, 10 February 1940.
81 Comments by Scott, Sargent, Cadogan, 7 February 1940 on the record of a conversation between Mr 
Graham Hutton and Mr Walton Butterworth of the United States Embassy at the country house of 
Ronald Tree, 5 February 1940 (originally entered in C2695/G), A1309/131/45 FO 371 24238 PRO.
82 Comment by Vansittart (18/3/40) attached to the accounts of conversations with Welles by Prime 
Minister, Churchill, the Chancellor, and Sir Kingsley Wood, 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 
24406 PRO.
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United States] are inclined to regard it simply as an election manoeuvre’.83 Lothian 
agreed, reporting that the ‘week-end press’ had seen the mission as ‘primarily 
connected with home politics in the presidential year’.84 856Clearly, the 1940 election was 
being considered as potentially important in trying to second-guess Roosevelt’s thinking. 
Such views were shared by Germany and France. Hans Thomsen reported to Berlin from 
Washington that the Welles mission and the neutrals’ declarations together 
‘unquestionably fit in well with Roosevelt’s domestic political strategy for the 
impending presidential election campaign, in which he will endeavour to play up his 
election for the third time as unavoidable and enforced by circumstances’. ‘ Bullitt 
reported to Ickes the contents of a message he had received from Daladier about the 
Welles mission. The telegram ‘... was to the effect that either the President had sent 
Welles to Europe as a matter of domestic policy, or he didn't know as much about the 
European situation as Daladier had hoped and believed. In either event, the President had 
gone down in Daladier’s estimation’. Across Europe, then, there was a concern that 
Roosevelt was motivated by domestic factors in launching the Welles mission. For 
Roosevelt himself, American public opinion was always his first consideration, but he 
was also practised in trying to manoeuvre around its vagaries.
Although it is beyond the direct focus of this study, the issue of the third-term 
provided a tantalising backdrop to events in Europe.87 For a man who often spoke of 
retiring to his family home in Hyde Park, New York, Roosevelt had not yet decided 
whether to run for an unprecedented third-term in early 1940.88 Although he fully 
understood that if the United States could exert any influence to avoid the spring 
onslaughts it might benefit any Democratic candidate, Roosevelt was also aware that 
overt involvement in European affairs would add to calls that he was entangling the 
United States. As such, it was a question of perspective, and with the likes of Senator 
Hiram Johnson suggesting that Roosevelt’s motive was to put the President ‘in
83 The Times, 10 February 1940.
84 Telegram from Lothian, 13 February 1940, C2400/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO.
85 Thomsen to von Ribbentrop, 9 February 1940, Document No. 603 33/25209-10 DGFP, p.757.
86 Ickes, The Secret Diary Vol. 111., p. 146.
87 The prospect of the third-term was picked up on by Thomsen in Washington. He wrote that the 
chances of Roosevelt running for a third-term had ‘greatly increased’ since the war began. The Chargé 
concluded that if Roosevelt were re-elected ‘a continuation of his policies must be reckoned with.’ 
Thomsen to von Ribbentrop, 7 February 1940, Document No. 597 2997/587589-92 DGFP, p.748.
88 In typically mischievous mode Roosevelt told Morgenthau that ‘I definitely know what I want to do’, 
before continuing that ‘it has gotten so far that it is a game with me. They ask me a lot of questions, 
and I really enjoy trying to avoid them’, Conversation between Morgenthau and Roosevelt, 24 January 
1940, MPD card 5.
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intimate touch with the war. in order that he may do his part as an undisclosed Ally of 
Great Britain*. Roosevelt had to tread carefully.89 On 10 February Johnson was 
quoted in the isolationist Chicago Tribune as saying the 'bombshell ... is a coolly 
calculated scheme to take us further in ... easing us a little bit forward to war'.90 
Roosevelt wanted to avoid such accusations, and both the stressing of the information 
gathering role and Welles* silence on his trip indicate how the Administration sought 
to balance the two perspectives of the mission: either involving the United States 
directly in Europe or being purely a domestic show.
Roosevelt explained his own views on the third-term issue to Morgenthau at 
the end of January 1940. Morgenthau recorded that Roosevelt did not ‘want to run 
unless between now and the convention things get very, very much worse in 
Europe’.91 That events would unfold in such tragic fashion during the spring of 1940 
led to Roosevelt’s accepting the calls of ‘We Want Roosevelt’ at the Chicago 
convention that summer.
Returning to the speculation surrounding the Welles mission in mid-February 
1940, one factor that would certainly develop as one of Roosevelt and Welles’ 
objectives for the mission was the assessment of the strength of the Axis between 
Berlin and Rome. The possibility that the Welles mission was aimed at testing the 
bonds of the Axis was immediately picked up on by those in Berlin. Kirk included in 
his report information that had been intimated to him on collaboration between the 
two Axis powers in the face of the Welles mission: ‘... It is said that particularly close 
contact with Rome is being maintained in regard to the significance and possible 
consequences of his [Welles’] mission.’ German concern was well founded, as 
Welles, having established Italy as part of the mission, sought once in Europe to try to 
preserve Italian neutrality. Historians Stanley Hilton and Elizabeth Wiskemann agree. 
Hilton states that ‘Italian neutrality’ was a ‘related objective of the Welles mission’, 
while Wiskemann argues that Welles ‘intended to counteract Germany’s pressure 
upon Italy to join the war’.92 This work has argued that consideration of Italian 
neutrality became an increasingly important objective during the early months of
89 Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 10 February 1940. Johnson later wrote that 
Roosevelt wanted ‘to knock down two dictators in Europe, so that one may be firmly implanted in 
America’. Letter from Hiram Johnson to Hiram Johnson Jr., 29 April 1939, HJP.
90 Chicago Tribune, 10 February 1940.
91 Conversation between Morgenthau and Roosevelt, 24 January 1940, MPD card 5.
92 Hilton, The Journal o f American History, 1971-72, p. 105. Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin 
Axis -  A History o f the relations between Hitler and Mussolini (London, 1949), p. 193.
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1940. The importance that Welles laid on Italy during the latter part of his mission, in 
his report and into the spring of 1940, is testament to this. Nonetheless, the 
significance of the Italian angle at this point is that the Germans saw it as a possible 
motivation of the mission, and therefore ‘a source of no little concern’.93 In fact both 
Ribbentrop’s hastily arranged trip to Rome while Welles was in London (March 11- 
12), and the Brenner Pass meeting (17 March) can be attributed to some degree to the 
Welles mission. Both events will be considered more fully in the course of later 
chapters.
A further line of speculation, and one which Roosevelt was evidently aware 
of, was the historical parallel between the mission of Sumner Welles and that 
undertaken by Colonel House some twenty five years earlier during the First World 
War. House had been sent to Europe in January 1915 and then again early in 1916 by 
President Woodrow Wilson. House's purpose was to ‘sound out the governments of 
the warring powers’ and therefore help Wilson in his search to ‘discover a means of 
ending the war’ which would therefore save ‘America from all possibility of being 
sucked into it’.94 That Roosevelt was aware of his history is shown by the fact that in 
his initial meeting with Lothian on 1 February he made a point of telling the 
Ambassador that ‘the Under-Secretary of State’s mission would be a public mission 
and not a private one like Colonel House’s’.95 Roosevelt explained this again to 
Breckinridge Long: ‘There would be no “Colonel House business’’. Whatever 
[Welles] did was to be done openly...’.96 This distinction was only explained 
explicitly in private; thus it is not surprising that the press and those in Europe were 
quick to make the link. The Chicago Tribune immediately charged Roosevelt ‘with 
following in Woodrow Wilson’s footsteps’ by attempting to ‘deal’ with the 
Europeans.97 The British Embassy in Paris reported that the French press had made 
the connection between House and the possibility of an early peace. ‘Many 
newspapers recall Colonel House’s visit during the last war,’ Campbell wrote, but he 
continued that ‘the general tone is that there must be nothing in the nature of 
mediation between the belligerents with a view to an early and inconclusive peace’.98
93 Hilton, The Journal o f American History, 1971 -72, p.99.
94 Hugh Brogan, The Penguin History o f the United States (London, 1990), p.487.
95 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940, HFS.
96 9 February 1940, BLP 5.
97 Chicago Tribune 10, 11, 13 1940 in Hilton, The Journal o f American History 1971-72 58.
98 Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office, 11 February 1940, C2188/89/18 FO 371 24405 
PRO.
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The allusion to House could also be found in Berlin. A cable from Kirk met Welles 
when he arrived in Rome. It ‘indicated that the Germans would talk to Sumner Welles 
more freely if he came to Berlin after London and Paris’. Kirk explained that this was 
because ‘the memory of Colonel House was still strong, and particularly his habit of 
repeating in London what he heard in Berlin’.99 The sentiment of this telegram 
confirmed what Kirk had cabled to Washington on 14 February. He stated then that 
there was ‘the definite impression that if the Under Secretary proceeds directly from 
Rome to Berlin and concludes his journey in Europe by visits to England and France 
the purpose of his visit will be coloured in the minds of the German authorities’.100 
Stanley Hilton agrees with this argument, noting that the Germans were ‘especially 
eager to have Welles make Berlin his last stop ... since any rumoured peace proposals 
would more than likely be attributed to the first countries he visited’.101 According to 
Kirk’s words and Hilton's analysis, Germany did not want to become associated with 
any peace proposals. This augured well for those who feared Germany might exploit 
the Welles mission for their own purposes. The link between the Welles and House 
missions was a logical one for the casual observer to make, given the parallels that the 
two were sent to Europe by Democratic presidents while the United States was 
neutral. However, the reality was that House had a considerably more invasive brief, 
while owing to the pressure of American opinion Welles could not appear to be 
transferring information or making any proposals of his own.
Concluding the analysis of the speculation that surrounded the Welles mission 
in the immediate aftermath of the 9 February public announcement is problematic. 
The difficulty lies in making clear assessments of what was fiction (the third-term 
issue) and what had a semblance of fact in relation to Roosevelt’s thinking (the 
gathering of information, etc.). The reality was that Roosevelt and Welles did not 
have entirely fixed objectives for the mission to achieve. Furthermore, it should be 
remembered that Roosevelt and Welles were not entirely unhappy with the rumour 
and counter-rumour that surrounded the mission. They made no effort to publicly 
clarify the stated goal of the mission from 9 February until Welles had returned to 
Rome in mid-March. As the goals of prolonging the ‘phony war’ and perpetuating 
Italian neutrality became stronger during the course of the mission’s evolution and
99 Hooker, Moffat, p.293.
100 Telegram No. 388 from Kirk to Hull, 14 February 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/32: Telegram. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.8.
101 Hilton, The Journal o f American History, 1971-72, p. 103.
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through its course, the more conjecture that surrounded the mission the better for the 
aim of making people think that Roosevelt might act when Welles returned to Europe. 
As long as the mission was presented as being not overtly entangled, i.e. not like the 
House mission, then it had the potential to achieve something from its developing 
goals. Had the mission been solely one to successfully explore the possibilities for 
peace with Germany, the lukewarm response the mission received across Europe, 
alongside the views of Hull and Great Britain, would have fundamentally undermined 
that objective at the outset. Clearly, Welles and Roosevelt were considering other 
goals for the mission.
Roosevelt’s History of Welles1 visit’
Before concluding this chapter, it is worth considering (with a view to the 
development of the mission’s objectives over the course of Welles’ time in Europe) 
the explanation Roosevelt provided to Long on 12 March of his motivations for the 
mission. Crucially, this episode further illustrates the flexible approach Roosevelt had 
to the Welles mission, how he was prepared to embark on policies while 
acknowledging that they may have only a marginal influence on events, and the 
evolution of the mission’s objectives themselves. Roosevelt told Long that he would 
tell him about the history of Welles’ visit, and his first comments are critical in 
illustrating how the Administration was prepared to embark on policy that was likely 
to be marginal in influencing events. Long recorded that Roosevelt ‘figured [the 
mission] could not do any harm and might do some good’. Roosevelt’s words stress 
further the belief he and his colleagues had that, although the Welles mission might 
carry certain risks, when set against the prospect of a forthcoming German offensive 
the risks were worth taking.
Roosevelt then went on to explicitly acknowledge that prolonging the ‘phony 
war’ was in his mind with regard to the Welles mission. With the prospect that ‘the 
Germans might launch a spring offensive about now’, Roosevelt explained that if 
‘Welles’ visit would delay that offensive or possibly prevent it, it would be worth a 
great deal. If it prevented it altogether, that would be fine. If it delayed it a month, that 
would be so much the better. Even a week would mean a lot, because it would help 
England and France to get additional supplies during that week’. Clearly, prolonging 
the ‘phony war’ was something Roosevelt was considering. Long concluded that the 
President wanted the Allies ‘to have as much time as they could have before the
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German attack commenced in all its ferocity, in order that they might be in a better 
position to defend themselves’. With this objective in mind, Roosevelt advanced the 
‘only other reason he sent Welles abroad’. Long recorded that this was ‘to find out 
what he could from Mussolini and from Hitler'. In this Roosevelt’s desire for first­
hand information, specifically on the state of the Axis, is clearly evident. 
Interestingly, Roosevelt was rather dismissive of the rest of the mission, as Long 
quotes him as calling the stops in Paris and London ‘just “window dressing’” . 
Roosevelt explained to Long that Welles ‘had to go there to balance the picture’, but 
‘what he had gone to Europe for really was to get the low-down on Hitler and get 
Mussolini’s point of view’.102 Clearly a dearth of information from the two Axis 
capitals was influential in Roosevelt’s mind at this point. It should be acknowledged 
that this conversation between Long and Roosevelt took place on 12 March, when 
Welles was in London. Undoubtedly, Roosevelt’s thoughts were therefore influenced 
by what he had heard from Welles in their entirely private communications on what 
the latter had learned in Rome, Berlin and Paris. That he considered Paris ‘window’ 
dressing at this stage is entirely compatible with the paucity of significant information 
Welles accrued in the French capital. Furthermore, for Roosevelt to say the ‘only’ 
other reason he sent Welles was to gather information is in direct conflict with the 
contents of the private letters he composed, where exploring the possibilities of a 
suitable settlement are clearly stated. Plainly for Roosevelt the focus of the mission 
had changed by 12 March. The exploration of the possibilities for a peace that was 
neither ‘inconclusive nor precarious’ had been relegated, from its position in January 
as the initial objective to below the gathering of information and the prolonging of the 
‘phony war’. The flexibility that had been part of the mission from the outset is again 
clear, as is Roosevelt’s capacity to retrospectively justify the mission’s purpose. The 
evolution of the mission’s objectives will continue to be monitored in upcoming 
chapters.
Conclusion: An Assessment of the Objectives for the Welles Mission on the Eve of 
Welles’ Departure
When Welles set foot on board the SS Rex bound for Naples on 17 February 1940, the 
initial purpose of the mission he was embarking on had been augmented by other
102 Record of conversation with Roosevelt, 12 March 1940, BLP Box 5.
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objectives. This meant the goals of the mission had evolved significantly during 
January and early February, and in both process and concept this evolution reflected 
the themes that this work has identified in Rooseveltian foreign policy, namely the 
influence of Welles; the concerns of Cordell Hull; the limitations on American foreign 
policy imposed by American public opinion, and the views expressed by the 
Chamberlain government. As Benjamin Welles acknowledges, ‘Roosevelt was a man 
of infinite complexity, ... and the Welles mission an example of multiple 
motivations."103 At its genesis the concept of the Welles mission was the exploration 
of the possibilities for a peace which was neither inconclusive nor precarious. The 
initial drafts of the mission’s press release, together with the development of 
Roosevelt’s thoughts on the contribution he could make up to the end of January 
1940, make it clear that this was his opening idea. That this early design was then to 
be subject to modification was typical of the way policy was made in the Roosevelt 
Administration.
There were three key influences on the drafting of the mission all laid over the 
underlying influence of American public opinion. First of all, Welles’ enthusiasm for 
the project undoubtedly helped Roosevelt’s idea crystallise as January 1940 
progressed. The second and third influences, Hull and the British, each provided 
qualifications which tempered the goal of exploring peace possibilities. In doing this, 
the objections raised helped broaden the mission’s scope. It is clear that when 
Roosevelt consulted with both Hull and the Chamberlain government, despite the 
negative, almost derogatory, tone of the communications from London, he was 
prepared to listen to their suggestions and then incorporate them into the evolving 
mission. This is vital in illustrating that Roosevelt did not approach the mission of his 
Under Secretary to Europe in a dogmatic manner. The exception that both he and 
Welles adhered to, along with other members of the Administration, was official 
silence on the mission as it progressed. From the 9 February announcement until 
Roosevelt made public the contents of Welles’ report at the end of March, the official 
silence was broken only by a reiteration of the public statement of the mission in 
Rome the day before Welles left Europe. Given the intense interest in the mission, it 
would have been very easy for ‘Administration sources’ to let information about the 
mission enter the public domain. Instead, the conjecture that ensued in the absence of
103 Benjamin Welles, Sumner Welles, p.241.
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any official word was actually part of Roosevelt and Welles’ goal of endeavouring to 
prolong the ‘phony war'. Any doubt that took hold in Berlin or Rome, as to the future 
conduct of the United States might contribute to this. Ultimately, of course, it would 
not. German plans for the escalation of the war were signed two days before Welles 
arrived in Berlin, and by early June Mussolini would be sufficiently wedded to Hitler 
to declare war on the Allies.
It is crucial to acknowledge that Roosevelt and Welles knew the mission stood 
a minuscule chance of achieving both its initial aim and those that had augmented it. 
Even when the mission was publicised as being one of gathering information, talk of 
the mission assisting the cause of peace remained. It was this confluence that Lothian 
reported to London on 13 February 1940. He wrote of his assessment of the opinion 
of the American weekend press that having ‘decided upon inclination to give [the] 
mission a chance, although this is regarded as one in a thousand, hope is expressed 
that the mission will at least not do harm’. It is significant that Lothian, who had 
seen at first-hand the development of the mission in the first week in February, and 
who had been told by Roosevelt and Welles separately of odds of ‘one in a thousand’ 
and ‘one in a hundred’ respectively, used the phraseology in reporting to London. The 
idea of the mission being a long shot was clear.
The publicised goal of the mission -  gathering information -  was sufficiently 
broad for Roosevelt and Welles to allow any positive developments to be considered 
successes, but at the same time any unhelpful outcomes to be presented as beyond the 
scope of the mission. Welles’ suggestion of Italian inclusion, then the prominence he 
gave to Mussolini’s comments elsewhere in Europe, the high profile of Italy in the 
conclusions to his final report, and the appeals made to Rome in the spring reveal how 
the Italian angle developed and how Welles sought to pursue it as something that 
could be achieved from his mission. The breadth of what the mission might achieve is 
clearly exemplified by Welles’ hopes for including Italy on the mission’s itinerary. 
Most importantly, Welles sought to preserve Italian neutrality and so limit the scale of 
the war. More generally, he saw an opportunity, also noted by others in the State 
Department, to build a neutral block of opinion upon which recognition of a code of 
international principles could be based. That Italy was still a neutral at this stage was 104
104 Comments from the American Department attached to telegram from Lothian, 13 February 1940, 
C2400/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO.
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also in his thinking, as discussions with Italy could help dilute accusations that the 
Administration was intervening directly in the conflict.
Concern for such accusations reflected both Roosevelt’s and Welles’ 
understanding of the constricting nature of non-entangling American opinion. The 
American people did not share the dangers Roosevelt saw in the situation in Europe. 
This was the major factor in why Roosevelt and Welles professed at the outset that the 
mission was to be both in the public domain and restricted to gathering information. 
By being able to point to such a limited goal, as Welles did in the only press 
conference that he convened on his mission, the Administration was able to claim that 
it was not involving the United States in the war in Europe and that it was acting in 
accordance with the neutrality legislation. Furthermore, the mission’s publicly stated 
objective should not be underestimated. First-hand information from a trusted 
confidant would give the President a clear account of the situation and the 
personalities involved such as he did not have from Rome or Berlin, and allow him to 
more fully assess the information he was receiving from Paris and London.
As a final conclusion, then, the initial concept behind the Welles mission 
evolved into a broader mission with a number of objectives in a relatively short space 
of time -  just six weeks at the beginning of 1940. Crucially for this analysis, the 
mission would continue to evolve. Roosevelt’s thinking in late January 1940 was 
clearly subject to a number of influences, which makes drawing distinct conclusions 
as to why the Welles mission was undertaken at the time and in the manner it was, a 
very complex matter. In essence, though, the continuing analysis presented here 
reveals that against the background of the ‘phony war’ the Welles mission resulted 
from Roosevelt’s awareness of the pressures of the various peace moves, constrained 
by American public opinion, and his view that the early part of 1940 provided a 
window of opportunity before the spring escalation. In this environment, Welles was 
able to provide the impetus and energy that became a diplomatic mission to Europe. 
The disapproval of the British government and the cautious words of Cordell Hull 
dulled the objective of directly exploring peace terms, but Roosevelt and Welles 
pressed on with the mission, believing the other objectives would still be worth 
exploring. Yet Welles had not lost complete sight of the idea of exploring peace terms 
before he arrived in Europe. They were worth pursuing, both for their own sake and 
for the purpose of understanding more fully the position of the belligerents. Welles 
never acknowledged as much because of his concern that it would appear as though
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he were in league with the belligerents -  the House concern. Nevertheless, and 
unbeknowingly, the British in a telegram notifying the Dominions of the Welles 
mission succinctly pointed to a possible outcome that Roosevelt and Welles had 
considered for the mission. The telegram stated that ‘in spite of these dangers, the 
Under Secretary’s visit may serve a good purpose if he can convey to the President a 
clear picture of the issues which are at stake, and assure him of the determination of 
the Allies to achieve the aims which they have set before themselves and have 
publicly proclaimed’.105 Such a statement would have been music to the ears of 
Roosevelt and Welles. For the pair, every last possibility of avoiding the expected 
catastrophe in the spring had to be thoroughly explored, even in the full knowledge 
that the odds were stacked against their making any positive impact on events in 
Europe.
105 Circular to the Governments of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, Union of South 
Africa and Brief 15 February 1940. C2546/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Hope, Despair, Friends - Welles in Rome, Berlin and Paris 17 February -  12
March 1940
As Welles travelled towards Europe in mid-February, the mission that both he and 
Roosevelt had devised had developed sufficiently from their initial concept so that 
Welles would be able to forward a number of objectives in his conversations in 
Europe’s capitals.1 This chapter examines the objectives Welles had for his 
discussions in Rome, Berlin, and Paris. The following chapter will deal with his time 
in London.
Welles’ time on the continent of Europe provided the opportunity to explore 
the breadth of the mission’s objectives. The investigation of the possibilities of peace, 
both for their own sake and because it allowed an assessment of the combatants’ war 
and peace aims, was considered along with the gathering of information and the 
objectives of perpetuating Italian neutrality and prolonging the ‘phony war’. 
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to expect that Welles, in each of the over twenty official 
conversations he had, would address each of these objectives in precisely the same 
manner. The evolution of the mission up to this point indicates that Welles himself 
was a key dynamic and had considerable scope to mould the mission. Its evolution 
can be seen in which elements Welles stressed within the spectrum of his objectives 
as he progressed through Europe. In some respects his emphasis reflected the reality 
of conducting conversations with assorted individuals in a variety of environments. In 
Rome, unsurprisingly, given that it was his first stop, Welles had the full breadth of 
the mission to explore. This meant stressing the potential benefits of neutrality in 
terms of Italo-American cooperation and encouraging Mussolini to believe in his post- 
Munich image as a peace broker, in the hope that he might seek to fulfil such a role 
before the spring catastrophe. These were points he would reiterate when he returned 
to Rome at the end of his mission. Welles’ emphasis in Berlin became more focused 
than the broad range of objectives he pursued in Rome. After his time in the German 
capital the discussion of peace in its broadest sense was solely for the purpose of 
assessing war and peace aims. Roosevelt and Welles, having acknowledged at the
1 Welles was accompanied on his mission by Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the Chief of the Department’s 
European division, and Hartwell Johnson, a junior aide, as well as by his wife, Mathilde, her cousin,
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outset that any accommodation with Hitler was a very unlikely prospect, certainly did 
not see peace with Nazi Germany as possible after Welles’ time there. That the 
Administration had already largely discounted the prospect of a stable and lasting 
peace with Hitler is evident in the lack of a presidential letter to the Führer. Instead in 
Berlin, Welles, having heard tirade after tirade about the injustices done to Germany, 
sought to prolong the ‘phony war’ by presenting an ambiguous position over whether 
upon his return to Washington Roosevelt might then make some ‘move’. In the 
French capital, Welles’ emphasis in conversation was to ask about the possibilities of 
peace with a view to gathering information with a particular stress on assessing 
French resolve. Throughout all of his conversations Welles knew he was working 
with long odds. In revealing that Welles had different emphases in the different 
capitals, this thesis illustrates further how within the breadth of the mission’s 
objectives, it continued to evolve, even once Welles was in Europe.
Tracing the evolution of Welles’ thinking when in continental Europe is 
acknowledged to be somewhat problematic. Evidence of Welles’ personal thinking at 
the time is scarce. His private views on how his mission was progressing were 
revealed in only a few documents, and in these instances Welles’ solemnity must be 
remembered. There is no record of the private communications he sporadically had 
with Roosevelt. While details of the communications between Welles and Roosevelt 
are impossible to know, this analysis has explained the intimate working relationship 
that the pair established as part of the longer-term themes at work in Administration 
policy-making. Indeed, the bilateral line of communication reflected the pair’s desire 
to limit the possibility of any sensitive political aspects of the mission entering the 
public domain. The full detail of the mission -  its breadth of objectives -  had to 
remain private to best enable their chances, acknowledged as being remote, of a 
positive outcome.
Although the direct focus of this work has become the day-to-day activities of 
Welles, the other themes that it has utilised to provide an analytical framework, 
should not be forgotten as underlying aspects of the mission. In the case of Hull’s 
role, the direct and private communication between Roosevelt and Welles meant Hull 
was not to the fore as the mission progressed. Crucially, the fact that Hull, named as 
one of the two recipients of Welles’ findings, should be left out of the most sensitive
their maids, Welles’ English butler, Reeks, and even his Scottish terrier, Toby. Benjamin Welles, 
Sumner Welles, p.246.
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communication epitomises the state of that triumvirate relationship in early 1940. 
With regard to American public opinion, the control that Welles and Roosevelt 
exerted over the mission in avoiding making any comment reveals the extent to which 
they both tried to prevent it becoming a source of criticism for the Administration. 
When the Administration did feel the need to comment on the mission it was only 
once Welles had returned to Rome in March and it was in direct response to 
suggestions that Welles was about to forward a peace move. Somewhat paradoxically, 
Welles, Roosevelt and Hull found themselves in agreement in arguing for a statement 
reiterating the 9 February declaration. This episode will be dealt with in due course in 
Chapter 6. Regarding relations with London, little can be said about Welles’ time on 
the continent. The British, having been somewhat reassured by Roosevelt’s presenting 
the mission as not being a public peace move, still had concerns about what Welles 
might privately have to offer. Whereas for those in London Welles’ time in Rome, 
Berlin and Paris meant watching and waiting, for the Under Secretary himself his time 
in those capitals was crucial in attempting to further the breadth of the mission’s 
objectives.
To reiterate: the aims of the mission continued to develop once Welles was in 
Europe. As his first meeting began in Rome Welles had the full spectrum of the 
mission’s objectives in mind, but as he travelled to Berlin and then Paris the 
objectives evolved subject to what he had learned and what was then possible. In 
Berlin the prospect of any peace settlement, acknowledged as being remote, became 
non-existent. This did not mean that he stopped a line of discussion that focused on 
possible peace terms, as this allowed him to gather explicit accounts of French, and 
then British, war aims and their conviction in fulfilling them. As Welles traversed 
Europe he hoped at the very least that while he was talking the guns would lie quiet.
Italy: Welles sees some ‘Hope’ in Conversation with Ciano
Welles began the mission on 26 February 1940 with conversations in Rome with 
Mussolini and his Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano. These two meetings were 
significant for the mission because in both cases Welles learned potentially valuable 
information which might further the objectives of his mission.
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The first meeting was with Ciano, and took place on the morning of 26 
February.2 While the subject matter of the conversation ranged from the poor state of 
Italo-American relations, through the neutrals conversations, to the proposed Rome 
Exposition in 1942 and was indicative of Welles trying to engage with the Italian, the 
meeting’s importance lay in two areas. The first was the way Welles presented to 
Ciano the goal of his mission and the second was that Ciano revealed views on the 
Axis with Germany and on Italian neutrality that gave Welles cause for hope in 
addressing the wider goals of the mission.
In describing his mission to Ciano, Welles revealed the interpretation of it that 
he wanted to portray in Italy. A discrepancy between the 9 February public statement 
and what Welles said is clear. The Under Secretary told Ciano that he was ‘to report 
to [the President] upon the present possibility of the establishment in Europe of a 
stable and lasting peace -  that was the only kind of peace in which my Government 
was interested’. Welles then added, ‘The President is not interested in any precarious 
or temporary peace which would, in essence, be no more than a patched-up truce.’ 
This second sentence is crucial in illustrating that the only type of peace the 
Administration wanted was one that would be stable and lasting. However, 
paradoxically, it also shows that Welles was prepared to let Ciano believe that in 
broad terms Roosevelt was considering a settlement as an objective of the mission. In 
view of the objections of Hull and Chamberlain this goal had been qualified, but not 
entirely discounted, by Welles at this stage.
Welles’ next comments further reveal the limitations on his mission brought 
about by the objections of London and Hull, and in this case they marry up with the 
published statement. Welles added that he ‘was not empowered to offer any 
proposals, nor to enter into any commitments’. Ciano’s response was to welcome 
those guidelines, as he ‘doubted whether the moment was propitious for any effort of 
that character’. These were potentially devastating words for the Welles mission had it 
been only solely to ensure peace, instead the concord that was evident during the rest 
of the conversation helps show, on the surface at least, that Welles was most
2 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano (Phillips also present), 26 February 1940, Report 
by Welles on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132!4 FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), pp.21-27. (Welles’ report can also be found in the following sources; The President’s 
Secretary’s File Container 6 The Welles Report The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library Hyde Park, New 
York; The Cordell Hull Papers Subject File Container No. 95, Reel No. 55 Welles Sumner -  European 
Trip 1940 Folder No. 406, both in the Library of Congress, Washington DC and at the Roosevelt Study
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interested in maintaining a dialogue with Ciano. Furthermore, Welles made a notable 
effort, as he would with Mussolini later and then when he returned to Rome, to praise 
Ciano’s diplomatic efforts. Welles used glowing terms in stating that he had been 
‘privileged to follow from a distance his [Ciano’s] brilliant career’. The normally 
reserved Welles went further in saying that he had seen with ‘much admiration’ 
Ciano’s efforts ‘to prevent war at the end of August, and since that date, to limit the 
spread of war’. Such flattery was part of Welles attempts to encourage continued 
Italian neutrality. If the Italian camp could be engaged sufficiently for them to think 
they may have a crucial role to play in any peace, then one of Welles’ objectives 
might be more possible. This aspect of Welles’ conduct, in perhaps a more desperate 
fashion, would be evident again when he returned to Rome at the end of his mission.
The most important information that Welles discovered in this first 
conversation of the mission came from Ciano’s views on the Axis and Italian 
neutrality. In the case of the former, Welles recorded that throughout the discussion 
Ciano ‘made no effort to conceal his dislike and contempt for Ribbentrop or his 
antagonism towards Hitler. He did not hide his anxiety with regard to Germany and 
his apprehension with regard to her military power’. Such a revelation was welcome 
news to Welles in his quest to gauge the Italian position in the Axis. Furthermore, 
Welles considered that one of Ciano’s chief interests was ‘to maintain a balance 
between the Allies and Germany so that Italian neutrality may be preserved and so 
that when peace negotiations are undertaken, Italian claims may receive preferential 
consideration’. Again this type of information was valuable to Welles in seeking to 
preserve Italian neutrality. That this was in his thinking had been evident from his first 
words to Ciano. He had opened by stating that ‘in the interest of civilisation itself the 
‘two great neutral influences should pull together, and not apart’ for ‘the construction 
of lasting and sound peace foundations’. Welles recorded that Ciano ‘heartily 
concurred’ with such a suggestion.
In order to provide a thorough analysis of the significance of this conversation 
it is necessary to understand the character of Ciano. The Duce’s son-in-law was a 
political chameleon in his ability to appear sympathetic to his immediate audience. 
While Welles stated in his report that Ciano ‘could not have been simpler nor more 
frank in the expression of his views’ in their meeting, the Italian had himself set out to
Center, Middelburg, the Netherlands; The Sumner Welles Papers, Box 206 Europe 1940 Report, The 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.)
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appeal to the Under Secretary. He wrote in his diary, published in 1947 with Welles 
providing the foreword: ‘I gave him [Welles] a humane turn to our conversation and 
this impressed him, because he was not expecting it.’3 Such duplicity was typical of 
Ciano and manifested itself in his tapping of the phone conversation Welles had with 
Roosevelt upon the former’s return to Rome in March. Questions exist as to how far 
Welles believed in Ciano’s apparent readiness to listen to the Under Secretary. This is 
especially relevant given that Welles later wrote of Ciano that ‘of all the men 
possessing high authority within the Axis governments, he was the only one who 
made it clear to me, without subterfuge and without hesitation, that he had opposed 
the war, that he continued to oppose the war, that he foresaw nothing but utter 
destruction for the whole of Europe through the extension of the war....’. However, 
this assessment was countered by Welles’ knowledge o f ‘... Ciano’s total inability to 
change the course upon which Mussolini had embarked’.4 Furthermore, that Welles 
wrote in his report in March 1940 that Italy will move as Mussolini alone decides, 
suggests he was indulging in his own intrigue in trying to encourage Ciano to think 
that Italy might have something to gain from their talks. Nevertheless, the tenor of 
Welles’ record of his conversation with Ciano suggests he saw the meeting as a 
positive one. That Welles’ tone indicates this even after Ciano had dismissed the 
prospect of any American intervention suggests that he regarded what else the Italian 
said as important information for furthering the range of the mission’s objectives. In 
essence, then, the meeting between Welles and Ciano was intriguing. Each was trying 
to engage the other without revealing his motivations; in Welles’ case the range of 
objectives his mission had developed; and in Ciano’s, his knowledge of Mussolini’s 
ultimate power over Italy’s policy. Welles’ understanding of Mussolini’s pre-eminent 
position would become evident in the Under Secretary’s next meeting on 26 February.
Rome: Mussolini’s Views
Though Welles’ meeting with the Italian leader was conducted in a civil manner, in 
private both parties acknowledged that little of substance was achieved.5 In Ciano’s 
estimation the meeting with Mussolini ‘went badly’, with Welles leaving the Duce’s
3 Draft of Ciano’s Diary, 26 March 1940, SWP Box 211.
4 Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary ¡939-1943 foreword by Sumner Welles (London & 
Toronto, 1947), pp.vii-xii.
147
Chanter Four
office ‘more depressed than when he entered it’.5 6 Nevertheless, the discussion began 
on a cordial note, with Welles presenting Mussolini with the personal letter the Under 
Secretary had composed on behalf of Roosevelt. The poor state of Italo-United States 
relations, along with the fate of the international economy, post-war disarmament and 
Washington’s neutrals conversations, provided a substantial introduction to the 
meeting before Welles’ mission was broached. Such a wide-ranging opening 
illustrates again the range of subjects Welles was seeking to talk about in order to 
engage the Italian government.
In specifically raising the purpose of this mission Welles repeated the 
interpretation of its goal that he had given to Ciano earlier in the day. He stated that 
his goal was to report ‘on the present possibilities of the establishment of the bases for 
a permanent and stable peace in Europe’, and that he brought with him no proposals. 
Mussolini’s response immediately betrayed his commitment to the Axis, as he stated 
that German claims in central Europe must be settled together with Italian claims in 
the Mediterranean.7 Despite such a settlement being clearly at odds with the Roosevelt 
Administration’s ideas for a just and lasting peace, Welles then asked the Duce 
outright if he considered it possible ‘for any successful negotiations to be undertaken 
between Germany and the Allies for a real and lasting peace?’. Given what Mussolini 
had said previously, his answer of ‘an emphatic “Yes’” is perhaps remarkable. 
Nevertheless he quickly followed this by stating that ‘I am equally sure that if a “real” 
war breaks out ... there will be no possibility for a long time to come of any peace 
negotiation’. Such a statement can only have added to the feeling in Welles’s mind 
that time was an issue in the ‘phony war’. Having lasted an hour, the meeting ended 
with a ‘particularly cordial handshake’ and an agreement that on his return through 
Italy at the end of the mission Welles would have a further meeting with Ciano and 
Mussolini.8 This meeting would illustrate how far Welles had by that stage dropped
5 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano and Phillips also present), 26 February 
1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 
Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.27-33.
6 Ray Moseley, Mussolini’s Shadow - The Double Life o f Count Galeazzo Ciano (New Haven & 
London, 1999), p.92.
7 Mussolini had made a speech to the Italian Grand Council on 4 February 1939, in which he said that 
‘Italy has in fact no free access to the oceans. She is really a prisoner in the Mediterranean, and the 
more populous and powerful she becomes, the more she will suffer from her imprisonment’. In F.W. 
Deakin, The Brutal Friendship -  Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall o f Italian Fascism (London, 1962), p.6.
8 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano and Phillips also present), 26 February 
1940. Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe. 121.840 
Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.33.
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consideration o f peace from the mission's objectives and was focusing on preserving 
Italian neutrality.
Also in evidence on this first day of the mission was Welles’ ability to reset its 
parameters by asking Mussolini for ‘his suggestions as to any conversations which I 
might hold in Berlin’. The Duce replied that he ‘believed that what I would be told 
there would be very similar to the opinions which he had expressed to me’. In asking 
this question, Welles was exhibiting the licence he had to move beyond a strict 
interpretation of the 9 February announcement, which stated that he carried no 
proposals. This would be in evidence to varying degrees during the rest of the 
mission.
Despite the prospect of further meetings, the Italian view of this meeting was 
not positive. Ciano recorded in his diary that Mussolini was ‘not impressed by 
Welles’ personality’.9 Richard Bosworth’s recently published and well-received 
biography states that in private Mussolini was ‘scathing about Welles and his 
President, dismissing the exchanges with his visitor’. This Bosworth attributes to 
Mussolini’s judgement that ‘Americans were eternally superficial, while Italians 
judged matters in depth’.10 That the Duce was not impressed by the Under Secretary 
is significant, as it illustrates further the duplicitous character of the Italians. 
Mussolini’s comments throughout the meeting were revealing of his own self- 
importance and his capacity to provide what he thought his audience wanted to hear.11 
While Welles saw some hope in the prospect of further conversations with Rome, 
Mussolini was not going to let the Under Secretary distract him from his devotion to 
the Axis. This would become clearer when Welles returned to Rome in mid-March.
In the American camp opinion was more positive. Phillips wrote that Welles’ 
visit prompted ‘the official “tap” ... which was turned on or off by Mussolini as he 
saw fit, [to be] turned slightly towards a more friendly approach to the United 
States’.12 Welles, in a telegram reporting on both conversations to Roosevelt and Hull, 
clearly saw some reason for optimism in pursuing the broad objectives of the mission. 
Observing that ‘Mussolini received me in a very friendly manner’, Welles pointed out 
that he believed ‘it wiser for me not to telegraph the more secret of the views
9 Entry for 26 February 1940. Muggeridge (ed.) Ciano’s Diary, p.213.
10 Richard Bosworth, Mussolini (London, 2002), p.365.
11 This is in line with Bosworth’s view that Mussolini was ‘always, anxious to govern, and to be seen to 
govern’. Bosworth, Mussolini, pp.1-2.
' 2 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 1 5 1 .
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expressed’ on the Italian view on the prospect of a settlement. Clearly he believed he 
had been given some privileged information, and in direct contravention of what he 
had just written Welles continued that ‘Mussolini stated emphatically that he believed 
that such a possibility [of a settlement] existed'.13 What Welles could have considered 
more secret than this in the subjects discussed is open to speculation, but that this was 
not considered the most secret information reveals that finding a peace settlement was 
not Welles’ top priority. Furthermore, these comments were reported as point six in an 
eight-point memorandum, and were in themselves given no extra comment. The remit 
of the other points covered in the telegram further reveal the extent of the mission’s 
goals. To report on the prospects for peace alongside international economic prospects 
and even the proposed 1942 Rome Exposition illustrates at the outset of the mission 
that Welles and Roosevelt did not see a settlement as an overriding objective, but as 
one aspect of the mission. This was crucial as it shows how far the mission had moved 
away from Roosevelt’s initial conception of searching for a settlement and the 
incorporation of other objectives.
It was of little surprise, then, that Welles did not make more of his 
conversations in Rome in his telegram to Washington. Mussolini had said that 
negotiations involving the Nazis and Italy could prevent further armed conflict, but 
only on terms incompatible with Administration policy: Italian control of the 
Mediterranean and German pre-eminence in Eastern Europe. Yet Welles pursued 
Mussolini and Ciano’s comments later on during the mission in order to address the 
objective of prolonging the ‘phony war’. The belief that Mussolini acting as conduit 
might provide the parties with something to discuss was preferable to further 
escalation of the fighting. Set against previous difficulties in Washington’s 
relationship with Rome, Welles’ meetings with Ciano and Mussolini did augur some 
degree of hope. That Welles had found the Italians prepared to enter into discussion 
meant the mission was not ‘stillborn’ in Welles’ eyes and that the possibility existed 
to further its broader goals.
Rome: Welles’ Silent Diplomacy
While Welles was considering how he could further his mission in his private 
conversations in Rome, in the glare of the world’s press he was content to respond
13 Telegram No. 127 from Welles to Roosevelt and Hull, 27 February 1940, FDR PSF RSC Reel 3.
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with ‘no comment’ when asked about the mission. Moffat’s previously unseen diary 
of the mission tacitly acknowledged at the outset that the press would be a key 
consideration for the Administration. He wrote that the press had been ordered to 
follow Welles ‘night and day’ so that they could ‘report in a friendly, objective, or 
hostile manner according to the politics of their editor.’14 Berle also recognised that 
the press would have to be considered on the mission. He had learned that the 
‘Chicago Tribune is sending along a man to write [Welles] up as unpleasantly as 
possible and make political capital against the Administration’.15 The importance of 
this was recognised by Welles, who remained tight-lipped on his mission. Although 
this earned him the title of ‘Sumner the Silent’ among the following press, his 
taciturnity in public meant that those in London and Paris learned very little of the 
mission.
The British Ambassador, Sir Percy Loraine, exhibiting the concern the British 
still had over the mission, was keen to rectify this and learn what Welles was doing in 
Rome. He had met Phillips in between the American’s two appointments on 26 
February and immediately reported back to London on Welles’ meeting with Ciano. 
Although no detail was disclosed, Loraine wrote that the interview had apparently 
been ‘most satisfactory’, with Ciano ‘at his best; friendly, charming, informative and 
lucid’.16 Loraine was able to meet Welles in person the next day at an informal lunch 
at the Embassy. Although Welles had told Phillips that he wished to avoid all social 
engagements on his visit because of ‘the nature of [his] mission, as well as because of 
present conditions in Europe’, the Under Secretary did end up in conversation with 
Loraine and the French Ambassador.17 18Despite Loraine later recording that he ‘would 
make no attempt to pump [Welles] about what had been said to him on the Italian 
side’, Moffat recorded that the Ambassador ‘without preliminaries’ did ask Welles 
‘what Mussolini had said to him’. Welles’ response reveals that he would not 
divulge any detail of his conversations. He stated ‘that he would no more tell him 
what Mussolini had said to him than he would tell Mussolini what the British Minister
14 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.l, SWP Box 211.
15 Memorandum by Berle, 16 February 1940, ABP Box 211.
16 Telegram from Loraine to Halifax, 26 February 1940, C2997/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO.
17 Telegram No. 32 from Welles to Phillips, 12 February 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/2: Telegram. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.7.
18 Telegram from Loraine to Halifax, 27 February 1940, C3117/89/18 FO 371 24405 PRO. ‘Diary of 
Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.7, SWP Box 211.
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talked about’. Moffat stated that this left Loraine ‘apparently puzzled’.19 Interestingly 
though, Loraine still filed a report to London that stated Welles’ conversations had 
been ‘instructive and that he had been received ... in a very friendly and cordial way 
which, in the case of Signor Mussolini had been rather unexpected’.20 That Welles 
talked with both the British and French Ambassadors, albeit at an informal luncheon 
at the Embassy perhaps reveals a certain disposition towards the Allies, especially as 
the German Ambassador had not been invited. Crucially, though, as Welles pushed on 
with his mission’s objectives he certainly did not divulge any details to the diplomatic 
corps in Rome before moving on to Berlin.
Berlin: Hitler’s Directive and Ribbentrop’s Tirade
Welles spent two nights in Zurich enroute to the German border, where he was met by 
a special train which took him to Berlin, arriving on 1 March 1940. Welles’ time in 
Berlin would see the prospect of reaching any kind of stable and lasting settlement 
with the Nazi regime, acknowledged from the outset as being remote, being discarded 
as one of his objectives. Having listened to various Nazi officials, particularly 
Ribbentrop, Welles knew privately that they were bent upon war as a means of 
achieving their aims. (Importantly, though, he would keep ‘exploring the possibilities 
for peace’ on the rest of his mission, as a means of learning what the belligerents were 
fighting for and assessing their commitment to the fight.) The Nazis’ fervour for war 
was evident throughout Welles’ time in Germany. On the eve of his visit, Hitler had a 
memorandum prepared to circulate to all those who would meet Welles. The 
document explained the reasons why Germany was at war and why no peace was 
possible. It also meant there was no prospect of Welles finding acceptable peace terms 
with the Nazi regime. The memorandum read: ‘All statements are to be avoided 
which could be interpreted by the other side to mean that Germany is in any way 
interested at present in discussing possibilities of peace. I request rather that Mr 
Sumner Welles not be given the slightest reason to doubt that Germany is determined 
to end this war victoriously and that the German people -  and their leadership -  are 
unshakeable in their confidence in victory.’21 The Nazi regime clearly did not
19 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.7, SWP Box 211.
20 Telegram from Loraine to Halifax, 27 February 1940, C3117/89/18 FO 37.1 24405 PRO.
21 Memorandum by the Führer ‘Directive for conversation with Mr Sumner Welles’, February 29 1940. 
Document No. 637 66/46595-98 DGFP, pp 817-819.
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contemplate finding any arrangement with Welles and were clear in the message they 
wanted to send.
The Under Secretary’s first meeting in Berlin revealed the distance between 
the American and his hosts. Welles met Joachim von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign 
Minister, on 1 March and began with the same assessment of his mission that he had 
presented in Rome.22 He told Ribbentrop that his mission was designed to facilitate 
‘the President’s desire to ascertain whether there existed any possibility of the 
establishment of a sound and permanent peace in Europe’. Ribbentrop’s response, 
which lasted ‘for more than two hours’, was an account of ‘Germany’s participation 
in European history, as he saw it, from January 30, 1933, the day Hitler became 
Chancellor’. He began by stating that there was no feature of German foreign policy 
that ‘conflicted’ with the interests of the United States government. Welles recorded 
that he had to restrain himself from interjection at this point, as he feared that ‘violent 
polemics’ would ensue, given Ribbentrop’s ‘obviously aggressive’ stance. Included in 
the German’s analysis was the mention that it was the British who had rejected 
Hitler’s October ‘peace offer’, and a remarkable analogy: Ribbentrop stated that 
‘Germany wished for nothing more in Europe than what the United States possessed 
through the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere’. The two-hour tirade ended 
with Ribbentrop stating that only once the English desire ‘to destroy Germany is 
killed, once and for all’ could there then be peace.23
By this time, and in a somewhat exasperated state, Welles said he ‘would not 
attempt to speak at any length, bu t... could not refrain from making certain comments 
upon what the Minister had said’. That Welles did not attempt to respond in any detail 
indicates that, however distasteful the German, Welles did not want to become 
involved in a ‘spat’ which could have jeopardised the rest of his time in Germany, or 
the wider goals of his mission. His meeting with Ribbentrop confirmed to him that in 
Germany his main priority must be to leave the impression that, upon his return to
22 Record of conversation between Welles and Ribbentrop (Kirk (United States Chargé), von Domberg 
(Chief of Protocol), and Schmidt (the official interpreter) were also present), 1 March 1940, Report by 
the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe. 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.34-41. The German account of the meeting can 
be found in the following location: Memorandum by an official of the Foreign Minister’s Secretariat 
‘Conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and Mr Welles in the presence of American Chargé 
d’Affaires, Kirk and Minister von Domberg.’ 1 March 1940, Document No. 640 F14/353-79 DGFP, 
pp.821-830.
23 Record of conversation between Welles and von Ribbentrop (Kirk, von Domberg, and Schmidt were 
also present), 1 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to 
Europe. 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132l/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.39.
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Washington, Roosevelt might act with some gesture. It was again a long shot, but 
there was no prospect of discussion with the Nazi regime. Welles’ limited response to 
Ribbentrop was nevertheless a straightforward assessment of the poor state of 
American-German relations. The reason, according to Welles, was the gross violation 
of international law, human rights and common decency perpetrated by the German 
government. Further, Welles could not let the meeting end without redressing 
Ribbentrop’s comments on the ‘Monroe Doctrine’. Welles suggested in forthright 
terms that if ‘the Minister desired to use the term “Monroe Doctrine” as synonymous 
with the term “sphere of influence”; whether political or economic, he should find 
some more accurate synonym’. After a brief riposte from Ribbentrop, which he again 
ended by stating that there could be no peace ‘save through German victory’, to avoid 
the potential for even more heated exchanges Welles ‘terminated the interview’ after 
an uncomfortable two and three-quarter hours.
Welles’ private observations about Ribbentrop show that he saw little prospect 
of ever being able to have a civil conversation with the Reich Foreign Minister, let 
alone reaching an agreement with his government. In a rare instance of Welles’ 
personal views being evident, he wrote of Ribbentrop: ‘[he] has a completely closed 
mind. He struck me as also a very stupid mind. The man is saturated with hate for 
England, and to the exclusion of any other dominating mental influence. He is clearly 
without background in international affairs, and he was guilty of a hundred 
inaccuracies in his presentation of German policy during recent years. I have rarely 
seen a man I disliked more.’24 Clearly, Welles was appalled by Ribbentrop. It is 
significant also that, throughout the pair’s conversation, both men used Dr Schmidt as 
an interpreter, despite the fact that, having been Ambassador to London and a 
travelling wine salesman in North America, Ribbentrop spoke English, and Welles 
spoke adequate German. The use of the interpreter is symbolic of the distance 
between the two men.
Welles’ next meeting on 1 March, conducted in entirely more civil 
circumstances, has two important features for this analysis. The meeting was with 
Welles’ German counterpart, Ernst von Weizacker, and although it was of little 
consequence because Weizacker was entirely marginal in Nazi policy-making, Welles
24 Record of conversation between Welles and von Ribbentrop (Kirk, von Domberg, and Schmidt were 
also present), 1 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to 
Europe. 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.41.
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learned of Hitler’s directive for conversations with him. Weizäcker told Welles, at no 
little personal risk, that he had ‘been strictly instructed not to discuss with you in any 
way any subject which relates directly or indirectly to the possibility of peace’.25 This 
was valuable information for Welles regarding the rest of his conversations in 
Germany. The second important aspect of this conversation was that, in breach of his 
remit, Welles stated to Weizäcker that although his conversations in Rome were 
confidential he ‘felt entirely able to tell him [of his] impressions after talking with the 
Duce’. Such impressions were obviously subject to Welles’ interpretation, but reveal 
how far he was seeking to utilise Mussolini’s comments as a means of prolonging the 
‘phony war’ and assessing the strength of the Axis. Based on Mussolini’s judgement 
that the ‘basis for a just and lasting peace could still be found before it was too late’, 
Welles asked Weizäcker if an approach from the Duce would receive a ‘favourable 
reception’ in Berlin. Although he gave no direct answer, Welles concluded after 
Weizäcker’s comments ‘that if the Duce approaches Hitler directly and secretly, it 
will have a decisive influence’; however, ‘if Ribbentrop knows of the approach, he 
will do his utmost to block it’. Ribbentrop’s position as a proponent of war was clear 
to Welles. Weizäcker wrote of this exchange that he had objected to Welles’ line 
because it was not his ‘business to discuss peace actions’, clearly revealing his 
concern to appear to be conforming to Hitler’s directive.26 According to Welles, the 
interview ended in an emotional state with tears in Weizäcker’s eyes and a hope that 
Welles’ mission might see ‘an absolute holocaust... avoided.’27
Berlin: Hitler’s View of the War
The next day, Welles met Hitler at the new Chancery building. The conversation 
would signal the end of any prospect of the Welles mission inaugurating a lasting and 
just peace. The meeting began with Welles, repeating as he had done the day before, 
that his mission was for the purpose of examining the grounds for a ‘just and lasting 
peace’ and that any information would be retained for the President and Secretary of 
State. Welles also spoke in his opening of Mussolini’s comments that ‘the foundations
25 Record of conversation between Sumner Welles and Ernst von Weizäcker, 1 March 1940, Report by 
the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe. 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.42-43.
26 Memorandum by Staatssekretär Emst Von Weizäcker on his conversation with Welles, 1 March
1940, Document No. 642 33/25243-44 DGFP, p.830.
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of a just and lasting peace might still be laid’.27 8 In doing so he was trying to assess the 
nature of the Axis; however, Hitler ignored Welles’ opening. Instead, in much the 
same vein as Ribbentrop and in accordance with his own directive, he explained how 
it was the British who had set out on a destructive path by declaring war and refusing 
his October ‘peace offer’. Hitler by contrast was merely trying to reunite all the 
German peoples. Although other issues were discussed, including Hitler’s claiming to 
be in agreement with the Roosevelt Administration’s principles on free trade, the 
theme returned to Germany as the victim in the war. Hitler’s final words illustrated his 
commitment to the conflict: ‘I can see no hope for the establishment of any lasting 
peace until the will of England and France to destroy Germany is itself destroyed.’29 
At the end of this conversation with Hitler, Welles knew that there was no 
chance of the founding objective of the mission -  exploring the possibilities of peace 
and finding the basis for a just and lasting settlement. This original aim had been 
weakened by the objections of Hull and the Chamberlain government, and it was now 
dealt a mortal blow by Hitler in Berlin. Langer and Gleason in The Challenge to 
Isolation agree. They suggest that ‘to all intents and purposes, ... the major objective 
of the Welles Mission had failed ... when the Under Secretary left the German 
capital’.30 However, while this analysis agrees that the exploration of peace was a 
major objective it was not the major objective, and so Welles still had additional 
objectives to pursue on his mission. In Berlin this meant cultivating the belief that 
something might come of the mission, and, more broadly prolonging the phony war, 
preserving Italian neutrality and gathering information for the President. An air of 
resignation which acknowledged that the Nazis were hell-bent on war can be seen in 
the rest of Welles’ time in Germany. It was evident the next day as Welles met first of 
all with Rudolph Hess, the Deputy Head of the Nazi Party. Their meeting was of little 
consequence. After Welles’ introduction as to the purpose of his mission, Hess merely
27 Record of conversation between Welles and von WeizScker, I March 1940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132Vi. FRUS 
1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), p.43.
28 Record of conversation between Welles and Hitler (Kirk von Ribbentrop, Reichsminister Meissner 
(Head of Hitler’s Chancery) and Schmidt were also present), 2 March 1940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 
1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.46.
29 Record of conversation between Welles and Hitler (Kirk, von Ribbentrop, Meissner and Schmidt 
also present), 2 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to 
Europe. 121.840 Welles, Sumner/13272. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.49.
30 Draft of Chapter 10 ‘The Phony Peace’ by Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation 1937-40, 
p 34-45, SWP Box 207.
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reiterated from a ‘typewritten memorandum’ the points that Welles had already heard 
from Ribbentrop and Hitler: the Allies were bent on the destruction of Germany and 
only military victory could guard against this. Welles wrote afterwards that it was 
‘entirely clear that either the Chancellor or the Foreign Secretary had dictated the 
course which the conversations to be had with me by the members of the German 
Government were to follow’.31 Once Welles was aware that ‘Hess was merely 
repeating what he had been told to say’, the Under Secretary ‘made no attempt to set 
forth any views of my own’ or record ‘any detailed account of this conversation.’32 
Welles did record much of the detail of his next conversation as it was with Reichs 
Marshal, Herman Goring, who had been the focus of much of the talk of peace the 
previous autumn.
Germany: Goring
In order to see Goring Welles endured open-topped car journey of an hour and a half 
in freezing temperatures to his country retreat, Karinhall. Welles’ aims for this 
conversation were to assess Goring’s standing in the regime in the light of the autumn 
rumours and, once he had found out that Goring was propagating the same message as 
the rest of the Nazi regime, to endeavour to play up the possibility that Roosevelt 
might act in the future. After his introduction, when he again referred to Mussolini’s 
opinion that ‘there was still a possibility of a firm and lasting peace’ in the hope of 
testing the Axis, Welles was once more subjected to the familiar recital of German 
foreign policy under the Nazis.33 Although, in contrast to Welles’ opinion of other 
high officials of the German regime, Goring was ‘simple, unaffected and exceedingly 
cordial’, the subject matter of the conversation did not fundamentally change.34 
Goring carefully outlined how the British had continually rejected Hitler’s efforts 
towards an ‘understanding’ and that it was they who were fighting a war of
31 Record of conversation between Welles and Hitler (Kirk, von Ribbentrop, Meissner and Schmidt 
were also present), 2 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special 
Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), p.46.
32 Record of conversation between Welles and Hess (Kirk and Schmidt were also present), 3 March 
1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe. 121.840 
Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.51.
33 Memorandum by an official of the Foreign Minister’s Secretariat on the conversation between Field 
Marshal GOring and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles in Karinhall (Kirk and Schmidt were also 
present), 3 March 1940, Recorded 4 March 1940, Document No. 653 66/46573-94. DGFP, p.851.
34 Record of conversation between Welles and GOring (Kirk and Schmidt were also present), 3 March 
1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 
Welles, Sumner/1321/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.52.
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destruction, not Germany, As elsewhere, the conversation discussed other matters, 
including the recent neutrals declaration by the United States -  on which Welles 
found Goring amenable, but only after a peace settlement in which Germany’s aims 
had been satisfied.
Welles’ objective of trying to instil in Goring’s mind the possibility that 
Roosevelt might act can be seen in the subtle differences between the German and 
American accounts of the final exchanges of the meeting. The German account ends 
with Welles declaring that he was leaving with ‘the hope that some way could still be 
found to avoid the tragedy of a war of annihilation’. He then apparently said that he 
‘would be glad’ when he arrived back in Washington to indicate to the President ‘that 
there was still some hope of peace’.35 The significance is that Welles’ own version 
does not mention either of these propositions. By pursuing this line, the Under 
Secretary hoped that the prospect of United States involvement might cause pause for 
thought before Germany considered escalating the war. This would achieve one of the 
mission’s objectives, that of prolonging the ‘phony war’. Welles’ words also reveal 
something of his diplomatic style, no doubt drawing on the experience learned in the 
smoke-filled rooms of South America, in intimating that the President might be ready 
to act under his advice and thus increase the perception in Goring’s eyes of Welles’ 
importance. Welles’ own account ends by recording a statement from Goring that is 
considerably more downbeat, offering no hope of anything other than war: an entirely 
more realistic assessment. ‘I fear that when you visit Paris and London you will 
realise that there is no hope for peace,’ Welles recorded of Goring. The German 
continued: ‘You will there learn what I now know, and that is that the British and 
French Governments are determined to destroy Germany, and that no peace, except 
on that basis, will be considered by them.’36 While it is always possible that both 
accounts were embellished in order to further their individual aims, given the 
congruence of the accounts up to this point there seems little reason to suggest that 
orchestrated fabrication took place. Instead, the subtle variations reveal Welles’ 
acceptance that delay was the best he could hope for from Germany.
35 Memorandum by an official of the Foreign Minister’s Secretariat on the conversation between 
GOring and Welles in Karinhall (Kirk and Schmidt were also present), 3 March 1940, Recorded 4 
March 1940, Document No. 653 66/46573-94 DGFP, p.851.
36 Record of conversation between Welles and Goring (Kirk and Schmidt were also present), 3 March 
1940. Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 
Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), p.56.
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Before Welles departed from Germany he met briefly with Hjalmar Schacht, 
the former Reichsbank President. This meeting, though it contains an extraordinary 
tale of intrigue prefaced by Schacht's statement that if what he said became known he 
would ‘be dead within a week', reveals further that Welles was not desperate to 
achieve a peace at all cost.37 Schacht outlined an apparent plan by a group of leading 
generals to depose the Hitler regime, which could be furthered if Schacht could visit 
the United States. Welles responded by dodging the question, as he was no doubt 
aware that the State Department’s view of Schacht was hardly complimentary. ‘To 
understand him,’ Messersmith had written in January 1939, ‘it is necessary to realise 
that his dominating characteristic is his ambition to play a great role, to be in the 
public eye and to have his outstanding merit recognised.’38 With this in mind, Welles 
ended the conversation by disassociating himself and restricting himself to the 
statement that he ‘could not undertake to question any course which he [Schacht] 
might determine to lay down for himself.39
Welles’ final opportunity to promote the view that Roosevelt might act after 
his return to Washington came when Ambassador Dieckhoff, the erstwhile German 
Ambassador to Washington, saw Welles and Moffat off at the station. Dieckhoff 
subsequently recorded that Welles ‘expected his trip to be successful if only Europe 
remained quiet “in the next four or five weeks”’.40 In making comments like this 
Welles, knowing that a settlement with the Nazi regime was nigh on impossible, was 
trying to implant the idea that his mission would result in an initiative from Roosevelt, 
in the hope that this might prevent the onset of any German offensive. It seems that 
Kirk was in league with this idea. After calling on von Weizacker the next day 
Dieckhoff concluded that Kirk had stated in ‘unmistakable terms’ that ‘at the end of 
Welles’s trip some kind of initiative by President Roosevelt could be expected’.41 
That Dieckhoff evidently put some faith in this line is clear from his composed report
37 Record of conversation between Welles and Schacht (Kirk was also present), 3 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/13254. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.57.
38 Memorandum of a conversation between Hull, Welles, Dunn, Moffat and Feis by Messersmith, 14 
January 1939, T1253 1930-39 Germany 711.62/175 Roll 1 State Department Central Files, Archive II, 
Maryland.
39 Record of conversation between Welles and Schacht (Kirk was also present), 3 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/ 132V4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.58.
40 Memorandum by Dieckhoff, 4 March 1940, Document No. 655 33/25282 DGFP p.864.
41 Record of conversation between Dieckhoff and Kirk, 4 March 1940, Document No. 655 33/25282 
DGFP, p-864.
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on the return to Berlin of James D. Mooney, one of the businessmen who had been 
involved in a peace move the previous autumn. Mooney had returned to Berlin in 
early March, erroneously believing that he had Presidential endorsement after briefly 
talking again with Roosevelt in January 1940.42 Nevertheless, Dieckhoff recorded that 
if ‘any American initiative can lead to results, it is that of Sumner Welles, but not of 
Mooney.’43 Welles’ activities had evidently raised the prospect that Roosevelt might 
consider some move. Historian Ralph de Bedts agrees that Welles had delay as an 
objective of his mission. He writes: ‘Given the likelihood that the so-called ‘phony 
war’ might not last forever, Roosevelt seemingly hoped that the mission might throw 
any Nazi offensive plans off balance.’44 The notion of prolonging the ‘phony war’, on 
the basis that the Roosevelt Administration might ‘act’ at some point in the future, is a 
key aspect of the analysis that this thesis proposes. That it was a deliberate tactic in 
Germany is supported by the fact that leading comments of the type Welles made 
there cannot be found in his discussions in Paris and London, and are seen only in 
vague terms when Welles returned to Rome. Faced with the prospect of either 
capitulating to Nazi dominance of continental Europe or witnessing complete carnage 
across Western Europe, and in the full realisation that it was unlikely to influence 
events, Welles saw this as worth pursuing as he progressed through Europe.
The substance of Welles’ meetings with the Nazi government had been 
predetermined by Hitler’s directive. This meant that he was unable to utilise 
Mussolini’s comment that a ‘settlement’ was still possible in order to engender a 
discourse that might prolong the ‘phony war’. Instead, Welles, having been subjected 
to a party line entirely incompatible with the Roosevelt Administration’s views, was 
left to propagate the view that something might flow from his mission upon his return 
to Europe. The notion that time was running out was clearly in the air while Welles’ 
party was in Berlin. Moffat was told by a former colleague in Berlin that ‘the moment 
the spring really comes anything may happen’. The Belgian diplomat, well aware that 
United States intervention would be wholly unlikely, expressed to Moffat views very 
much akin to those Welles was disseminating. Moffat recorded of the Belgian: ‘Even
42 The tale of James D. Mooney from his role in the talk of peace in the early autumn of 1939 and then 
his return to Berlin in March 1940 is the subject of a paper by this author currently under preparation 
and intending to be submitted for publication in the summer of 2005.
43 Memorandum No. 656 by Dieckhoff on his conversation with Mooney, 5 March 1940 B21/B005423 
DGFP, p.865.
44 Ralph F. de Bedts, Ambassador Joseph Kennedy 1938-40 -A n  Anatomy o f Appeasement (New York, 
1985), p. 188.
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if it’s not true, let the Germans think that you might come into the war ... It’s the only 
deterrent possible.’45 The futility surrounding the mission was brought to the fore for 
Welles facing the Nazi government. In fact, the day before Welles arrived in Berlin, 
Hitler had authorised plans to invade Scandinavia. As Welles left Germany on the 
evening of 3 March and returned to neutral Switzerland, battle plans were being 
drawn up.
Milan to Paris and a chance meeting
After resting for two days in Switzerland, Welles headed for Paris on board the 
Simplon-Orient Express. From his conversation with an unexpected travelling 
companion it is possible to gain a rare insight into Welles’ personal views about his 
mission, and its multifaceted nature. On board the train was Ambassador Joseph 
Kennedy, heading for London to prepare the ground for Welles. Although Kennedy’s 
is the only account of this meeting, and his views on the fate of Europe were by this 
stage significantly divergent from those of the Administration, his record of the 
conversation is worthy of analysis. Kennedy had passed through Rome briefly, on his 
way to Milan to board the train, and had called on Phillips. There he had learned two 
things: firstly, and in accordance with what Welles himself had ascertained, that 
Mussolini ‘was still strong for Hitler’ while ‘the rest of the Italian Government group 
... from Ciano down were pro-Ally... none of them had that fortitude of character that 
would lead them to take positions in opposition to what Mussolini might want.’46 The 
second piece of information that Kennedy relayed was news that the Germans had 
approached the Pope with a request that Ribbentrop be accorded an audience. As the 
two Americans pondered this seemingly surprising move, Kennedy concluded that ‘it 
seemed patent... that the reason for Ribbentrop’s visit was his [Welles’] own visit to 
Berlin’. Perhaps such a conclusion reveals Kennedy’s hope that Welles’ mission had 
influenced policy in Berlin. The reality of Ribbentrop’s trip to Rome was that it was 
an opportunity for Germany to tell Mussolini that Italy’s position was alongside 
Germany and in the war.47 Although unknown at the time, this conformed with what 
Welles had learnt in Germany and how he responded to Kennedy on the train to 
Rome. He told the Bostonian that, although he had told Hitler and Goring of
45 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p. 15, SWP Box 211.
46 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.538.
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Mussolini’s willingness to see ‘a negotiated peace’ and that the Duce was prepared to 
‘use his influence to attempt to bring one about,’ they had responded in a negative 
fashion. This prompted Welles to again quote long odds in relation to his mission. 
Welles stated he was ‘sceptical about immediate results’, Kennedy’s account states, 
and ‘that the chances of peace seemed about one out of a thousand.’ Nevertheless, 
Welles hinted at the wider objectives of the mission: he ‘believed that in any event his 
mission would have some value in consolidating official American opinion on the war 
and its issues’. Such an assessment, albeit subject to Kennedy’s interpretation, is 
significant in revealing the other objectives of the mission and specifically the 
influence that American opinion had on Administration policy formulation. Yet there 
was little time for further reflection as the pair soon arrived in the French capital with 
Welles ‘eager to do the rounds in Paris’.47 8
Paris and More Discussion
When Welles arrived in Paris he was back among friends. He knew Paris well, had 
met many French politicians government before and was well informed of events in 
the French government owing to the efforts of Ambassador Bullitt. Despite Bullitt’s 
success in conveying a general picture, Welles’ conversations in Paris were conducted 
with an emphasis on gathering information. In particular, his discussions were aimed 
at ascertaining French commitment to pursuing their war aims, their post-war plans, 
and the state of relations with Rome. Welles also maintained the silence that had 
typified his mission. At this time, he had two motives for this: firstly, in Europe 
Welles wanted to prolong the belief that the mission might result in something, and, 
secondly, in the United States he wanted to avoid any accusations that he was 
bringing with him from the Axis capitals any ‘terms’ for the Allies. The memory of 
House was still strong.
Welles began his time in Paris by meeting the elder statesman of French 
politics, President Lebrun, on 7 March 1940. The conversation proved largely 
inconsequential because of the President’s frail mental and physical state. Welles 
recorded that the Frenchman had great trouble remembering ‘with any accuracy
47 Ribbentrop arrived in Rome on 10 March for talks with Mussolini, and the Pope. Wiskemann The 
Rome-Berlm Axis, (London, 1949).
48 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, pp.541-2.
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names or dates, or even facts’.49 As in Italy and Germany, Welles’ meetings in Paris 
followed quickly on from one another, and his next appointment was an entirely more 
significant meeting, with Prime Minister Daladier. Given that they had met 
previously, it was hardly surprising that Welles characterised their conversation as 
‘exceedingly frank and entirely informal’. He began as he had done elsewhere by 
stating that he brought no proposals, ‘much less any commitments’, and explained 
that Roosevelt had sent him ‘in order to ascertain whether there was still any hope that 
a basis for the negotiation of a peace of the right kind could be found’. Welles asked 
the Prime Minister for his views ‘as to the possibilities for the negotiation now of a 
just and lasting peace’, adding that it was his ‘very definite impression’ that the Duce 
‘believed that there was still time for the establishment of such a peace’.50 In Paris, 
therefore, as in Berlin, Welles was keen to mention Mussolini in the hope that raising 
the Italian’s name might trigger memories of his role at Munich. This might in turn 
lead to a reduction in tension between Paris and Rome and the preservation of the 
‘phony war’. Unsurprisingly, Italy provided the focus of Daladier’s response as he 
recounted in glowing terms Mussolini’s conduct during the Munich crisis. Daladier 
suggested that ‘the real difficulty ... was an adjustment between Italy and Great 
Britain’, not with France, as he saw no reason for not acquiescing to various Italian 
demands in the Mediterranean. Daladier continued in this tone as he stated that ‘there 
was every reason why the really German peoples of Central Europe should live under 
German rule, provided they so desired’. Daladier’s comments reveal that elements of 
appeasement were still alive in the corridors of power in Paris. Welles drew this 
conclusion, stating that the ‘Prime Minister made it very clear to me that he did not 
believe that political or territorial adjustment would create any insuperable difficulty 
in reaching peace’. Furthermore, and equally significantly, Daladier ‘made it clear 
that whatever he might say in public, he would not refuse to deal with the present 
German regime’. Although Daladier’s comments alluded to the possibility of 
achieving a settlement, Welles, who knew that any ‘just and lasting’ peace with the 
Nazis was impossible, was more concerned with ascertaining how far the French 
willingness to ‘deal’ reflected a lack of conviction. Had he still been set upon reaching
49 R eco rd  o f  conversa tion  betw een  W elles and  L ebrun (M u rp h y  (U n ited  S tates C h a rg é ) w as a lso
p resen t) , 7 M arch  1940, R epo rt by the  U n d er S ecre tary  o f  S tate (W elles )  on  H is S pecia l M ission  to
E u ro p e , 121.840 W elles, S u m n e r/U l'A . FRUS  1940 V ol. 1. (U S G P O , 1959), p .59.
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a settlement he would surely have made more of Daladier’s comments. Welles 
continued to investigate French belief further by raising the much-discussed issue of 
disarmament. He pondered: ‘How could any actual step towards disarmament be 
undertaken by France or by England unless they were confident that Germany and 
Italy were in reality disarming at the same time?’ Welles, in order to test French 
resolve, followed this by declaring that ‘the United States would not assume any 
responsibility ... which implied as a potential obligation the utilisation of American 
military strength in preserving the peace of Europe’. This line, for entirely practical 
reasons to do with the strength of non-entangling opinion in the United States, had 
been one that the Administration had taken with both the British and the French in 
preceding years. It reflected a view that the Allies must ‘stand up and be counted for’ 
in the fight against the Axis and not be seen to be relying on the eventual involvement 
of the United States.
This meeting with Daladier is significant for understanding Welles and his 
mission by the time he reached Paris. Though Welles was in familiar surroundings 
and discussing familiar subjects, this conversation reveals that he was not purely 
concerned with securing a peace from the mission. Had this been his priority at this 
stage he would surely have made more of Daladier’s comments that in private he 
would be prepared to ‘deal’ with the Nazis. Instead, Welles sought to broaden the 
discussion in order to assess the state of Franco-Italian relations and to assess the 
government’s commitment to defeating Nazism.
In discussing Italy and Mussolini at some length, Welles implicitly revealed 
that after Berlin he saw Italian neutrality as becoming a more important objective of 
his mission. If the mission could alleviate tensions in Franco-Italian relations from the 
French point of view, then it would remove one of Mussolini’s justifications for 
entering the war, and so prolong the ‘phony war’. To this end, Welles welcomed the 
comments of M. Leger, the Secretary General of the French Foreign Office, who 
under obvious prompting from Daladier stated, ‘in the most categorical manner’, that 
‘every possible consideration was given from now on to the sensibilities of both
50 R eco rd  o f  co n v ersa tio n  betw een  W elles and  D alad ie r (M u rp h y  w as a lso  p resen t), 7  M arch  1940,
R ep o rt b y  th e  U n d er S ecre tary  o f  S tate (W elles )  on H is Special M ission  to  E urope, 121.840 W elles
S u m n e r /1321/2. FRUS  1940 V ol. I. (U S G P O , 1959), pp .60-65 .
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Mussolini and CianoV1 This was encouraging for Welles as he sought to preserve 
Italian neutrality.
Familiar as they were to him, Daladier seems to have taken on board Welles’ 
words on hardening Allied resolve. The British Embassy in Paris recorded the next 
day that ‘M. Daladier considered it essential to demonstrate the strength of the Allies’ 
organisation, financial and economic, their determination to win, and their confidence 
in doing so without external aid'.52 This is important for Welles’ mission, as it had 
intended to assess Allied resolve. The importance for the Allies of not appearing to be 
waiting for the Americans was understood by those in Paris and London, and, 
paradoxically perhaps, this would encourage American support for their cause. The 
‘audience’ for this resolve was American opinion which was sceptical of the reality of 
the conflict that the spring might bring.
Of further relevance for comprehending Welles’ conduct on his mission was 
that in talking to Daladier he continued to use the same format for his conversations 
that he had with the Germans and Italians, even when confronted with an old 
acquaintance. In doing this he did not tell Daladier any more about his mission’s 
progress than he had told Hitler in Germany. Welles was fully aware that he could not 
be seen to be giving any advantage to a particular party, and this meant not appearing 
to favour the French, especially as he had just come from Berlin. Here the memory of 
Colonel House is evident. In essence, Welles’ conversation with Daladier simply 
represented a further opportunity to gather information on the French position.
Welles’ meetings the next day took in a range of French opinion, yet 
ultimately proved of little consequence. Of more importance was a brief press 
conference he held on 8 March, at which he maintained his public ‘silence’ in stating 
that he would repeat nothing he had heard thus far on his mission. The day began with 
a meeting with the President of the Senate, Senator Jeanneney, who recounted with 
‘Clemenceau’ style vigour how France had been forced into war with Germany three 
times during his life. M. Herriot, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, sought to 
portray himself to Welles as someone who had tried to mediate across the Rhine for 
years but had been deceived by German trickery. He was thus convinced that ‘the 
German people were themselves the cause of the present situation, and not their
51 R eco rd  o f  conversa tion  betw een  W elles and  D alad ie r (M u rp h y  w as a lso  p resen t), 7 M arch  1940,
R ep o rt by  th e  U n d e r S ecre tary  o f  S tate  (W elles )  on H is S pecial M ission  to  E urope, 121.840 W elles,
S u m n er/1 3214. FRUS  1940 V ol. 1. (U S G P O , 1959), p .67 .
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leaders alone’. Welles found Herriot ‘utterly pessimistic, completely without hope, 
and without an iota ot any constructive suggestion or proposal with regard to the 
possibility of any lasting peace’. In contrast to this he found the Deputy Prime 
Minister, M. Chautemps, ready to discuss peace. Proposing an agreement on territorial 
questions in the East, and with a practicable plan for disarmament and the 
maintenance of French security, Chautemps was prepared to ‘strongly recommend ... 
entrance upon negotiations ... rather than a continuation of the war’. A last meeting in 
the day with the Minister of Justice, M. Bonnet, proved merely to be an opportunity 
for the Frenchman to justify his role in the negotiations with Germany over the 
previous two years.52 3
Welles’ day was not over though as he took the opportunity to reiterate the 
public objectives of his mission. The purpose of such a reiteration at this stage of his 
trip was to state for the masse ranks of the press, many of whom had not followed him 
to Berlin, that he would not be revealing what he had learned in Rome or Berlin in his 
conversations in Paris. At the American Embassy Welles reaffirmed that his mission 
was ‘solely to be able to give an account to the President of the present situation in 
Europe. Consequently he could not either directly or indirectly make any allusions to 
the information he had been given or to the views which had been expressed to 
him’.54 During Welles’ time in Germany the press had become insatiably greedy for 
information and Welles sought to mitigate the prospect of a sensational story 
emerging from the rumours by making this statement. Such a story did emerge on the 
eve of Welles’ departure from Europe, and would require a further pronouncement of 
the mission’s stated goals. In Paris, Welles handled the press with no little aplomb and 
typically dry humour: as Murphy, the Charge to Paris, recorded ‘The Under 
Secretary’s clear-cut statement to the journalists that he would say absolutely nothing 
about what he has seen and heard and what he thought about what he had seen and 
heard left them tongue tied before his smiling invitation to ask him any questions that 
they thought he might answer.’55 Although Murphy reported that Welles’ approach
52 Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office, 8 March 1940, C3654/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
53 Record of conversations by Sumner Welles with, in turn, Senator Jeanneney, M Herriot, M 
Chautemps, M Bonnet (Murphy was also present), 8 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe. 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/*. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), pp.68-69.
54 Quoted in a telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office, 8 March 1940, C3606/89/18 FO 371 
24406 PRO.
55 Telegram No. 309 from Murphy to Hull, 8 March 1940, 121.840 Welles. Sumner/101. General 
Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Central Decimal File Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
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had “clicked’ with the French press, after he had returned to Washington a photograph 
taken in Paris was to cause Welles and the Administration momentary discomfort. At 
the time, Welles’ party were content with the press coverage they were receiving. 
Moffat wrote in his account of the mission after seeing numerous ‘personal titbits’ 
about the party that ‘on bigger things, the press has been surprisingly good’.56 At this 
stage at least, Welles’ silence was serving the wider purposes of not letting the 
mission appear to be entangling the United States in European intrigue.
Paris: Revnaud Impresses Welles
Welles’ most significant meeting in Paris took place the next day (9 March) with 
Treasury Secretary Paul Reynaud at the Louvre. This meeting was important because 
the Under Secretary found Reynaud to be a kindred spirit on the issue of economic 
diplomacy. He wrote in his report of Reynaud that he had a ‘greater grasp of foreign 
relations, and ... a keener mind, than any other member of the present French 
Government’.57 In this meeting Hull’s influence, although he was many miles away at 
the time, could be felt on the course of the mission. When the meeting turned to the 
economic difficulties that were bedevilling American relations with the Allies, Welles 
urged Reynaud to continue French purchases of American tobacco and other 
agricultural products. Despite the cordial mood Reynaud could not agree 
wholeheartedly to Welles’ request, using much the same argument that the British had 
used that the French were conserving dollar resources for future purchases.
Hull’s influence could also be seen in Welles’ presentation to Reynaud of a 
memorandum on principles of United States foreign economic policy. The document, 
which was in effect an economic addendum to Hull’s 9 February announcement, 
stressed access to raw materials and free markets: ‘Healthy international commercial 
relations are the indispensable foundation of well being and of lasting peace between 
nations.’58 These were familiar points to Welles, who, as seen in his conference plan 
for November 1937, was very much part of the Administration’s efforts to forward a 
principled agenda for the conduct of international relations. Reynaud welcomed the
56 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.24, SWP Box 211.
57 Record of conversation between Welles and Reynaud (Murphy was also present), 8 March 1940, 
Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132!4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.70.
58 Text of memorandum handed by Welles to Reynaud. In a Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign 
Office, 10 March 1940, C3689/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO. [see also Telegram No. 105 from Welles to 
Hull, 9 March 1940, 121.840 Welles Sumner/105: Telegram FRUS 1940 Vol. 1., (USGPO, 1959) p.16]
167
Chapter Four
State Department memorandum in rather contradictory terms -  ‘emphatic 
acquiescence’ -  but nevertheless announced later in the day that the terms were part 
of the principles that France was fighting for. Such a statement was intended to reach 
an American audience and provides more evidence of how the Administration sought 
to encourage the Allies to acknowledge that they were fighting for values akin to 
American ones.
Regarding Welles’ immediate mission, as many of his compatriots had already 
commented to Welles, Reynaud suggested that it was the future of French security 
that was at stake and not necessarily the immediate issue. He believed that the 
‘political and territorial issues now at stake could be solved without any considerable 
difficulty through negotiations between the Allies and Germany’, but that ‘The real 
problem, was the problem of how France could obtain security and insure herself 
against a repetition of German aggression’.59 Here was the dilemma that Welles heard 
throughout Paris and which was the real issue for the French. Expression of such a 
predicament would be replicated when Welles arrived in London.
Before leaving Paris for London, Welles also met the exiled Polish leadership 
then in Paris. The significance of this meeting is that it illustrates further that the 
mission no longer had debate over acceptable peace terms as a central objective. Had 
this been the case, the meeting with the Poles would have been important. Instead, the 
meeting with the leadership of the country that had precipitated the Allied declaration 
of war was entirely more symbolic than substantial. The Prime Minister, General 
Sikorski, impressed Welles as a man o f ‘character, of integrity, and of patriotism’, but 
the conversation focused on the Pole’s accounts of German atrocities. Moreover, 
Welles found Zaleski, the Foreign Minister, ‘profoundly pessimistic’.60 To orchestrate 
any peace settlement of the European war Poland and the Soviet Union would have 
had to be involved, as more than half of Poland was in Soviet hands. Stanley Hilton 
considers Moscow a ‘significant omission’ from Welles’ itinerary.61 As it was, the 
meeting with the Polish leadership was of little consequence for the mission, except in 
illustrating that it had evolved well beyond its embryonic objective.
59 Record of conversation between Welles and Reynaud (Murphy was also present), 8 March 1940, 
Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.70.
60 Record of conversation between Welles and General Sikorski (Prime Minister in exile of Poland) and 
M. Zaleski (Foreign Minister in exile of Poland), 9 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), p.72.
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Conclusions to Welles’ Time in Paris
In essence, Welles’ stop in Paris was far from momentous. This was of little surprise 
to the Administration in Washington, as they knew more about the French 
government than the others Welles would visit; elsewhere the Under Secretary had 
more to learn. Nevertheless, Welles’ time in Paris is important in revealing more 
about the conduct of his mission and its breadth of objectives. He evidently made a 
good impression in Paris, as the British Embassy reported him to be ‘a man of the 
highest character, extremely loyal and of great honesty of purpose’. However they 
added quite aptly that ‘His very honesty might lead to some naïveté.’61 2 Indeed, 
Welles’ adherence to preserving his almost ‘saintly’ neutrality meant that he did not 
disclose any of the broader objectives for his mission in Paris. With the memory of 
Colonel House clearly in mind, it is certainly notable that when among friends in Paris 
Welles did not disclose the details of his conversations in Berlin and Rome. In 
focusing on the role of Italy and Mussolini, he hoped to dampen tensions between 
Paris and Rome and so preserve Italian neutrality. Furthermore, in talking of Allied 
war aims Welles had endeavoured to impart the familiar Administration line that the 
Allies needed to take on more responsibility in order to elicit greater support from the 
United States. What Welles learnt from a cross-section of French opinion was that the 
heart of the matter was the recurrent problem of security against German aggression. 
While not revolutionary news, this was fulfilling the information-gathering objective 
of his mission, with particular reference to what the French believed they were 
fighting for.
French opinion of Welles after his time in Paris was largely positive. Gone 
were the initial French concerns that Welles’ trip would be a German propaganda 
coup: instead, and with the preface that Welles had ‘refrained from giving any 
information’ to the French authorities, they concluded that ‘his sympathies were 
definitely on the side of the Allies, and that what he had seen of Germany had not 
pleased him’. In relaying this information to London through the British Embassy, the 
French Foreign Ministry felt that Welles had ‘not been taken in by Herr Hitler and
61 Hilton, The Journal o f American History, 1971-72 p. 103.
62 Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office, 8 March 1940, C3654/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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that his impression of Herr von Ribbentrop was definitely disagreeable’.63 Although 
largely accurate, ‘disagreeable’ does not do justice to the vehemence of Welles’ 
dislike of the German Foreign Minister.
As Welles left Paris on 10 March for London, his mission continued to fulfil 
the goal of gathering first-hand information for Roosevelt and had the capacity, 
through its continuation at the very least, to further two others: the prolonging of the 
‘phony war’ and the perpetuation of Italian neutrality. The lack of attention in Paris to 
a potential peace settlement, even after a number of people had mentioned it as a 
possibility, reveals further that Welles no longer saw this as a primary objective of the 
mission. Welles was by then using the discussion of ‘peace terms’ to facilitate 
dialogue in pursuit of the mission’s other objectives.
Conclusions to Continental Europe: ‘Hope, Despair. Friends’
The two weeks from 26 February to 10 March that Welles spent on the continent of 
Europe allowed him to explore the breadth of objectives that his mission had 
developed since its initial conception in January and subsequent refinement in 
Washington in early February. Through contact with Europe’s statesmen the mission 
evolved further, with different emphases becoming evident in Welles’ conversations. 
Welles himself was the major influence on the development of the mission as he 
moved through Europe. Having been entrusted with the mission by Roosevelt, he had 
licence to explore what he thought possible within the spectrum of objectives.
in Rome, Welles found in Ciano a genial and friendly disposition; someone 
whom he could talk to, but he knew the extent of the Foreign Minister’s influence. 
Although written with hindsight, Welles described Ciano’s ‘efforts’ to maintain 
Italian discretion, as ‘futile’. Welles attributed this to Ciano’s obsequiousness towards 
Mussolini: ‘Count Ciano was a man who lacked neither personal dignity nor physical 
courage, yet I have seen him quail at an interview with Mussolini when the Dictator 
showed irritation.’ Welles sums Ciano up as an ‘amoral product of a wholly decadent 
period in Italian history’.64 Nevertheless, Welles considered Ciano to be the most 
accommodating member of the Axis governments that he met. Though perhaps not 
surprising given his impressions of many of the Nazis, Welles’ positive reportage of
63 Telegram from Campbell to the Foreign Office on conversation at the French Foreign Ministry, 8 
March 1940, C3654/89/I8 FO 371 24406 PRO.
64 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, pp.vii-xii.
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Ciano also reflects the lengths he was prepared to go to produce a positive outcome 
from the mission. The subject matter Welles considered in Rome -  most notably his 
direct question to Mussolini as to whether peace was possible and Mussolini’s 
positive response -  reflected his ability to operate within the scope of the mission’s 
objectives. Even though Mussolini’s terms (for Italian dominance in the 
Mediterranean and German dominance in continental Europe) were far from 
palatable, Welles saw some value in discussing Mussolini’s desires in that it 
maintained a dialogue which he hoped would prevent the early escalation of conflict. 
In the light of the long odds -  the ‘one in a thousand chance’ that Roosevelt had 
mentioned -  that Mussolini had not dismissed Welles and in fact had provided 
grounds for further discussion did provide some glimmer of hope. Equally, if not 
more importantly, Mussolini’s words provided something that Welles could use 
elsewhere -  in Berlin, to test the bonds of the Axis, and in Paris, and then London, to 
test Allied resolve. Lastly, in Rome Welles hoped he could encourage Mussolini to 
believe that he might again be pivotal to peace in Europe and act as the ‘honest 
broker’. Such a course of action might help preserve Italian neutrality. Welles later 
told Kennedy that Mussolini was ‘essential to the cause of peace’, although he 
recognised fully, as he would in his report, that ‘[Mussolini] has got to get what he 
wants’.65 Though Welles’ aims in Rome seem unrealistic in view of events during the 
rest of 1940, mindful of the intention of the Administration to ‘leave no stone 
unturned’ Welles was attempting to further a range of objectives which he 
acknowledged stood little chance of halting the slide to war.
In Berlin, however, Welles’ scope for furthering his mission was inhibited by 
Hitler’s directive. This effectively signalled an end to the mission’s chances of 
exploring the possibility of peace. Personally, Welles found the Nazis distasteful and 
was left in despair by their aims. Although he thought Goring spoke ‘rationally’, this 
was only in comparison to Hitler, who, he considered a ‘really ... cruel man’, and 
Welles was almost apologetic in suggesting he had ‘reacted badly’ to Ribbentrop.66 
Welles’ disgust with the Nazis meant he resolved to try to leave in the minds of 
certain Germans the idea that his mission might produce a significant outcome. This 
was only ever a long shot. What is crucial is that Welles continued to talk about the 
conditions for a peace in Paris, London and then back in Rome, because this provided
65 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.553.
66 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.554.
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a vehicle to explore the other objectives of the mission. Had he considered peace a 
real prospect after his time in Berlin then the comments he heard -  from Daladier 
particularly -  in Paris would surely have interested him more. Welles’ priorities in 
Paris were to assess the French government’s commitment to their war aims, the state 
of French relations with Rome, and to a lesser degree their post-war plans. Continuing 
to pursue the line of conversation he had had in Rome and Berlin allowed for this, and 
countered any charges of ‘favouritism’ i.e. that he had changed his stance when 
among the Allies. He further sought, as the Administration had done during the 
months preceding the war, to reinforce French resolve. However this could not be 
openly acknowledged by Welles for fear of appearing entangled in European affairs. 
It is very difficult to see Welles’ success in achieving these objectives in Rome, Berlin 
and Paris as anything other than largely peripheral. Importantly, Welles at the time 
was not in a position to assess his success, but, as has been seen, ‘success’ was not a 
prerequisite for Administration policy to be considered.
Evident in the first three legs of Welles’ mission was the Under Secretary’s 
understanding that he needed to keep interest in the mission going while avoiding 
controversy. He appreciated Roosevelt’s desire ‘to do something’ and so operate 
within the dual trends of American public opinion in early 1940. Welles was able to 
discuss wider ideas of security that accorded with the State Department’s principles 
for international relations. Also obvious during the first three stops of his mission is 
his ability to push at the point of least resistance and so attempt to achieve something 
along the broad front of the mission’s objectives. The wish to perpetuate the ‘phony 
war’ and Italian neutrality was evident as was Welles’ desire to gather first-hand 
information, especially in Rome and Berlin. The continuing interplay and 
development of the mission’s objectives would be very important in London as, too, 
would Welles’ own understanding of the state of Anglo-American relations. In 
London the Chamberlain government waited with some trepidation for the Welles 
mission to arrive.
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CHAPTER FIVE
‘The Grass Snake’ Arrives: Welles in London 10 March -1 3  March 1940
When Welles arrived in London on 10 March, the objectives for the mission that he 
had embarked on had already evolved. In London this would continue as he 
maintained his quest for information. Having heard from Daladier that he might 
consider a settlement with the Nazi regime, Welles pressed those in London on what it 
would take for them to contemplate peace with those in Berlin. He did so not for the 
purpose of genuinely exploring peace with Hitler’s government, but in order to inform 
Roosevelt about the British government’s war aims and their commitment to them. 
This fulfilled Welles’ objectives as he saw them by this stage of his mission. The 
British government’s intention on the eve of Welles’ arrival was to impress upon the 
Under Secretary their steadfast commitment to the war in order to dispel any notion 
that Welles’ may have had that they would be prepared to accept peace with Hitler’s 
regime.
As Welles landed in London, relations between the Roosevelt Administration 
and the Chamberlain government were far from harmonious because of the minor 
crisis of late January and tension caused by the disclosure of Welles’ intended mission 
at the beginning of February. While these tensions were somewhat mitigated by the 
British influence on the mission’s objectives -  notably the removal of the word 
‘peace’ -  and by Welles’ silence on his mission thus far, Chamberlain’s government 
still harboured concerns as to what Welles would have to say on the issue of a 
settlement. Through the course of the conversations Welles undertook, these worries 
were somewhat alleviated but never completely dispelled, and were even augmented 
by concerns over Welles’ conception of disarmament and security. The net effect of 
Welles’ time in London was largely neutral in terms of a positive or negative 
influence on Anglo-American relations. Nevertheless, one can see a hint of accord 
between the United States and Great Britain in one area despite the difficulties that 
arose. Jay Pierrepont Moffat arrived in London, having limited his efforts on the 
mission up to that point to meeting a number of diplomatic colleagues across Europe. 
In London his presence was important, because in a semi-official capacity he met a 
number of representatives of the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare. The latter were a significant audience for Moffat as he presented the State
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Department's concerns over the British economic practice that had prompted the 
minor crisis of early 1940.
With Welles in London, this chapter continues to consider the spectrum of the 
mission’s objectives against the backdrop of the themes this thesis has explored. 
Naturally, Welles continues to play a prominent part in this analysis, and, given the 
circumstances, so does consideration of Anglo-American relations. It is important also 
to remember that the concerns of Hull and the limits to American foreign policy 
continued to be relevant to Welles in his discussions. A number of Hull’s anxieties in 
particular would be replicated by the British. Further, Welles was conscious of not 
appearing to exhibit any favouritism to the British for fear of being cast in a ‘Colonel 
House’ mould, and so continued to remain silent about the progress of his mission to 
the press.
This chapter will also continue its analysis of the interaction of Welles’ 
objectives. In London his emphasis was on the most straightforward one: the 
gathering of information, with a particular focus on information that revealed British 
war aims. This focus fitted in with the recognition that the exploration of peace for the 
purpose of resolving the conflict was nonsensical after Welles’ experience in Berlin. 
Likewise, there was little value in pushing the case for Italian neutrality in London, 
although this would definitely be reinvigorated when Welles returned to Rome. 
Furthermore, Welles’ objective of prolonging the ‘phony war’ in London served only 
to increase tension in Anglo-American relations. British second-guessing of Welles’ 
motives did little to dispel the notion that his mission might produce something. In an 
indirect fashion this helped Welles to sustain the doubt he wanted to engender in the 
minds of those whom he had met in Berlin as to his ultimate course of action. In this 
environment, the gathering of information was Welles’ most achievable goal.
To support the analysis, this chapter will chart Welles’ numerous 
conversations in London and consider the emphasis of those discussions. This will be 
of particular relevance in his two meetings with Chamberlain (11 and 13 March). The 
records of Welles’ meetings in London are drawn from two main official sources and 
a third, personal account. The British Foreign Office records illustrate succinctly the 
initial worries that Welles’ visit prompted in Whitehall. They also acknowledge that, 
although Welles contemplated the discussion of peace with the Nazi regime, he found 
the prospect entirely distasteful. The Welles report published in The Foreign 
Relations o f the United States mirrored that in his own memoirs, Time for Decision. It
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differs little from the British account in substance, though it uses less specific and 
political language, and gives only rare glimpses of Welles’ personal views. The main 
difference between the two accounts lies in who introduced the points of discussion. 
The British account emphasises that Welles was the instigator of key issues, 
especially in his first meeting with Chamberlain and Halifax, whereas Welles’ 
account is less clear. Halifax after meeting Welles on 11 March went as far as to 
suggest that Welles had introduced the ‘general outline of [a] plan...’ based on the 
principles of international conduct.1 In view of Welles’ practice elsewhere, it is 
reasonable to assume that, after his customary introduction and with his diplomatic 
experience in play, he did introduce issues and then manage the debate where he 
thought it possible and practical. The Welles report though, reflects the fact that he 
did not want to be accused of bringing ‘proposals’ to the discussions for fear of 
exceeding the published stipulations of his mission and risking criticism for the 
Administration. The third account of Welles’ conversations in London comes from 
Joseph Kennedy, and was written, based on original notes, almost twenty years after 
the mission took place. Despite the passage of time, in his account the Ambassador’s 
slant on the course of the ‘phony war’ is clear, i.e. that Great Britain was doomed and 
peace with Germany was better than the prospect of communism in Western Europe. 
With views so divergent from those of the Administration in Washington, it is no 
surprise that in contrast to the other two accounts it is only Kennedy’s that maintains 
discussion o f  an imminent peace during Welles’ time in London. The distance 
between Kennedy’s views and Roosevelt’s outlook only reinforces his requirement 
for first-hand information in London. Nevertheless, it is an account worthy of 
attention, given the moments of personal insight it provides. In brief, the Foreign 
Office records reveal British uncertainty; Welles’ account, political awareness; and 
Kennedy’s, his personal interpretation.
London: Kennedy’s Preparation for Welles’ Time in London 
Having travelled to Paris with Welles, Kennedy then continued on to London. While 
Welles was preparing to depart for London the Ambassador met with Chamberlain 
and Halifax.
' Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 1 ] March 1940, No.256 C3815/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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The initial concerns the British had about the mission are clear, as is an 
appreciation that the mission had not become a rallying point for any peace move. The 
Prime Minister explained to the Ambassador that he had initially been ‘very much 
concerned’ by the prospect of the mission, but that after the transatlantic discourse of 
early February ‘it had been made so clear by Washington’ that the trip was not to 
make a peace proposal that purpose that he was now at ease with the situation. 
Furthermore, Chamberlain thought that ‘Welles had handled the trip in such a 
masterful fashion as to allay any suspicion or unrest that might be in the mind of 
anyone’.2 Chamberlain’s words acknowledged that the mission had not turned into a 
coup for Hitler which might have seen Welles arrive in London with a ‘peace plan’ 
from the Führer. In Kennedy’s own account of this conversation his conclusion 
amplifies this line and supports the view that Welles’ aim was to assess Allied 
resolve. Kennedy recorded that Chamberlain was ‘happy ... believing that [the 
mission] would help to make more articulate for America and the rest of the world the 
war aims of the belligerents’.3 Such an assessment mirrored the one the Chamberlain 
government had despatched to the Dominions in early February, and shows a 
sophisticated degree of understanding of the Administration’s position. Nevertheless, 
as far as preparing the ground for Welles’ arrival was concerned, this conversation 
revealed that British concerns, though effectively reduced, still existed.
Kennedy’s assessment of the mission on the eve of Welles’ conversations 
further reveals his opinion of the original motive behind the mission, and of the nature 
of the man who had sent Welles to Europe and his Administration in Washington. 
According to Kennedy, Welles had told him that ‘there’s nothing ... that Roosevelt 
would like to do more than make a dramatic move for peace. If he sees anything in 
my report to encourage him in such a move, he will jump for it, Hull 
notwithstanding’.4 Even with Kennedy’s own bias, the sentiment of this fiirther 
confirms that the mission’s original objective, as conceived by Roosevelt and Welles 
in early January, was to explore the possibilities for peace. However, these comments 
also illustrate that Hull, who had opposed the mission from the outset, would act as a 
constraint on any action. Welles’ awareness of his own responsibility in this process is
Ä m o S S S Ä ’ Mareh l94° ' 121840 W r/I08 : T^ ram-
3 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, pp.548-549.
4 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, pp.553-558.
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obvious. He had to exploit his information-gathering role in order to present 
Roosevelt with as complete a picture as possible.
London: A Press Conference, Cause for Concern and the First Meetings 
11 March was a typically busy day for Welles on his mission, with three important 
meetings. The first was with Lord Halifax, the second with the King and Queen and 
the third with Chamberlain. However, Welles’ day had already been eventful by the 
time of his first meeting that afternoon. His day had begun with a press conference at 
the United States Embassy, where his awareness of his mission’s presentation was 
again evident. He prefaced the questioning from the hundred or so eager pressmen 
with his familiar statement of purpose: ‘he was in Europe solely to report to President 
Roosevelt on the present situation.’ Welles then stated: ‘I would like to emphasise that 
1 have no proposals to make and no commitments to offer in the name of my 
government. I am here solely on a fact-finding mission.’ Clearly this was far from the 
truth, but Welles sought to maintain this as the public explanation of the mission. His 
response to the questions raised revealed that he was steadfast in this. The vast 
majority of enquiries found Welles responding with ‘No comment’, which prompted 
The New York Times to remark that he was living ‘up to his reputation for reticence’.5 
Welles continued to be conscious, as exhibited in this press conference, of the public 
perception of the mission. In London, as he had done in Paris, despite the familiar 
surroundings, Welles wanted to make sure he could not be accused of being too 
‘friendly’ with the Allies, for two reasons. Firstly, such kinship would bankrupt the 
tenuous aim he had of leaving in the minds of the Germans the notion that the United 
States might act, and secondly, it would appear as though Welles was in league with 
the Allies. Neither scenario would help him further his mission’s broad goals in view 
of what he saw as the pressing time factor.
After finishing the press conference, Welles had a lunch meeting with 
Kennedy at which the latter’s standing in London became clear. Kennedy told Welles 
that he had not been invited to accompany him to Buckingham Palace that afternoon. 
Having just that morning dealt with the press, Welles was only too aware of what they
5 This notwithstanding Welles did answer one question in more depth, but that only served to illustrate 
his dry sense of humour. When asked to comment on whether his face looked ‘gloomier than usual’ 
when he left his meeting with Hitler, Welles rejoined ‘No Sir. Like you, one of my greatest defects is 
that 1 cannot see my own face.’ Report on press conference by Mr Sumner Welles at the United States 
embassy in London, New York Times, 11 March 1940.
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would make of this. ‘Some of them will interpret it to mean that you and I have had a 
row. Others will say that the British want to put something over on me and have left 
you out because they know you are on to them. And still others will say that the 
British are sore because Kennedy said the United States must keep out of the war and 
so they are going to snub him. Any one of these interpretations will raise hell in the 
United States and can have serious repercussions, more so to the English than to us. I 
can’t see them being so stupid and I will telephone Cadogan right away.’6 Welles 
managed to sort the situation out, as Cadogan explained that it was simply an 
administrative error, but the Under Secretary’s concerns illustrate his anxiety over the 
way the mission was viewed, particularly in the United States. Although explained 
away by the British as an administrative error, it seems likely that they wanted to 
prevent Welles’ meeting with the King being tarnished by Kennedy’s defeatist views. 
Kennedy’s opinions on the outcome of the war meant that those in London, as well as 
those in Washington, no longer used the American Embassy as a key channel of 
communication. Nevertheless, Kennedy had established a close relationship with the 
Royal couple during his time in London and this was evident in the meeting Welles 
had at Buckingham Palace that afternoon.
Though not as important as the conversations Welles would have with 
members of the government, his discussion with the King reveals two significant 
features. Firstly, on both sides there were happy reminiscence of the royal visit of the 
previous summer, with Welles stating he had ‘never known of a more completely 
successful visit’ as it had engendered a ‘very genuinely friendly feeling on the part of 
many millions of my fellow-citizens’.7 *The second and more important aspect of this 
conversation was a memorandum prepared by the Foreign Office for the King on the
Q
line to take with ‘Mr Sumner Welles on the subject of dealing with Germany’. This 
was likened ‘to a Ministry of Information propaganda briefing’, but reflected a clear 
cut statement of Britain’s position.9 This was the type of statement Welles was keen to 
hear, but it was unfortunate that the King’s difficulties in communicating meant that 
Welles characterised the meeting as ‘rather strained, with occasional lengthy pauses’.
6 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, pp.558-559.
7 Record of conversation between Sumner Welles and King George VI, 11 March 1940, FDR PSF 
Container 6. Also in the FDR PSF RSC Reel 5. Kennedy accompanied Welles on all of his meetings in 
London.
* Letter from R.C. Skrine Stevenson (Foreign Office) to the Right Honourable Sir Alexander Hardinge 
(King’s Private Secretary), 11 March 1940, HFS.
9 Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox -  A Biography o f Lord Halifax (London, 1991), p. 191.
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Nevertheless, the document stated that there were two clear difficulties in ‘dealing 
with Hitler’: firstly, ‘his complete unreliability’, and secondly, ‘his limitless 
ambitions’. These points prefaced three ‘concrete obstacles to peace’. In turn, the 
Foreign Office document pointed to Germany's refusal to consider ‘restoring 
independence to [the] Poles and Czechs and [a] deliberate policy of extermination in 
Poland’, the absence in Germany of a readiness to ‘agree to either disarmament or 
liberal trade system’, and the ‘abandonment of [the] doctrine of force’. At this point 
the memorandum put forward the British side of the case, asserting that the country 
had ‘no wish for, or expectation of, any gains from the war’, unlike the Germans who 
hoped to ‘dominate Europe, if not the world’. Finally, the Foreign Office message 
sought to expound the view that the British public was ‘united in its firm resolution’ 
to fulfil the previously stated aims of defeating Nazi Germany and restoring Polish 
sovereignty. This last point was one that Welles would hear throughout his time in 
London -  British commitment to their war aims -  and it would help him fulfil his goal 
of fact-finding. It is all the more unfortunate, then, that such a concise statement failed 
to be fully conveyed to Welles because of the King’s difficulties in communicating. In 
Welles’ other conversations in London the difficulties that arose in the exchange of 
views were far more to do with substance than with the manner in which things were 
said.
T nndon: The First Meeting With Halifax
The importance of Welles’ meeting with Halifax, besides its role as a prelude to the 
Under Secretary’s meeting with Chamberlain, lies in a number of areas. As a 
procedural point, Welles began his meeting with the same introduction he had used 
elsewhere: that he and his government wanted nothing to do with a ‘patched-up 
peace’.10 Also as he had done elsewhere, he then discussed Mussolini’s role and his 
claims in the Mediterranean. This drew a particularly robust response from Halifax, in 
keeping with the line the British government wanted to take with Welles.
Significantly for the development of the mission’s objectives, this first 
meeting with Halifax saw Welles press the issue of British war aims. He questioned 
how far Britain was fighting against fascism and Hitler’s regime and how much they
10 Record of conversation between Welles and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign Office to Lord 
Lothian, 11 March 1940, C38I4/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO. This document is also referenced C3814/5
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were fighting for a settlement to territorial issues in Eastern Europe. While any 
distinction here may seem nonsensical, it is worth considering how important it was 
for Welles to be able to declare to the American people that the British were not 
fighting a war for territorial acquisition. Welles’ report of this conversation 
emphasises that Halifax spoke ‘in great detail’ of the efforts he and Chamberlain had 
made to placate Hitler." Each time, the pair were met by ‘new and more far-reaching 
demands’, and ‘what was far more intolerable’ was Hitler’s ‘utter disregard [for] the 
solemn agreements into which he had entered’. This led the Foreign Secretary to state 
that ‘peace could not be made except on the basis of confidence, and what confidence 
could be placed in the pledged word of a Government that was pursuing a policy of 
open and brutal aggression, and that had repeatedly and openly violated its solemn 
contractual obligations’. While his report refrained from adding any comment at this 
juncture, Welles’ remarks the previous day to Kennedy reveal that he understood the 
British predicament. He pre-empted the Foreign Secretary’s line by telling Kennedy 
that there was ‘no confidence anywhere’, leaving the British to believe that ‘Hitler 
lied yesterday and that he will lie tomorrow’. Welles added: ‘I confess, I agree with 
them.’12 Though a note of caution should be sounded, given that this came from 
Kennedy’s personal account, Welles would not have disclosed such a view in 
anything other than a private conversation for fear of suggesting that greater 
American assistance was waiting around the comer. A concern which precisely 
married up to one of those Hull had previously expressed.
In his conversation with Halifax, and in subsequent conversations, Welles also 
sought to ascertain what Britain was fighting for by talking about the principles of 
security and disarmament leading to a settlement that divorced the territorial issues 
from the political ones. This was familiar fare to Welles, given the heritage of his 
Armistice Day plan, but it was also familiar to the Chamberlain government. The lack 
of faith that the British had in such principles after their experience in the inter-war 
period gave them considerable cause for concern in assessing Welles. Vansittart wrote 
after reading Halifax’s record of the meeting that what disquieted him most was 
Welles’ naïveté in regard to disarmament’, about which he thought the Under 1
No.253 and 3241/G27 SECRET FO 115 Embassy and Consular Archives, United States of America 
Correspondence PRO. Kennedy accompanied Welles on all of his meetings in London.
11 Record of conversation between Welles and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132!/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), p.73.
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Secretary talked in a ‘glib and facile way’.12 3 Nevertheless, Welles did press the issue 
by asking ‘whether disarmament was not the real key to the problem, because it 
seemed to [him] that a real disarmament must tend towards the reestablishment of 
confidence...’.14 In doing this Welles sought to use the broad issue of disarmament as 
a tool for the purposes of drawing out longer-term British war aims. Views on how far 
disarmament was integral to providing security against future aggression would 
provide Welles with an assessment of what the British were fighting for in early 1940.
London: Welles’ First Meeting with Chamberlain
Welles’ emphasis on disarmament as a means of providing security was again to the 
fore when he met for the first time with Chamberlain later on 11 March 1940. Before 
then Welles raised the matter of how far Hitler was the cause of Britain’s belligerence 
and in so doing raised more concerns for the British. Nevertheless, the meeting began 
with Welles handing Chamberlain a personal note from Roosevelt.15 As Chamberlain 
read the note the Under Secretary restated the purpose of the mission in his customary
preamble.
The conversation opened with Welles seeking further information on 
Chamberlain’s aims in the war. He stated to Chamberlain that he had come across the 
strong conviction in Germany that it was ‘fighting a war of self-preservation’, as they 
were convinced that Britain was trying to ‘destroy the Reich’.16 This may have been 
augmented by Kennedy’s assessment of the British position, recorded at the time by 
Moffat. The Ambassador had learned that Chamberlain ‘is determined not only that it 
will not make peace with the present “gang” in Germany, but will not make peace on 
terms that would enable any German Government or the German people to say they 
had won the war’.17 Welles wanted to know whether Britain felt she was fighting 
Germany as a whole or the Nazi regime in isolation. The Prime Minister rejoined that 
the United States ‘might take as a premise the positive assurance that England had no
12 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.558.
13 Notes by Vansittart attached to Record of conversation between Welles and Halifax in despatch from 
the Foreign Office to Lothian, 11 March 1940, C3814/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
14 Record of conversation between Welles and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Spécial Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), p.73.
15 Letter from Roosevelt to Chamberlain, 14 February 1940, FDR PSF RSC Reel 26.
16 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/ .^ 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.75.
17 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.25, SWP Box 211.
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intention of destroying the German people, nor of impairing the integrity of the 
German Reich'. Such an assurance would help Roosevelt draw distinctions in the eyes 
of the American people between the British and the destructive policies of the Nazi 
regime. In discussing Hitler’s ‘gang’, Chamberlain stated ‘flatly that so long as the 
present Government of Germany continued there could be no hope of any real 
peace’18. This was because of the ‘impossibility of trusting Hitler’.19 It was clearly the 
Nazi regime, the one that Welles had found so appalling, that was the crux of the 
matter. Kennedy lamented later that day that because the ‘the only peace Chamberlain 
thinks will work is his peace and that calls for the end of the Hitler regime’ that this 
‘offer’ would not allow Welles much ‘to work on’.20 While clearly revealing 
Kennedy’s belief that the mission was intended to find a settlement, his comments 
reinforce the view that for the British it was Hitler’s regime that was the reason for the 
war.
In contrast to Kennedy’s conclusion, Chamberlain deduced that Welles’ line of 
argument on Hitler was a precursor to the Under Secretary’s suggesting the Führer 
could be moved to a ‘figurehead’ position. While such rumours had been prevalent 
during the autumn in Washington, Welles had seen nothing in Berlin to suggest this 
was either likely, or more importantly, palatable to American sentiment. Chamberlain 
nevertheless felt Welles had ‘made up his mind’ that for a settlement to be achieved 
Hitler would ‘nominally retire but remain a leading personality in Germany’.21 Such a 
solution, Chamberlain had explained to Welles, would allow Hitler to claim that ‘he 
had come out of the war without loss of prestige’ and would be ‘unacceptable to the 
Allies’. Chamberlain stated that the ‘Allies had gone into war to convince Germany 
and the world that force did not pay’, and any solution that allowed ‘Herr Hitler to 
retire from the nominal leadership of Germany’, would enable ‘Hitler to claim that it 
did’. Welles’ line in discussing Hitler’s position had clearly irked Chamberlain and 
raised a concern over his mission.
18 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132Vi. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.76-77.
19 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 11 March 1940, No.256 C3815/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
20 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Kennedy 
Memoirs PJL, p.565.
21 PM’s account of his impressions of Welles War Cabinet Conclusions 67 (40) extract 7 of meeting 
held 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO. This document is also referenced Volume VI 1 
March-30 April CAB 65 PRO.
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Chamberlain was also disenchanted with the next line of discussion Welles 
had introduced. Welles had sought to assess Chamberlain’s view on future security 
through disarmament. Chamberlain’s response reflected British disillusionment with 
this issue, as he said ‘he had been over the subject so many times but never with 
fruitful results’.22 23The differences in opinion between Welles and Chamberlain over 
this issue as applied to the future of central Europe dominated the rest of the 
conversation. British assessments made in the immediate aftermath of this meeting 
reveal how they viewed Welles and this agenda.
Both Halifax’s notes and the Welles report refer to the different conceptions of 
disarmament by drawing parallels with the ‘old story of the chicken and the egg’. 
Halifax stated that the interview ‘turned upon whether disarmament could proceed, or 
at any rate be the agent for restoring confidence, or whether it would be the effect of 
such confidence being in fact required. After comparing the controversy to that of 
“‘the hen and the egg”, Mr Welles said he was inclined to agree with the first 
(disarmament leading to confidence); the Prime Minister argued vigorously for the 
second (confidence being a precursor to disarmament)’. Such divergent starting 
positions meant Chamberlain told the War Cabinet two days later that ‘Welles was 
aiming at the impossible’, in suggesting ‘that the necessary sense of security could be 
obtained by general disarmament’.24 Chamberlain was totally at odds with Welles’ 
view; the Prime Minister thought it was inconceivable ‘to secure disarmament first 
and security second. The exact reverse was the case’. The differing points of view 
also reflected the different ideas on how to tackle the issues of the day that had soured 
relations between London and Washington at the onset of the crisis.
Just as troubling to the Chamberlain government as Welles’ views on 
disarmament was that the Under Secretary ‘seemed to have in mind [a] general outline 
of [a] plan’. After having listened to Welles, Halifax summarised the points made to 
him. The Foreign Secretary saw four features in Welles’ comments:
‘a) That the Germans should agree to withdraw their troops from 
Poland and Bohemia within an area to be agreed by discussion.
22 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Kennedy 
Memoirs PJL, p.565.
23 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 11 March 1940, No. 256 C3815/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
24 PM’s account of his impressions of Welles War Cabinet Conclusions 67 (40) extract 7 of meeting 
held 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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b) That inasmuch as paper assurances and signatures were valueless, a 
scheme should be found for rapid and progressive disarmament of the 
belligerents. This is to be accomplished by progressive destruction of 
offensive weapons on land and in the air, and of factories devoted to 
the production of such weapons, and the creation of an international air 
force.
c) That, while this process was continuing up to a point to be agreed, 
armies would remain mobilised and the blockade would continue.
d) That there should be associated with this general layout a plan of 
economic reconstruction.’25
When outlined in a manner such as this Welles’ points of discussion take on 
the appearance of a ‘plan’. Yet Welles was at pains to point out that in London, as 
elsewhere, he had ‘no proposals’ of his own. Welles’ explanation of his conduct in his 
report was that he was ‘merely exchanging views in order to try and get as clear a 
knowledge as I possibly could of his [Chamberlain’s] point of view and that of his 
Government’.26 Welles was introducing ideas of security and disarmament in order to 
prompt British views and so further ascertain British war aims. Welles’ son wrote that 
his father had ‘pressed his “security through disarmament” formula’ in his meetings 
on 11 March.27 28
It should be of little surprise that Halifax’s assessment of Welles’ ‘plan’ 
caused concern in London. Having overcome Roosevelt’s desire to use the word 
‘peace’ for fear of it embarrassing the Allies in early February, it seemed that his 
Under Secretary was ready to make a proposal that would end up leaving the Allies in 
just such a position. Chamberlain explained to the Cabinet that he suspected 
Roosevelt ‘would make some attempt to bring the war to an end, even if that attempt 
should be embarrassing to us’. This was a considerable setback to the semi-positive 
outlook Chamberlain had explained to Kennedy on the eve of Welles’ arrival in 
London.
25 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 11 March 1940, No. 256 C3815/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
26 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.77.
27 Welles, Sumner Welles, p.251.
28 PM’s account of his impressions of Welles War Cabinet Conclusions 67 (40) extract 7 of meeting 
held 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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Also of significance, although not so controversial, was Welles’ raising of 
economic issues. Having discussed economic matters with Reynaud it was hardly 
surprising that the Under Secretary should want to glean the views of the British on 
this subject. This had implications for discovering British war aims as well as 
supporting the wider State Department programme. Welles suggested that 
disarmament could lead ‘... towards the rebuilding of economic security which in turn 
always made less likely the urge towards military conquest’.29 This was a fundamental 
and recurrent feature in the foreign policy of the Roosevelt administration.
In essence, discussion of disarmament had vexed Chamberlain. It was ground 
that had been covered numerous times in the interwar period, and, without a dramatic 
shift in the American position that would see United States involvement Chamberlain 
saw Welles’ line as a waste of time. Vansittart wrote that American suggestions of 
disarmament were ‘entirely worthless’ unless the United States were ‘prepared to go 
to war with anybody (i.e. Germany) who may be found (as they would be found) 
infringing any disarmament clauses within a short while’.30 Of course, the United 
States was not in a position to act in such an enforcement role. The British diplomat 
concluded that Welles’ ‘suggestion is merely playing ostrich, and all this is far too 
serious for the participation of ostriches’. Such an assessment identified a key 
weakness in American foreign policy from the British point of view: the retreat from 
responsibility.
In discussing the role of Hitler, Welles was endeavouring to establish how far 
the German leader was the basic reason why Britain was fighting, but this line 
resulted only in concerns arising in the Chamberlain government. Given Welles’ 
personal experience of Hitler, it is inconceivable that he favoured the continuation of 
his regime. Yet in discussing Hitler’s role Welles was making himself look 
unsophisticated in the eyes of the Prime Minister and others in Britain. This was 
important, as it left Chamberlain with the impression that Welles would present 
Roosevelt with a proposal for ending the war, at a time when Welles considered the 
possibility of a meaningful settlement to have passed. The Prime Minister would have
29 Record of conversation between Welles and Halifax, 11 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959). p.74.
30 Notes by Vansittart attached to Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in 
despatch from the Foreign Office to Lothian, 11 March 1940, No. 256 C3815/89/18 FO 371 24406 
PRO.
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one more chance to impress his objections upon the Under Secretary in a meeting 
later on 13 March.
London: 12 March information gathering on British opinion
Before Welles met Chamberlain and Halifax again, he had the opportunity to canvass 
a wide variety of opinion in London. The importance of these conversations with 
members of the Cabinet, the Opposition and other leading figures lies in a number of 
areas. Firstly, the consistency with which Welles approached his meetings is evident; 
this was even the case when he met old acquaintances such as Eden, who had stayed 
at Welles’ Maryland mansion during his visit to the United States the previous year. 
The second feature of these discussions is the range of sources from which Welles 
was able to gather information. Related to this was his capacity to relay to Roosevelt 
after the mission the characters of the individuals he had met. Given Roosevelt’s 
penchant for personal diplomacy, such information was potentially valuable. His 
opinion of Churchill as an ‘impressive character’, for example, made its way back to 
the President, although that was accompanied by an assessment of the future Prime 
Minister’s state of inebriation.31 32During the vast majority of the conversations on 12 
March, as throughout his whole time in London, Welles heard of Britain’s unswerving 
commitment to prosecuting the war.
The leaders of the opposition parties showed a solidarity of purpose with the 
government when Welles met them. When he asked Clement Attlee and Arthur 
Greenwood, the Leader and Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, what it would take to 
bring about security, Attlee made it clear that he wanted Germany to learn the lesson 
that force would not prevail. Welles recorded that the pair ‘saw no way out except the 
defeat of Hitler’. Although the Liberal leader, Sir Archibald Sinclair, spent an hour 
with Welles, the meeting served only to reinforce the British position. Welles was 
again given the same message: ‘There can be no compromise with Hitler.’33
31 in a cabinet meeting on 12 May 1940, Ickes recorded of Welles’ opinion of Churchill that he ‘was 
the best man that England had, even if he was drunk half of the time.’ Ickes, The Secret Diary Vol. III., 
p. 176.
32 Record of conversation between Welles, Attlee and Greenwood, 12 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.81.
33 Record of conversation between Welles and Sinclair, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132’/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), p.81.
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On this day of reaffirmation, a dissenting view from the government’s line 
came from Mr Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner, as he presented the views of 
the Dominion governments. The Australian presented Welles with a memo on the 
issue of peace and posed the question of what was the more practical, ‘a cooperative 
or an enforced peace settlement?’ This line of thinking, with its implied reference to 
the inadequacies of the Versailles settlement, was simply filed in Welles’ notes.34 Had 
peace still been a priority for Welles, he could have used this opportunity to enlist the 
support of the Australian in his efforts. He did not. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the Under Secretary noted Bruce’s views to be ‘widely divergent from the opinions 
held by the majority of the members of the British Government’.35
Welles had little respite on this busy day, as he was soon the guest of honour 
at a lunch hosted by the Chancellor, Sir John Simon, at 11 Downing Street. An array 
of ministers and dignitaries had been assembled and spoke on various facets of the 
war effort.36 The conversation was cordial as Welles explained to his host the 
Administration’s concerns over American public opinion and, implicitly, how this 
influenced his own mission. According to Simon’s account, Welles was worried that 
many American people were ‘afraid that if they gave the Allies any assistance, even 
financial, they would ultimately be dragged into the war’.37 This was of course a 
crucial concern for the Roosevelt Administration and a constant consideration for 
Welles. Welles explained that this desire among many of his countrymen rationalised 
their wanting to see an end to the war. Such a proposition troubled Simon. Exhibiting 
the resolve his government wanted Welles to hear, he told the American that he 
‘should realise the strength of [British] resources, and should not go back to 
Washington with the impression that peace proposals, the real object of which was to
34 Memorandum handed to Welles by Bruce, 12 March 1940, FDR PSF Box 23.
35 Record of conversation between Welles and Bruce, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), p.82. The subject of Anglo-American relations in respect of Australia during the 
late 1930s and early 1940s is the subject of a paper to be presented by this author in 2005.
36 Record of lunch meeting Welles, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on 
His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), 
pp.82-83. Chancellor’s Luncheon No. 11 Downing Street Tuesday 12 March 1.30pm: Sir John Simon 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer), Lord Hankey (Minister without Portfolio), Lord Chatfield (Minister of 
Defence Coordination), Sir Kingsley Wood (Secretary of State for Air), Sir Andrew Duncan (President 
of the board of trade), Sir Horace Wilson (Permanent Secretary, Treasury) and Vansittart (Chief 
Diplomatic Advisor to the Foreign Office). Sir Ronald Lindsay (the former ambassador to Washington) 
was invited but was unable to attend.
37 Sir John Simon’s account of his impressions of Mr Welles War Cabinet Conclusions 67 (40) extract 
7 of meeting held 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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reassure American fears, would serve also to save us from destruction’. They simply 
would not.
Of further note is the fact that Lord Chatfield, the Minister for the Co­
ordination of Defence and one of the other lunch guests, sent his impressions of 
Welles to Lothian in Washington. T must say I like the look of him,’ Chatfield 
recorded, ‘and he gave me a good impression of honesty of purpose, and I feel sure 
that his visit will have been of great value and will put the President in a wonderful 
position to know the European outlook from all quarters.’38 Chatfield was evidently 
impressed with Welles and correctly surmised the broader aim of Welles’ mission, 
that of relaying information to the President. The tone of Chatfield’s assessment of 
Welles contrasted sharply with that of Chamberlain. This can be explained in part by 
Chatfield’s relationship with Lothian. The Ambassador had primed Chatfield as to the 
nature of what the United States wanted from Britain; namely information with which 
to educate the American people. Lothian had told Chatfield as early on in the war as 
15 September that he needed ‘any facts and figures’ in order ‘to bring home the real 
issues and the real facts to Roosevelt and other leaders here’.39 He implored Chatfield 
to comply with his request by stating: ‘Believe me, there is nothing more important 
you can do than to equip me with the facts and the arguments which will bring home 
to the United States the real situation which confronts us.’ Chamberlain’s concern, on 
the other hand, was that supplying information to the Americans would fail to produce 
tangible help.
London: Eden and Churchill
After lunch Welles moved on to appointments with first Eden and then Churchill, 
both had returned to the government at the Dominions Office and the Admiralty 
respectively upon the outbreak of war. Welles began the discussions with Eden by 
asking whether he ‘saw any way out of the existing deadlock’. Again, the government 
line was in evidence. Eden responded that the only solution to the crisis was ‘the 
defeat of Germany and the establishment of a regime in that country in whose good 
faith it would be possible for other nations to have confidence’. Welles further pressed
38 194 Letter from Chatfield to Lothian, 14 March 1940, CHT/6/2 Papers relating to Anglo-American 
Relations 1939-40 Correspondence with the Marquis of Lothian. Lord Chatfield Papers, National 
Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
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Eden, stating he ‘could not believe that it was past the wit of men to devise some 
method of avoiding so terrible a fate for civilisation’.39 40 He continued by repeating his 
proposal that disarmament might be able to provide a solution. He asked Eden if it 
was ‘so impossible to visualise a continuation of mobilisation on the fronts, while 
stage by stage a scheme for disarmament was worked out under international 
supervision?’41 In pursuing this line Welles was trying to assess just how far Eden 
would be prepared go to avoid the spring onslaught. The answer, Welles learned, was 
a further reiteration of British resolve. His chronicle shows that Eden ‘had no belief 
that any disarmament move could be considered until after Germany had been 
crushed, and taught that “war does not pay”’, adding in conclusion, ‘Mr Eden’s 
conviction is that nothing but war is possible until Hitlerism has been overthrown’.42 
To Eden such a view seemed to disappoint Welles, as he recorded that Welles seemed 
‘depressed by the refusal to believe in the possibility of an arms agreement in the 
present conditions’.43 While it was conceivable that the American had been 
disappointed with Eden’s response, his report exhibits no such intimation. Instead, he 
concluded that the meeting had been particularly cordial with Eden ‘as charming and 
agreeable as always’ and had shown further evidence of British resolve.44
Having spoken with Eden, Welles called on Churchill at the Admiralty. Whilst 
Welles had used the opportunity provided by his conversation with Eden to further 
press his thoughts on disarmament, Churchill dominated the discussion to such an 
extent that he spoke without a pause for over two hours. Churchill, complete with 
‘cigar and highball’, evidently impressed Welles, as he included in his report that 
Churchill spoke in a ‘cascade of oratory, brilliant and always effective, interlarded
39 116 Letter from Lothian to Chatfield, 15 September 1939. CHT/6/2 Papers relating to Anglo- 
American Relations 1939-40 Correspondence with the Marquis of Lothian. Lord Chatfield Papers, 
National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.
40 Record of conversation between Welles and Eden. Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.571.
41 Record of conversation between Welles and Eden, 12 March 1940, a memorandum from Mr 
Bourdillon (Dominions Office) to Mr Lawford (Central Department of the Foreign Office), 14 March 
1940, C4010/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO. The record of conversation is also referenced as PREM 86-90 
4-25-2 194 Foreign 47 (USA) PRO.
42 Record of conversation between Welles and Eden, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), p.83.
43 Record of conversation between Welles and Eden, 12 March 1940, a memorandum from Bourdillon 
to Lawford, 14 March 1940, C4010/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
44 Record of conversation between Welles and Eden, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), p.83.
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with considerable wit'.45 Welles wrote later in the month that Churchill was ‘one of 
the most fascinating personalities he had ever met'.46 A wide variety of subject matter 
was covered in Churchill's oratory, although he concentrated on events in the 
Atlantic. In view of the united front the government wanted to present, Churchill 
emphasised that the German naval campaign was not having a huge impact on British 
shipping. Instead, he explained that the convoy system was now ‘functioning 
perfectly’, the German magnetic mines had been overcome and a new invention ‘had 
eliminated the danger of submarines, as in any sense a serious menace to England’s 
ability to continue her provisioning, and her export trade’.47 Of course this was far 
from the truth as the Battle of the Atlantic was to show. Welles’ report of the meeting 
concludes by referring to the sentiment he had heard from all those he had met that 
day bar Bruce. The Welles report states that Churchill thought there could be ‘no 
solution other than outright and complete defeat of Germany; the destruction of 
National Socialism and the determination in the new Peace Treaty of dispositions 
which would control Germany’s course in the future in such a way as to give Europe, 
and the world, peace and security for 100 years.’ Such an assessment would be in 
accord with the pronouncements of the man who within two months would be Prime 
Minister, though in March of 1940 Welles’ estimation of Churchill served only to 
present a further example of British resolve.
T ondon: 13 March - a Former Prime Minister and Economic Considerations 
After talking to a future prime minister, Welles began the next day by talking to a 
former prime minister. Welles meeting with David Lloyd George was far from 
significant, as Welles knew that Lloyd George was peripheral to policy-making in 
London. Although Welles found the Welshman to be in broad agreement with his own 
thoughts for security and disarmament, the conversation did not dwell on these topics 
as they turned to the quality of the leaders in the democracies.48 Lloyd George felt in
45 Record of conversation between Welles and Churchill, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/13214. FRUS 
1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.83-85.
46 Foreign Office Minute by Gage after conversation with Lothian, 28 March 1940, C4618/89/18 FO 
371 24407 PRO.
47 Record of conversation between Welles and Churchill, 12 March 1940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/1321/2. FRUS 
1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.83-85.
48 Record of conversation between Welles and Lloyd George, 13 March i940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/1321/2. FRUS 
1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.85-86.
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contrast that ‘the totalitarian governments, and I include Russia among them, have 
brilliant leadership whereas the democracies have none. There is only one exception,’ 
the Welshman stated, ‘and that is Mr Roosevelt.’ He continued by declaring that his 
only ‘real quarrel with him is that he was not bom an Englishman’.49 On that note the 
meeting ended, and Welles moved on to a more important meeting at the Treasury.50 
There he met Sir Horace Wilson, the Treasury’s Permanent Secretary. The subject of 
this was an American proposal flowing on from Hull’s 9 February announcement for 
‘unofficial Anglo-United States cooperation to consider post-war economic 
problems’.51 The Administration saw this as an opportunity for ‘the exchange of data 
and suggestions’, as long as there was ‘no publicity and no suggestion made that they 
[were] engaged in any joint activity’. The American desire to keep any cooperation 
low-key is shown by Kennedy’s concern that nobody should go from Great Britain to 
the United States ‘in the near future unless it was quite clear that the person who went 
could go quietly’.52 Wilson recorded that this was because it might Took as if we were 
from this side following up Mr Welles’ visit to Europe’. Although Welles was keen to 
stress there should be no formal links, given his concern for post-war planning he was 
favourably disposed to the prospect of Anglo-American cooperation as he ‘thought 
there would be advantage in the two committees informally exchanging ideas whether 
by visits personally or by means of memoranda.’ Although these ideas were followed 
up by an exchange of letters, the significance of the meeting between Welles and 
Wilson for this work is that it is not mentioned at all in the Welles report.53 Viewed 
alongside the efforts of Moffat in London, which will be dealt with shortly, this 
meeting reveals that Welles was endeavouring to further Anglo-American 
understanding albeit in secret and on a limited issue. Such efforts suggest that Welles’
49 Record of conversation between Welles and Lloyd George, Kennedy Memoirs PJL, pp.570-571.
50 Another marginal figure with whom Welles met on 13 March was James Maxton, a dissident labour 
MP and notable socialist. He was keen to press Welles to implore Roosevelt to make a move for peace 
_ ‘He saw no other possibility of averting a disastrous and fatal war of complete devastation.’ Record 
of conversation between Welles and Maxton, 13 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959). p.87.
51 Comments by Perowne attached to Telegram No.280 from Lothian to Foreign Office, 29 February 
1940, A1544/431/45 FO 371 24248 PRO.
52 Record of conversation between Welles and Wilson, 13 March 1940, A2300/431/45 FO 371 24248 
PRO.
53 This conversation was followed up when Sir George Schuster, the Chairman of the British 
committee, wrote to Welles on 9 April, with Welles responding on 6 May 1940 (A2880/431/45 FO 371 
24248 PRO). Welles was especially interested to learn that the aim of Schuster’s committee was ‘the 
finding of a practical form for the embodiment of the general idea of organised international economic
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mission was not likely to produce results that would fundamentally affect the interests 
of Great Britain, such as his return to Washington with a peace plan that condoned 
Germany’s acquisition of Eastern Europe. However, this was the fear that 
Chamberlain held, reinvigorated somewhat after his first meeting with Welles (11 
March), when he again met the Under Secretary (13 March). Before this it is pertinent 
to recall the importance of the variety of other people Welles met in London. His own 
consistent preface and then the consideration of the disarmament question were 
designed to draw out statements of what Britain was fighting for and about British 
commitment to their aims. In the variety of meetings he had, the British resolve shone 
through. Nevertheless, and not just because of the dissenting views of Bruce and 
Lloyd George, Welles was able to assess a range of opinion and gauge the character 
of those he met. His aim of gathering information on present conditions in Europe was 
being fulfilled.
London: The Second Meeting with Chamberlain and Halifax 
Welles’ final meeting in London was again with Chamberlain and Halifax, on 13 
March. The importance of this meeting was that it presented Chamberlain with the 
opportunity to further stress the British determination to carry on with the war. It is 
notable that Chamberlain took the lead in this meeting in endeavouring to do this. As 
for Welles, this discussion allowed him to learn more about the British view of the 
situation in Europe.
Chamberlain began the meeting by attempting to reaffirm to Welles the 
strength of British resolve. He handed Welles a letter intended for the President, 
which stressed this. It stated that Welles now knew ‘exactly how the situation’ looked 
to him. Rather paradoxically, Chamberlain’s hope that Welles’ mission ‘may have 
fruitful results, if not immediately, yet in time to avert the worst catastrophe’, belied 
his concern that Welles would suggest something to Roosevelt when he returned to 
Washington.54
cooperation for the sake of creating material welfare as a foundation for a regime of peace and 
advancing civilisation’.
54 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132!4 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90. The full text of Chamberlain’s letter of 13 March 1940, 
reads as follows:
“My Dear Roosevelt: Your very kind letter of the 14th Feb was duly handed to me by 
Sumner Welles, whom it was a great pleasure to me to meet. We have had two frank 
and intimate talks and he knows exactly how the situation appears to me. 1 sincerely
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Chamberlain then told Welles directly that he had given great consideration to 
what the Under Secretary had said during their previous meeting. He felt he had to 
emphasise at the outset ‘the impossibility of proceeding on the assumption that 
disarmament could by itself breed confidence, where in fact the opposite was in his 
judgement true, namely that only from restored confidence could you get 
disarmament’. Chamberlain underlined the problems he foresaw in discussing 
disarmament. He pointed out that ‘the distinction between offensive and defensive 
weapons was one that was very difficult to draw ... the only practicable method of 
advance was to endeavour to pursue progressively ... qualitative limitation’.55 Rather 
optimistically, Welles’ report suggested that although Chamberlain felt these were 
significant problems theoretically, they ‘could be solved, but he had not discovered 
the solution’.56 This perhaps typifies Welles mindset of seeking to leave options open 
rather than close them.
Carrying on Chamberlain again took the lead in stressing to Welles that 
complete destruction of Germany was not part of British war aims. Chamberlain told 
Welles that he wanted to make it ‘definitely clear’ that it was not ‘a war objective 
either to destroy the German Reich or to subjugate the German people’. This was of 
definite value to Welles for the purpose of tackling the misconception amongst the 
American people that the war was about territory in Eastern Europe. Chamberlain 
then went on to suggest that, in order to illustrate that destruction of Germany was not 
one of Britain’s aims, the British Empire could ‘bind themselves not to attack 
Germany by a formal undertaking given to the United States’.57 In asking Welles for 
his views, he immediately added, quite contrarily, given his proposal, that ‘this would 
impose no responsibility on the United States’. The British record states that Welles 
saw ‘no objection to it from the point of view of the United States. He would submit it 
to the President’. In typically less committal language the Welles report states that he 
would simply communicate Chamberlain’s suggestion to Roosevelt, adding a
hope that his mission may have fruitful results, if not immediately, yet in time to 
avert the worst catastrophe. Meanwhile may I say how deeply I admire the courage 
and humanity with which you are striving to grapple with this last and culminating 
effort to establish the rule of force. Yours sincerely, Neville Chamberlain”
55 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/I8 FO 371 24406 PRO.
56 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/\l2Vi. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90.
57 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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qualification that he assumed ‘the latter would wish to see the text of any suggested 
declaration before reaching any final opinion’.58 As was evident elsewhere on his 
mission, Welles was aware of the potential domestic political implications of his 
mission, and it is clear that he was mindful of not appearing to have discussed any 
notion of American commitments. However, he did fulfil the pledge to discuss the 
matter with Roosevelt. In early April, in almost the last hours before Germany struck, 
Roosevelt’s response illustrated again the constraint imposed by the American 
public’s fear of entanglement. This will be discussed in the final chapter.
Welles’ continued to press on the question of how far the Nazi regime was the 
root cause of Britain prosecuting the war. He asked Chamberlain directly whether, on 
the optimistic assumption ‘that satisfactory arrangements could be reached for the 
restoration and future status of Poland, Bohemia and Moravia, and supposing that 
other provisions could be drawn up in regard to disarmament which made for security 
on the lines discussed, would the British Government feel it still impossible to deal 
with the present regime?’59 His response was to suggest that such a transformation 
would be in the nature of a ‘miracle’ and that ‘he did not believe that a miracle would 
occur’.60 Chamberlain continued that ‘so long as Hitler or his group remained in 
control of Germany’, there would be no prospect of Germany entering ‘into any 
arrangements which would offer any real guarantee of security to the Allies’.61 This 
was the essence of the British position. Significantly, Welles’ account adds that 
Chamberlain stated that if ‘a miracle did occur, and there seemed a practicable plan of 
security offered, he would not discard such an opportunity of striving for a real and 
lasting peace merely because the present Nazi regime remained in power’.62 Although 
Kennedy would later see this as offering the prospect of peace, it was certainly not 
intended that way by Chamberlain. Welles’ assessment reflected his own desire not to
58 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Linder Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90.
59 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
60 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132Vi. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90.
61 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
62 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90.
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preclude any option.63 In fact, Welles saw Chamberlain’s comments in terms 
reminiscent of those applied to his own mission. Kennedy’s account states that, 
having likened being able to find any accommodation with Hitler to a miracle, 
Chamberlain said, ‘I am perfectly willing to see a miracle happen and willing to pray 
to God that it might,’ to which Welles’ response was to say that ‘the chances are one 
in a thousand, better, one in ten thousand, but there is a chance and therefore I must 
explore every possible angle’.64 In less colourful prose the British account agrees that 
Welles offered such odds: ‘one chance in ten thousand.’65 Such sentiment exemplifies 
what Welles saw as the quintessential nature of his mission: to explore every last 
opportunity for resolution ahead of the spring offensives, no matter how forlorn, in 
fulfilling the breadth of the objectives of his mission. The British acknowledgement 
that Welles considered any proposals to have only a one in ten thousand chance of any 
type of success gave them some hope that Welles’ mission would not result in 
embarrassing the Allies.
The conversation then broadened out, under Chamberlain’s direction. It turned 
firstly to Germany’s colonial desires. Chamberlain suggested the ‘creation of a broad 
colonial belt through Africa’, which would provide an open trading block and 
emigration rights.66 Welles concluded that if Chamberlain’s proposals were enacted 
there could ‘be no further basis for the German complaint of discrimination in the 
colonial field’. That this matter was raised by Chamberlain suggests that he wanted to 
present a further unpalatable aspect, particularly in the eyes of the American people, 
of any settlement to Welles. That colonial matters were discussed is notable, given the 
American commitment during the Second World War to overseeing the end of 
colonial rule. -  which formed a key element of American post-war planning.
63 Chamberlain’s consideration in the last instance -  a miracle -  of a settlement with the Nazi regime 
reflected the last vestiges of appeasement in London and some consistency in his opinion. After 
Hitler’s October offer of ‘peace’, Cadogan recorded that Chamberlain was reluctant to entirely dismiss 
the speech and say absolutely definitively that ‘we won’t make peace with Hitler’. (Dilks, Cadogan, 
p.221.) Such sentiment better explains the dilemmas facing the British government in late May 1940 
when a settlement with Hitler’s regime was being considered, as explored in John Lukács, Five Days in 
London May 1940 (New Haven & London, 1999). In March of 1940 such a prospect was not as 
Chamberlain tried to put forward British resolve.
64 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax. Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.577.
65 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/I8 FO 371 24406 PRO .
66 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, 13 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/13214. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.87-90.
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The second topic that Chamberlain introduced in broadening the discussion 
with Welles was the role of Russia. In Kennedy's account, it is important to recognise 
that by discussing this issue Chamberlain and Welles both implicitly acknowledged 
that Welles’ proposals comprised a ‘plan’ or ‘scheme’. Having stated that the Russian 
triumph in the Russo-Finnish war had ‘profoundly modified’ the Allied position, 
Chamberlain asked Welles if his ‘plan contemplated bringing Russia into the 
situation’.67 68 Welles’ response to the question was negative but implicitly 
acknowledged Chamberlain’s observation that he had a plan. He stated that if ‘they 
came in that might be all to the good, although it would increase the intrinsic 
difficulty of mutual confidence particularly in the realm of inspection’. Interestingly, 
Welles added that the Russians ‘are not essential to the scheme’, continuing that 
‘Russia has not demonstrated her ability to become much of an offensive force in 
Europe and an international body could consequently easily deal with whatever 
offensive threat Russia might make. Russia, moreover, because of her difficulties with 
Japan is unlikely to want to come in’. The British account of this part of the 
conversation is notable for mirroring this line but fails to mention a ‘plan’ or 
‘scheme’. It states that there was merely ‘some discussion as to the reactions of the 
Russian attitude towards any possible disarmament in the West. It was generally 
admitted that no system of inspection could operate in Russia and that the attitude of 
Russia would in turn be greatly affected by that of Japan’. This is important, because 
even those who had considered Welles’ ideas of 11 March to constitute a plan did not 
see all of Welles’ comments in this light. In this sense they were using some 
discretion in assessing Welles’ different lines of discussion. Nevertheless, the 
implications of Welles’ comments on Russia were significant, as there is no mention 
of Russia in the Welles report. While he may have considered Russia to be beyond the 
focus of the mission, it is also possible that he along with many in the United States at 
that time did not consider Russia to be integral to a solution to Europe’s woes. His 
assessment of Russia’s capabilities, although perhaps right on ‘offensive’ attributes, 
was dismissive of the traits that would ultimately be so vital to Allied victory in the 
Second World War. Welles’ analysis of Russia augments Hilton’s view that Russia’s 
omission from the tour itinerary meant the mission did not aim at a universal
67 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax, Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.576.
68 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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settlement.69 This historian agrees with him, but Hilton fails to consider the full range 
of objectives the mission had developed. Russia's omission was very significant if the 
mission had been solely to explore peace: but it was not, and although the breaking of 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact might have assisted in prolonging the ‘phony war’, the Soviet 
Union was very far from ever being considered as integral to the Welles mission.
What Welles did consider as integral to his mission was his interest in the 
Italian angle. Although only briefly considered in London, Welles’ desire to pursue 
this when he returned to Rome is evident from his quizzing of Chamberlain on the 
meetings Ribbentrop had conducted in Rome on 10 March. Although they had ‘no 
certain news’, the British Ambassador in Rome had seen nothing that would indicate 
Mussolini had any ‘intention of leaving the fence on which he ... rested’.70 For Welles, 
as he prepared to leave London and return to Rome, this request for information 
reveals again that he saw Italy as potentially important in furthering the mission.
Welles and Chamberlain’s discussion came to an end after an hour and a half, 
with an official dinner imminent. Yet the range of topics discussed reflected an 
important episode in the course of the Welles mission. Chamberlain stressed to Welles 
the British resolve to overcome the Nazi regime. The core of the British view was that 
‘Herr Hitler personified a system and method with which the British Government had 
learned from bitter experience it was impossible to make terms’.71 In taking the 
initiative in this conversation, he tried to dispel the worries he and other members of 
his government had about what they conceived to be Welles’ plan. He was happy to 
broaden the scope of the discussion by talking of Russia and the colonial question in 
order to dilute Welles’ focus on producing (and present obstacles to) any settlement. 
For Welles,, this conversation concluded his formal talks in London with a final 
reiteration of British determination to prosecute the war. This was central to Welles’ 
search for information, particularly in assessing British and French aims. While he 
undoubtedly welcomed British resolution in private, given his distaste for what he had 
seen in Berlin, Welles’ report reveals no opinion either way. The absence of opinion 
and neutral language about his talks in Britain exhibited his commitment to present 
Roosevelt with a straightforward account of the conditions in Europe. Despite this,
69 Hilton, The Journal o f American History, 1971-72 p.105.
70 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
71 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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Welles did take on board the message the British were pressing home. He would tell 
the Italian King in Rome that he had not found ‘intransigence in France or England, 
but, merely the determination, and a very cold determination, to fight to the finish'.72 73
Clearly, the British approach had been well impressed upon Welles.
Welles' final conversations in London were less weighty and took place at a 
dinner convened in Downing Street. Welles found himself seated between 
Chamberlain and Churchill, with discussion focusing on the American neutrality zone 
around the Americas. Given that Welles had been crucial to the introduction of the 
zone the previous autumn, he explained ‘the background and the workings of the 
“chastity belt” around the Americas', and asked why the British did not publicise their 
respect for the zone, as they ‘would lose nothing and gain much from American 
sentiment’.74 Without an answer being given the conversation moved on as Welles 
was given a guided tour of Downing Street by his host. Welles ended his account of 
his time in London by quoting Chamberlain’s last words to him. They repeated the 
sentiment of the Prime Minister’s letter to Roosevelt, and ended with Chamberlain 
saying he has ‘has all my admiration, and I shall hope to see you here again in happier 
days’.75 On this note, Welles mission to London ended.
London: Moffat’s Mission
Before leaving the London episode of the Welles mission it is important to consider 
that Welles was not the only American who held high level discussions in London. 
Jay Pierrepont Moffat, the State Department’s Chief of the European Division, had 
spent most of the previous two weeks engaged in low-level discussions with members 
of the diplomatic corps in the European cities he visited. In London, the significance 
of his discussions showed that the Welles mission had an important ulterior purpose. 
His role was to help ease the tension in Anglo-American relations which had
72 Record of conversation between Welles and King Emmanuel II, 16 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132’/j. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), p.93.
73 Prime Minister’s Dinner No. 10 Downing Street Wednesday, 13 March 8.30pm: Chamberlain, 
Welles, Churchill, Kennedy, Sinclair, Attlee, Moffat, R.A. Butler (Parliamentary Undersecretary of the 
Foreign Office), Sir Samuel Hoare (Home Secretary), and Sir Cyril Newall (Chief of the Air Staff of 
the Royal Air Force and Air Chief Marshal).
74 Hooker (ed.), The Moffat Papers, p.303.
75 Record of dinner conversation London, 13 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State 
(Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/i. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), pp 90-91.
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prompted Lothian to record that Roosevelt had mentioned a ‘recent minor crisis’ at 
the end of January 1940.76
Lothian was very much aware of the importance of Moffat in this role, as 
evidenced by his communication of 29 February 1940. He wrote: ‘I am sure I need 
not emphasise the desirability of every attention and courtesy being paid to Mr 
Sumner Welles ... but I hope Mr Moffat will not be overlooked. We are very 
dependent on the latter’s good offices and he would I am sure appreciate any kindness 
that can be shown him by his opposite numbers in the Foreign Office.’77 This was 
taken on board by the Foreign Office, as illustrated by the fact that when Cadogan and 
Halifax were discussing the arrangements for Welles’ stay on 9 March, their first 
point related to Moffat. Cadogan wrote: ‘It is important from the point of view of the 
relations between our Embassy in Washington and the State Department that Mr 
Pierrepont Moffat should be included so far as possible.’78 Moffat was therefore 
considered in British arrangements, with ‘Rab’ Butler being detailed to entertain him 
on the evening of 11 March and the American being invited to attend the final dinner 
at Downing Street.
Moffat evidently enjoyed the evening hosted by Butler. He wrote in his diary 
that the ‘dinner was excellent, and the talk good’. Moffat was also impressed by his 
host, whom he described as having ‘an interesting mind... clever, quick, and intensely 
ambitious.’79 During the evening, Moffat spoke with R.S. Hudson of the Board of 
Trade, about the issue of British purchases of Turkish tobacco (in preference to 
American tobacco). This had been one of the factors that had given rise to the 
difficulties earlier in the year, and Moffat, although understanding of the reasons was 
disappointed to learn that the British had no intention of altering this practice. The 
efforts the British made in entertaining Moffat led the American to visit a number of 
London clubs on 11 March before retiring in the early hours having eaten ‘bacon 
sandwiches with the Duke of Devonshire and his son’. These efforts to entertain 
Moffat continued the next day, and it was not until after a dinner laid on by David 
Scott of the Foreign Office that Moffat got to speak with the Earl of Drogheda, the
76 137 Telegram No. 142 from Lothian to Halifax, 1 February 1940 HFS.
77 190 Telegram from Lothian to Scott (Head of the American Desk), 29 February 1940 HFS.
78 Memorandum to Halifax, 9 March 1940,101 PREM 4-25-2 194 Foreign 47 (USA) PRO.
79 Hooker, Moffat, pp.298-9. Welles knew also of Butler’s ambition as the Under Secretary recorded in 
his report that Butler was ‘understood to be Mr Chamberlain’s particular protege.’ Record of dinner 
conversation, 13 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission 
to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.90-91.
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Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Economic Warfare.80 Moffat saw this as 
his opportunity to put across the American, and in particular the State Department, 
point of view. Outlining the concerns over the denial of navicerts, a possible British 
blacklist and the inspection of the mails, he reserved his and his department’s gravest 
worry until last. Moffat asked whether it was really necessary to apply the label ‘it is 
necessary to do this to end the war’ to British actions when it was often used merely 
to cover ‘administrative conveniences.’ He feared that it was ‘like raising the cry of 
“Wolf, Wolf’ and that if it were used too frequently in a lightened sense it would not 
be listened to’ when it was really warranted.81 82In following this line of argument 
Moffat was entirely in line with the State Department. Given that Moffat’s meeting 
gave him the opportunity to operate as a mouthpiece for such views in London, 
historian Robert Matson proposes that Moffat’s ‘firm enunciation may have been the 
most significant, if unintended, result of the Welles Mission’. While this overstates 
the case, Moffat’s performance on the mission might certainly have contributed to the 
resolution of the ‘minor crisis’, and so to an improvement in the general state of 
Anglo-American relations.83
rnnclusions: British Views of Welles’ Time in London
Welles’ discussions in London had at best perplexed the Chamberlain government, 
and had at worst revived their suspicions of Washington which they hoped had been 
overcome in early February. Any assessment of Welles’ impact upon his return to 
Washington was difficult for London to gauge in early March. Like the rest of the 
world, the Chamberlain government would have to wait and see what Roosevelt 
would do when Welles arrived back in the United States.
Nonetheless, initial British reaction to Welles was variable. Vansittart was 
ferocious in his views. He stated that ‘Mr Sumner Welles emerges more and more 
clearly as an international danger. His idea of security via disarmament first is 
nonsense, and I am glad that the Prime Minister dealt with him so firmly on all
80 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat pp..32-35, SWP Box 211.
81 Hooker, Moffat, pp.300-1.
82 Robert Matson, Neutrality and Navicerts -  Britain, The United States and Economic Warfare, ¡939- 
40 (New York & London, 1994), p.46.
83 M offat‘s role in London allowed him to meet with a number of the members of the Foreign Office. 
At lunch on 11 March Moffat had the opportunity to meet with Scott, Strang, Balfour, Makins and 
others at the Foreign Office who dealt with the United States. Moffat noted that the British were well 
informed of the ‘minor crisis’ as Lothian had reported the American position ‘fairly and in detail’. 
‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.26, SWP Box 211.
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grounds, though I regret that he [the Prime Minister] even contemplated the 
possibility of gradual disarmament with this Germany, for until the Germany not only 
of Hitler but of the military caste has been disposed of, disarmament is not only a 
delusion but a death-trap’. This was vitriolic enough but he continued in an even more 
scathing manner: ‘Mr Sumner Welles’ chief crime towards common sense and 
humanity is that he has now gone so far as to want us to make peace with Hitler.’ In 
some contrast to Vansittart’s views were those expressed by Campbell in Paris. After 
briefly meeting Welles in Paris during his stopover en route back to Rome, the 
Ambassador said Welles ‘had been immensely impressed by the conversations which 
he had with the Prime Minister, Your Lordship [Halifax], the First Lord of the 
Admiralty and others’. Campbell saw these comments as ‘rare pearls’ and recorded 
that Welles had given ‘the impression of having left London with quite different ideas 
from those with which he arrived’. ' This augured some hope that Welles had been 
convinced by the government’s line.
The British were further encouraged in their belief in the aftermath of Welles’ 
mission that the Roosevelt administration would not embarrass them by a speech 
Roosevelt delivered on 16 March, while Welles was back in Rome. The speech was 
broadcast nationally in the United States and its timing and text illustrate that 
Roosevelt wanted nothing to do with any ‘inconclusive’ peace. Roosevelt’s opening 
stated clearly his foundation for peace: ‘Today we seek a moral basis for peace.’ He 
continued: ‘It cannot be a sound peace if small nations must live in fear of powerful 
neighbours. It cannot be a moral peace if freedom from invasion is sold for tribute. It 
cannot be an intelligent peace if it denies free passage to that knowledge of those 
ideals which permit men to find common ground. It cannot be a righteous peace if 
worship of God is denied.’86 Roosevelt’s final sentences added to these sentiments: 
‘These are the highest of human ideals. They will be defended and maintained. In 
their victory the whole world stands to gain; and fruit of it is peace.’ Having made no 
public utterance on the ongoing conflict since the announcement of the mission and 
having been kept informed of Welles’ findings, Roosevelt can have been in little 
doubt as to the affect of such a speech. 845
84 Comments by Vansittart (18/3/40) attached to War Cabinet Conclusions 67 (40) extract 7 of meeting 
held 13 March 1940, C3949/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
85 Telegram from Campbell to Halifax, 14 March 1940, C3977/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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Roosevelt’s speech was a fillip to the British in the aftermath of Welles’ time 
in London. Halifax cabled Lothian in Washington to suggest the Ambassador make a 
special point of telling Roosevelt that his speech had been greeted with ‘pleasure and 
admiration’ by Chamberlain in Parliament on 20 March.86 7 Halifax went on to say that 
‘the President’s speech came at an appropriate moment when all sorts of rumours are 
abroad of the possibility of a patched-up peace’. Halifax also admitted the tactics the 
government had adopted when Welles was in London. He wrote they had 
‘endeavoured to put to him frankly [their] point of view’, and Halifax concluded 
Welles had been ‘glad to receive’ such straightforward views. The Foreign 
Secretary’s concluding words reveal an air of greater confidence in London that 
Welles’ mission would not result in any move by Roosevelt that would compromise 
the Allies. ‘It is inconceivable to us that a peace fulfilling the conditions so well 
defined by the President himself would be signed with the present rulers of Germany.’ 
Lothian agreed with the sentiment of his friend. His final comments to Hull revealed 
again the fear that had surrounded the whole enterprise, as he stated that the British 
government were ‘especially glad that Mr Welles had come and gone without any 
development of a dangerous or harmful nature’.88
More reflection on Welles’ mission can be found in a Foreign Office minute 
prepared once Welles had left Europe. It began by suggesting that Welles’ views 
seemed ‘to have been to some extent affected by Mussolini’s influence, to have been 
impressed in Berlin by Germany’s pretended invincibility, and to have been spoon-fed 
by Mr Kennedy as to the prospects of general financial ruin’. While reflecting British 
awareness of Kennedy’s views, they concluded with a degree of hope that what 
Welles told them ‘may have reflected his own impressions rather than the President’s 
mind’. The Foreign Office thought Welles ‘had in mind to suggest that the President 
should put forward an outline for peace which would not require the elimination of 
Herr Hitler’s Nazi regime but which would give security to the Allies’. The British 
felt ‘Mr Welles appeared disappointed at receiving the impression from all his 
interlocutors here that his ideas on disarmament were impractical in present 
circumstances’. The Foreign Office attributed Welles’ disappointment to the fact that
86 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, pp. 102-104. The text 
can also be found in telegram No.376 from Lothian to Halifax, 17 March 1940, C4031/89/18 FO 371 
24406 PRO.
87 Draft telegram from Halifax to Lothian, 21 March 1940, C403I/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
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those whom Welles met ‘spoke strongly to Mr Welles and he was left in no doubt as 
to our position, but we cannot tell what effect we produced on him, or whether we 
disabused him of some rather serious misconceptions’. This was the ultimate dilemma 
that the British faced in the aftermath of Welles’ mission -  how far did Welles truly 
believe in the points he had discussed? They had not learned Welles’ views over and 
above what they had gleaned from his line of argument: whilst indicative, they 
appreciated that it was not definitive and an element of doubt remained. The Foreign 
Office memorandum concluded, that despite the British efforts, ‘there is still some 
risk that Mr Welles may advise the President to make some attempt to bring the war 
to an end even if that attempt should prove embarrassing to the Allies’. Had the 
British learned that Welles had taken such a strong sense of British resolve away with 
him, as he explained to the Italian King, they would no doubt have been pleased, yet 
even after Welles had left, the British were still not completely clear as to what the 
final outcome of his mission might be.
Conclusion: Welles’ Objectives in London
When Welles left London and headed back to Rome he still had a range of objectives 
to pursue. Notably, he would seek to further Italian neutrality and prolong the ‘phony 
war’. However, when in London Welles’ pursuit of his objectives was largely focused 
upon gathering information. His conversations had two emphases that facilitated clear 
declarations of British aims. The first was to enquire about how far Hitler and the 
Nazi regime were the root cause of Britain’s fighting the war, and the second was to 
push the British on their views on disarmament. Welles was successful insofar as he 
left London, with a definite view that the British were fighting against Hitler’s regime 
and what it stood for. This, along with what he had learned on the continent, achieved 
Roosevelt’s objective of one man being able to gather information from each capital. 
Regarding the other objectives, Welles paid them scant attention in London, which 
reflected his belief in trying to leave options open. The pursuit of peace was no longer 
relevant once he had arrived in London, except in the realms of the ‘miracles’ 
Chamberlain had spoken of. That Welles had openly acknowledged the lengths of the 
odds he was dealing with -  ‘one in ten thousand’ -  is crucial in revealing that, no 89
88 Memorandum of conversation with Lothian by Hull, 22 March 1940, 740.00119 European War 
1939/301. FRUS 1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), pp. 19-20.
89 Foreign Office ‘Impressions of Welles’ Minute, 27 March 1940, C4564/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
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matter how desperate a hope, Welles was going to explore every last opportunity to 
succeed. Kennedy, even with his hope that the war would end imminently, 
acknowledged the odds: ‘The chance was still, however, one in a thousand.’90 The 
same could be said of Welles’ other objectives in his time on the continent, although 
in London, perhaps unsurprisingly, Italian neutrality and prolonging the ‘phony war’ 
were not priorities. But when Welles returned to Rome, both would again be 
important.
In regard to his conduct in London, Welles remained conscious of how his 
mission continued to appear, particularly to the American people. As had been the 
case when he arrived in Paris from Berlin, Welles still did not want to appear to be in 
league with the Allies. This sprang out of his own stoic character and the residue of 
feeling within the State Department that the British were taking advantage of the war 
to the detriment of American interests. This was seen in Welles concern for the 
absence of an invitation to Kennedy for his meeting with the King which was more to 
do with how that would appear in the press rather than the value he placed on any 
contribution Kennedy might make. The problem here was that the element of doubt 
that Welles’ approach left in his conversations, which he hoped might serve a purpose 
in Berlin, served only to increase anxiety in London. This example betrays the double- 
edged complexity of gauging Welles’ motivations at every stage of his mission, and 
again the attitude that in these circumstances policy should be tried even if its 
outcome was unfavourable.
The concerns raised by Welles’s mission in the Chamberlain government were 
the major result of the American’s time in London from the British point of view. The 
lines of discussion on the Nazi regime and disarmament took on the appearance of a 
‘plan’ to many of the people whom Welles met. Such an assessment was not 
unreasonable, but was definitely not Welles’ professed intention. But, as with much of 
Welles’ time in London, it was subject to understandable misinterpretation by the 
Chamberlain government. Any ‘plan’ caused concern, as the British found it 
incongruous to talk of disarmament making possible a lasting peace with the Nazi 
regime. This meant that, the mission failed to improve mutual understanding in 
Anglo-American relations. Nevertheless, the semi-official role that Moffat adopted, in 
addition to the unofficial talks Welles held on post-war economic problems, reveals a
90 Kennedy Memoirs PJL, p.578.
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predilection in certain areas for accord. However, this did not extend to Welles 
disclosing the full breadth of the mission’s goals to the British when he clearly felt a 
greater understanding with them in comparison to the views he had encountered in 
Berlin. Instead, as Welles headed back to Rome, concerns remained in London. The 
welcome given in London both to the speech by Roosevelt on 16 March and to 
Welles’ reiteration of the mission’s purpose in Rome two days later, reveal the 
continuing anxieties. It is to Welles’ return to Rome, and continuing convolution of 
his conduct and objectives, that this thesis now turns.
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CHAPTER SIX
Increasingly Forlorn: Welles Heads Home via Rome
Once back in Rome Welles called upon the full range of his diplomatic skills and 
experience in pursuing his mission’s objectives. His priorities, with the likelihood of 
the offensive shortening as every day passed, were to prolong the ‘'phony war’ and 
perpetuate Italian neutrality. Welles attempted to achieve these by maintaining a 
dialogue with Ciano and Mussolini that encouraged them to think of themselves as 
potentially pivotal to peace. Further, Welles hoped that the fact that he was still 
discussing Italy’s role might engender some doubt as to what might happen at the 
mission’s conclusion. This proved impossible as Mussolini set out to test how far 
Welles was prepared to involve the United States in the conflict in Europe. When 
Welles declined Mussolini’s offer to discuss the American’s views with Hitler, any 
doubts in the minds of Mussolini over the American position were dismissed. Welles 
knew he was in no position to make any commitment to European security on behalf 
of the United States in the spring of 1940. Mussolini’s offer in mid-March revealed 
the limitations that ‘exploring the possibilities of peace’ had in terms of Welles 
creating the impression that the United States might play a part. In this situation 
Welles’ attention focused on the gathering of information in an environment where 
catastrophe appeared imminent. Pervading Welles’ time back in Rome was a sense of 
urgency concentrated by an acceptance that the ‘phony war’ would soon end. The 
world’s press saw the announcement of Hitler and Mussolini’s meeting at the Brenner 
Pass on 18 March (just hours before it took place) as a precursor to escalation. Welles 
also learned from Donald Heath, a staff member of the American Embassy in Berlin 
who had travelled to Rome to speak to Welles personally, that in Germany as 
elsewhere ‘the imminence of an offensive probably against the Maginot Line, is more 
and more generally accepted’.1 Welles understood this pressure. He wrote later that 
Mussolini’s view of the situation was that ‘the minute hand had reached one minute 
before midnight’.2 The aura of impending doom brought with it a sense of 
responsibility for Welles to make sure he had explored every last option and gathered 
every last piece of information. This adds to the complexity evident thus far, in 
deciphering the key tenets of his conduct.
1 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.46, SWP Box 211.
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The intentions of the Roosevelt Administration at this time were shown in a 
speech Roosevelt delivered on 16 March. At the same time that Welles was meeting 
Ciano in Rome, Roosevelt proclaimed: ‘Today we seek a moral basis for peace.’3 
Such a peace -  one that was ‘neither precarious nor inconclusive’ -  was incompatible 
with what Roosevelt knew Welles had heard in Berlin. The terms laid out in this 
speech marked an emphatic acknowledgement by Roosevelt that he had not received 
anything from Welles that could lead him to fulfil the conceptual aim of the mission, 
simply put there was no opportunity to exploit in the name of peace. Publicly, of 
course, the mission continued to be ‘solely for gathering information’, something that 
was reconfirmed by the Under Secretary himself the day he left Europe.
This chapter will outline Welles’ diplomatic manoeuvrings in Rome and his 
efforts to maintain cordial relations with Mussolini and Ciano in order to perpetuate 
Italian neutrality. The conversations held between them will be scrutinised for this 
purpose, and in doing so the duplicity of Mussolini and especially Ciano will become 
clear. The chapter will also assess the way the mission appeared to the American 
people and how this continued to be important to Welles and the Administration in 
Washington. The reiteration of the mission’s public goal on the eve of Welles’ 
departure from Europe served to illustrate this succinctly. Also evident here and rather 
like Britain’s ongoing worries, are Hull’s continuing concerns. The Secretary of 
State’s disquiet became more acute as the mission drew to a close and this will be 
examined toward the end of the chapter. In an important sense then, as in the Chapter 
Three, this chapter sees the ongoing themes of the work interwoven with the 
objectives of the mission. In particular, the goal of Italian neutrality is emphasised, as 
well as the concern for American opinion. The final aspect of this chapter addresses 
the report that Welles composed for Roosevelt. It was almost exclusively narrative in 
recording the conversations Welles had around Europe, and therefore was very much 
in line with Welles’ publicised goal of information-gathering. Ultimately, the report 
presented Roosevelt with little scope for maintaining any notion that the mission 
could have any further outcome. He thus told the world’s press that the mission would 1
2 Telegram No. 191 from Welles to State Department, 17 March 1940, 121.840 Welles Sumner/143 
General Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
1 Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, pp. 102-104. The text 
can also be found in telegram No.376 from Lothian to Halifax, 17 March 1940, C4031/89/18 FO 371 
24406 PRO.
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not be heralding any further move from Washington. The impact of the mission, as 
was always likely to have been the case, was negligible.
Rome: Welles’ Efforts at Prolonging Italian Neutrality
Welles’ efforts at prolonging Italian neutrality began again as he met Ciano on 16 
March. He hoped to engage both Ciano and Mussolini with the prospect that they had 
a role to play in a settlement. Alongside a good deal of personal flattery of the pair, 
Welles entirely overstated the reception Mussolini’s ideas had received elsewhere. 
Welles clearly considered Italian neutrality as his priority -  his only hope -  when 
back in Rome.
The compliments and the embellishments began immediately. Welles opened 
his conversation by stating to Ciano that he ‘had been looking forward for many days 
to [his] return to Rome, and to the opportunity of having further conversations with 
him’.4 He continued: ‘one of the outstanding impressions that I have gained on my 
trip is the confidence felt that the Minister and the Duce would do everything possible 
on behalf of Italy to further the reestablishment of peace.’ Such comments were far 
from the truth of what he had heard elsewhere. However, and more accurately, Welles 
went on to explain that he had found in London and Paris ‘a complete determination 
on the part of [the British and French] governments to continue the war to its bitter 
end’. In telling Ciano this, Welles was endeavouring to raise doubt as to Germany’s 
invincibility and stress that Italy would face a resolute and prepared enemy. Ciano, 
although proclaiming that he was ‘by no means convinced of Germany’s ability to 
win’ a decisive victory in 1940, concluded from Welles’ remarks that if the Allies 
‘fight truly, on this road, they are on the way toward defeat.’5 Nevertheless, in 
suggesting this Welles might well have been influenced by an assessment that Moffat 
learned of Italy in London. Butler had told the diplomat that ‘Italy did not want to join 
the Allies in war, but did want to join them in the peace’.6 While maybe reflecting 
more hope than expectation, Butler’s words alluded to suspected weaknesses in Italian 
military forces and to the dangers Italy would face in a Europe dominated by Berlin.
4 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 16 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132V4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), pp.96-97.
5 Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary ¡939-1943 foreword by Sumner Welles (London & 
Toronto, 1947), pp.vii-ix.
6 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.37, SWP Box 211.
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It was to his time in Berlin that Welles then turned. He recounted how he had 
been told in Berlin of Allied intentions to destroy the Reich, but that when he had 
visited Paris and London he had found that this was far from the case. Ciano replied 
that he knew this to be true. He went on, no doubt much to Welles’ satisfaction, to tell 
him of Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome while Welles had been en route to London. With 
the preface that he would speak ‘frankly, and of course solely for the information of 
the President’, Ciano told Welles that throughout Ribbentrop’s conversations in Rome 
he had stated ‘that Germany was determined to undertake a military offensive in the 
near future; that she was not considering any solution short of a military victory as a 
means of obtaining peace, and that after German victory peace would be laid down by 
German “Diktat”’.7 Such a stark assessment certainly helped Welles to gauge the 
situation in Europe. Ciano continued, and in doing so tried to portray himself as a 
moderating influence. Welles recorded that Ciano had tried ‘as he had at 
Berchtesgaden, to persuade Ribbentrop that the reasonable objectives of Germany 
could be achieved by negotiation’. Crucially, Ciano went on to say on that basis he 
had ‘mentioned’ Welles’ mission. Ribbentrop’s response shows how little the 
Germans were actually considering Welles’ mission. Ciano said that ‘Ribbentrop had 
brushed to one side all references of this character, and that he had talked in very loud 
and violent terms of German power and of German military strength’. This exchange 
within the Italo-German conversation was relevant information for Welles, as it 
showed again Germany’s aggressive position. Although he may have been concerned 
that his comments had been the subject of discussion between the Axis, the fact that 
his mission was raised at all indicates that it had registered on the Nazi agenda. That it 
was pushed, to one side so readily, though, reveals that the mission although on an 
agenda, did not serve to encourage talk of peace but, in fact, helped to hasten German 
planning for war. Also evident in this passage were Ciano’s less than complimentary 
interjections on the Nazis and on Ribbentrop in particular. Having heard this, Welles 
turned the conversation to one aspect he had pressed in London.
In introducing talk of disarmament, Welles was doing so for subtly different 
reasons than he had done in London. Whereas in London he was trying to extract 
statements of British aims, in Rome Welles was trying to find terms that might entice
7 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 16 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of 
State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. 
(USGPO, 1959), p.97.
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Ciano to prolong the hiatus. He stated that what was needed was ‘agreement upon 
measures of real disarmament’, and this drew Ciano ‘immediately’ into saying that he 
‘quite agreed'. Welles continued with the aim of using the disarmament question to 
preserve the ‘phony war’. He pondered whether ‘... the brink of the precipice upon 
which they were now poised might prove to be an incentive to all peoples to strive 
towards a real and actual disarmament, and the means of practical security which that 
alone could afford’. Welles’ record shows that Ciano made no direct response to his 
plaintive suggestion. Instead the conversation moved on in a fashion that augured 
some hope for Welles.
Ciano suggested to Welles that he delay his departure from Rome. The reason, 
he said was that ‘word from Berlin would probably be received before noon on March 
19 and that he would m eet... to give me the last word that he had before I departed’. 
Such a proposition was welcomed by Welles, as it would enable him to gain the most 
up-to-date picture possible before he left Europe. Though the value of the information 
that Welles was waiting for, was perhaps already in question. In response to an 
enquiry from Phillips as to the nature of the information Ciano was to receive, the 
Italian ‘refused to specify’. Furthermore, personal opinions of Ciano in the American 
camp were not wholly complimentary. While the Welles report saw Ciano as 
accommodating, Welles was aware of his playboy image.8 Moffat went further, as he 
found the Italian to be an ‘open and rather disengaging snob’ who had ‘eyes and ears 
for nothing but the ladies’. Nevertheless, Moffat did observe that Ciano was able to 
turn off ‘his frivolous side as though he ... pushed an electric button’.9 Such an 
assessment alludes to Ciano’s duplicity, which would be in evidence again during 
Welles’ time in Rome.
Rome: Mussolini tests Welles
Having received Ciano’s suggestion that he wait in Rome for further information with 
some satisfaction, Welles was less pleased with the offer he received in his next 
meeting with Mussolini. Investigation of this illustrates two things: firstly, that the 
Welles mission had a minimal effect upon the Axis in terms of them pausing for 
thought; and secondly, the clear limitations to Welles’ exploration of peace. In
8 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano and Phillips also present), Rome 26 
February 1940, Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 
121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.27-33.
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essence, the offer amounted to Mussolini asking whether he could tell Hitler the 
content of his conversations with Welles. Welles endeavoured to stall and stated that 
he would need to speak with Roosevelt. In that conversation which took place later 
that day, Welles argued that allowing his views to be discussed would be tantamount 
to appearing to have had his own proposals and to be entangled in Europe’s 
diplomacy. Roosevelt agreed, and declined Mussolini’s request.
Nonetheless, the meeting on 16 March began in a genial atmosphere. After the 
Duce had welcomed Welles ‘with the utmost cordiality and in a very friendly personal 
way’, the conversation started with his asking Welles for the ‘impressions’ he had 
formed on his tour. As ever, Welles began by stating that the views expressed to him 
were intended solely for the President and the Secretary of State. Nevertheless, Welles 
stated that elsewhere he had told his audience that Mussolini still saw a settlement as 
possible. Clearly overstating the facts, Welles continued that he had found ‘on all 
sides’ confidence in Mussolini and Ciano desire’s to work for peace.9 10 To this Welles 
added that ‘it seemed to [him] that the influence of Italy towards this end might 
consequently be very great’.11 This flattery worked, as it had done earlier in the day 
with Ciano, insofar as Mussolini interjected to say that this was true and he ‘had done 
everything possible to avert the present war’. With this contrived adulation out of the 
way, Welles returned to Mussolini’s opening enquiry and within the self-imposed 
‘limitations set forth’ outlined his impressions.12
Welles’ opening reflected his own views. The American recounted that 
everywhere ‘the fundamental demand was for security; not a fictitious nor illusory 
security but a security which involved a real disarmament’. He then went on to say, 
with little basis in fact given what he had heard in London, that territorial questions in 
Europe ‘were by no means insoluble problems’.13 Such an assessment aimed to 
engage Mussolini, and it certainly did so. Mussolini responded firstly by telling
9 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat pp.45-51, SWP Box 211.
10 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/13214. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.100-106.
11 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, 
Telegram No. 191 from Welles (Rome) to State Department, 17 March 1940, 121.840 Welles 
Sumner/143 General Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive 11, Maryland.
12 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132)4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.100-106.
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Welles of the imminent meeting he was to hold with Hitler at the Brenner Pass. In 
repeating Ciano’s appraisal, he continued, that during Ribbentrop’s recent visit the 
Reich’s Minister had insisted that ‘Germany would consider no solution other than a 
military victory and that peace negotiations were impossible’.13 4 In the light of this, 
Mussolini believed ‘that the German military offensive was in fact very close, and 
that it would be undertaken within a number of hours rather than within a number of 
days’. Having set this scene, Mussolini then asked Welles if the American would 
authorise him ‘to communicate to Hitler the impressions [he] had formed with regard 
to the possibility of a negotiated solution of territorial and political questions in 
Europe’. Welles’ response illustrates clearly the limits to his mission as he knew the 
mission could not entangle the United States in direct discussions between Europe’s 
belligerents. Welles stated that he was ‘not empowered to give ... such authorisation 
and that [he] would require specific instruction from the President of the United States 
before [he] could make a reply’. Welles did go on to say he would ask Roosevelt over 
the telephone and inform Ciano of the result later in the day.15 By stating that he 
would need to consult with Roosevelt he was trying to build in some delay and 
possibly engender doubt over the eventual outcome of his mission.
Mussolini’s proposition crystallised the mission’s limits. In endeavouring to 
draw out from Mussolini consideration of the possible role Italy might play, the 
Italian’s proposal had overstretched Welles’ licence to operate. He knew he was not in 
a position to agree to Mussolini’s proposals. Welles duly rang Roosevelt later on 16 
March to discuss the ‘chief points’ of his conversation with Mussolini. This was the 
‘first and only telephone call’ Welles made to Roosevelt during the course of the 
mission, and reflected the sense of urgency which Mussolini’s proposal was dealt 
with.16 This urgency reflected a concern that the proposal would involve the United 
States in the war. Welles urged Roosevelt to decline the offer, as he knew full well 
that American intervention between the belligerents was too risky for his government
13 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, 
Telegram No.191 from Welles (Rome) to State Department, 17 March 1940, 121.840 Welles 
Sumner/143 General Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
l4Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'A FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.100-106.
15 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.100-106.
16 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.46, SWP Box 211.
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in Washington. Roosevelt agreed with Welles’ advice against authorising him ‘to 
agree to permit Mussolini to convey to Hitler any impressions ... with regard to any 
possible territorial adjustments'.17 Consideration of the views of the American people 
was still very much to the fore as Welles explained his recommendation. He feared 
that ‘the impression would inevitably be created that the President was participating in 
the determination of such bases for a political peace as might be offered by Hitler’. To 
offer something of an alternative Welles’ ended his remarks by returning to his views 
on disarmament as a means of providing security. Welles stated that security was the 
‘fundamental issue, since security involved real and actual disarmament of the kind 
which would make it possible for men and women to go back to constructive work, 
with a consequent increase in living standards, and with a consequent immediate 
opportunity for all of those economic readjustments which are indispensable to a 
durable peace’. In such literary terms the conversation ended, but it is interesting to 
note that this sentiment was repeated by Roosevelt in his speech later that day. The 
speech laid out plainly the type of settlement the United States wanted to see. The 
British government particularly welcomed Roosevelt’s utterances.
Nonetheless, Mussolini’s offer had succinctly illustrated the constraints under 
which the Welles mission took place. Both Roosevelt and Welles knew that the 
mission could not appear to involve the United States in European affairs, and when 
the opportunity arose here it was declined. Moffat understood the gravity of what 
Mussolini’s offer meant to the Welles mission. He noted that thus far ‘our task has 
been relatively easy: henceforth, it will require all S. W.’s acumen to prevent 
becoming entangled in German designs and Allied counter-designs’.18 This opinion 
reveals a number of important elements. Firstly, Moffat’s concern that Welles was 
facing a situation in which he was placed between Berlin and the Allies. The second 
aspect is the use of the word ‘entangled’, as it alludes to Moffat’s understanding of the 
appearance of neutrality that the mission had to maintain. Perhaps most telling, 
though, was Moffat’s revelation that he thought the mission up to that point had been 
a relatively straightforward task, which can only mean that he thought it had not been 
intended to produce a peace settlement -  by any reckoning a complex task. This 
episode shows that the founding aim Roosevelt and Welles had in January 1940 for
17 Record of telephone conversation between Welles and Roosevelt, 16 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp. 100-106.
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the mission -  of exploring the possibilities for peace -  had been fulfilled, and their 
decision to decline the opportunity to do anything more than ‘explore’ illustrates the 
limits of the mission.
Mussolini’s motive in making the proposal seems to have been to test how far 
Welles was prepared to involve the United States. When Ribbentrop had visited Rome 
on 10 March Mussolini had learned from the German that ‘the visit of Sumner Welles 
to Berlin produced nothing new’.18 9 This left Ribbentrop to ponder: ‘In Germany 
people are asking what Roosevelt actually meant by that step.’ Mussolini postulated 
to Ribbentrop during their meeting that the whole Welles mission ‘must principally be 
a question of an internal American matter’. In these circumstances it seems likely that 
Mussolini was endeavouring to probe how far Welles’ mission was an internal matter 
or a genuine peace move. Welles’ negative response confirmed to Mussolini that he, 
and his Axis partner Germany, did not need to take note of Welles’ mission.
Interestingly, in Welles’ report he ends coverage of this conversation with 
Mussolini by noting that the Duce said something ‘very significant’. Welles recorded 
that Mussolini stated ‘that while the German-Italian pact exists he, Mussolini, retained 
entire liberty of action’.20 Mussolini was clearly trying to impress upon Welles his 
importance in the Rome-Berlin Axis, and this no doubt reflected his desire to ‘to 
impress his visitors rather than listen to what they were saying’.21 However, Welles 
was fully aware that Mussolini was almost wedded to Hitler at this stage. Ciano had 
told him that morning that ‘Mussolini was definitely “pro-German”’.22 With hindsight 
unavailable to Welles at the time, this would become obvious at the Brenner Pass 
meeting.
Rome: Ciano’s Deception
Welles dined informally with Ciano later on 16 March and told him of Roosevelt’s 
decision to decline Mussolini’s offer. Welles was somewhat surprised that Ciano
18 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.46, SWP Box 211.
19 Record of conversation between Ribbentrop and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 10 March 1940 -  
XVIII. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers, p.342.
20 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.100-106.
21 Lecture by Denis Mack Smith, 21 October 1998, University of Wales, Swansea.
22 Record of conversation between Welles and Mussolini (Ciano also present), 16 March 1940, Report 
by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. I.(USGPO, 1959),pp.100-106.
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‘expressed emphatic approval’ of the President’s decision to resist the Duce’s 
suggestion. Ciano believed it dangerous for the United States to be involved in ‘the 
formulation of any terms of political adjustment which might be considered by 
Hitler’.23 In endeavouring to return Welles' flattery, Ciano continued by agreeing with 
the American’s analysis that ‘security’ was the key problem facing Europe. Ciano 
also stressed to Welles, as Mussolini had done, that the forthcoming Brenner Pass 
meeting might be a precursor to the outbreak of fighting. Welles learned that Hitler 
was insistent upon the meeting taking place on the 18 March and lasting for no longer 
than an hour.24 Time was clearly of the essence during Welles’ return to Rome. The 
post dinner conversation ended with Ciano informing Welles that even if war were 
imminent, ‘close, friendly, and continuing relations between Italy and the United 
States would prove of inestimable value when the time came for laying the 
foundations of a decent and enduring peace’.25 Such words were to ring entirely 
hollow as, within weeks, Italy declared war on the Allies. Ciano’s duplicity is clear 
with hindsight. In May 1940 he visited Albania to meet with ‘General Carol Geloso, 
commander of Italian military forces there, and ordered him to prepare for war’.26
Interestingly, Ciano recorded in his diary what he considered to be the most 
important result of his meetings with Welles. His assessment was that Welles’ 
information led him to conclude that ‘in London and Paris there does not exist any of 
the uncompromising attitude which their speeches and the papers indicate’.27 Here 
again Welles efforts may have had unintended consequences. While Welles had tried 
to suggest that the Allies were resolute in prosecuting the war, Ciano interpreted these 
comments to reveal a fear within the Allies of Nazi Germany that confirmed to him 
Germany’s dominance.
Though Ciano might have been guilty of misinterpretation in making his 
assessment of Allied resolve, his capacity for outright duplicity was also in evidence. 
In agreeing with Roosevelt’s directive that the United States should not become 
involved, Ciano was drawing on a phone tap of Welles’ conversation with
23 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 16 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/\32Vi. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.96-100.
24 Entry for 16 March. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary 1939-43, p.222.
25 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 16 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.96-100.
26 Moseley, Mussolini's Shadow, p. 114.
27 Entry for 16 March. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diary, p.222.
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Roosevelt.28 His diary shows that he had listened to the entire discussion, which 
allowed him to record an accurate picture of events. Ciano’s precise assessment of 
Welles’ mission was ‘that Roosevelt does not wish to commit himself beyond a 
certain point, and certainly not before he has carefully examined the results of his 
colleague’s European mission’.29 It is perhaps ironic that Ciano’s capacity for deceit 
had allowed him to make a true evaluation of Roosevelt’s predicament.
Welles had utilised the licence given to him to operate independently by 
Roosevelt on his mission thus far, but Mussolini’s offer had raised the prospect of 
direct United States involvement. Welles would have to use the acumen that Moffat 
said he would need in order to dispel the notion. However, Welles’ hope that his 
mission might act as a brake to the escalation in Europe was not compatible with a 
clear declaration that there would be no United State involvement. This was to be the 
dilemma Welles would face during his final days in Europe, and it was one that he 
made little progress in addressing.
Rome: A Telegram to Washington and Hull’s Concerns in Evidence 
Having spoken to Roosevelt on the telephone, Welles followed this up with his first 
telegram to Washington since his time in Paris. The explanation for this was ‘the 
urgency of the situation’, which underlines that time was of the essence when he 
returned to Rome. The importance of this telegram is that Welles stressed his 
information-gathering role, even after he had received Mussolini’s offer. The 
likelihood of Hull being the recipient of the telegram was probably in his mind here, 
especially as he had recently spoken to Roosevelt. Welles began by stating that after 
his conversation with Mussolini he ‘had thereby been encouraged in [his] search for 
information’.30 Welles did turn to the prospect of peace, but only as point seven of the 
memorandum. He foresaw two possibilities. First of all, Welles thought that as a
28 The likelihood of this occurring helps explain why Roosevelt and Welles did not use the telephone to 
communicate but a specially encrypted diplomatic code. Welles’ awareness of the risks that his 
conversations would be bugged is shown by comments he made when he arrived in London. Welles’ 
party was moved to the Dorchester after it was originally intended they would stay at Claridges. The 
reason was that the manager at Claridges was thought to be a member of the Italian Fascist Party. 
Kennedy recorded of Moffat ‘that perhaps the British wanted to move the mission to a hotel where they 
instead of the Italians had the microphone privileges’. To which Welles responded, ‘saying that he 
suspected something like this wherever he stayed and so he had dutifully refrained from saying 
anything.’ Kennedy Memoirs PJL p.551.
29 Entry for 17 March. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diary, p.223.
30 Telegram No.191 from Welles (Rome) to State Department, 17 March 1940, 121.840 Welles 
Sumner/143 General Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
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result of the Brenner meeting ‘Mussolini may convey to the Allied Governments 
peace terms which would prove entirely unacceptable and which might be couched in 
the nature of a German ultimatum’. Welles immediately considered how such a move 
should be dealt with in order to remove any notion that he or the United States had 
been party to any knowledge of this. His suggestion is prefaced by an implicit 
acknowledgement of the importance he placed on maintaining Italian neutrality. 
Welles wrote: ‘I would suggest that the Secretary issue a statement saying that while 
the President greatly appreciated the particularly cordial and friendly reception 
accorded me by the Duce and by Ciano, as well as the opportunity they have given me 
of procuring the information which the President sent me to Europe to obtain, 
nevertheless neither the President nor I have been consulted in anyway with regard to 
the peace terms nor were the President nor I in anyway apprised of their nature before 
they were made public.’ Welles followed this immediately by saying that such a 
statement ‘would immediately kill the impression which would presumably be 
intentionally created that the President’s step in sending me abroad had favoured a 
drive of that character’. This absolution from involvement in any peace drive 
illustrated Welles’ own concerns and those he knew Hull harboured, over his mission 
being presented as an outright peace mission. The second of Welles’ options was his 
last point, and painted a bleak picture for Europe: ‘A second alternative is that Hitler 
actually is determined upon a military offensive in the immediate future and will 
consider no alternative. End.’
This telegram helps further in elucidating Welles’ approach upon his return to 
Rome in March 1940. The objective of gathering information is clearly outlined, as by 
implication, is the prominence he gave to Mussolini. The distance Welles wished to 
put between the Administration and the prospect of a peace move provides further 
evidence of the dangers he perceived in his mission’s image being tarnished by 
association in the eyes of the American public. Further, the realism with which Welles 
tackled the prospect of German aggression shows that in March 1940 he was fully 
aware of the threat posed by Nazi Germany. That Welles understood all these factors 
at the time was crucial as he sought to fulfil the objectives for the mission. Once 
Welles had fulfilled the conceptual purpose for the mission that Roosevelt and he had 
considered at the turn of the year, and the possibilities of peace had been explored to 
no avail, the other goals of the mission came into focus.
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For Hull the concerns continued, and in some respects became more acute, as 
Welles’ mission drew to a close. He confessed to Lothian that ‘the problem of 
defeating the peace offensive which had been developing towards the end of Welles’ 
mission had given him great anxiety’.31 Hull continued that he thought the situation 
was precarious, as the American people were ‘asleep on the central issue to-day as 
Great Britain had been in the past’. Further, Hull was worried by the constant press 
attention Welles was receiving, even if no headline-grabbing story had resulted thus 
far. Given these concerns, Hull welcomed Roosevelt’s 16 March speech, which he 
saw as dispelling ‘the spread of the “peace at any price” sentiment... which would be 
the equivalent of a German victory’.32 The term ‘peace at any price’ was one that had 
quickly become associated with the discredited policy of appeasement and was of 
concern to many in the Roosevelt Administration. Berle, in agreement with Hull, 
wrote that he was ‘glad’ Roosevelt made the ‘speech against the peace-at-any-price 
idea [because] if it has no other effect, it will indicate that Welles is not behind the 
peace-at-any-price move’.33 The concern for how Welles’ mission was regarded by 
the American people remained.
Rome: Welles Waits and Visits the Vatican
While Hull continued to fret over the outcome of the mission in Washington, Welles 
continued his series of meetings by visiting the Pope at the Vatican. This meeting, and 
one with the Vatican’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Maglione, took place on 18 March 
while Welles was waiting in Rome for news of the Brenner Pass meeting. Although 
aware that the Vatican held a unique position in Italian society, Welles also knew that 
the Pope had only marginal influence on Mussolini. The meeting touched on a 
number of important areas, but should be considered very much in the light of Welles’ 
pursuit of continuing Italian neutrality.
Welles went into the meeting knowing the views of the Vatican on the 
prospect of peace and on Italy’s role. Myron Taylor, Roosevelt’s recently appointed 
representative to the Vatican, had told Moffat that the Vatican ‘did not believe the 
moment opportune for a peace conference’.34 They had ‘reluctantly ... come to the
31 Telegram No.399 from Lothian to Halifax, 22 March 1940, C4490/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
32 Memorandum of conversation with Lothian by the Secretary of State, 22 March 1940, 740.00119 
European War 1939/301. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp. 19-20.
33 Memorandum by Berle, 18 January 1940, Box 211 ABP.
34 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.45, SWP Box 211.
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conclusion that there must first be a further trial of strength’. Clearly, the Vatican was 
not considering bringing about peace at that time. Of more importance to Welles at 
this stage was what Taylor had learned with regard to the Vatican’s view of the Italian 
position. Taylor calculated the ‘principal preoccupation of the Vatican’ as being ‘to 
keep Italy non-belligerent’. This aim was in line with Welles’ own thinking on how 
his mission could make a contribution to events in Europe. According to the British 
Representative to the Vatican, the Pope told Welles that ‘the President would perform 
a service of the highest value in the interest of peace by exerting his influence with 
Mussolini so that Italy would remain a non-belligerent’.35 A comment such as this at 
such a time, from a source with some independent perspective may have further 
confirmed the importance of Italian neutrality in his thinking.
Important with regard to the future of Italy was Welles’ direct enquiry as to 
the contents of the Pope’s recent conversation with Ribbentrop. The Pope informed 
Welles that Ribbentrop had been most deferential, but this did not hide the German’s 
central message. Throughout their conversation Ribbentrop stressed Germany’s 
‘determination to proceed with the war until she had achieved a military victory’.36 
Welles also learned that Ribbentrop had endeavoured to suggest that ‘a vast German 
offensive on the western front was imminent, perhaps only a few days away’.37 In 
bringing up the subject of Ribbentrop’s trip to Rome, Welles was looking to find out 
about the possible end of the ‘phony war’. Such information would clearly help his 
mission’s objectives. Ultimately, though, there was little consequence to the meeting 
Welles held with the Pope, or the conversation he held later in the day with the much- 
respected Cardinal Maglione.38 Italy was under the direction of Mussolini, who at that 
time was at the Brenner Pass agreeing to enter the war.
Rome: Ciano’s Return from the Brenner Pass Meeting
When Ciano returned to Rome to meet Welles on 19 March, the Italian was at his 
most deceitful. At the same time, Welles’ behaviour acknowledged that in this final
35 Telegram from Osborne (The Vatican) to the Foreign Office, 19 March 1940, C4215/89/18 FO 371 
24406 PRO.
36 Record of conversation between Welles and Pope Pius XII, 18 March 1940, Report by the Under 
Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132!4. FRUS 
1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.106-108.
37 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.45, SWP Box 211.
38 Record of conversation between Welles and Cardinal Maglione, 18 March 1940, Report by the 
Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. 
F R U S  1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.108-110.
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episode of his mission gathering information was his main priority. His last act before 
leaving Rome was to reiterate this public goal of his mission.
Welles returned to the Rome Golf Club on March 19 to meet Ciano. The 
Italian described the meeting at the Brenner Pass as ‘no more than a domestic 
incident' for the Rome-Berlin Axis.39 Despite claiming to speak with complete 
frankness to Welles, Ciano continued that he thought ‘the most important thing for 
[Welles] to learn was that there would be absolutely no change in Italy’s non­
belligerent attitude as a result of the meeting'. This assessment is at complete odds 
with the actual facts of the Brenner Pass meeting, at which Mussolini agreed to join 
Germany in the war. Ciano’s own account reveals his double-dealing nature, 
particularly his propensity to tell his audience whatever he thought they wanted to 
hear. His diary admits this, in revealing how he responded to the British 
Ambassador’s enquiry about the Brenner meeting. ‘I put him at ease,' Ciano wrote. 
‘The Brenner meeting is no prelude to surprise in our policy. This is what he wanted 
to hear.’ While it might not have been a ‘surprise’ that Italy would agree to join her 
Axis partner in the war, and although it did not take place immediately, Ciano was 
clearly not being completely frank with either the British Ambassador or Welles.
Ciano’s next comments reveal further intrigue. Although stating correctly that 
the meeting had seen no German peace proposals or any request for ‘Mussolini to 
present any suggestions for peace proposals to the Allied governments’, he continued 
with an entirely fatuous line. Ciano stated that he ‘very emphatically ... believed that 
the time might come in the not distant future when Hitler would be receptive to the 
consideration of a negotiated peace’. Under such circumstances ‘the initiative should 
be taken by. the President of the United States, using Italy as its “point of support” in 
Europe.’40 The first part of Ciano’s comments here alludes to the possibility Welles 
had suggested in his 17 March telegram to Washington. That no proposals would be 
immediately forthcoming was welcome news to Welles as he sought to avoid the 
appearance of his being involved in peace negotiations. However, the second part of 
Ciano’s comments, that Hitler might be receptive to peace terms in the future, was 
pure fantasy. Given what Welles had learned himself in Berlin, he knew this to be the 
case. His suspicions of Ciano can only have been reinforced.
iq Entry for 19 March. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, p.224.
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Ciano’s duplicitous qualities are shown to an even greater extent in a 
monologue at the end of his final meeting with Welles, and the last of the mission. He 
made the hollowest of promises. Ciano asked Welles to tell Roosevelt ‘that so long as 
I remain Foreign Minister, Italy will not enter the war on the side of Germany, and 
that I will do everything within my power to influence Mussolini in that same 
sense’.40 1 History would soon prove this to be a complete lie.
Welles’ time back in Rome exposes the delicate nature of the task he faced. 
He had tried to play up a possible role for the Italians and exploit both Mussolini’s 
‘liberty of action’ and Ciano’s dislike of the Nazis. This was done with a view to 
furthering Italian neutrality and limiting the scope of the war. Welles knew it to be a 
thankless task, given Mussolini’s attraction to Berlin and his complete control over 
Ciano, but nevertheless in an increasingly pressured environment he saw some value 
in pursuing it. Ciano’s final words to Welles perhaps allude to the dilemma facing the 
American. From a position of imminent disaster maybe something could be made of 
his comment that ‘nothing will be more gratifying to me than the opportunity to 
cooperate in the name of Italy with the United States in the cause of the 
reestablishment of that kind of just and durable peace in which the President 
believes’.42 When faced with the prospect of total war in Western Europe Welles 
would continue to exploit any last vestige of opportunity that Ciano’s comments 
provided to preserve Italian neutrality in the spring of 1940.
Rome: Welles’ Parting Words
Cordell Hull’s concerns that Welles’ mission would become associated in the press 
with rumours of peace became a reality during Welles’ final hours in Rome. Welles 
had been followed on his travels in Europe by numerous members of the press, many 
of whom had accompanied him all the way from the United States. Welles, as has 
been seen, strictly limited his public utterances and so endeavoured to restrict the 
rumours surrounding his mission. ‘Rab’ Butler in London had referred to Welles as
40 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 19 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132Vi. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
I. (USGPO, 1959), pp.110-113.
41 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 19 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132'A. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.110-113.
42 Record of conversation between Welles and Ciano, 19 March 1940, Report by the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132V4. FRUS 1940 Vol. 
|. (USGPO, 1959), pp.110-113.
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‘carp-like’, owing to his capacity for silence.43 Such a tactic had served to 
successfully prevent sensational headlines appearing in the American press, but Hull 
continued to worry. Prompted both by continual questioning from the press in 
Washington and by Welles’ telegram of 17 March, which had mentioned the 
possibility that he might receive peace terms from Hitler, Hull suggested to Roosevelt 
that he compose a message to Welles to stress the fact-finding nature of his mission. 
Roosevelt in typical fashion initialled ‘OK FDR’. Hull then wrote to Welles that he 
thought it ‘hardly inconceivable that any peace proposal based on an ultimatum as to 
time and/or threat of force will be put up to you for either action or comment’. This 
was clearly a prospect that worried Hull, as he continued: ‘I assume that within your 
function as fact-finder you would not be given peace terms for transmission to 
belligerents, except as data for our information.’44 Though Hull’s words show that he 
was not party to the direct communications between Roosevelt and Welles, they also 
clearly reveal his concern that the United States should in no way be seen as 
intervening between the belligerents.
Hull’s fear that amid the plethora of press rumours one would come to the fore 
came to fruition the very next day, while Welles waited in Rome. Herbert L. 
Matthews of The New York Times penned a story which prompted a flurry of 
questioning about the mission. Matthews wrote that Ribbentrop had delivered to the 
Pope an ‘eleven-point peace’ programme, which Welles had received from Hitler and 
then discussed with the Pontiff.45 Considerably upset, Hull immediately cabled Welles 
and suggested that he issue a strong denial. The United Press had already added to 
Matthews’ story by saying that the terms presented were ‘far from satisfying the 
desires of the Allies’, and Hull wanted such stories to be dispelled.46 The Under 
Secretary promptly followed Hull’s suggestion:
‘In order to allay the flood of rumours about my mission, I wish to state 
categorically that I have not received any peace plan or proposals from 
any belligerent or from any other government; that I have not conveyed 
any such proposals to any belligerent nor to any other Government; nor
43 The reference to Welles being ‘carp-like’ was made by ‘Rab’ Butler in conversation with Miasky 
(Soviet Ambassador), 18 March 1940, C4325/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO Kew, London.
44 Memorandum from Hull to Roosevelt, 18 March 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/132a General 
Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
45 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat p.52, SWP Box 211.
46 Quoted in Telegram No.66 from Hull to Welles, 19 March 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/142b. 
FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p.18.
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am I bringing back to the President any such proposals. My mission has 
been solely one of gathering information for the President and the 
Secretary of State as to the present conditions in Europe.’
Angered by the story, Welles tracked Matthews down later in the day and told 
him plainly that the story contained ‘not one solitary vestige of truth’.47 Moffat’s diary 
confirms Welles’ public reiteration of the mission’s purpose. The account reads: 
‘Welles issued a public statement that he had neither received nor proposed any peace 
plan whatsoever, and that his mission was what it had been [when] announced, - 
namely, fact-finding.’48 Welles’ words in Rome provide further evidence of the 
appearance he and the Administration wanted the mission to have. This marked the 
end of his time in Europe.
Washington: Welles’ Report, Italian Neutrality and Prospects for Peace
Welles arrived in the United States on March 27 and proceeded straight to
Washington to present Roosevelt with his report.
Welles’ report reveals to varying degrees the multiple aims of the mission. 
The explicit mention of a section entitled ‘Italy and Peace in Europe’ shows the 
importance Italy had assumed in Welles’ thinking as an objective for the mission. 
Implicit to this and in Welles’ conclusion is an acknowledgement that prolonging the 
‘phony war’ was on the verge of becoming impossible although anything that could 
be done to encourage its continuation might be beneficial. With regard to the original 
objective of the mission, Welles’ conclusion reveals that there was now no prospect 
for peace between the belligerents. Throughout the extensive, 117-page report, 
Welles’ capacity to record his conversations with Europe’s leaders is self-evident. 
That this includes a conclusion of only two pages shows that Welles did not embellish 
his report with a host of personal views or recommendations. It reads as a remarkably 
neutral narrative
The interesting aspects of the report for the mission’s objectives lies in the 
section entitled ‘Italy and Peace in Europe’.49 Welles began it by stating that 
‘Mussolini alone’ would determine Italy’s future. Welles’ understanding of this is
47 Telegram No.198 from Welles to Hull, 19 March 1940, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/135. FRUS 1940 
Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), p. 19.
48 ‘Diary of Trip to Europe with Sumner Welles’ by Moffat, p.52 SWP Box 211.
49 “Italy and Peace in Europe”. Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission 
to Europe, 121.840 Welles, Sumner/ 132'A FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.l 13-116.
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crucial. No matter what he thought about Ciano, he knew after his time in Rome that 
Mussolini was the one who counted. His subsequent efforts to further Italian 
neutrality in the spring of 1940 should be seen in this light. Welles saw a potentially 
pivotal role Mussolini could play, but nevertheless did not see Mussolini as a man of 
real character. This became clear when Welles reported to Roosevelt that Mussolini 
remained ‘at heart and in instinct an Italian peasant. He is vindictive, and will never 
forget either an injury or a blow to his personal or national prestige. He admires force 
and power. His own obsession is the recreation of the Roman Empire. His conscience 
will never trouble him as to the way or the means, provided the method of 
accomplishment in his judgement serves to gain the desired end’.50 These are not the 
words of a man, who had placed faith in Mussolini being an agent of peace. Instead he 
saw Mussolini’s position, particularly during his initial time in Rome, as one that 
could be exploited with the aim preserving Italian neutrality and the ‘phony war’. But 
he was far from hopeful as he considered Mussolini to be wedded to Berlin. Welles 
explained that if ‘Germany obtains some rapid apparent victories, such as the 
occupation of Holland and Belgium, I fear very much that Mussolini would then force 
Italy in on the German side -  and I use the word “force” advisedly’. Of course the 
events of April and May in Northern Europe encouraged Mussolini in that direction.
Even after this assessment Welles did turn to his belief in the value of seeking 
to improve relations with Rome. That he saw any worth in this reflects his, and the 
Administration’s, experience of seeking to explore every last opportunity: the one in a 
thousand chance. Welles reasoned that the ‘United States can make a very real and a 
very practical contribution towards the cause of peace by improving relations between 
the two countries’. He noted that Roosevelt’s letter to Mussolini had been ‘a powerful 
factor’ in the warm reception he had received. If relations could be improved, then 
accord between Rome and Washington ‘would do much to prevent any possible entry 
of Italy into the war, and should a negotiated peace in Europe prove practicable, the 
ability of the United States through the President to maintain a friendly and 
confidential contact with Mussolini might in many contingencies prove of exceptional 
value’. These comments again reflect Welles’ desire to keep an option open no matter 
how seemingly distasteful. Overall, the inclusion in Welles’ report of the section on 
Italy shows the emphasis that he placed on Mussolini and the role of Italy. Prefaced
50 Report by the Under Secretary of State (Welles) on His Special Mission to Europe, 121.840 Welles, 
Sumner/132'/2. FRUS 1940 Vol. 1. (USGPO, 1959), pp.l 16-117.
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by an accurate awareness of Hitler’s influence over Mussolini, Welles implicitly 
revealed the importance that prolonging Italian neutrality had assumed in the Welles 
mission, even if it were a hope against hope in the face of impending catastrophe.
Welles’ report also reveals the Under Secretary’s assessment that prospects for 
peace were absolutely minuscule. Although this section is perhaps tinged with his 
own views on the issues to be tackled in an eventual peace, the conclusions he draws 
are clear. Welles wrote for Roosevelt:
‘I do not believe there is the slightest chance of any successful 
negotiation at this time for a durable peace if the basis for such 
negotiation is made the problem of political and territorial readjustment or 
the problem of economic readjustment.
The basic problem I feel is the problem of security, inseparably linked to 
the problem of disarmament.’
In making this claim, Welles’ understanding that security meant guarantees 
against future aggression is clear. On this basis, he saw disarmament as a potential 
method of establishing security, yet he did not lose sight of the importance of political 
issues; ‘they must be solved before any lasting peace can be found.’ His concluding 
remarks show further the extent to which he was endeavouring to find that one in a 
thousand chance of averting catastrophe. Even this was prefaced with a realisation of 
the difficulties involved. ‘I do not underestimate the magnitude of the task of finding 
any hope of real peace so long as Hitler and his regime remain in control in 
Germany,’ Welles continued. ‘The only slight hope of peace, before Europe plunges 
into a war of devastation, or drags through a long-drawn-out war of attrition ... is the 
agreement by the great powers of Europe upon some practicable plan of security and 
disarmament. This would be the “miracle” spoken of by Mr Chamberlain which 
would persuade Great Britain and France once more to negotiate with Hitler.’ Welles’ 
belief that a miracle would be needed to avoid catastrophe was a tragically accurate 
assessment.
Washington: Roosevelt’s Press Conference
Welles had briefed Roosevelt, and then Hull on the morning of 29 March. The 
President announced later that day in a press conference that peace in Europe was a
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‘scant prospect’.51 Therefore, despite his assertions to the contrary ever since the 
mission had entered the public arena, such an admission implicitly acknowledged that 
exploring the possibilities for peace had been at least part of the thinking behind the 
mission. Nevertheless, Roosevelt opened the press conference by sticking to his 
publicly proclaimed line that the mission had not been meant to consider peace. He 
stated that Welles ‘had not received, nor has brought back to me, any peace proposals 
from any source’. Still, even after the mission, concern remained that the United 
States could become entangled in peace negotiations. Such anxiety would continue 
through the spring as events unfolded in Europe. Crucially, Roosevelt continued his 
statement by pointing to what he saw as the justification for the mission. In this he 
stressed, perhaps predictably, the information Welles had collected. ‘The information 
which he has received from the heads of the governments which he has visited will be 
of the greatest value to this government in the conduct of its foreign relations.’ He 
qualified this to state that it was not information regarding any peace settlement but 
information relating ‘to the views and policies of the European Governments 
mentioned’. Roosevelt then provided further justification by stressing the value of the 
fact that just one person, Welles, had been able to meet with so many different people. 
While also revealing his own penchant for personal diplomacy, in his next comment 
Roosevelt declared that he was ‘glad to say that Mr Welles’ mission has likewise 
resulted, through personal contacts and through the conversations which he held, in a 
clarification of the relations between the United States and the countries which he 
visited and will, I believe, assist in certain instances in the development of better 
understanding and more friendly relations’. Roosevelt’s final point touched on peace. 
‘Finally, even though there may be scant immediate prospect for the establishment of 
any just, stable, and lasting peace in Europe, the information made available to this 
Government as a result of Mr Welles’ mission will undoubtedly be of the greatest 
value when the time comes for the establishment of such a peace.’ Interestingly, it is 
only at the end that the word ‘peace’ is mentioned in connection with the Welles 
mission, and even then it is in dealing with the future peace and not the present. In 
looking to the future Roosevelt was in effect asking his audience, the American 
people, to think about what role the United States would have to play. In this sense the
51 Statement by the President, Issued to the Press, 29 March 1940, FRUS 1940 Vol. I. (USGPO, 1959), 
p.20. Rosenman, The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt 1940, pp.l 11-112. Quoted 
in full on page 5 of New York Times, 30 March 1940.
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mission was fulfilling its role of educating the American people about the dangers 
Roosevelt envisaged in a European war. Roosevelt’s final comments added a 
salutation to his friend’s efforts in Europe. ’To Mr Welles go my thanks and full 
appreciation for carrying out this difficult mission with extraordinary tact and 
understanding and in accordance with the best American diplomatic traditions.’ 
Roosevelt refused to add any more at the press conference. Within two weeks of 
Roosevelt’s announcement, the ‘phony war’ would end with Germany’s invasion of 
Scandinavia. Nonetheless, the themes that had fostered the Welles mission and the 
objectives Welles pursued did create in various forms a legacy that will be examined 
in the final chapter of this work.
Conclusions to Welles’ Trip to Europe
When Welles left Italy on 20 March he, in a better-informed position than the vast 
majority in Europe, suspected that the stalemate of the ‘phony war’ was drawing to a 
close. He ‘feared ... time would necessarily elapse.’52 The threat of the spring 
offensives had run as an undercurrent throughout the ‘phony war’, and were now 
staring Europe in the face. Within two weeks of Welles presenting his report to 
Roosevelt, Hitler ordered German forces into Denmark and Norway, and a month 
later Germany attacked the Low Countries. The same day, in Whitehall, Churchill 
became Prime Minister of Great Britain. These events fundamentally altered the 
geopolitical landscape that Welles had faced. Nevertheless, against a backdrop of the 
expectation that the ‘phony war’ would end in a matter of weeks with complete 
catastrophe, the perpetuation of the unreal stalemate and particularly of Italian 
neutrality remained important objectives for Welles.
This chapter has shown how in an increasingly pressurised situation, that the 
themes identified in this work became interwoven with the objectives of the mission. 
The emphasis once Welles was back in Rome was to perpetuate Italian neutrality and 
the ‘phony war’. He endeavoured to do this by continuing to talk to Ciano and 
Mussolini about an Italian role in any possibility of avoiding escalation. Welles was 
fully aware that this was unlikely to succeed, but he was familiar with operating in 
situations when the odds seemed ‘long’. He wrote later that any ‘ability of the United
52 Telegram No. 191 from Welles (Rome) to State Department, 17 March 1940, 121.840 Welles 
Sumner/143 General Records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Box 296, Archive II, Maryland.
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States to arrest the catastrophe was tenuous’.53 Welles also knew upon his return to 
Rome that the fate of Italy lay in the hands of ‘one man, and one man only’, that man 
being Mussolini. Despite Welles’ efforts to engage with Ciano, he knew that Ciano 
‘was wholly subservient’ to the Duce. This should be borne in mind when this work 
turns to examining Welles’ efforts to maintain Italian neutrality even after Hitler’s 
attack on the West: they were aimed directly at Mussolini. Welles saw this effort, 
manifested in a series of appeals, as part of his responsibility to explore every 
possibility to avoid the cataclysm of full-scale war in Europe. In this aspect he was 
taking to the extreme the State Department’s institutional memory of conducting 
policy knowing that any impact would be minimal. The theme identified, of Welles’ 
position in Administration foreign policy-making, is also evident here in the 
prominence Welles places on Italy as the mission winds down and into the summer of 
1940.
The other objectives that the mission had initially developed had, by the time 
of Roosevelt’s press conference, proved unattainable. This was always suspected to 
be the case. With regard to the exploration of the possibilities for peace, this had been 
exhausted. Nothing approaching acceptable peace terms had emerged. Instead, Welles 
could barely contain his disgust with those he had met in Berlin. Equally, the goal of 
fact-finding had been achieved through Welles’ thorough conversations as chronicled 
in his report. It was a surprise to no one, least of all Roosevelt and Welles that it 
contained little ground breaking information. The enquiry with regard to Allied war 
aims had provided Welles with a picture of what the Allies were fighting against: 
namely, Nazi domination of continental Europe. However, it would take closer 
Anglo-American cooperation on infinitely more important matters over the upcoming 
months and years for a synergy to emerge on what the British, and subsequently the 
United States, were fighting for. In the end this was a set of values espoused in 
proclamations such as Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms speech (January 1941) and 
epitomised in documents such as the Atlantic Charter (August 1941). In this light, the 
state of Anglo-American relations at the end of the mission was little different from 
what it had been immediately after Welles had left London. Roosevelt’s speech of 16 
March had further soothed some British anxieties, but many remained before the
53 Foreword by Sumner Welles, Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diary 1939-43, pp.vii-ix.
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momentous events of the spring took hold. An instant of these anxieties will be 
examined in the final chapter.
During the final leg of the Welles mission and upon Welles’ return to 
Washington, the continuing importance of American public opinion to the Roosevelt 
Administration is once more evident. Hull’s heightened concern in the last days of 
Welles’ time in Europe, as to the presentation of the Under Secretary’s activities, 
reflected the non-entangling element of American opinion. Welles too was aware of 
this during his time in Europe and of the dilemma it placed him in. The dual trends 
within American opinion allowed, and indeed encouraged, the President on the one 
hand to consider the situation in Europe, but on the other hand to steer clear of 
anything that the American public might regard as entangling. The line was thus very 
fine between accusations of being ensnared in European politicking and endeavouring 
to outline the challenges a European war posed to the United States. In public, the 
mission had to give the appearance that the United States was neutral, although this 
might have hampered Welles’ ability to create doubt over the future course of 
American policy. As it was, Roosevelt’s speech declaring that peace must have a 
moral basis, before his 29 March statement, can only have contributed to the belief in 
Rome and Berlin that they could discount the United States from their consideration. 
By that stage Roosevelt in Washington had learned of Welles’ views of the Nazi 
regime, and had told Long in their 12 March conversation (quoted here at the end of 
Chapter Three) his retrospective motivations for the mission. Roosevelt saw no 
prospect of reconciling the issues at stake in Europe with his perception of the views 
of the American people at that time. Essentially he was hamstrung, and was left to 
watch with no tools, diplomatic or otherwise, to affect Hitler’s advance across 
Western Europe in April and May.
In the face of Nazi Germany’s exploits in the spring of 1940, the final chapter 
of this work considers the legacy of the Welles mission in Europe and in Washington. 
Any legacy was, however, tenuous, as the events of the spring overwhelmed the 
margins at which the Welles mission operated. The New York Times, which had 
emblazoned news of the mission’s announcement on its front page on 10 February, 
relegated coverage of Roosevelt’s press conference of its end to page 5. Comment 
was restricted too. The New York Times article stressed that the mission would be of 
use at some nebulous point in the future: ‘When [the] Time Comes’, and that the
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mission had ended in nothing more than a “‘a very handsome sentence’” .54 Such an 
assessment illustrates the minimal impact -  always acknowledged as being the most 
likely outcome -  of the mission. The analysis of the mission’s motives and objectives 
is consequently where the real diplomatic and political drama lies, and has thus been 
the focus of this study.
54 Felix Belair Jr in The New York Times, 30 March 1940.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
The Welles Mission: A Short-term Legacy to the Anglo-American Relationship
and Rooseveltian Foreign Policy
Roosevelt’s statement at his press conference on 29 March 1940 that there was ‘scant 
immediate’ prospect for peace proved tragically correct within two weeks. The spring 
and summer of 1940 saw a fundamental remapping of Europe’s political geography 
which inaugurated four years of Nazi domination on the continent. Germany’s attack 
upon Scandinavia (Operation Weseruebung, 8-9 April) and then the Low Countries 
(Operation Gelb, 10 May), Churchill becoming British Prime Minister, Italy’s 
eventual intervention, the capitulation of France, the drama of Dunkirk, and then the 
Battle of Britain all contributed to one of the most tumultuous six months in European 
history. Under such circumstances it is of little surprise that the mission of Sumner 
Welles has been ill-considered. With the geopolitical landscape changed so 
dramatically in such a short space of time, the legacy of the Welles mission was 
overtaken in many respects. Any long-term impact amid the unfolding European war 
was negligible.
This final chapter begins with an examination of a number of episodes in the 
spring and early summer of 1940 that illustrate the continuing relevance of the themes 
this thesis has utilised in exploring the mission and the objectives that Roosevelt and 
Welles had for it. In one sense at least, then, this meant that the mission did produce a 
series of legacies. The key role played by Welles, the worries of Hull, the concept of 
policy being carried out in the knowledge that it would have only a minimal effect, 
and the influence of relations with Great Britain, are all evident in the final phase of 
the mission’s influence. The first episode under consideration concerns a series of 
appeals sent to Mussolini by the Roosevelt Administration. The chapter moves on to 
look at the continuing concern that Welles and the Administration had for the public’s 
perception of the mission. It does so by looking at Welles’ conduct in dealing with a 
photograph of him taken during his time in Paris. The capacity for misunderstanding 
in Anglo-American relations, which has characterised much of this analysis, including 
Welles’ time in London, was again in evidence in the spring of 1940. This was 
particularly the case as the two governments exchanged views over the proposal 
Chamberlain had made in his second meeting with Welles on 13 March. Although the
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individual events that this chapter examines were of minimal importance when set 
against the events of the summer of 1940 they are crucial in illustrating the thesis that 
this work has presented. The Welles mission can be truly understood only if the 
longer-term themes that made it possible are considered alongside the objectives that 
both Roosevelt and Welles sought from it. This chapter will conclude by offering its 
final analysis of the Welles mission in terms of Rooseveltian foreign policy and the 
Anglo-American relationship at the beginning of the summer of 1940.
Welles. Presidential Appeals and Italian Neutrality
Roosevelt watched in dismay as German forces struck in the spring of 1940. His 
capacity to influence events was limited by the dual trends within American public 
opinion. In these circumstances he adopted a policy option that he had used before in 
times of increased tension -  in April and August 1939. In those instances Roosevelt 
had sent appeals to key European leaders in the expectation not that they would avert 
disaster, but that they instead might provide a momentary pause for thought and also 
indicate again to the American people who were the ones with aggressive intent. 
These were the same motives that Roosevelt had when he composed a series of 
messages for Mussolini in April and May 1940. The fast-changing environment meant 
each was different, but the underlying motivation remained the same as it had been 
when previous presidential appeals had been considered. The appeals, unsurprisingly, 
had very little impact on events in Europe. Ultimately, the case for persevering with 
efforts to preserve Italian neutrality was made redundant by Mussolini’s declaration of 
war on the Allies on 10 June 1940.
As for Welles, although he quickly resumed his normal duties within the State 
Department upon his return from Europe, he did not forget the final section of his 
report -  entitled ‘Italy and Peace in Europe’. It was his desire to see Italy remain 
neutral and so to limit the scale of the war which governed his thinking in the 
aftermath of his mission. Welles at first opposed and then supported the series of 
presidential appeals destined for Mussolini. His change of mind reflected the lengths 
he was prepared to go to in order to preserve Italian neutrality. Having opposed the 
sending of the first appeal on the grounds that it would serve only to incense 
Mussolini and push him closer to Berlin, Welles sought to use subsequent appeals to 
reverse this.
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The first of the appeals illustrates once more Roosevelt’s disposition to try and 
assist the Allied cause. The appeal was prompted by a British request. Lothian told the 
State Department of British concerns over Mussolini’s position following Hitler’s 
conquests in Scandinavia.1 In a meeting on 29 April the Ambassador told Hull that the 
‘preliminary reverses’ that the Allies anticipated in Norway might encourage 
Germany to entice Italy into the war. In the light of the Administration’s ‘interest in 
peace and in keeping the war from spreading’, Lothian continued by asking whether 
Roosevelt ‘might find something further to say to Mussolini that would be persuasive 
with him to keep him out of the war at least for the present’.2 Hull’s response was 
non-committal, betraying his belief that there was little value in ‘these personal 
appeals’.3 His memoirs note that he ‘said so to the President on several occasions’. 
Nevertheless, it seems that Roosevelt had already been thinking along these lines, as 
he had members of the State Department prepare a draft. Once he had learned of 
Lothian’s request, the message was sent to Rome, where Phillips relayed it to Ciano 
on 1 May 1940.4 The message, dressed up in typical Rooseveltian language, was a 
‘warning not to enter the war’.5 The note cautioned that if the war were to spread, 
‘some neutral states’, i.e. the United States, would have to review their position. 
Ciano confided to his diary that, despite its ‘polite phrases’, the objective was ‘none 
the less clear’ in providing a warning to Rome. Ciano described Mussolini as 
accepting the appeal with ‘ill-grace’ and his response as ‘cutting and hostile’. 
Mussolini was not to be shaken from his allegiance to the Axis.
This reaction was precisely the basis of Welles’ objection to sending the 
appeal. He had feared that to do so could prompt Mussolini into taking the decision to 
join the wqr. Moffat, Welles’ travelling companion, shared this view. His diary 
recorded that Welles ‘and I argued very strongly that no message should be sent. After 
all, any message would imply that we disbelieved the assurances Mussolini had given 
Sumner Welles six weeks ago’.6 Although these assurances amounted to nothing 
substantial for the Administration, to send an appeal so shortly after Welles’ return
1 Lothian had already telephoned the Department with his concerns. Moffat recorded on 28 April that 
Lothian had called and asked ‘if there was anything that the President could do to restrain Mussolini, or 
any message that he could send, the Allies would be enormously grateful’. Hooker (ed.), Moffat, p.305.
2 Memorandum of conversation between Hull and Lothian, 29 April 1940, CHP.
3 Hull, Memoirs Vol. 1., p.778
4 Telegram No. 45 Roosevelt to Mussolini, 29 April 1940, Department of State Publications. Peace and 
War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington D.C., 1943), pp.518-19.
5 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, pp.241-242.
6 Hooker, Moffat, p.305
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would indicate to Mussolini that the Americans placed little value in their 
conversations in Rome. Unusually, Welles found himself in agreement with Hull, 
although for different reasons, and in opposition to Roosevelt in arguing against this 
first appeal. Nevertheless, Roosevelt proceeded as a result of Lothian’s direct request.
In the aftermath of the German attacks on 10 May, and despite Mussolini’s 
abrupt response to Roosevelt’s first appeal, the Administration looked again at the 
possibility. On this occasion Welles helped to draft the appeal which was given to 
Mussolini on 15 May.7 The quick German successes in the Low Countries encouraged 
Welles to argue that another message might act to temper Mussolini’s desire to enter 
the war. In accordance with this, the telegram was composed in an understanding 
tenor. Ciano noticed this, as he commented that the ‘tone is changed; it is no longer, 
as it was the first time, in a covertly threatening style’.8 Instead he noted that it was 
‘rather a ... conciliatory message’. The text began with Roosevelt making ‘the simple 
plea that you [Mussolini], responsible for Italy, withhold your hand, stay wholly apart 
from any war and refrain from any threat of attack. So you only can help mankind 
tonight and tomorrow and in the pages of history’.9 Roosevelt’s words, composed by 
Welles, were a clear attempt to encourage Mussolini to remain out of the war. Ciano 
confided to his diary that an appeal was likely to have little effect on Mussolini, 
‘when he is convinced that he has victory in his grasp’. Although Ciano called upon 
Phillips to relay Mussolini’s ‘thanks to the President’ and to assure him that the 
appeal would ‘be given the most serious consideration,’ Phillips was not positive in 
reporting back to Washington.10 He wrote: ‘It is clear ... that the Duce does not desire 
to receive me today.’ Mussolini had reverted to the stance he had adopted prior to the 
Welles mission, of refusing to see the Ambassador. Clearly, any notion of 
understanding Welles might have inaugurated during his own time in Rome had 
expired. Mussolini’s refusal even to see Phillips indicated this, and meant that any 
further appeals were only likely to enrage the Italian.
7 Telegram No. 47 Roosevelt to Mussolini, 14 May 1940, Department of State Publications. Peace and 
War, pp.524-25.
8 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 160.
9 Telegram No. 47 Roosevelt to Mussolini, 14 May 1940, Department of State Publications. Peace and 
War, pp.524-25.
10 Telegram No.348 from Phillips to Washington, 15 May 1940, FDR PSF Box 3.
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Nevertheless, a further appeal from Roosevelt followed on 26 May 1940." 
The circumstances of this appeal reveal the desperate situation that the Allies were in, 
as it was prompted by a request from London and Paris. With German forces 
advancing rapidly through the Low Countries, the British and French were ready to 
consider negotiating with Mussolini. Clive Ponting states that Churchill and Reynaud 
asked Roosevelt to ascertain from Mussolini ‘what price he wanted for a settlement’.1 2 
Yet John Lukács pointed to a subtle but crucial difference in the views of London and 
Paris with regard to Mussolini’s role. He states that Reynaud’s ‘main purpose was to 
try buying Mussolini off; Halifax’s to try inducing Mussolini to mediate with 
Hitler’.13 Although both these views prompted the Anglo-French approach to 
Washington the distinction is crucial; ‘buying off Italy facilitated the war against 
Germany, Italian mediation meant its end’.14 While the story of Halifax’s readiness to 
consider a settlement with Hitler at the end of May 1940 and Churchill’s refusal to do 
so is a fascinating one, it is beyond the scope of this study. Its relevance here is that 
the Allies turned to Roosevelt as they sought to influence Mussolini. Nonetheless, and 
sharing the outlook of the Administration, the British were not hopeful of the impact 
of an appeal. Lorraine, the British Ambassador to Rome, was despondent as he felt no 
‘attempt by Roosevelt would do any good’, yet the Ambassador suggested, ‘the 
situation could hardly be made worse.’15 With Mussolini refusing to see Phillips, the 
American delivered this third message to Ciano. The intention of the message, again 
composed by Welles, fitted very much with the objective he had pursued when on his 
mission of limiting the scope of the war. The telegram declared that Roosevelt’s ‘sole 
desire in making this suggestion [was] to make a practical effort towards avoiding the 
extension of the war’.16 In more candid terms, Ciano considered Roosevelt’s proposal 
amounted to an offer ‘to become the mediator between us and the Allies, making
11 Telegram No. 49 Roosevelt to Mussolini, 26 May 1940, Department of State Publications. Peace and 
War, p.536.
12 Clive Ponting, Churchill (London, 1995), p.450. Frank Warren Graff agrees that Churchill and 
Reynaud asked Roosevelt to ‘say the British and French were willing to consider reasonable Italian 
claims.’ Frank Warren Graff, The Strategy o f Involvement: A Diplomatic Biography o f Sumner Welles 
1933-43 (New York, 1988), p.313.
13 Lukács, Five Days in London, p. 119.
14 Guy Nicholas Esnouf, British Government War Aims and Attitudes Toward a Negotiated Peace, 
September 1939 to July 1940 PhD Dissertation, Cambridge University, 1988, p.223.
There is considerable debate as to how far members of the British Cabinet were prepared to negotiate 
with Mussolini at this stage. In the tense cabinet meetings of 26-28 May Churchill’s will to fight on 
eventually prevailed over Halifax’s desire to consider negotiation. This is well covered in John Lukács, 
Five Days in London May 1940, (London, 2001).
15 John Lukács, Five Days in London May 1940 (London, 2001), p.l 18.
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himself [Roosevelt] personally responsible for the execution, after the war, of any 
eventual agreements’.16 7 Phillips showed some agreement in stating the message ‘was 
an offer of mediation’.18 Crucially, though, Roosevelt and Welles were not preparing 
any American intercession. Historian Frank Warren Graff regards this plea as ‘the 
next logical step in his series of appeals to Mussolini’.19 Having so carefully 
orchestrated the Welles mission to present the image that the United States was not 
going to become entangled in European affairs, the pair were not in a position to 
change their minds despite the trying circumstances of the spring of 1940. 
Notwithstanding the desperate pleas of Churchill and Reynaud, this appeal did not 
foretell any American involvement.
As the situation deteriorated for the democracies with Germany’s armies 
continuing their advance, Roosevelt considered a final appeal to Mussolini, which was 
sent on 30 June.20 Welles was less involved in this one, and its language was 
decidedly more bellicose. This appeal amounted to a definite warning to Mussolini 
and cautioned him about the ‘traditional interest’ of the United States in the 
Mediterranean. It went on to say ‘that Italy’s intervention in the war would bring 
about an increase in armaments by the United States and a multiplying of help in raw 
materials and war supplies to the Allies.’ Nonetheless, the result was the same, with 
only Mussolini’s level of annoyance rising. This was relayed to Phillips by Ciano. 
‘America has no business in the Mediterranean,’ the Italian stated, any more ‘than 
Italy has in the Caribbean sea.’21 2Ciano warned Roosevelt that any ‘further pressure 
...can only stiffen Mussolini’s determination.’ This was precisely what Welles had 
feared at the outset of the appeals process. The Italian decision to go to war alongside 
Germany had already been taken. It had been agreed to in principle at the Brenner 
Pass meeting, and Ciano wrote in his diary the day before Roosevelt’s final appeal 
arrived that the ‘decision has been taken. The die is cast. Today Mussolini gave me
"Jlthe communication he has sent to Hitler about our entry into the war’.
16 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 161.
17 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano 's Diary, p.255.
18 Phillips, Ventures in Diplomacy, p. 160.
19 Graff, The Strategy o f Involvement, p.313.
20 Telegram Hull to Phillips, 30 May 1940, Department of State Publications. Peace and War, pp.538- 
539.
21 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, pp.257-8.
22 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, p.257.
236
Chapter Seven
The significance of this series of appeals in the aftermath of the Welles 
mission lies in a number of areas. In the fluid situation of April and May 1940, they 
reveal that Roosevelt was deeply concerned by the escalation of the conflict. His 
readiness to act in accord with the Allied cause is exposed again. Furthermore, the 
appeals, particularly the first and fourth, became clear warnings to Mussolini, and 
risked antagonising the Italian. Roosevelt’s patience was about to break. It did so most 
clearly in the speech the President delivered on 10 June at Charlottesville, Virginia. 
Roosevelt declared of Mussolini’s decision to join the conflict that day that ‘the hand 
that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbour’. Roosevelt continued, 
promising that the United States would act, but adding the proviso that American 
security would also be enhanced: ‘We will extend to the opponents of force the 
material resources of this nation: and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up 
the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have 
equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense.’23 The 
fact that Roosevelt pointed out that ‘at the same time’ as offering assistance to those 
fighting the Axis, his policies would be increasing the security of the United States, 
reflected his long-held policy which accommodated American non-entangling 
opinion. Also reflecting a longer-term practice was the very process of delivering 
Presidential appeals that were unlikely to influence their recipients. Again the 
influence of the American people can be seen, as the appeals served to provide a 
record of the Administration’s efforts to avert war and in doing so point out the 
aggressive designs of the Axis powers. In regard to Welles, these appeals reveal a 
variety of salient lines that this thesis has put forward. Not only do the appeals and 
their drafting show his involvement in policy-making, but they also reveal his desire 
to fulfil a legacy to his mission. By maintaining a dialogue with Mussolini, Welles 
hoped that Italian neutrality could help the cause of the Allies and limit the scope of 
the conflict. There is therefore no little continuity between Welles’ pursuit of this 
during his time in Europe earlier in the year and upon his return.
The Appearance of Welles’ Mission and American Public Opinion
The consideration of the American public that was evident in the appeals to Mussolini
was already evident in the aftermath of the Welles mission. In dealing with a minor
23 Rosenman (ed.), The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt Vol. 1940, pp.259-64.
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incident surrounding the publication of a photograph taken while he was in Paris, 
Welles maintained the Administration’s care over the appearance of his mission to the 
American people. On 16 March the French journal l ’Illustration had published a 
photograph showing Welles in discussion with Reynaud.24 Little might have been 
expected of this, until the photograph came to the attention of the Press Section of the 
German Foreign Office in early April. The reason was the map which appeared in the 
background of the picture. The Germans were riled by the borders to the south and 
east which showed to Berlin’s mind that Germany was divided. Protests were made to 
Alexander Kirk, the American Chargé in Berlin, that Welles had discussed territorial 
matters with the French -  the implication of the map. Kirk had no answer, as Welles 
was travelling home at the time. Once Welles had arrived in Washington and 
delivered his report, he set about countering the stories that the picture had spawned in 
Europe’s press. These stories claimed that Welles had overstepped the public goal of 
his mission. The adverse reaction that they could cause across the Atlantic had been 
one of Hull’s concerns since the mission had first been considered. Welles’ response 
was categorical in its refutation of such allegations. He called the charges ‘fantastic 
nonsense’, as at ‘no time during the course of my interviews in Paris or in any other 
capital I visited was any reference made to any maps. I never even looked at any map 
which may have been in Monsieur Reynaud’s office’.25 This message was relayed to 
Berlin, and Kirk was then summoned to the German Foreign Office. There he was 
given a statement that the Germans did not ‘care’ whether Welles ‘noticed the map or 
not’ but that the picture had been published ‘showing Mr Welles, M. Reynaud and the 
map’. The German announcement continued: what ‘would the world have said if we, 
on occasion of Mr Welles’ visit in Berlin, had had him photographed with Ribbentrop 
and Goering with a map showing a drastic partition of England? This is not a question 
of “Germany-Welles” but a question of “war policy or peace policy”.’ While this 
question might not have been entirely unreasonable, it was never answered, as wholly 
more serious events took place in the days following this meeting. Importantly, in 
regard to this study, that Welles had to issue a statement about the appearance of the 
mission even after he had returned illustrates that the Administration was still very 
aware of the political risks his mission had entailed. Even then, the Administration
24 Please see Appendix Four.
25 Telegram Mo. 843 from Washington to Kirk, 5 April 1940, 121.840 Welles Sumner/165b General 
records of the Department of State 1940-1944 Central Decimal File Box 297, Archive II, Maryland.
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was conscious of the American public entertaining the thought that Welles had 
discussed political -  entangling -  issues.
Anglo-American Relations in the Aftermath of Welles’ Mission: British Views of 
Roosevelt
As has been explored in this work, those in Chamberlain’s government still harboured 
notable concerns over Welles’ mission after the Under Secretary left London. 
Although these were mitigated by Roosevelt’s speech on 16 March and the low-key 
statement he had delivered on 29 March, the possibility that the White House might 
act to expose the British position still existed. These concerns, revealing of the effect 
the Welles mission had upon Anglo-American relations, were evident at the beginning 
of April 1940. Lothian reported to London the substance of a conversation he held 
with Roosevelt and Welles on 3 April 1940.26 Roosevelt had begun the conversation 
by referring to the proposal Chamberlain had made during his meeting with Welles on 
13 March. This proposal was for the British to give a territorial guarantee of Germany 
to the United States. In raising Chamberlain’s suggestion at the beginning of April, 
Roosevelt and Welles were trying to exploit the opportunity to clarify British war and 
peace aims. The proposal had been made by Chamberlain in order to dispel the 
impression Welles had garnered in Berlin of the ‘unanimity of opinion in Germany’, 
that the Allies saw the break up of Germany as one of their war aims. How far 
Chamberlain thought at the time that the scheme would be taken up is debatable. 
Nevertheless, the proposal suggested that the British ‘bind themselves not to attack 
Germany by a formal undertaking given to the United States’.27 Roosevelt’s response 
to this suggestion was typical of the policy the Administration pursued in the late 
1930s, in that it sought to bring a multilateral aspect to the offer and so allow the 
United States to ‘retreat from the responsibility’. Roosevelt’s justification was that if 
Chamberlain’s offer was directed to all neutral states because o f ‘American politics’ it 
would be more acceptable in the United States. In this light, Roosevelt had a prepared 
statement which outlined what he sought from such a policy. It bore the hallmarks of 
the foreign policy that emanated from the Roosevelt State Department in calling upon
26 Telegram No. 459 from Lothian to Foreign Office, 3 April 1940, C 5073/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
27 Record of conversation between Welles, Chamberlain and Halifax in despatch from the Foreign 
Office to Lothian, 13 March 1940, No. 274 C3999/89/18 FO 371 24406 PRO.
2 3 9
Chapter Seven
the need for security of ‘national unity and existence to all nations both large and 
small’, the removal of armaments that prevented children having ‘a free and happy 
life’, equal access to raw materials and markets, the abolition of offensive weapons, 
and the freedom of information. The influence of Welles is evident in these terms, as 
they would lead to the code of conduct in international relations that he believed in. 
Also implicit in this proposal was the aim that Welles had pursued when in London of 
gathering information on the British war aims. An alignment between British aims 
and the proposals the Administration was considering would have helped present the 
Allied cause to the American people. This was clear from Roosevelt’s final statement: 
‘The Allied objective in fact was security in the widest sense of the word for all 
nations. In this way only could all nations alike look forward to future generations 
living under some other regime than that of fear.’ Lothian’s response to this was 
characteristically to point to the immediate issue facing his government: i.e. the 
ongoing conflict. Although Roosevelt had prefaced his proposal by stating that it 
would not enter ‘at this stage into the question of possible peace terms’, Lothian 
rightly pointed out that it would be well nigh impossible not to give ‘the impression 
that it was a proposal for peace’. This was clearly of concern to Roosevelt and Welles. 
The latter immediately suggested an addendum to any proposal that the Allies ‘ought 
to make it clear that it [the proposal] is not concerned with the conditions of peace but 
solely to enlighten the nations including Germany about the fundamental basis of the 
new world which the Allies had in view’. The concern for projecting a longer-term 
vision of what the Allies were fighting for  is revealed again, particularly in light of 
Welles work on a post-war planning committee.
Lothian’s report of this meeting caused much concern in London, reminiscent 
of that raised at the outset of the Welles mission. The report was first seen on 8 April 
by R.M. Makins, a clerk in the Central Department, who concisely described the 
British concerns.28 He wrote that Roosevelt ‘has completely misunderstood the point 
of our proposal’, given that, ‘it was an essential part of the proposal that the 
undertaking not to attack Germany would be given by the Allies to the United States 
Government only, who would therefore accept -  as a stakeholder -  some indirect 
responsibility’. Here, Makins identifies what seemed an intractable problem for the 
British in dealing with the United States. Cadogan added in a most succinct statement
28 Comments by Makins (8/4/40) attached to Telegram No. 459 from Lothian to Foreign Office, 3 April 
1940, C 5073/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
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that the 'principal snag’ was that ‘the US will not act alone’. This left Makins to 
conclude that Roosevelt’s suggested text was ‘nothing but the familiar demand that 
we should make [a] further statement of peace aims.’ That the British were aware of 
the Administration’s desire is significant in revealing an understanding of the 
pressures Roosevelt operated under. However, the reticence evident in Makins’ tone 
discloses a British distaste for Roosevelt’s dependence on American opinion. On the 
other hand, for Roosevelt, repeated statements of British peace aims would help 
distinguish between the Allies and the Axis in the eyes of the American people.
The reservations the British had about Roosevelt’s proposal were expressed in 
stark terms by Vansittart. Having read Makins’ remarks he characterised Roosevelt’s 
draft a ‘characteristically woolly’ and the President’s ‘references to disarmament, 
abolition of offensive weapons, etc. reflect[ing] the usual American naivete on these 
matters’. Vansittart was adamant as to how the British government should react to 
Roosevelt’s suggestion: ‘Let us now get on with fighting the war, which is the only 
effective form of propaganda. And do not let us get drawn into all this embarrassing 
rigmarole by these distant and inexperienced amateurs.’29 This disenchantment 
replicated Vansittart’s attitude towards the Welles mission, and so did his final 
concern. Repeating his suspicion that the upcoming presidential election was dictating 
Roosevelt’s appeals, Vansittart suggested that ‘His Majesty’s Government must on no 
account be influenced by tyros, even if these are influenced by electioneering 
notions’. Those in the Foreign Office were clearly less than impressed with the 
President’s counter proposal in the aftermath of the Welles mission.
At a time when Hitler’s forces were making rapid progress in Scandinavia, 
Halifax’s priority in dealing with Roosevelt’s proposal was to remain engaged in 
dialogue with Washington. Makins wrote of Halifax that he ‘wished to keep President 
Roosevelt in play in spite of the importance of the events in Denmark and Norway.30 
Cadogan shared this view. He wrote: ‘...I should have thought we ought to send a 
[telegram]... I don’t like leaving the President unassured (he might even do something 
foolish on his own).’ Cadogan’s candid admission demonstrated the potential that still 
existed for misunderstanding and confusion in Anglo-American relations. The worry
29 Comments by Vansittart (8/4/40) attached to Telegram No. 459 from Lothian to Foreign Office, 3 
April 1940, C 5073/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
30 Comments by Makins (17/4/40) attached to Telegram No. 459 from Lothian to Foreign Office, 3 
April 1940, C 5073/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
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for the Foreign Office, as it had been in early February, was that Roosevelt might act 
independently, and in London’s eyes rashly, and so jeopardise British interests.
In order to forestall this possibility, Halifax authored a telegram to Lothian on 
20 April 1940.31 It questioned whether the President would want to maintain his 
proposal under the circumstances brought about by Hitler’s successes in Scandinavia. 
Halifax wrote that in ‘the altered circumstances we presume that the President would 
regard a statement of the kind he suggests to be inopportune. A brutal aggression has 
just taken place and further attacks on inoffensive neutrals are very probable. In the 
circumstances a statement intended primarily to reassure the German people would be 
open to considerable misconstruction’. Lothian was already well versed in conveying 
sensitive issues to the Administration, and, to the President especially owing to their 
personal relationship. At this point the matter was taken no further because of the 
force of events, as Hitler’s military consolidated their conquests in Scandinavia.
Nevertheless, this episode illustrates the potential for misinterpretation in the 
Anglo-American relationship in the aftermath of the Welles mission. The British 
viewed Roosevelt’s response to Chamberlain’s proposal with suspicion and 
frustration. The possibility that the suggestion might prove to be a precursor to a 
further embarrassing policy drive from Washington still existed, and, the terms the 
President offered were just a reiteration of those they had heard before. At the same 
time though, Roosevelt’s suggestion was viewed as a relatively low-key and 
somewhat belated outcome of the Welles mission. That the proposal remained 
bilateral at that stage gave the British greater scope to manage any developments that 
Roosevelt might consider. In this sense it did not cause any wider embarrassment, and 
so fulfil the concerns held earlier in the year that Roosevelt would publicly 
compromise the British. Halifax’s response of keeping Roosevelt ‘in play’ revealed 
the approach the British were adopting by the spring of 1940 in dealing with the 
President. With the Welles mission having provided a portent, Halifax and Lothian’s 
responses to the proposal indicated that, despite the potential for exasperation in 
London, it was still in British interests to try to accommodate Roosevelt. This was in 
order to keep up to date with Washington’s thinking and check at the earliest 
opportunity any move by the Administration, that they considered rash. As an 
outcome of the Welles mission this discussion over Chamberlain’s proposal reveals
31 Telegram No. 621 from Halifax to Lothian, 20 April 1940, C 5073/89/18 FO 371 24407 PRO.
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how neither party was able to wholly grasp, in accordance with their own aims, the 
aims of the other. As David Reynolds suggests of Anglo-American relations during 
the summer of 1940, both governments were ‘engaged in an uneasy bargaining game’ 
and were ‘exploring in a rather heavy handed way how best to obtain support from the 
other’.32 Support in various forms would ultimately be forthcoming because of the 
catastrophic events of the summer, and not in any meaningful sense owing to any 
positive outcome from the Welles mission.
The events that have been analysed in this chapter thus far -  the presidential 
appeals, the response to the I ’Illustration picture and the Anglo-American exchange 
over Chamberlain’s suggestion, have pointed out elements of the longer-term themes 
that are necessary in understanding the place of the Welles mission in Rooseveltian 
foreign policy. Between these events, Welles’ role, Hull’s concerns, foreign policy 
being enacted with little prospect of influencing events, regard to Anglo-American 
relations, are all evident. Underlying them all was a concern for American opinion. 
Furthermore, of the objectives Welles had for his mission, the pursuit of Italian 
neutrality and the desire for clear assertions of British aims were still being pursued 
and providing a legacy to the mission. In the closing portion of this study, the themes 
that have allowed for this examination of the Welles mission will be considered in a 
final analysis of Rooseveltian foreign policy in the spring of 1940.
An Assessment of Rooseveltian Foreign Policy in the Aftermath of the Welles 
Mission
The governing principles of Rooseveltian foreign policy were altered little by the 
experience of the Welles mission. Roosevelt had believed since Munich at least that 
Hitler would ultimately have to be stopped in the only terms he understood: military 
force. Kimball writes: ‘Roosevelt clearly believed that the defeat of Britain [and 
France] at the hands of Nazi Germany posted a very real threat to the national security 
and interests of the United States.’33 At the outbreak of war he was ready to support 
the Allied cause against the Axis, and to assist them as far as he could. For Roosevelt 
personally, Kimball again writes, ‘the question was not whether America would aid 
Britain and the Allies, but to what degree’. Roosevelt’s efforts to ensure revision of 
the neutrality laws should be seen as an example of this. That he could go no further
32 Reynolds, The Creation o f the Anglo-American Alliance, p. 116.
33 Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act -  Lend Lease 1939-45 (Baltimore, 1969), p.9.
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and offer direct assistance to the Allies reflected his realisation of an ill-prepared 
American military infrastructure, but more importantly, the views of the American 
people. As explained at the outset of this thesis, Roosevelt had to contend with dual 
trends in American opinion. Their influence on his foreign policy and on the Welles 
mission is manifest.
The non-entangling sentiment within American opinion made overt assistance 
to the cause of the democracies impossible during the period covered by this study. 
Roosevelt knew this, and thus engaged his energies in circumventing its influence. To 
a greater or lesser degree all of the policy initiatives that have been examined here in 
the run-up to war, and the Welles mission itself, had to contend with it. In Roosevelt’s 
view the American people had to be educated in a sophisticated and respectful manner 
to understand the threats he saw in Europe. However, having been caught too far 
ahead of American opinion in the aftermath of the Quarantine Speech, he was 
conscious that to implement bold policy initiatives could be counter-productive. In 
these circumstances the force of events provided the best form of education for the 
American people. That is why British and French collusion with Hitler at Munich did 
so much to damage the cause of the Allies in the eyes of the American people, and 
why upon learning of Hitler’s attack on Scandinavia in early April 1940 Roosevelt 
proclaimed it a ‘great thing’ as it would force a ‘great many Americans to think about 
the potentialities of the war’.34 The ever-erudite Lothian had a keen understanding of 
Roosevelt’s position. He wrote in the aftermath of Germany’s invasion of Scandinavia 
that the ‘intrinsic ugliness of the aggression achieved effects that no Allied 
propaganda could have secured’.35 The impact of this, Lothian explained would not be 
seen in terms of any ‘great movement towards intervention’, but crucially in creating 
‘a profound effect on American opinion in the sense that it has increased largely the 
number of those who feel that Hitlerism will inevitably in the end force the United 
States of America into the war in defence of her own vital interests’. In simple terms, 
Lothian surmised that ‘The United States is ninety-five percent anti-Hitler, is ninety- 
five percent determined to keep out of war if it can, and will only enter the war when 
its own vital interests are challenged’.36 This analysis was what faced Roosevelt when 
composing his foreign policy in early 1940. As the summer wore on the British
34 Jonathon Daniels, The Complete Presidential Press Conferences o f Franklin D. Roosevelt Volume 
XV (New York, 1972), p.242.
35 Letter No.362 from Lothian to Halifax, 23 April 1940, 3241/182/9 FO 115 PRO.
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understanding became more sophisticated, with Cadogan commenting in the 
immediate aftermath of Churchill’s request for American destroyers: ‘I’m quite 
convinced that President] will do all he can, but he can’t go ahead of his public.’36 7 
The rapid success of the German military, which saw them reach the English Channel 
by 20 May, heightened Roosevelt’s consideration of these dual views. He dealt with 
them by focusing on rearmament, on 16 May 1940 he had called upon the nation to 
produce ‘50,000 planes a year’, a total that was eventually exceeded by one hundred 
percent.38 Under the pressure of these dual trends it is understandable that 
Rooseveltian foreign policy was made with a view to it appearing non-entangling. 
This meant policy was accepted, by those orchestrating it, as not being able to directly 
influence events in Europe. The limits were appreciated by those around him: to 
paraphrase Berle’s description of the appeals sent to Europe in August 1939, 
Rooseveltian foreign policy at times had the appearance of an ill-timed Valentine sent 
to an inappropriate recipient. Crucially, though, with regard to public opinion, the 
Administration were convinced that these moves had to be made, even if they bore the 
hallmarks of the naivety Vansittart identified in the Welles mission.
After war had broken out in September 1939, Roosevelt pondered how to 
reconcile his belief in the need for Hitler to be overcome and his inability to influence 
events because of American opinion. The emergence of what became the Welles 
mission in early January 1940 is self-evidently complex. Yet the ultimate shape of the 
mission was determined by the themes that this thesis has identified. Each of these 
will now be considered in summary as this work reaches its conclusion.
The intervention of Sumner Welles was critical to the mission that emerged in 
January and subsequently developed in early 1940. Described as ‘the most Olympian 
of Roosevelt’s advisers’, Welles’ relationship with Roosevelt was such that the pair 
were practised in concocting policy and its direction.39 Roosevelt’s penchant for 
personal diplomacy facilitated this and is well seen in the Welles mission. Kimball 
remarks appropriately that ‘one of the characteristics of Franklin Roosevelt’s long 
presidency was his emphasis on personal diplomacy, both in his use of personal 
contacts and in his desire to shape the broad, long-term direction of American foreign
36 Letter No.362 from Lothian to Halifax, 23 April 1940, 3241/182/9 FO 115 PRO.
’7 Dilks (ed.), Cadogan, p.285.
38 Edward Stettinius, Lend-Lease-A Weapon for Victory (London, 1944), p.24.
39 John Lamberton Harper, American Visions o f Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, & 
Dean G. Acheson (New York and Cambridge, 1994), p. 178.
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relations to meet his own criteria’.40 Through Welles, Roosevelt was able to gamer 
valuable information on the individuals who were involved in the war in Europe. 
From Welles’ point of view, Roosevelt’s style allowed him to develop the mission in 
conjunction with his own views on establishing principles of international relations. 
Having been vital to establishing the ‘Good Neighbor’ policy during the 1930s, 
Welles’ Armistice Day conference plan inaugurated this and he returned to these 
themes during the rest of his tenure as Under Secretary. At the time of his mission, 
particularly in London, Welles utilised ideas of disarmament and security to facilitate 
his gathering of information. In essence, the zeal and appetite that Welles brought to 
Roosevelt’s initial idea was integral to the final outcome of the mission. His skills and 
experience were vital in the evolution of the mission and its objectives. Those 
attributes in Hull were, in a very different fashion, also fundamental to Welles’ 
mission.
Cordell Hull played a crucial, if less direct, part in the Welles mission. The 
prospect of a member of the Administration departing for Europe worried Hull from 
the outset. He saw the potential to antagonise the democracies and, more importantly 
to him, endanger the standing of the Administration in the eyes of the American 
people. These concerns replicated those he had over Welles’ Armistice Day plan, and 
in many ways Hull’s views remained consistent during the period under 
consideration. Yet Hull’s role in foreign policy-making is subject to debate. While he 
was given presidential licence to pursue reciprocal trade, he was not party to key 
elements of foreign policy-making. Kimball has gone so far as to say that Roosevelt 
‘consistently acted as his own Secretary of State’ and so bypassed Hull, in delegating 
‘the conduct of specific foreign affairs to men like Under Secretary of State Welles or 
Morgenthau’.41 Kimball concludes that the real reason Hull remained Secretary of 
State for so long, an unprecedented twelve years, was his ‘political influence with 
Congress’. His appreciation of how Congress reflected the views of the American 
people made him an important asset to Roosevelt, and this should not be 
underestimated. David Woolner in a forthcoming volume looks at the role that Hull 
played in formulating a comprehensive foreign economic policy, the legacy of which 
can still be seen in the form of the World Trade Organisation. In the opinion of this 
historian, Hull, throughout his time in office, played a critical if less than direct role in
40 Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler - Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (New Jersey, 1991), p.4.
41 Kimball, Unsordid Act, p.34.
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formulating Rooseveltian foreign policy. In the case of the Welles’ mission, Hull’s 
influence, important though it was, could be felt away from the central decision­
making of Roosevelt and Welles.
The influence of the dual trends within American public opinion pervaded the 
Welles mission. To varying degrees, in the minds of Roosevelt, Welles and Hull, the 
appearance of Welles’ activities in Europe were of concern. This manifested itself in a 
number of ways, such as Welles’ silence to the press and the reiteration of the 
mission’s public purpose prior to his departure from Europe. In broader terms the 
underlying influence of the non-entangling attitude of the American people revealed 
itself in a number of interrelated aspects of Rooseveltian foreign policy-making. 
Firstly, foreign policy was set out without necessarily having fixed goals in mind. At 
the same time foreign policy was intended to have only marginal influence. The 
various appeals are the best examples of policy initiatives being undertaken in the full 
knowledge that their impact on their recipients would be minimal. These appeals also 
exemplify a third feature of how Roosevelt’s foreign policy was influenced, that being 
a consideration of how any policy would appear to the American people after the 
event. In this regard, the continuing education of the American people as to the 
dangers posed by the Axis was served by policies that showed the latter to be hostile 
to American interests and values. All of these elements were relevant to the formation 
and evolution of Welles’ mission to Europe in early 1940.
The nature of the mission was also influenced by consideration of Anglo- 
American relations. That Lothian learned about the proposed mission ahead of its 
announcement, and ahead of the other nations that Welles would visit, reveals a 
disposition toward London within the Administration. The exchanges that followed 
between Washington and London, on the back of the minor crisis, illustrate that there 
were considerable grounds for misunderstanding. Indeed, for Chamberlain himself the 
prospect of Welles’ mission represented his worst fears about Rooseveltian foreign 
policy. Replicating his own concerns of January 1938 when faced with Roosevelt’s 
plan for an international conference, Chamberlain shared with Hull the worry that 
Hitler would take advantage of the mission to the detriment of British interests. This 
possibility hung over the mission from the early days of February right the way 
through until the middle of April, without complete resolution in British minds. The 
discussion, in April, of Chamberlain’s suggestion of giving assurances to the United 
States of British intent towards Germany, reveals that the opportunity for
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misunderstanding remained. That no more dramatic move from Roosevelt followed 
Welles’ return to Washington was ultimately welcomed by many in London, although 
there was little scope to rejoice as Hitler’s tanks rolled westward. Though the Welles 
mission did not herald a new era of Anglo-American understanding, and it certainly 
did increase unease in a number of quarters, it did not lead to lasting distrust in 
relations between Washington and London either. The events of the spring and 
summer of 1940 overtook any possibility that might have existed for a lasting 
outcome in this area.
These themes provide the context of Rooseveltian foreign policy-making, 
from which a direct analysis of the motivations and objectives of the Welles mission 
can proceed. By the end of 1939, Roosevelt was motivated to consider what became 
the Welles mission. His comments to Berle and Lothian in early December show he 
was contemplating how he could act. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that it 
was not clear that this motivation would coalesce around the sending of his Under 
Secretary to four European capitals with a number of objectives in mind. The 
pressures created after four months of ‘phony war’ were crucial here. The dual trends 
within American public opinion have already been explained, but added to these was 
the pressure of operating in a situation where spring offensives were accepted to be 
inevitable. Welles himself, wrote later: ‘The prospects for the Western democracies 
already seemed very dark indeed, although not yet so hopeless as they became a few 
months later.’42 This increased the likelihood of considering policies the effect of 
which was likely to be negligible. The discussion of the issue of peace, exemplified 
by the dialogue in October among members of the State Department, should also not 
be overlooked. The post-war world was of clear concern to the United States 
Administration and the discussion of peace in Washington should be seen in this light. 
The emergence of a post-war planning committee in early 1940, the declaration to the 
neutral powers and then Welles’ subsequent career, suggest how seriously the issue 
was taken. Concern in Washington for the post-war world also fed into the onset of 
the minor crisis in Anglo-American relations, which Roosevelt was clearly aware of at 
the same time as the emergence of the concept of a mission to Europe and contributed 
to Roosevelt’s belief that a mission to Europe might be worthwhile.
42 Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano's Diary, pp.viii-ix.
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During January 1940, as Roosevelt weighed up the different motivations, the 
objectives for a mission emerged. They were liable to evolve from the outset, and 
would continue to do so throughout the course of the mission and into the spring. To 
restate the objectives of the mission, the initial concept was an exploration of the 
possibilities of peace. From the start this was acknowledged as being a long shot and 
other objectives developed from this concept. Throughout the mission’s course, and 
indeed the whole war, Roosevelt believed that United States interests were 
incompatible with any settlement with Hitler in the long term. Unless Hitler changed 
his policies in a comprehensive and fundamental way -  something they knew was not 
going to happen -  Roosevelt and Welles were not striving to achieve a lasting peace 
settlement with Nazi Germany. Gathering information from the European capitals that 
Welles visited may have been an obvious goal. But it was important for Roosevelt in 
deciding upon the mission, given the paucity of valuable information independent of 
national bias. Additionally, the concept of perpetuating the ‘phony war’ became part 
of the mission. It reached most prominence in Berlin, where it was hoped that 
American ambiguity might influence German plans, and there it was Welles’ most 
logical objective. Closely intertwined was the objective of seeking to encourage 
Italian neutrality, particularly by supporting any notion that Mussolini might be a 
force for peace. Of course this would prove untenable, but Welles in particular saw 
the Italian angle as worth pursuing when faced with the prospect of catastrophe in 
Europe.
When the escalation of the conflict arrived in April and with it such 
fundamental changes in the month that followed, the Welles mission ceased in many 
senses to have relevance for Roosevelt. His initial concept had proved untenable, as 
he suspected it would, and the breadth of the other objectives had not provided 
anything substantial, especially in the face of the German advance. In this sense, any 
chance of a legacy to the mission which could have influenced events in Europe had 
gone. This also means that this analysis ends at a time when a whole range of issues 
arise in Rooseveltian foreign policy and Anglo-American relations brought on by the 
war.
A final word on American public opinion, in acknowledgement of its enduring 
position in this analysis, can be drawn from the ever-erudite and articulate Lothian. 
Acknowledging in the spring of 1940, with such dramatic events taking place in 
Europe, that any assessment of American opinion was ‘difficult to crystallise in a
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despatch because things are so fluid ... and so constantly changing’, he felt the views 
he had despatched on 1 February on the nature of United States public opinion were 
still valid.43 Lothian wrote to Halifax surmising the dichotomous attitude within 
American opinion: ‘The United States is still dominated by fear of involvement and 
incapable of positive action. On the other hand the war is steadily drifting nearer to 
them and they know it.’44 It is therefore somewhat ironic that the trauma that the 
Welles mission brought to many in London could have been avoided had Lothian’s 
sage advice on the pressures under which Roosevelt operated, offered consistently 
since his appointment, been heeded more closely.
This thesis has presented a wealth of evidence and analysis to explain the 
influences behind Roosevelt’s decision to undertake the Welles mission. While the 
precedents established in the examination of Rooseveltian foreign policy and Anglo- 
American relations can help towards an understanding of Roosevelt’s decision to 
embark upon the Welles mission, it must be acknowledged that the detail of the 
conversations between Roosevelt and Welles in early January does not exist. In this 
light, Roosevelt’s comments to Breckinridge Long in early March show him to have 
been content for the mission to remain between him and his Under Secretary. He told 
his Assistant Secretary of State that ‘he was the only person who knew why Welles 
had been sent abroad, and he was the only person who would know what Welles had 
to say’.45
Ultimately, though, the Welles mission was conceived by two individuals who 
did not commit to record their precise thoughts on all aspects of the mission. The later 
famous George F. Reiman, having accompanied Welles from the Swiss border to 
Berlin as part of the American Embassy delegation, later recalled his thoughts on the 
Welles mission. ‘I was never briefed on the purposes of Mr Welles’ journey,’ Kennan 
commented. ‘I cannot recall that he ever spoke to me in the course of his trip; and I 
know no more of his talks with the European leaders than the official files would 
reveal.’46 This thesis has scoured those files and other sources. In posing an original 
and searching question about Rooseveltian foreign policy and the place of the Welles 
mission, this work has contributed to the scholarly understanding of the subject. In the
43 Letter No.362 from Lothian to Halifax, 23 April 1940, 3241/182/9 FO 115 PRO.
44 Letter from Lothian to Halifax, 29 April 1940, HFS.
45 Record of conversation with Roosevelt, 12 March 1940, BLP Box 5.
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end, Welles' summation of the mission as ‘a forlorn hope’ is one I consider to be most 
apt. 46
46 Record of conversation between Kennan and Graff 16 February 1971. In footnote 39 Frank Warren 
Graff, The Strategy o f Involvement: A diplomatic Biography o f Sumner Welles 1933-43 (New York, 
1988), p.283.
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